Since Russia adopted its law requiring nonprofits that receive foreign funding to register as “foreign agents” in 2012, a growing number of countries — including Kyrgyzstan, Georgia, Hungary, Slovakia, Nicaragua, and El Salvador, among others — have introduced or enacted similar legislation. This diffusion of authoritarian “foreign-agent-type” laws is part of a larger, decades-long trend. Leaders aiming to consolidate power have been learning from each other to restrict the resources and activities of independent civil society organizations. Yet in many countries that don’t have their own thriving bases of private philanthropy, international funds remain an essential source of viability for many organizations working on vital social issues, including combatting corruption and crime, alleviating poverty, and providing life-saving care.
“Foreign agents” laws do not merely concern nonprofits or their sources of funding, as if that weren’t enough. Rather, they also serve as a clear indicator that autocratic conditions are taking hold. By creating an uneven playing field for entities they otherwise cannot control — and harassing or eliminating them entirely — rulers can preserve a deceptive façade of democracy at the same time as they erase its substance. “Foreign agents” laws have damaging implications for democracy, but civil society activists, lawyers, and experts across contexts who have unfortunate experience with such laws have developed a variety of essential resistance strategies. These strategies include knowledge-sharing to preempt threats, boosting public support for the nonprofit sector, and building coalitions with domestic and international allies.
Legal Repression Camouflaged as Defense Against “Foreign Influence”
The unabated global spread of distorted laws on “foreign agents” presents an urgent threat to democracy and basic civil liberties. Civic associations are essential for holding governments accountable by monitoring and evaluating electoral integrity, reporting on abuses of power, and exposing — even often filling — gaps in public services. They also enable ordinary citizens to participate in public life by nurturing the necessary skills, networks, and interpersonal trust they need to work in common cause. Repressive leaders and authorities who reject such independent activity often manipulate existing laws or, with compliant legislative branches, devise new ones to crack down on civil society and its access to resources, all the while benefiting from a veneer of legality. Authoritarian laws on “foreign agents” thus serve as a powerful tool of “legal” repression that governments can weaponize against dissent.
In addition to discouraging nonprofits from accepting foreign funding — and ensuring they wither on the vine — another distinct purpose of the current wave of restrictive NGO laws is to smear and discredit independent organizations — and often individuals — in the eyes of their fellow citizens by misrepresenting them as “agents of foreign influence.” This damaging stigmatization relies on a flawed rationale — namely, drawing false equivalence between accessing international funds and acting under the direction of unspecified “foreign” interests. Notably, authoritarian laws on “foreign agents” actually do not require any evidence of the latter. Moreover, the misleading “foreign agent” label is meant to justify and legitimize disproportionate punitive measures, including fines, excessive administrative burdens, restrictions, and even bans on legitimate civil society work.
Taken together, these measures amount to the persecution of civil society and often lead to shuttering of organizations. By manipulating rhetoric about foreign interference and using vague language, these laws enable officials to selectively punish those who they perceive as a threat to their power by portraying them as a threat to national security. And the stigmatization helps them get away with it as long as enough of their constituents are under the impression that any crackdown is warranted.
The accelerating diffusion of “foreign agents” laws across countries also threatens global norms on freedom of association and freedom of expression. The more countries adopt these laws, the more restrictions on civil society will be normalized across the globe. Moreover, this greater acceptance of repressive practices makes it more likely that even more countries will adopt these anti-democratic laws to suppress civic engagement. Global authoritarian powers provide ideological support and a salient example for prospective autocratizers on how to erase civil society from public life and degrade fundamental freedoms. The resulting cascade of anti-democratic norms is a grave but often overlooked dimension of global authoritarian influence.
Even where distorted laws on “foreign agents” do not exist, the official narrative that civil society organizations represent foreign interests can be very harmful. Importantly, it serves to mislead the public about the work of civil society organizations and eases acceptance of further repression — whether legal or not — by the wider society. In reality, such rhetoric is a telltale sign of a values alignment between illiberal governments and major authoritarian patrons that seek to expand their own anti-democratic influence and abhor civil societies that are independent of the State. The rise in stigmatizing narratives targeting NGOs can be a precursor to more expansive legal action and has a chilling effect on civic engagement. The weaponization of “foreign agents” laws and stigmatizing narratives targeting civil society is a serious threat to democracy worldwide.
How Civil Society Can Resist “Foreign Agents” Laws
Unless the international community and affected societies muster a stronger and more urgent response, the spread of “foreign agents” laws across the globe will ensure continued victories for autocracy. Yet, the response to date has not matched the urgency of the challenge. Between February 2024 and January 2025, I conducted conversations with civil society activists, lawyers, and experts from Central Asia, Europe, Latin America, and Russia to understand the strategies they pursued to counteract “foreign agents” laws and their recommendations for future action. U.S.-based scholars and practitioners also provided helpful insights. While the strategies below focus on nonprofits, their efforts alone might not be sufficient to reverse or mitigate “legal” repression without international attention and support. Nonprofits operate with scarce resources, a problem exacerbated by the recent sharp decline in international assistance. This scarcity, however, further underscores the need to learn across regions and act swiftly, develop effective narratives to boost public support, and build broad coalitions to pull resources.
Learn from Experience Across Regions and Prepare for a Rapid Response
The political and legislative environment affecting civil society organizations’ ability to operate can change very fast. To avoid being caught off guard, civil society leaders need to pay careful attention to the development of repressive civil society legislation in their region and even across regions. Repressive NGO laws that global authoritarian powers such as Russia practice and support can travel across borders by virtue of a salient example or through well-established elite networks. Experts identified close resemblance between the Kyrgyz law on “foreign representatives” adopted in 2024 and Russia’s original law on “foreign agents.” Not long before the Kyrgyz law was passed, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu spoke about taking “preventive measures” against “pro-Western” NGOs in Central Asia that were, in his view, engaged in “anti-Russian activities.”
Foreign agent laws and their likenesses have gained momentum not only in Eurasia and Europe, but also in Latin America. Nicaragua passed a “foreign agents” law in 2020 and Venezuela passed a similar restrictive NGO law in 2024. After a “foreign agents” bill was first introduced in El Salvador in 2021, strong international pressure was instrumental in thwarting this repressive legislation. However, the bill remained a latent threat for civil society until its revival and quick passage at the end of May 2025. Amid a larger crackdown on dissent, the law contributed to an exodus from the country of many of the human rights defenders, journalists, and lawyers who had stayed despite mounting threats in the past. Learning from counterparts across countries and regions about strategies of resistance against repressive laws could prepare civil society to challenge restrictions on freedom of association at home and potentially avoid these outcomes – or at the very least protect themselves to a certain extent.
An important lesson is that smear campaigns disparaging civil society organizations as purveyors of “foreign influence” signal a heightened risk of forthcoming laws on “foreign agents.” In Georgia and Slovakia, such stigmatizing narratives circulated for several years before their restrictive NGO laws were finally adopted in 2024 and 2025, respectively. (In Slovakia’s draft law, the “lobbying” label replaced “foreign agents” before it was dropped as a concession.) Furthermore, in Kyrgyzstan, as one researcher told me, the adoption of the law modeled on Russia’s “foreign agents” law was preceded by diffusion of Russian-style narratives. Actively monitoring such narratives might serve as part of an early warning system.
Other warning signals may include laws that restrict NGO funding and operations more discreetly, without attracting attention by the “foreign agent” designation. For example, some countries impose burdensome bureaucratic requirements on civil society organizations using foreign funds, require prior government approval for receiving foreign funds, or restrict domestic fundraising. These stealthy laws may provide a foundation for progressive deterioration of freedom of association. Civil society organizations could potentially preempt the worsening of repressive tactics if they pay heed to early warning signals and anticipate threats. Taking action early, when it carries fewer legal and personal risks, is always easier than responding to a full-blown crisis.
Once bills on “foreign agents” are introduced, timely action is also crucial. Repressive laws can be pushed through legislatures particularly fast, giving civil society little time to consider their implications. Under these conditions, it is important to understand the key provisions of the legislation — seeking legal analysis, where necessary — in order to rally international donors and other allies to support civil society. Putting pressure on authorities early could result in temporary withdrawal of the draft law, as happened in Georgia, or its modification, as in Kyrgyzstan.
Invest in Bolstering Public Support for Civil Society
As noted above, laws on “foreign agents” aim to discredit and delegitimize civil society organizations to ease acceptance of legal repression among the public. Given this central goal, civil society organizations need to become savvy and strategic about building public support. Mounting effective public communications campaigns is one key aspect of mobilizing the public in defense of NGOs. Developing effective narratives to counter “foreign agents” laws, crafting narratives explaining the value of civil society work, and expanding public outreach are important ways to enhance organizational communication. This may include engaging social media “influencers” to tell stories on behalf of NGOs in a language that people can understand and relate to.
In countries where bills on “foreign agents” are being debated, civil society organizations need to prepare arguments that expose manipulation of the law and undermine its typical justifications. As part of this effort, civil society could clearly explain the difference between authoritarian laws on “foreign agents” specifically targeting NGOs and laws related to foreign influence in democracies. Depending on the context, NGOs could further explain that international funding is often instrumental for the provision of basic services to citizens and even for the operations of their government. The tangible damage to communities and people’s lives that would ensue if repressive laws were to compromise NGOs’ funding should be made strikingly clear.
In addition to envisioning the negative consequences of “foreign agents” laws, people need to be aware of what they gain when nonprofits are thriving. Investing in the capacity of NGOs to cultivate public support by explaining the value of their work and publicizing positive community impact should be a strategic priority for organizations and donors. Such positive communication could even help generate additional citizen-driven funding and engagement. In practical terms, this might mean engaging beneficiaries of nonprofit work to speak about their experiences, in order to establish a connection of empathy between civil society and the public.
Asking authoritative public figures, community leaders, and creative artists to advocate on behalf of civil society organizations would help amplify their outreach. Beyond establishing alliances with traditional independent media, organizations may want to turn to communication platforms and creative modes that enjoy wider popularity. This would enable NGOs to reach audiences where they actually consume information and entertainment.
Discussions about foreign-agent-type laws and NGO funding are often dry and technical. Effective public outreach should focus on simple and accessible arguments regarding the value of NGOs for improving people’s lives rather than on abstract norms. A unified narrative strategy among nonprofits could help strengthen these arguments. For example, the consistent portrayal of the Georgian law on “foreign agents” as the “Russian law” that would derail Georgia’s European future helped mobilize mass protests against the law. Organizations need to be cognizant of their own context and use relevant data to tailor narratives so that they resonate with local values.
Build Broad Coalitions and Sustain International Alliances
The challenge of “foreign agents” laws is too daunting for any one country’s civil society to combat in isolation due to asymmetries of power and resources between nonprofits and autocratizing governments. To counteract the spread of these laws, civil society organizations need to coordinate efforts and build alliances at the national, regional, and global levels. This requires nonprofits to overcome divisions, unite in common cause, and build coalitions to pursue coordinated resistance strategies. Reaching out to other sectors such as independent media and businesses to build cross-cutting networks of solidarity could also help confront repression. A Slovak civil society activist highlighted to me the need to collaborate with independent media to counter misleading narratives, and a Bulgarian legal expert noted fruitful attempts to seek support from local businesses that invest in nonprofits. Last, but not least, a Hungarian journalist suggested to me that private international philanthropies can more actively engage in defending freedom of association instead of swiftly withdrawing from contentious environments. The composition of such wider cross-sectoral support will depend on the country context.
Furthermore, civil society organizations may need to swiftly mobilize diplomatic representatives of donor countries who are concerned about this issue to apply collective pressure on officials involved in devising these repressive laws. In the long run, international advocacy must include efforts to strengthen norms on freedom of association by engaging regional and global multilateral bodies and the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Assembly and of Association.
Conclusion
The efficacy of any of these measures, of course, would depend on the degree to which autocracy has taken hold in any given country. Given the limited reach of independent media in partly free societies, bureaucratic harassment, and scarce resources, more forceful international action is crucial in upholding democratic norms and preserving civil societies’ ability to seek resources and sustain their operations. Continuing cuts in international assistance in favor of other priorities certainly make this a more challenging proposition. Yet, complacency in the face of civil society destruction is a self-defeating choice. Barring an urgent and concerted effort by committed democracies and their allies worldwide, the shrinking domestic accountability of autocratizers would only embolden them to act more aggressively in the global arena, strengthening authoritarian alliances and the security threats they represent.
