Upholding Justice Within: Strengthening Internal Accountability at the International Criminal Court

The International Criminal Court (ICC) was established to deliver justice for the most serious crimes of international concern. However, recent developments have highlighted a growing dissonance between the Court’s foundational mission and its internal governance practices. Persistent reports of workplace misconduct, limited institutional safeguards, and delays in implementing meaningful reforms have prompted renewed scrutiny of the Court’s ability to model the standards it seeks to uphold globally.

In recent months, two lead counsel practicing before the Court were disciplined following allegations of workplace bullying and professional misconduct (see here and here). In parallel, ICC Prosecutor Karim Khan has taken a leave of absence amid an ongoing investigation into allegations of sexual abuse and misconduct and retaliatory behavior. Public reporting indicates that the inquiry involves concerns about the treatment of staff who raised accountability issues and the broader climate such actions may have fostered within the institution.

These incidents form part of a wider pattern. In recent years, multiple senior officials, including from within the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP), have departed under circumstances reportedly linked to internal investigations involving misconduct, including the alleged harassment of junior staff. Many of these departures have been handled with limited transparency. This pattern dates back to the earliest days of the Court. In 2008, an administrative tribunal found that the first ICC Prosecutor, Luis Moreno Ocampo, had wrongfully dismissed a staff member who accused him of sexual violence, ordering the Court to pay damages. Similar concerns persisted during the tenure of his successor, Fatou Bensouda, when reports of workplace misconduct—including sexual harassment—were widely described as systemic.

These developments speak not only to questions of individual accountability, but to broader institutional vulnerabilities. At present, the Court lacks a fully empowered and professionally resourced compliance architecture capable of responding to allegations of misconduct in a timely, consistent, and victim-sensitive manner. Absent such reforms, the ICC risks further eroding the confidence of its staff and partners—and diminishing its moral authority in the eyes of the international community.

Progress Since the Independent Expert Review: A Critical Juncture

There have been efforts to develop better internal accountability at the ICC, including the 2020 Independent Expert Review (IER) commissioned by the Assembly of States Parties (ASP). The resulting 2020 report offered a comprehensive assessment of the Court’s institutional challenges, including significant findings related to workplace culture, internal governance, and the efficacy of oversight mechanisms. Many of the more than 380 recommendations focused on improving accountability structures and fostering a safer, more transparent working environment.

The IER’s conclusions were sobering. It identified systemic shortcomings in management, leadership, and administrative practices across the Court. According to the Experts, a prevailing culture of fear inhibited staff from reporting misconduct, with concerns about retaliation and ineffectual follow-up cited as major barriers. Particular attention was drawn to the OTP and segments of the judiciary, where staff described hierarchical and adversarial dynamics that enabled bullying and discouraged open communication.

The IER report stated:

The Experts heard many accounts of bullying behaviour amounting to harassment in all Organs of the Court, though particularly in the OTP. They also heard frequent complaints that the culture of the Court’s workplace was adversarial and implicitly discriminatory against women. They heard a number of accounts of sexual harassment, notably uninvited and unwanted sexual advances from more senior male staff to their female subordinates. Female interns seemed to be particularly vulnerable to such approaches […].

These challenges were compounded by gaps in human resources policy, insufficient training for managers, and the absence of clear, professional pathways for addressing misconduct. Critically, the Review found that existing oversight structures—particularly the Independent Oversight Mechanism (IOM)—lacked adequate resources, specialized expertise, and the full confidence of staff.

Among its key observations:

The IOM does not as yet enjoy the full confidence and trust of all staff. There is a disinclination to make complaints freely and willingly about, and to report officially, alleged impeachable conduct, especially by elected or senior officials. In turn, this makes it more difficult to assess the real extent of the occurrence of misconduct and misbehaviour, and could be a significant factor in the underreporting of reprehensible conduct.”

“Despite the operationalisation of the IOM in late 2015, there is a perception from staff that individuals who officially complain may still bear a personal risk and the repercussions, including possible reprisals for a staff member, if publicly known, stand very high.

Five years later, many of the core issues identified by the IER persist. Reports of bullying, harassment, and reprisals continue to emerge, while internal investigations remain uneven—often described by staff as slow, opaque, and, in some cases, retraumatizing. Though the Court has introduced incremental reforms, such as expanded staff surveys and select policy updates, it has yet to undertake the kind of structural overhaul necessary to promote a professional and safe working environment.

The Court’s handling of the ongoing investigation involving Prosecutor Khan has brought these institutional concerns into sharp relief. The IOM, which initially led the inquiry—the investigation is currently being managed by the United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services—has faced criticism from civil society and legal professionals for aspects of its investigative approach. Public reporting indicates that investigators questioned the victim in front of her child about sensitive matters—a practice inconsistent with established trauma-informed protocols—and closed the investigation within just a few days, possibly never opening a formal investigation at all.

Additionally, while the IOM has framed its procedures around a “victim-centered” model, the implementation of this model has raised serious concerns. Multiple sources indicate that investigations may be closed if the complainant chooses not to remain engaged with the process. Although intended to empower victims, this practice effectively shifts the burden of pursuing accountability onto individuals who may already feel vulnerable or fear retaliation. In doing so, it risks enabling retaliatory conduct and reinforcing a culture of silence.

By contrast, in the United States, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act imposes a duty on institutions to investigate sexual harassment once they become aware of it, regardless of whether the victim chooses to proceed. This approach recognizes that such misconduct often reflects systemic issues, may impact others beyond the immediate complainant, and requires institutional, not individual, response. Even where a complainant disengages, investigations may continue based on available evidence, underscoring the broader duty to protect the workplace and uphold professional standards.

Perhaps most concerning is the prolonged duration of several recent disciplinary investigations, which has further eroded confidence in the Court’s internal accountability mechanisms. For example, the investigation into Melinda Taylor, lead counsel for the al Qaeda-linked terrorist Al Hassan Ag Abdoul Aziz Ag Mohamed Ag Mahmoud, commenced in May 2022 but did not reach a decision until nearly two years later, in April 2024. Similarly, the disciplinary case involving Jennifer Naouri, lead counsel for Mahamat Said Abdel Kani, a militia commander in the Central African Republic, began in April 2023 and concluded in April 2025. In both instances, the investigations resulted in findings of serious bullying and demeaning conduct toward junior staff. The investigation concerning Prosecutor Khan was initially opened in May of 2024, reportedly closed, then reopened, and has now extended for nearly six months without resolution. During that period, in all of those investigations, allegations of further abuse and bullying against witnesses and other staff were alleged. These delays stand in stark contrast to the efficiency with which the OTP has conducted complex investigations into alleged atrocity crimes, including the rapid collection of evidence and issuance of arrest warrants against senior state officials. That the Court can move more swiftly in complex atrocity investigations than in addressing internal misconduct underscores a troubling misalignment in institutional priorities—and highlights the urgent need for a modern, responsive compliance framework.

Reframing Internal Discipline: Learning from Other Models

One of the most pressing and underexamined challenges facing the ICC is its current approach to addressing internal misconduct. The Court has historically handled allegations of workplace harassment, retaliation, and abuse of authority using procedures and evidentiary standards that closely resemble those employed in criminal proceedings. While this may reflect the Court’s prosecutorial origins and culture, such an approach is not well-suited to administrative disciplinary matters. The consequence is a system that, in practice, often imposes high burdens of proof, rigid formalism, and extended procedural delays—features that can discourage reporting, frustrate complainants, and hinder institutional responsiveness.

This concern was directly flagged in the IER, which noted:

There is a general negative perception of the Court’s internal grievances procedures. Staff feel that the Court has dealt with its internal grievances procedures in a too legalistic approach, especially criminal law approach; that it translated into very complex rules and procedures, which are viewed as an obstacle (especially by nonlegal staff) and overall dissuade staff from complaining.

As the IER observed, while a quasi-criminal framework may be appropriate for adjudicating core international crimes, it is ill-suited to evaluating administrative concerns such as workplace bullying, harassment, or abuse of authority. The result is a disciplinary structure that can delay accountability, re-traumatize complainants, and inadvertently permit retaliatory conduct to persist unresolved.

By contrast, many national and international institutions with judicial, investigatory, or law enforcement responsibilities have adopted a different model—one that distinguishes clearly between criminal justice and internal compliance. Examples include the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), the United Nations (UN), and several national judicial systems and ministries. Though their structures vary, these models share several foundational features:

1. Trained Compliance Professionals: Internal investigations are conducted by individuals with specific expertise in employment law, workplace misconduct, and trauma-informed practice. These are typically professionals—not litigators—trained in administrative procedures rather than criminal prosecution. Their role is not to punish, but to ensure institutional standards are upheld.
2. Layered Oversight Mechanisms: Institutions such as the DOJ’s Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR), the UN’s Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), and national inspector general offices operate independently from the operational or prosecutorial arms of their institutions. They are empowered to conduct investigations, recommend disciplinary action, propose institutional reforms, and publish aggregate findings, thereby reinforcing both accountability and transparency.
3. Interim Protective Measures: These systems provide mechanisms—such as temporary administrative leave, reassignment, or adjustments to supervisory duties—that safeguard the integrity of the institution and protect all parties during the pendency of an investigation. These measures are non-punitive but ensure that unresolved allegations do not jeopardize workplace safety or institutional trust.
4. Clear Evidentiary Standards and Timelines: Administrative procedures typically rely on the “preponderance of the evidence” standard and are guided by well-defined timelines. The goal is not to reach a criminal verdict, but to assess whether conduct fell below institutional expectations—and to respond accordingly.
5. Confidential and Victim-Centered Protocols: Recognizing the power dynamics involved in workplace misconduct, modern compliance models prioritize confidentiality and sensitivity. Investigations are structured to avoid unnecessary confrontation, minimize retraumatization, and provide psychological safety for all parties.
6. Public Reporting and External Audits: Many oversight bodies regularly publish anonymized reports on the nature and volume of complaints received, outcomes, and institutional responses. These transparency measures, combined with periodic external audits or peer reviews, help build credibility and allow for institutional learning.

In contrast, the ICC’s current compliance structure reflects several areas of concern:

• Conflation of Criminal and Administrative Standards: Internal investigations often mirror the Court’s approach to criminal trials—employing adversarial procedures, extensive fact-finding, public hearings in some instances, and a de facto “beyond reasonable doubt” standard before action is taken. This approach risks procedural overreach in administrative contexts and can delay timely resolution, particularly in cases where evidence is limited to testimony or where complainants seek non-punitive remedies.
• Lack of Expertise and Perceived Conflicts: Oversight roles have at times been filled by individuals without specific training in workplace misconduct investigations. For example, the current head of the IOM was appointed from the OTP, raising concerns about both perceived independence and subject-matter expertise. Reports from ongoing investigations indicate the use of questionable tactics, including unannounced visits to complainants and interviews conducted in the presence of family members—practices at odds with trauma-informed standards.
• Insufficient Interim Safeguards: The ICC lacks a reliable and consistent mechanism for instituting protective measures during pending investigations. Even in cases involving senior officials and serious allegations, interim steps—such as limiting supervisory authority or placing individuals on leave—have not been systematically applied. Prosecutor Khan’s recent leave of absence, while welcome, occurred months after the initial complaint and followed reports of alleged retaliatory conduct.
• Lack of Transparency and Incomplete Resolutions: The ICC does not publicly report on the volume or nature of misconduct allegations, and perpetrators can game the system by resigning before the conclusion of the investigation when the outcome is clear. Complainants are often left without information on the status or resolution of their cases, undermining trust in the process and fueling perceptions of institutional secrecy.
• Fragmented Compliance Architecture: Responsibility for ethics and workplace conduct remains dispersed across organs of the Court, without a centralized office empowered to coordinate policy, track trends, or proactively mitigate institutional risk. This fragmentation leads to inconsistent practices, gaps in institutional memory, and unclear lines of responsibility.

This challenge is not new. During my own time in OTP, policies and procedures on core workplace issues were often lacking, training was infrequent if not non-existent and often delivered by lawyers whose core expertise lay in international criminal law, not organizational behavior or human resources. These efforts were earnest, but the absence of experienced HR professionals meant that staff were often presented with formalistic or overly legalistic guidance, rather than practical, victim-sensitive strategies grounded in best practice. This left many employees—particularly junior staff—confused about their rights, reluctant to report concerns, and skeptical of the system’s responsiveness.

More broadly, the discourse around workplace accountability in the international criminal law ecosystem has too often been insular. While the field draws upon diverse legal and investigative talent, it has historically undervalued the insights of professionals from adjacent disciplines—labor law specialists, psychologists, ombuds experts, and compliance officers—whose expertise is essential to building healthy, functional institutions. As a result, reforms have at times lacked grounding in the very areas most critical to preventing and addressing misconduct.

The implications of these deficiencies are significant. First, they discourage internal reporting. Many staff members, especially junior professionals, interns, and personnel from underrepresented regions, express reluctance to report misconduct, citing concerns about retaliation or institutional inertia. This erodes trust and deprives the Court of the information necessary to address misconduct early and effectively.

Second, the Court’s internal accountability challenges increasingly affect its external credibility. As an institution that relies on cooperation from States, the ICC must demonstrate that it is governed by the same principles of fairness and accountability it asks others to uphold. Perceptions of double standards or institutional impunity risk undermining the Court’s moral authority, especially in politically sensitive investigations.

Finally, and perhaps most fundamentally, the ICC’s ability to deliver justice is inextricably linked to its internal integrity. The Court was established to confront abuses of power and vindicate the rights of victims. If it cannot address allegations of abuse within its own structure—if it tolerates a culture of silence, fear, or impunity—it risks alienating the very communities it was created to serve. This vulnerability has already been exploited: in its most recent statement before the UN Security Council, the Russian Federation cited the ongoing allegations against Khan as evidence that the Court lacks moral authority. Although such claims are self-serving, they underscore a deeper truth—the ICC’s legitimacy is inseparable from its internal credibility. A robust and trusted disciplinary system is not a peripheral concern—it is central to the Court’s credibility, both internally and externally.

Toward an Enhanced Compliance Architecture

The recent series of allegations involving senior officials at the ICC, regardless of how those proceedings ultimately conclude, have reinforced a critical truth: the Court’s internal accountability systems remain in urgent need of reform. These developments have generated renewed public attention and political momentum, which should not be treated as a temporary crisis to be managed, but rather as an opportunity to complete the structural reforms long recognized as necessary. The political will that exists now—across civil society, within the ASP, and among staff—should be channeled toward advancing and institutionalizing the recommendations of the IER, ensuring they result in durable, systemic change.

This year’s ”Special Session” of the ASP in New York, scheduled for July 7-9, offers a unique platform to do so. Although the Conference is formally centered on the crime of aggression, its convening of States Parties, Court officials, and external stakeholders offers an opportune moment to revisit and strengthen the Court’s internal functioning. As discussions continue on how best to expand the Court’s jurisdiction or confront geopolitical challenges, equal (if not more) attention must be paid to the foundational question of whether the ICC can credibly and consistently deliver justice—both externally and internally. Focusing solely on legal ambition without first addressing structural integrity risks stretching the Court’s already limited resources and eroding its legitimacy from within.

To meet this moment, the ICC must modernize its compliance architecture in line with international best practices. This will require not only policy updates, but also a shift in institutional mindset—from treating misconduct as an exception to be managed quietly, to recognizing that a strong internal accountability framework is indispensable to the Court’s long-term effectiveness and legitimacy.

Below are some recommendations:

1. Establish a Centralized Compliance and Ethics Office: A dedicated compliance and ethics office—operating independently from both the OTP and the Registry—should be empowered to oversee the Court’s broader approach to workplace conduct and integrity. This office would be responsible for coordinating misconduct investigations, reviewing and harmonizing internal policies, tracking trends, developing training programs, and issuing regular reports on disciplinary outcomes. Centralization would ensure consistency across the Court’s organs and create a focal point for staff engagement on issues of workplace behavior and institutional accountability.
2. Empower Professional Oversight: Oversight positions, particularly within bodies such as the IOM, should be filled through a merit-based process that prioritizes candidates with recognized expertise in employment law, administrative investigations, workplace safety, and trauma-informed protocols. While institutional familiarity can be valuable, oversight roles must be independent from prior organizational hierarchies and should not be used to promote internal candidates as a matter of course. Ensuring diversity of perspective and external accountability will strengthen the integrity of the system and foster greater staff trust in its outcomes.
3. Mandate Timelines and Transparency: To build trust in the system, administrative investigations should proceed according to defined timelines and process benchmarks. Investigations that extend over multiple years without resolution can cause significant harm—to complainants, to the accused, and to the institution itself. Moreover, anonymized data on the number and nature of complaints, processing times, and outcomes should be published in an annual report to the ASP, helping to promote accountability while safeguarding privacy.
4. Commission Independent Reviews of Workplace Culture and Accountability: The Court should periodically commission external reviews of staff perceptions regarding harassment, retaliation, and trust in internal accountability systems. Led by experts in workplace integrity and trauma-informed compliance, these assessments should use anonymized surveys, interviews, and benchmarking against peer institutions. Summarized findings should be shared with the ASP and used to guide training, policy reform, and risk mitigation. Regular reviews will help the Court identify systemic issues early and demonstrate a sustained commitment to institutional integrity.
5. Establish a Standing ASP Agenda Item on Internal Integrity: The ASP should designate “Internal Integrity and Workplace Accountability” as a standing agenda item at its annual sessions. Regular reporting on disciplinary matters, whistleblower protections, and institutional reforms would ensure sustained oversight and provide a forum for constructive engagement with Court leadership. Elevating these issues affirms that internal accountability is essential to the ICC’s legitimacy and effectiveness.
6. Authorize Interim Measures: The ability to recommend and, where appropriate, implement interim protective measures is a cornerstone of responsible compliance governance. The IOM and other designated bodies should have a clearly defined mandate to propose temporary suspensions, modified duties, or other safeguards when credible allegations arise—regardless of the seniority or elected status of the official involved. These measures should be non-punitive and guided by principles of fairness and proportionality, but essential to maintaining a safe and respectful workplace during the course of an investigation.
7. Clarify the Distinction Between Administrative and Criminal Processes: The Court should formally delineate the procedural and evidentiary standards that govern administrative investigations, distinguishing them from criminal prosecutions. Administrative inquiries are not designed to determine guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but rather to assess whether conduct has breached institutional norms or policies. Establishing this distinction more clearly will allow investigations to proceed with appropriate flexibility, speed, and victim-sensitivity, while maintaining due process protections for all parties.
8. Strengthen Whistleblower Protections: The Court must foster an environment in which staff feel safe and supported in reporting misconduct. This requires not only confidential and secure channels for reporting, but also enforceable guarantees against retaliation. Protections should include access to legal support, rights to reassignment or leave where needed, and external review of retaliatory claims. Experience from other institutions shows that robust whistleblower policies are essential to uncovering misconduct and promoting a culture of transparency.
9. Improve Access to Support Services for Complainants: Alongside structural reforms, the Court should ensure that individuals reporting misconduct have access to adequate psychosocial and legal support. This includes trauma-informed counseling services, access to neutral advisors, and the ability to obtain independent legal guidance when navigating internal processes. Institutions such as the UN and World Bank have successfully embedded ombuds services and confidential advisory offices to support complainants and improve institutional response.

These recommendations are not simply procedural adjustments; they form the foundation of a professional and credible compliance system. One that not only deters misconduct but reaffirms the ICC’s commitment to fairness, dignity, and justice—not just in the courtroom, but within its own institutional walls.