When President Donald Trump huddled with his advisors in the Situation Room last Friday night, the first and most important question should have been: What is the best policy option to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon? The answer is beyond dispute: The best possible way to guarantee that Iran will not build a nuclear weapon is for Iran to decide that it is in its own interest not to build a bomb, to agree not to do so and – in exchange for the lifting of sanctions – to submit to a stringent international monitoring and inspection regime that is reliable enough to assure the international community that Iran will never obtain nuclear weapons (i.e., an updated version of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the Iran nuclear deal that Trump withdrew from in 2018, more on that below). That outcome should be the preferred objective of U.S. policy.
Does sending B-2 bombers to drop bunker-busters on Iran’s nuclear sites advance the likelihood that Iran will agree to refrain from building nuclear weapons or does it make this scenario less likely? The answer to that question seems self-evident. The U.S. decision to have bombed Iran will now not only most likely destroy the likelihood of a negotiated solution, it already appears to have galvanized Iranian public sentiment against the United States, and may well increase domestic support for the nuclear program. Having used bunker busters makes it more likely – not less – that Iran will cross the nuclear threshold once and for all.
In truth, the most challenging – and least likely to succeed – way of preventing Iran from crossing the nuclear threshold through military force, which will require multiple interventions from external forces which, in turn, will likely necessitate perpetual air superiority over Iran and frequent on-site monitoring on the ground. Since the Midnight Hammer operation has done nothing to resolve the problem of locating Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium and will require an on-the-ground presence to truly achieve that objective. Plainly, the task of denuclearizing Iran will require human monitoring inside Iran – potentially amounting to a quasi-occupation of Iran or something approaching it for the foreseeable future.
Whether the newly announced cease fire actually leads to an end to hostilities will not change the new reality: a comprehensive agreement is less likely now than it was before the bombing and preventing Iran from rebuilding its nuclear program — or acquiring a nuclear device from a third party nation — can occur only with constant supervision and intervention from forces operating outside of Iran.
Ultimately, Trump’s decision to bomb Iran increases the risk that Tehran will cross the nuclear threshold. Imposing controls on Iran from the outside is simply unsustainable; it is the worst possible path to follow when it comes to preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons and would require continual use of force and coercion on an unwilling Iranian nation. Netanyahu’s own national security adviser Tzachi Hanegbi admitted on Israeli television on June 13 that Iran’s nuclear program “cannot be destroyed through kinetic means.”
Critics of those who support the idea of establishing an inspection regime must address the fact that such efforts and agreements have been effective in the past. For decades, the international community has relied on a variety of international arms control agreements that have been largely successful. For example, the United States and the Soviet Union – when it was at the height of its power – entered into arms control agreements that effectively reduced nuclear stockpiles, eliminated nuclear testing and regulated missile defense systems. Perhaps the single most successful arms control initiative in recent history– one that is also relevant to the situation in Iran today–was the United Nations’ Special Commission that, over many years, inspected Iraq to locate Saddam Hussein’s alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction and, as the world learn, had effectively kept a lid on him.
As for Iran’s record of compliance with international agreements, the record is clear. It is indisputable that Iran essentially complied with the terms of the JCPOA that was negotiated under President Barack Obama. That agreement limited Iran’s nuclear program and prevented Iran –- for fifteen years – from developing the capacity to build a nuclear weapon. Before withdrawing from the JCPOA, the first Trump administration acknowledged Iran was complying with the agreement. In Sept. 2017, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said Iran was “in technical compliance of the nuclear arrangement.” At the same time, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joseph Dunford told Congress, “The briefings I have received indicate that Iran is adhering to its JCPOA obligations.” And in May 2018 – shortly after Trump withdrew from the nuclear deal– the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), responsible for implementing the agreement, issued its final quarterly report stating that Iran had complied with the terms of the JCPOA. It is noteworthy that public opinion in Iran during the life of the JCPOA supported Iran’s decision to conclude the nuclear deal.
Trump’s decision to bomb Iran has likely destroyed any willingness on the part of the Iranians to enter into any agreement consisting of the same kind of inspection regime that would have been possible two weeks ago. Such a regime was necessary then – and would be necessary today – to reassure the world that Iran had decided not to develop a nuclear weapon.
We don’t know what the blowback will be inside Iran resulting from Trump’s attacks, but Trump’s bombing raid is likely to undermine, if not silence, any voices within Iranian leadership circles seeking a diplomatic solution. For Trump to equate an Iranian decision to eschew nuclear weapons with “unconditional surrender” does not advance diplomacy among Iranians. Those Iranians who hate the West most are empowered by what Trump has said almost as well as by what Trump has done. They will argue that it was always in Iran’s national interest to develop a nuclear weapon. They will contend that Iran requires a nuclear weapon for its own self-defense, concluding that only nuclear armed states may act with impunity. The pro-bomb faction inside Iran will very likely be ascendant for decades to come, making Iran’s decision to build a bomb more likely, not less.
There is a final question to be asked: Did this bombing achieve U.S. policy objectives or will further action be required?
Saturday night’s bombing may have caused a rush of relief among many Americans who have rightfully long feared a nuclear armed Iran. That euphoria will soon wear off, and like an opioid that feels good at the beginning but leads to disaster, Americans will discover that the use of this particular drug – B-2 bunker busters – will ultimately make things catastrophically worse.
Studies suggest that military strikes on nuclear facilities have had mixed results: peacetime attacks modestly delayed nuclear programs, while wartime strikes were largely ineffective due to poor intelligence and operational challenges. Notably, the most effective strikes occurred early—before a nuclear threat was imminent—though such actions are the least defensible under international law.
On the night of the bombing, Trump claimed that the Fordo site had been “totally obliterated.” The next morning, the Secretary of Defense said, “Many presidents have dreamed of delivering the final blow to Iran’s nuclear program, and none could, until President Trump.” But then the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs said they would have to complete a damage assessment before drawing any conclusions about whether and to what degree the mission had been successful. By evening, U.S. officials were conceding that they did not know the whereabouts of Iran’s uranium stockpile, which appears to have been moved offsite before the American strikes.
Simply put, it will not be possible to know that Iran’s capacity to enrich uranium has been destroyed without independent personnel on the ground to conduct inspections. Can we be sure of anything in Iran without proper verification? One midnight bombing run is not likely to be enough. We can expect that more will be necessary. Much more. As for the problem of deterring Iran from crossing the nuclear threshold? It just got exponentially harder.
