On August 8, the Israeli cabinet authorized a plan to expand the war in Gaza. The plan, reportedly, involves establishing “operational control” of Gaza City while “evacuating” its population. According to Israeli media, the idea is to place Gaza City under siege by October 7, 2025; to evacuate a million people to new “humanitarian zones,” and to establish 12 additional points for the distribution of humanitarian aid.
Apparently, these are initial steps in a plan that would end in Israeli control over Gaza at large. As some senior analysts have pointed out, it is unclear to what extent this plan is serious or militarily practicable. Nevertheless, on August 10, Netanyahu doubled down on the plan, and even presented an expanded version of it, in a way that would make it difficult for him to back down without significant pressure. And as the experience of this horrendous war has taught us, the worst-case scenario ends up happening, again and again.
Reportedly, the plan met with strong objections from Israel’s own military. As one military source told Israeli media,
“[w]e will achieve operational control in Gaza, and what after that? This is a disaster. This is Hamas’ preferred military course of action … [t]his is what happened in Fallujah and Mosul – soldiers will be killed, Gazan civilians will be killed. This will play into Hamas’ hands.”
The families of Israeli hostages held since Hamas’ Oct. 7, 2023 attack are furious, as this plan would almost certainly lead to the deaths of their loved ones, and they are calling for a general strike. Even Israel’s closest European allies were appalled by this idea, which surfaced precisely at a time when the world seems to have utterly had enough of the atrocious images coming from Gaza. Germany, no less, slapped a partial arms embargo on Israel in response to Netanyahu’s announcement of the plan.
At bottom, the plan is irreconcilable with the requirements of an occupying power under international law. Like those that have come before it, this plan seeks to exploit the removal of civilians from significant stretches of territory in Gaza as a (legally hollow) justification for failing to provide for their basic needs, their self-determination, or for public order.
Occupation Does Not Turn on Semantics, But on Facts
While the plan is discussed publicly as involving the “occupation of Gaza,” the official cabinet decision does not mention the term “occupation” at all. As YNET reported:
“The cabinet decision did not use the word ‘occupation,’ replacing it with the phrase ‘takeover’ – for legal reasons related to responsibility for the civilian population. However, a senior Israeli official emphasized that this was only the official definition, when in fact the reference was to the occupation of Gaza.”
This point precisely triggered a clash between Netanyahu and Israel’s Attorney General (whom he tried to fire a few days earlier, only to face a Supreme Court injunction). Israeli outlet N12 reported that:
“During the nightly cabinet meeting, a confrontation took place between the prime minister and the attorney general. ‘You cannot carry out an occupation without taking responsibility for the territory,’ she said in a statement. Netanyahu responded: ‘Where did you get occupation from? We want to take control of the territory like we have done in all places so far.’”
Denying that the plan involves occupation seems to be of paramount importance for Netanyahu. On August 9, he tweeted that “[w]e are not going to occupy Gaza – we are going to free Gaza from Hamas. Gaza will be demilitarized, and a peaceful civilian administration will be established.”
In legal terms, claiming that one can “take over” territory – or achieve “operational control” over it – without occupying it is nonsense. It is also strange to suggest an intent to pursue regime change in a territory without having occupied it before. Otherwise, how would the authority in control be able to enforce this change?
In well-established law, occupation stems from effective control over territory or, in some cases, over governmental functions, regardless of what the occupying power calls it. It does not require an official statement that a territory is “occupied,” nor that a military administration is officially established.
The majority opinion in the international legal community is that the Gaza Strip is already occupied. The ICJ has also reiterated this recently. In light of the weight of opinion that points to Gaza already being under Israeli occupation, the point might be considered moot – if the territory is occupied, why does it matter that Netanyahu now plans to “take over” parts of it? The import is the following: the stringency of obligations under the law of occupation is commensurate with the level of control that the occupant possesses. In short, it is arguable that even an already occupied territory can become “more occupied” (for lack of a better term) in terms of the depth of legal obligations incurred. There are also some in legal and diplomatic communities who resist calling the current situation an occupation but would no longer hesitate with such a takeover of territory.
The Goal of Netanyahu’s Plan: Deeper Occupation without Obligation
The fact that Gaza is already occupied is not the main point of this piece. Rather, I want to focus on why it is so important for Netanyahu to claim that the plan does not entail “occupation,” and the structural dynamics of the war that make this plan patently unlawful. In short, when Netanyahu says “taking control” without “occupying” what he really means is taking over the territory without having to fulfill the duties of an occupier. And the way that this is to be done – to be blunt – is by making sure the territory is taken without civilians: they would be pushed to an increasingly crowded space, over which Israel will deny that it exercises any control.
According to customary international law, once an army takes effective control over territory, the basic obligation of the law of occupation kicks in, requiring the occupying state “to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.” The occupant needs to balance the welfare of the local population and individual rights, the self-determination of the people in the territory, and the lawful security interests of its own forces (see here). Of course, whether the occupied territory contains civilians, or whether these have fled before, is immaterial both for the existence of a state of occupation and for the rights of these civilians and the obligations the occupier has towards their property.
Beyond these general obligations, there are strict prohibitions on abusing the territory’s resources, destroying property absent extreme necessity, building settlements, or annexing the territory. These prohibitions are in direct conflict with some statements by extremist Israeli cabinet members, who have repeatedly urged annexation of the territory and rebuilding Israeli settlements (intentions that Netanyahu currently denies).
The right of self-determination also prohibits unilateral regime change. In this sense, Netanyahu’s claim that the Palestinian Authority would not govern Gaza is in itself an idea that runs counter to this right. The Palestinian Authority, in conjunction with the PLO, is the recognized international body representing the Palestinian people (and the government of the State of Palestine, for states that recognize it). Similarly, the vision of permanent Israeli “overall security control” in Gaza also runs counter to the temporary nature that undergirds lawful occupation. But in the rest of this piece, I want to highlight something more fundamental in Netanyahu’s plan: specifically, what he seems to mean by “takeover” of the territory and what it would in fact entail.
Maintaining public order and ensuring rights in occupied territory, as required by the international law of occupation (and international human rights law), is heavily demanding in terms of resources. It requires significant boots on the ground to enforce public order and ensure the welfare of the civilian population across the board, including access to food and medical supplies– or at least the cooperation of local authorities in doing so. Netanyahu has neither of these.
First, Israel is definitely unwilling to invest resources in rebuilding and maintaining order in Gaza. Moreover, its military is overstretched – it simply does not have the personnel to “properly” occupy and administer Gaza in a manner that would conform with international humanitarian law (IHL). Indeed, such a project would require a military administration with staff officers, support units, policing forces, and a massive reconstruction effort from day one. This would be an enormous undertaking, especially considering the extensive destruction in the territory and the ongoing starvation crisis.
Second, Netanyahu is also apparently unwilling to work with any credible local authority in Gaza that would alleviate the need for troops. While he alludes to vague civilian authorities that would presumably govern Gaza, so far, Israel has been willing to cooperate occasionally only with local gangs. These incapacities, however, are not merely logistical – they are paired with a deliberate legal posture that appears aimed at evading responsibility.
An Occupation of the Maximum Territory with the Minimum Civilians
The “new” plan, thus, is in essence an intensified and expanded continuation of the current trajectory of the Gaza war. One former general even said it was “more of the same.” Lacking the forces needed – or the motivation – for proper control and public order, and without any legitimate political vision for Palestinian self-rule, when Netanyahu says “taking over” Gaza he refers to the expansion into new areas of the destructive method utilized in the war to date. We now know the pattern: first civilians are evacuated (allegedly for their protection, but they are in fact not allowed to return and this becomes, at best, an item of negotiation); then, the IDF “clears” the area by extensively destroying infrastructure (a method recently used in Rafah and Beit Hanoun). Whether the forces on the ground operate this way for ideological reasons, or as part of an extreme zero risk approach, is immaterial: the end result is near total destruction of civilian infrastructure, while civilians are squeezed into an ever-shrinking strip that lacks minimum living conditions.
At the end of the day, the new plan seems like a mere rebranding of the much maligned “previous” plan to concentrate the population in a “humanitarian city” in South Gaza (a term that was dropped from the current cabinet decision). When Netanyahu says “takeover,” the aim seems to be an occupation of the maximum possible territory with the minimum possible civilians. The idea, then, is that the absence of civilians – a situation created by the occupier itself – is used to claim that there is no occupation to begin with. While this is a non-starter legally, it is part of a wider political discourse of denying any responsibility for the welfare of Gaza’s civilians.
Crucially, this mode of action is not merely an attempt to avoid the stringent positive obligations that occupation entails. Notably, Netanyahu has not seriously committed to allowing people to return to their homes, as international law requires. In fact, he has implied quite the opposite. The plan must also be read against the backdrop of the stated intention to “encourage emigration” from Gaza, in accordance with the unbaked “Trump plan,” and the botched Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF) aid framework that Netanyahu’s new plan seeks to expand. This is exactly where this new “occupation” – in all likelihood – would surely turn into at least a crime against humanity of forcible transfer and deportation.
The additional disastrous outcome for Palestinians in the increasingly crowded evacuation zones is entirely foreseeable, as the ongoing situation on the ground proves time and again. Pushing even more people into “humanitarian” zones in which they face inhumane conditions would certainly give rise to more claims and a larger swath of the international community believing that the act of “deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction” is taking place, which may amount to a genocidal act when coupled with the special intent to destroy a group in whole or in part (for one of these increasing claims see here). Although vehemently denied by Israel, possible evidence for the latter could be found in statements of senior government officials that are almost never rebuked by Netanyahu himself, nor has any significant action been taken against those officials to date.
What is crystal clear from its announcement is that there is no way to make Netanyahu’s “new” plan for Gaza lawful under IHL, if only because of the structural way in which this war has been conducted. Israel under Netanyahu does not have the will, forces, or resources to “occupy” such territory lawfully, even when setting aside the malicious intent of extremists in the Israeli government, who are not at all shy about their vision of annexation of Gaza, deportation of its people and renewed Israeli settlement of the territory.
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Regardless of its military feasibility, the plan follows a consistent logic: it seeks to deepen territorial control while denying the legal consequences that international law attaches to occupation. In this sense, the plan may appear improvised tactically but remains coherent strategically. Under all of these circumstances, calls to comply with IHL ring hollow; the only sensible call is to immediately backtrack from this plan and to bring an immediate end to the calamity in Gaza. Ending the war, the return of the hostages, and working with the Palestinian Authority and other international actors is the only conceivable plan, as any alternative only means a deeper abyss.
