Talks of an endorsement by the United Nations Security Council of the Gaza ceasefire agreement, and further steps towards a transitional administration in the territory, have been ongoing for some time. On November 4, Barak Ravid published a U.S.-sponsored draft Security Council resolution that is currently under discussion.
Involvement of the Security Council in the Gaza tragedy is a positive development. If one thing has been clear throughout this catastrophe, it is that the parties cannot be left to solve this themselves. However, the draft, as reported, is rife with fundamental legal problems and ambiguities that if not resolved and clarified, would ultimately harm the resolution’s legitimacy and its potential to both solidify calm in Gaza and move towards a more sustainable future. In this short piece, I want to highlight several immediate issues.
The draft endorses President Donald Trump’s 20-point Gaza plan, which began with a ceasefire and hostage deal, and would ostensibly end in a heavily conditioned “pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood.” The draft also references “the Final Communiqué of the Emergency Summit Conference of the Extraordinary Arab Summit,” a March 2025 summit in which Palestinian President Abbas agreed to the establishment of a temporary local administrative committee in Gaza, to replace Hamas rule. The draft’s key element is its recognition of the so-called Board of Peace (BoP) (chaired by Trump, and so far slated to include Tony Blair) as a “transitional governance administration” in Gaza, until “the Palestinian Authority has satisfactorily completed its reform program, the satisfaction of which shall be acceptable to the BoP.” The draft also “underscores the importance” of full humanitarian aid in Gaza, including through the U.N, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the Red Crescent. However, it opens the door to the exclusion of “any organization found to have misused such aid” (potentially allowing the BoP to exclude UNRWA).
Operationally, the draft authorizes the BoP to act as a transitional administration, by supervising “a Palestinian technocratic, apolitical committee of competent Palestinians from the Strip,” as envisioned in the Arab Summit, which would deal with local day-to-day administration. The BoP would also be charged with reconstructing Gaza and its economy and performing any additional tasks necessary to advance the 20-point plan. Crucially, the draft also authorizes the BoP to establish an International Stabilization Force (ISF), which would work in cooperation with Egypt and Israel and would have the power to “use all necessary measures” (i.e., force) to carry out its mandate. Its role would include, inter alia, ensuring the demilitarization of Gaza. According to the draft, the mandate of both the BoP and the ISF would initially last for two years.
Legally, however, the draft is problematic in several aspects. Fundamentally, it is unclear whether the draft envisions any consent by the Palestinians, whether through the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) or the State of Palestine, to BoP rule and the deployment of the ISF. Usually, when forces are deployed with Security Council authorization in a certain territory, the council notes the consent of the local government. For example, Resolution 1546, which authorized the presence of a multinational force in Iraq following the establishment of an interim government there, recognized “the request conveyed in the letter of 5 June 2004 from the Prime Minister of the Interim Government of Iraq to the President of the Council, which is annexed to this resolution, to retain the presence of the multinational force”.
Here, official Palestinian authorities are absent, both in terms of consent to the powers of the BoP and to the deployment of the force. Furthermore, it has almost no meaningful reference to Palestinian participation in decision-making. Compare, for example, Resolution 1483 (regulating the powers of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq) which contained numerous references to its obligation to work with the “people of Iraq” when performing its functions. Conversely, to the extent cooperation is envisioned in the draft, it is only with Israel and Egypt.
While Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas participated in President Trump’s celebratory Peace Summit in Egypt, he did not sign its final declaration. Indeed, the State of Palestine expressed some support for Trump’s plan, and has indicated agreement in principle to the general concept of establishing of a technical committee in Gaza (as described in the Arab Summit). But all of this is very general. It is unclear whether such support carries over to the specific arrangement envisioned in the draft. Be that as it may, if there is indeed such consent, it should be made crystal clear in any resolution, since it is key for the legal status and powers of any interim administration, as well as for increasing its legitimacy.
Crucially, in the absence of such consent, the establishment of an interim administration, deployment of forces, and authorization of force in Gaza would be coercive. For the council to authorize a coercive act, it must act under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, since binding enforcement measures can only be undertaken when Chapter VII is invoked (in distinction from the council’s power to make legally binding legal determinations, even without invoking Chapter VII). The usual formula to trigger Chapter VII is for the council to determine that a situation is “a threat to international peace and security.” The draft, however, determines that “the situation in the Gaza Strip threatens the regional peace and the security of neighboring states.” The intentional choice not to use the usual language of Chapter VII – although the meaning is virtually similar – appears aimed at maintaining ambiguity and allowing certain States to argue that Chapter VII wasn’t invoked, and thus to contest certain elements of the plan later on.
Additionally, when there is no local consent, a Chapter VII mandate is needed to grant the BoP the far-reaching transformative powers the draft envisions. This is because otherwise, the BoP would be an occupying entity that simply receives control over territory in Gaza from a previous occupant – Israel. However, under the of law occupation, and absent special authorization from the Security Council, the occupant must respect the status quo ante in the territory – economically, physically, and legally – and cannot radically transform its governance structure.
This is precisely why the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq sought to “enhance” its transformative powers through Resolution 1483. That resolution granted the coalition powers that were much broader than those of a “regular” occupying power, including the power to transform Iraqi institutions and its entire economic structure. To emphasize: I do not mean to defend here the transformation or occupation of Iraq; rather, I aim to highlight that in the past it was clearly understood that specific Security Council authorization was needed to exercise such broad authority in occupied territories. It should also be noted that largely in contrast to the draft, the Iraq resolutions included clear and developed provisions for cooperation and coordination with the Iraqi people and institutions.
In sum: legally, the draft leaves open the BoP’s source of authority, which in turn gives rise to doubts about the scope of its authority. Specifically, it is unclear whether it is based on consent, or on Chapter VII powers. Furthermore, it seems to almost completely disregard local self-determination as an organizing principle. The BoP is to hover above a local Palestinian committee. The ISF would only be required to cooperate with Israel and Egypt, not with local Palestinian authorities. Understandably, some of the ambiguities in the draft are likely meant to accommodate irreconcilable views, chiefly about the role of the Palestinian Authority in Gaza. But at the end of the day, if fundamental issues of authority and legitimacy are not resolved, such an arrangement would quickly run into disagreements and conflicts both internally and externally. Anyone who wishes to see successful international involvement in securing a long-lasting calm in Gaza should expect more.
