The world is used to a wide variety of “COPs,” the common shorthand for the annual meeting of Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Paris Agreement. COPs routinely differ based on, among other things, the host country and its priorities, the conference venue, the key issues mandated for decision, and background geopolitics. But, by any standard, this year’s COP 30 in Belem, Brazil, is likely to be unusual.
Beyond the U.S. about-face with respect to the Paris Agreement, and considerable global tumult, this COP stands out because a key climate issue this year will not necessarily be addressed – at least not officially.
The backbone of the Paris Agreement is the “nationally determined contribution” (NDC), in which each State Party communicates its short-term greenhouse gas emissions target(s) and which it must regularly update. The Parties’ 2035 NDCs, which are due this year, will be highly consequential concerning the extent to which the world is – or is not – on track to limit the increase in global average temperature above pre-industrial levels anywhere close to the Paris Agreement goal.
A basic feature of the Paris Agreement is that NDC emissions targets are determined by each Party in line with its national circumstances, rather than negotiated with other Parties at the COP. As a result, the NDCs will have been submitted before Belem and will not be a formal feature of the COP unless an affirmative step is taken. Many Parties are rightly clamoring for the COP to address the aggregate NDC submissions and respond with concrete follow-up. Brazil should use its leadership position to help achieve such an outcome.
Failure to Respond to the NDCs Would Be Indefensible
The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change Secretariat will issue its customary NDC “Synthesis Report” in the fall. It is anticipated that the collective 2035 NDCs will not be sufficient to put the world on a safe temperature trajectory, particularly if that of China (the roughly 30 percent emitter) is not reasonably ambitious. As such, the metric for this COP’s success is its ability to confront the NDC situation and decide on an appropriate response. Belem will fail to “meet the moment” if it does not.
In addition, this year marks the 10th anniversary of the 2015 adoption of the Paris Agreement. It is an important time to reflect on the pros and cons of efforts under the Agreement. Some are using the occasion to call into question the Agreement’s effectiveness and viability, including its consensus approach to decision-making. While it may reflect somewhat negatively on the Agreement for Belem to acknowledge that the NDCs do not yet “add up” and call for next steps, it would be a far worse indictment of the process if the Parties cannot even agree that it is necessary to respond.
Silence at Belem Would Be a Missed Opportunity to Reinforce the Parties’ Commitment to Multilateralism and the Paris Goals
As part of their 2023 review of progress under the Paris Agreement (the first “global stocktake”), the Parties reaffirmed their “commitment to multilateralism” and resolved “to remain united in the pursuit of efforts to achieve the purpose and long-term goals” of the Agreement. Particularly in light of the U.S. withdrawal announcement, using the opportunity of Belem to take action on NDCs in earnest would be a win-win — reflecting the political will of the remaining Parties to tackle the hard issues and to do so through the multilateral process.
A Belem Focus on 2035 NDCs Would Enable a More Nuanced Evaluation, Including Concerning the Role of U.S. Sub-National Actors
The NDC Synthesis Report may not be able to give a full picture of the latest NDCs:
- First, while the NDCs were formally due on Feb. 10, many Parties are running late. While not desirable, it is possible that the NDCs of some key Parties will not have been submitted by the time the Synthesis Report is issued.
- Second, the Synthesis Report may not be able to accurately reflect the U.S. situation, i.e., it may opt to either include the U.S. NDC as submitted in December 2024 (because the United States is, per the terms of the Paris Agreement, still a Party until early 2026) or not consider that NDC at all because the United States has submitted its instrument of withdrawal. However, the true story lies somewhere in between, with the U.S. sub-national governments and other actors (through both the S. Climate Alliance and America Is All In) committed to aggressive climate action.
A post-Synthesis Report review in Belem, particularly one that includes the participation of sub-national representatives from various countries/regions, would enable a more complete, as well as more nuanced, reckoning of the NDC situation.
Given the Parties’ Numerous Pronouncements on 2035 NDCs, Silence at Belem Would Be a Missed Opportunity to Reflect on Their Effectiveness
The Parties to the Paris Agreement have not been shy about taking decisions regarding 2035 NDCs, including in the context of their first global stocktake. That being the case, it would be illogical and incomplete for the Parties not to make a collective assessment of such NDCs once submitted.
The Paris Agreement itself was not very prescriptive when it came to NDCs, leaving most aspects (timing, content) to the national determination of each Party. However, as the climate crisis has deepened, the COP for the Paris Agreement has gotten progressively more directive when it comes to NDCs. While emphatically leaving intact the “nationally determined” nature of NDCs, it has:
- with respect to timing, encouraged Parties to communicate NDCs this year with an end date of 2035;
- with respect to content, encouraged Parties to submit “ambitious, economy-wide emission reduction targets, covering all greenhouse gases, sectors and categories and aligned with limiting global warming to 1.5oC, as informed by the latest science, in the light of different national circumstances”; and
- encouraged Parties to align such NDCs with long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies.
Ideally, and consistent with the global stocktake’s call for dialogue on implementing its outcomes, Belem would take the opportunity to assess the extent to which the above decisions were successful in driving NDC ambition, as well as take the necessary next set of decisions.
The Options Regarding Modalities Are Wide Open
There are numerous options regarding forum/level, conclusions, and scope available to the Parties:
- Regarding the forum, options range from the more technical (e.g., the Mitigation Work Programme, follow-up to the first global stocktake) to the more political (e.g., a Ministerial or Leaders event, either of which Brazil could arrange even in the absence of full Party agreement);
- Regarding the written vehicle used to reflect the Parties’ views and conclusions, there are also several possibilities (e.g., a decision of the Parties flowing from a particular forum, a cover decision managed by Brazil); or
- Finally, the NDC issue could be handled in isolation or in concert with other topics (e.g., in connection with climate finance, in the context of an overall review of Paris at ten years old).
The specific modalities are less important than the act of considering and responding. As Brazil, the Parties, and other stakeholders look ahead to Belem, they should work to ensure that the NDC issue lies at the heart of COP 30. Other decisions and initiatives, while potentially valuable in their own right, will not be a substitute for a missing NDC response.
