Among the many executive orders signed by U.S. President Donald Trump in his second term, one initiative has gone largely unnoticed: his push to accelerate deep-sea mining. While overshadowed by other policy moves, this effort is part of a broader strategy — one aimed at securing and stockpiling critical minerals essential to U.S. economic and national security objectives. Deep-sea mining is the process of extracting mineral resources from the ocean seabed such as, copper, nickel, cobalt, manganese, and other rare earth elements often found within polymetallic nodules, crusts, and sulfide deposits. These materials are essential to the production of rechargeable batteries for electrical vehicles, smartphones, laptops, solar panels, and wind turbines. To date, no country has commercialized the ocean floor, yet the race to do so appears to be gaining more momentum than ever as the United States and China face a standoff over global supply chains.
The United States and China Race for Critical Minerals
Tensions between the United States and China spiked in late 2024 after China announced harsh export restrictions on dual-use technologies and barriers to trading critical minerals. As it stands, out of 42 minerals, including rare earth elements, the United States is import-reliant on 13 minerals and depends on China for 9 of them. Meanwhile, China is import-reliant on 8 minerals, with the United States dominating production for only one of these: beryllium. Yet, China’s lead does not stem from resource inequities, but rather comes from its own State-backed investment policies that have made it more economically viable to produce critical minerals there than in the United States. Despite bipartisan acknowledgment in the importance of critical minerals, the United States has been unsuccessful in promoting a strong and coordinated national strategy that is capable of competing with China’s dominance in the sector. As a result, the United States has begun reassessing its reliance on land-based supply chains and is increasingly exploring new avenues such as deep-sea mining to gain a competitive advantage. However, this approach may come too late to meaningfully alter the balance of influence.
Comparing and Contrasting U.S. and Chinese Strategies to Deep-Sea Mining Regulation
China’s deep-sea mining strategy involves redefining the rules of access and governance, leveraging its engagement with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and its influence within the International Seabed Authority (ISA) to shape emerging norms in its favor. As a party to UNCLOS — the leading international framework on maritime law (also referred to as the “constitution for the oceans”) — China frequently works through ISA, the UNCLOS body responsible for regulating deep-sea mining activities, to advance its strategic interests. Notably, Chinese State-backed enterprises, such as the China Ocean Mineral Resources R&D Association (COMRA) and the China Minmetals Corporation, have secured exploration contracts with ISA, permitting deep-sea mining in the Southwest Indian Ridge and the Western Pacific — regions beyond China’s national jurisdiction. This engagement affords China substantial opportunities to shape global rulemaking, positioning it as a leading participant in ISA forums where rules, regulations, and standards for exploration are formulated. Through COMRA’s mapping, sampling, and experimental operations, China also helps set global benchmarks by producing critical geological, ecological, and technical knowledge that directly informs ongoing discussions regarding global regulatory standards for deep-sea mining. The result is durable influence over the drafting of ISA rules, which carry binding force for UNCLOS member States and their authorized contractors. The current draft ISA rules not only codify China’s operational practices and turn de facto standards into formal law, but also conveniently limit its liability from external claims.
Unlike China, the United States has not ratified UNCLOS, citing concerns over national sovereignty, economic interests, and environmental regulations. Despite enjoying bipartisan support, these issues have prevented the treaty from securing the two-thirds majority required for the Senate’s advice and consent to ratification. Although not a party to UNCLOS, the United States has historically recognized many of its provisions as reflecting customary international law and has generally acted in accordance with them. At the July 2025 ISA Assembly, however, the United States clarified that, as a non-party, it does not consider itself bound by certain provisions — particularly those governing deep-sea mining under Part XI and the 1994 Implementing Agreement. Regardless of such selective acceptance, many UNCLOS provisions are arguably binding on the United States, as the Convention’s wide scope and the endorsement of 169 UN member States have effectively elevated much, if not all, of its framework to customary international law.
Consistent with its decision not to join UNCLOS, the United States has instead developed its own domestic maritime law regulations to account for deep-sea mining activities which include the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act (DSHMRA) and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), among others. While largely aligned with UNCLOS principles, these regulations operate independently of its institutional mechanisms, reflecting the U.S. preference for maintaining regulatory autonomy over seabed activities. Although the U.S. position has faced only limited formal condemnation, several UNCLOS member States, including Norway, Poland, and India, have criticized it as inconsistent with the “common heritage of mankind” principle that underpins Part XI of the Convention. In practice, should there be any U.S.-licensed operations in areas already designated by the ISA for exploration, this could generate diplomatic disputes or claims that such activities violate international law. Yet, because the United States is not a party to UNCLOS, it remains outside the ISA’s dispute-settlement framework, limiting other States’ ability to compel compliance.
This independent approach has allowed the United States to pursue bilateral agreements with other countries to advance deep-sea mining activities beyond jurisdictional limits and gives the United States greater flexibility to negotiate on its own terms while still adhering selectively to customary international law norms. One example is the Cook Islands Cooperation on Seabed Mineral Resources, setting the stage for United States deep-sea resource exploration beyond jurisdictional limitations. Agreements like these signal that the United States intends to pursue alternatives to the ISA that allow the United States to advance deep-sea mining and resource development under its own terms, rather than being constrained by ISA’s regulatory framework (although this agreement involves the Cook Islands’ EEZ and thus does not technically fall under the ISA’s jurisdiction; nonetheless, this may signal broader U.S. intent in Pacific mining). By relying on bilateral agreements rather than operating through the more cumbersome UNCLOS and ISA frameworks, the United States can shape regulatory approaches on its own terms. The Joint Statement on U.S.–Cook Islands Cooperation on Seabed Mineral Resources exemplifies this flexibility: rather than prescribing binding regulatory obligations, it simply affirms an intention to “support the research necessary to inform seabed exploration.” This open-ended framework affords the parties greater latitude to define their respective roles and expectations over time, enabling a more adaptable and mutually negotiated understanding of seabed activities. This contrasts with the consensus-based decision-making procedures under UNCLOS and the ISA, which often require input or approval from multiple bodies and involve extensive environmental impact assessments, financial guarantees, and compliance management. By negotiating directly with partner States, the United States can circumvent these procedural hurdles, advancing its deep-sea initiatives more efficiently and within frameworks that align with its strategic and commercial priorities. However, this approach carries significant costs, among them the continued ceding of regulatory influence to China and other active ISA members, which are shaping the international rules under which most States, including potential U.S. partners, will ultimately operate.
Who is Leading the Race?
Despite recent policy advancements, the United States arguably lags behind China in the race for critical minerals, both on land and under the sea. The Trump administration’s Executive Order seeks to close the gap with China by easing domestic regulatory burdens, such as permitting, to accelerate deep-sea mining. While this could enhance the United States’s competitiveness, it also risks positioning the country as an international outlier. This has the potential to alienate partnerships in the process, particularly with France, Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom, Mexico, Fiji, Samoa, and Palau, all of which are States that have advocated either for a ban or at least a temporary moratorium on deep-sea mining until further research about its environmental effects can be completed. Not only does the United States aim to ramp up its deep-sea mining efforts in direct contrast with moratorium-aligned States, but it seeks to undertake exploration independently from UNCLOS regulations. By relying on domestic laws and bilateral agreements instead of fully participating in UNCLOS and the ISA, the United States avoids obligations such as mandatory environmental impact assessments for activities beyond national jurisdiction, providing financial guarantees, submitting compliance reports, and following the ISA’s regulatory framework for the allocation of seabed mining rights in areas beyond national jurisdiction.
Ultimately, how the United States navigates these competing pressures will determine whether it can realistically close the strategic gap with China — or inadvertently widen it by alienating itself from the broader international community and multilateral institutions that govern the high seas. What is clear is that in the race for critical minerals, those who control the legal and regulatory frameworks will shape not only who has access, but also which values — profit, security, or sustainability — define the future of both land- and sea-based resource extraction.
