Efforts by the United States and Qatar to end the decades-long conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo have accelerated significantly since late June, building on earlier mediation initiatives led by the African Union, the East African Community, and the Luanda and Nairobi processes. The conflict originated in the aftermath of the 1994 Rwandan genocide, and the current phase of diplomacy was catalyzed by a foundational U.S.-brokered DRC–Rwanda peace accord signed on June 27. In the agreement, the government of Rwanda agrees to withdraw its forces from eastern Congo, and the two sides commit to: ceasing “hostile acts,” disarming and conditionally integrating members of non-state armed groups into the Congolese military, establishing a joint security coordination mechanism, facilitating the safe and voluntary return of displaced populations, and launching a framework for regional economic integration. Efforts to manage armed groups through military integration, if not properly implemented, could threaten to undermine this entire framework.
Building on the momentum of the peace accord, the Congolese government and the Rwanda-backed Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC)/Mouvement du 23 Mars (M23) in mid-July signed a Qatari-brokered Declaration of Principles that reportedly established a framework for the implementation of a ceasefire and committed both parties to finalize a comprehensive peace agreement by Aug. 18. Representatives from the DRC, Rwanda, the African Union, Qatar, and the United States then held the first Joint Oversight Committee meeting in late July to elect co-chairs, adopt terms of reference for monitoring the ceasefire and troop withdrawals, and assess early progress toward stabilizing the region. And in early August, the DRC and Rwanda signed a bilateral economic framework designed to attract Western investment in the region’s critical mineral wealth with enhanced supply chain transparency, which is due to be implemented by September.
Despite the theater provided by these interlocking agreements, the security situation on the ground has thus far not been amenable for building sustainable peace. Clashes have persisted between M23 rebels and pro-Congolese government Wazalendo militia across North and South Kivu provinces, with both sides reportedly reinforcing their front-line positions. The Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), which started as remnants of the Interahamwe that perpetrated the 1994 Rwandan genocide then fled into eastern DRC, remains active in the region, and shows no signs of being neutralized, as the June 27 agreement requires within 90 days (by the end of September). This has provided leaders in the Rwandan capital Kigali with a pretext to delay the complete withdrawal of their military, which the United Nations has accused of providing direct support to the M23 while continuing to enable mineral smuggling from rebel-held zones. Meanwhile, the Ugandan military has also been active in the Kivus, ostensibly to confront the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF). However, their presence has coincided with an increase in Uganda’s export of refined gold, which has raised credible accusations that its leaders are profiting from illicit Congolese minerals.
What is Military Integration?
Included in the June 27 peace agreement is a provision for the “disengagement, disarmament, and integration of non-state armed groups,” including the conditional, case-by-case integration of former combatants into the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) and the Congolese National Police. And yet neither the AFC/M23 nor any armed group operating in eastern DRC were a party to the agreement.
Military integration (sometimes called “military power-sharing” in academic literature) is a dimension of power-sharing that involves the distribution of authority within the coercive apparatus of the State by incorporating or amalgamating non-statutory armed groups (i.e., rebel groups, local militia, etc.) into a statutory security framework (i.e., military, police, gendarmerie, intelligence services, etc.). It is a completely separate process from disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), which is the process of disarming combatants, formally removing them from armed groups, and supporting their socio-economic integration into civilian life.
This article will focus on the less-explored concept of military integration, as it has been increasingly incorporated into peace agreements in recent decades – especially when the State has been unable to militarily defeat armed adversaries. In these situations, governments can opt to continue fighting non-State armed groups, ignore them and accept that they lack the monopoly on the use of force within the country (thus allowing proxy warfare by neighboring States), or seek political-military accommodation with them through military integration. Each of these approaches has its drawbacks, and they are not mutually exclusive; often, governments opt for integration as the “least bad” choice.
When it comes to military integration, this is not the DRC’s first rodeo. Since the 1999 Lusaka Agreement and the 2002 Pretoria Agreement, the Congolese government has repeatedly sought to address armed groups such as the Rally for Congolese Democracy factions, the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo, and various Mai‑Mai groups through DDR or by integrating them into the Congolese security forces. The breakdown of these integration efforts ultimately drove the 2012 formation of the M23 – the main instigator of recent instability in the eastern DRC – as former National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP) fighters cited failed promises of proper integration and grievances over command structures as justification for their renewed rebellion. This process has been, and will continue to be complicated by Rwanda’s post-genocide support for proxy forces in eastern DRC and the presence of hundreds of armed groups operating in the region.
Why Integration Matters: Lessons from Success and Failure
Given the DRC’s troubled history with integration, skeptics might question whether the process should be attempted again. However, it would be more reasonable to posit that one of the reasons these types of arrangements fail is because they are poorly structured and not fully implemented. Indeed, military integration has been properly implemented in successful war-to-peace transitions from Zimbabwe (1980) to El Salvador (1992) to Bosnia and Herzegovina (2006). The DRC, however, faces a constellation of challenges that will make successful implementation extremely challenging. Deep political tensions between President Felix Tshisekedi and the AFC/M23, combined with the FARDC’s inability to impose a monopoly on the use of force within its territory and the security concerns and economic incentives that perpetuate conflict in the east create formidable obstacles to any meaningful power-sharing arrangements. Yet understanding how military integration could be implemented remains valuable if there is to be any hope of breaking the cycle of conflict and unlocking the economic potential that could benefit the Congolese people.
My extensive research on South Sudan’s similarly challenged experience with military integration between 2006 and 2013 – based on interviews with military officers, government officials, United Nations personnel, peace process mediators, and civil society actors, as well as the vast academic literature on military integration – revealed seven critical lessons about managing this process during war-to-peace transitions. South Sudan’s subsequent collapse into civil war in 2013 and ongoing struggles with renewed conflict underscore the fragility of poorly implemented integration processes.
These pillars of military integration also have broader applicability to countries currently undergoing war-to-peace transitions, such as Syria, as well as for future cases such as Myanmar, Sudan, and Yemen. Although these are diverse cases, these countries share similar challenges: weak State capacity, the proliferation of non-State armed groups, and a fragmented political-military landscape that makes power-sharing efforts particularly challenging.
The seven pillars outlined below therefore serve a dual purpose: they illustrate the measures that would be required to overcome the country’s structural disadvantages as far as managing armed groups, while simultaneously providing a roadmap for how countries embarked on war-to-peace transitions could approach the integration of armed groups into statutory security forces – even as the DRC’s own prospects for success remain deeply uncertain.
Pillar 1: Treat Integration as a Time‑Bound, Transitional Security Mechanism
Military integration should be approached as a temporary security arrangement designed to manage the actual or latent threat of non-State armed groups, not as a permanent means by which to “buy peace.” The DRC’s previous experience reveals the dangers of treating integration as an open-ended process, which in that case created perverse incentives for armed groups to defect and reintegrate repeatedly as a means of political leverage.
The recent peace agreement’s stipulation for “conditional, case-by-case integration” offers an opportunity to establish clear, one-time windows for non-State armed groups to disarm and be integrated into the Congolese security forces – thus forcing the government to think beyond short-term accommodation toward longer-term goals for the professionalization of the security forces. Critically, a time-bound process creates a forcing function for implementation and could reduce uncertainty that would ordinarily fuel spoiler behavior. Moreover, a time-bound process will eventually allow the FARDC, in this case, to “graduate” from the perpetual integration of armed groups and move towards professionalization through security sector reform (see more below).
Pillar 2: Develop and Implement a Disciplined Integration Roadmap
Under the best circumstances, the implementation of military integration arrangements can be complicated; success is possible, but would be abetted by an overarching roadmap that clearly defines roles, responsibilities, timelines, and benchmarks. Last month’s peace agreement does not specify whether some, or all, of the hundreds of armed groups believed to be operating in the eastern DRC will be eligible for integration into the Congolese security forces.
As a result, it will be important for the Congolese government to have an accurate understanding of the size, composition, geographical distribution, command structures, and political affiliations of armed groups that might be interested in integration so that the DRC and its international supporters can adequately plan for the cost, structure, and logistics of a one-time integration process for each group. This comprehensive assessment should inform the immediate logistics of integration, which include negotiation between the government and armed groups, cantonment of former combatants, and verification of troop numbers, fitness screening, rank harmonization and assignment, and division assignment.
Pillar 3: Synchronize Integration with Civilian Reintegration Processes
In a post-conflict context, security force salaries tend to be more abundant and reliable than salaries in the civilian sector, which often has been degraded by conflict. As a result, it is imperative that any demobilization initiatives outside of the integration process, such as DDR, are conducted simultaneously and provide benefits that are of similar monetary value and consistency as being in the military or a member of an armed group with access to illicit mining profits. If the security forces or armed groups are the only reliable means of economic security, there is simply no chance for civilian reintegration – which is chronically underfunded and often poorly-implemented during war-to-peace transitions. Following previous conflicts, the DRC actually implemented a system of tronc commun, or dual-track integration and demobilization processes, whereby former combatants were provided the options of returning to civilian life or integrating into the FARDC. However, one of the reasons it was ultimately unsuccessful was due to the open-ended nature of the integration process, which incentivized defection.
Pillar 4: Prioritize Integration Before Broader Security Sector Reform
Contemporary understanding of military integration is constrained by the fact that frameworks for security sector reform (SSR) were developed in the 1990s during peaceful democratic transitions in Europe and Latin America, where the challenge was transforming authoritarian militaries into civilian-controlled forces rather than integrating non-State armed groups into a unified military structure. As a result, international guidance on post-conflict security arrangements focuses on the technical aspects of DDR and SSR, while overlooking the foundational work of merging opposing armed groups into a cohesive national force.
This sequencing problem is a sizeable liability: broader SSR efforts cannot succeed without first establishing a genuinely integrated military foundation, as institutional reforms will have little staying power if the underlying force remains divided along factional lines. Without successful integration as a prerequisite, SSR efforts will inevitably build institutional structures atop fractured military units that retain competing loyalties and command structures. When subjected to political crises or military pressures, these poorly integrated forces will revert to factional behavior, undermining the civilian oversight and professional standards that SSR programs aim to establish.
Pillar 5: Align Military and Political Power-Sharing Arrangements and Shield from Elite Interference
The success of military integration (or military power-sharing) is deeply intertwined with political power-sharing, or the distribution of political power within the executive, administrative, or legislative sectors of government. These elements of power-sharing are mutually reinforcing during war-to-peace transitions; when one starts to fail – whether through non-implementation of agreements, exclusion of key stakeholders, or failure to deliver promised benefits – the other becomes compromised.
Formed in December 2023, the Alliance Fleuve Congo represents a political-military alliance between the M23 and several other armed groups, as well as a bloc of 17 political parties. While AFC/M23 was not a signatory to the June 27 agreement between the DRC and Rwanda, Qatar‑mediated talks in Doha remain the primary channel for addressing their specific demands and integrating them into any broader power‑sharing framework.
The durability of the Washington agreement and any agreement reached in Doha will be directly linked to the synchronized distribution of influential roles in the political and security sectors in the DRC. Further complicating these dynamics, former President Joseph Kabila’s return to the country through M23-held Goma in May underscores his enduring political clout in eastern DRC, and is likely to add additional pressure to the future distribution of political power.
Should international mediators manage to pressure the Congolese government to agree to political-military power-sharing arrangements, President Tshisekedi may be inclined to circumvent such arrangements and strengthen his own power. He might attempt to achieve this through the creation of parallel security forces within the FARDC that are purposely excluded from the integration process or through continued cooperation with government-aligned militia, in violation of the June 27 peace agreement.
Pillar 6: Don’t Assume Amalgamation = Cohesion
In order to address chronic instability in the eastern Congo, the FARDC and the former combatants integrated into the force will need to act as a cohesive, national military instead of continuing to be an amalgamation of formerly warring parties. During transitions from war-to-peace, there are three ways to foster cohesion: political indoctrination, common professional orientation, and social contact. These dimensions are not mutually exclusive, as cohesion can be nurtured through multiple dimensions during a military integration process.
Once integrated units are formed, cohesion is not a given, but rather something to which the FARDC will have to devote special attention through the development and dissemination of a common national ethos (political indoctrination); directing the force to a common mission, such as stabilizing the Kivus (common professional orientation); or simply by having formerly warring parties live, sleep, and fight in close proximity (social contact). Notably, the peace agreement specifies that former combatants will be individually integrated into the security forces, thus implying that integrating armed groups intact, as had been done in the past, is not an option.
Although it will remain challenging to break the chains of command within former armed groups even once their combatants are individually integrated and dispersed across the Congolese security forces, making a concerted effort to foster cohesion within the force may help degrade these linkages. Without deliberate cohesion-building efforts, integrated units risk fragmenting along old factional lines during periods of heightened political or military tensions, which would have an adverse impact on regional stability and the economic benefits that stabilization is meant to deliver.
Pillar 7: Leverage Third‑Party Engagement and Technical Assistance
During the implementation of military integration, third-party actors can support the process as mediators during peace negotiations; guarantors of security in the form of peacekeepers or a ceasefire monitoring force; or providers of financial, logistical, or technical assistance. The involvement of third-party actors such as the United States or Qatar, in this case, does not guarantee success or successful implementation – but it could add value given a lack of trust between the DRC and Rwanda and the monumental task ahead of the FARDC to address insecurity in the eastern Congo.
Notionally, former combatants integrating into the Congolese security forces may require ‘bridging training’ so that they are brought up to the same standards as FARDC soldiers, though such standards are undermined by the military’s own entrenched dysfunction. Historical precedents for such third-party technical assistance include the deployment of British Military Advisory and Training Teams in Southern Africa, notably in Zimbabwe during the 1980s merging of formerly warring parties into the new Zimbabwe National Army, and in South Africa during post-apartheid military restructuring. In the DRC context, as many of these groups have been engaged in armed conflict against the State for decades, there is a need for a ‘guarantor of security’ to act as a neutral arbiter of the process, although it is doubtful that the currently-deployed U.N. peacekeeping mission will be able to fill this role. Finally, considering the regional security and economic interests at play, third-party actors can impose external accountability mechanisms to help mitigate spoiler behavior on the part of the government or armed group leadership.
Reality Check
Very few, if any of these pillars, are likely to be achieved in the DRC, so it is highly likely that any political-military power-sharing arrangements that emerge in the coming months will never be implemented, and the peace process will fall apart. In fact, the pillars in this article provide a roadmap for how these arrangements in the DRC probably will eventually collapse. This pessimistic assessment stems from the strong headwinds confronting the DRC at this juncture. Perhaps most critically, the political tensions between Tshisekedi and the AFC/M23 may preclude the kind of elite consensus necessary for any meaningful power-sharing arrangement unless agreed to under duress.
Even if such consensus could be achieved, the Congolese government’s limited institutional capacity makes it unlikely to develop and implement the kind of detailed roadmap that successful integration requires. And third-party actors may lack the attention span to provide sustained financial or technical support. DDR programs will almost certainly be underfunded, increasing pressure on the security forces to absorb non-State armed groups to contain the actual or latent threat they pose to stability in the absence of a neutral guarantor of security.
Meanwhile, the economic incentives that fuel conflict in eastern DRC – particularly control over mineral resources – will continue to create perverse motivations for armed groups to maintain their autonomy rather than genuinely integrate into statutory security structures. The regional dimensions of the conflict, particularly Rwanda’s likely continued involvement through proxy forces, mean that the FARDC may return to its well-worn practice of ‘buying peace’ in the east, which would revive an open-ended integration process that is ultimately unsustainable.
However, limited success might be possible if the Congolese government and its international supporters take measures to compensate for the aforementioned challenges. The Congolese government should avoid open-ended integration processes in favor of a time-bound process, develop transparent strategies that accurately assess security force absorption capacity and demobilization costs to enable appropriate international funding, and synchronize DDR and integration processes to provide sustainable livelihoods for integrated forces and those reintegrated into civilian life.
Success also would be more likely under three conditions: 1) if political power-sharing arrangements keep pace with military integration to maintain elite buy-in, 2) if elites are deterred from taking actions to counteract political-military power-sharing, and 3) if the FARDC makes a deliberate effort to foster cohesion after members of armed groups are integrated. Finally, security sector reform should wait until the security forces have “graduated” from the integration process – ideally supported by direct financial support from third-party actors such as the United States, Qatar, and the European Union, as well as technical support from African countries that have successfully managed military integration, such as Mozambique and South Africa.
