In 2023, the U.S. State Department created a new system to respond to incidents in which foreign forces cause civilian harm using American-made weapons. Called the Civilian Harm Incident Response Guidance (CHIRG), the new system was intended to investigate and respond to such allegations. But according to a new government report, the program has resulted in no action, nor even plan of action, for any of the cases it deems credible.
The report from the Government Accountability Office (GAO), titled “State Can Improve Response to Allegations of Civilians Harmed by U.S. Arms Transfers,” analyzed end-use monitoring laws and the State Department and Defense Department’s monitoring and response mechanisms. Congress commissioned the report in its National Defense Authorization Act for 2024. GAO concluded that the processes in place today “do not fully address the risk that recipients may use transferred U.S. defense articles to commit human rights abuses.”
After providing its bleak assessment, GAO recommends that CHIRG be able to receive reports of civilian harm from outside the U.S. government so that it has a more complete picture of instances in which foreign forces are using U.S. weapons to harm or kill civilians. GAO also urges the State Department to develop a strategy to identify the appropriate staffing and resources it needs to handle the CHIRG workload. (I have previously made similar recommendations in this forum.)
The CHIRG could be abolished by the stroke of a pen. Yet despite its shortcomings, the CHIRG remains a worthy institution. A properly resourced CHIRG would help protect against American-made weapons being used in ways that violate U.S. and international law, and it would provide an answer to skeptics of U.S. arms transfers. Amid State Department cuts, the CHIRG is one area that should receive at least a modest increase in resources. And just as importantly, higher-level State Department officials must have the political will to make the process work.
GAO Insights Into the CHIRG Process — and Its Dismal Results
The State Department has still not published any information on how the CHIRG works. The GAO report fills that gap, laying out the three-stage CHIRG process. First, State conducts an analysis of whether a report establishes it is more likely than not that there was civilian harm caused by a U.S.-origin weapon. If that is established, State assesses whether there was a violation of international or U.S. law, or any other condition placed on the arms transfer, and then recommends what actions should be taken. Finally, State is supposed to develop an action plan for making sure its recommendations are carried out. State anticipated that for each case this process would be complete within two months of the initial report of civilian harm.
The State Department has never published the overall results of the CHIRG. The GAO report finally does. As of April 4, the CHIRG had received 634 reported cases of civilian harm. (The GAO report notes “that non-U.S. government parties such as the United Nations have identified thousands of civilian harm incidents resulting from the Israel-Hamas conflict alone.) Fifty-four of the CHIRG cases were closed after State investigated and found no civilian harm or no U.S. items involved, and an additional 571 were still in stage 1 analysis. Two cases had moved to stage 2 after initial reports were found credible, and seven cases had made it to stage 3. However, GAO found that not a single CHIRG case where a U.S.-origin item resulted in civilian harm had been completed. A Washington Post story from October 2024 about civilians killed in Gaza also found this to be the case.
So, the bottom line is dismal: since the State Department created the CHIRG in August 2023, it has resulted in no action at all for any case — nor even a plan for action. And State officials could provide no timeline for completing any of its cases.
The State Department Responds
In explaining the lack of results, officials told GAO that “State did not anticipate implementing the CHIRG in active conflict zones with thousands of allegations of civilian harm.” State officials cited the intensity of some conflicts, such as Israel’s war in Gaza, and the shortage of staff resources.
These are puzzling assertions. The CHIRG was created in response to a 2022 GAO report on the civilian impact in Yemen of U.S. military support to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which resulted in thousands of civilian casualties. How could State not anticipate that U.S.-origin weapons would be used in active conflict zones and result in many allegations? And out of the hundreds of allegations the CHIRG considered, how could State not develop and implement even one action plan for cases it deemed credible in over a year and a half?
According to the GAO report, there are five regular employees, two contractors, and three interns working on the CHIRG. The report did not mention what, if any, other duties these personnel had in addition to the CHIRG. And tellingly, the State Department did not contest that the CHIRG needs more resources. In response to the GAO suggestion for more resources, State said only that it would “continue to review efficiencies in the CHIRG and identify appropriate staffing and resources to address civilian harm globally.”
In response to the report’s recommendation that State develop a public-facing mechanism to receive reports from outside the U.S. government, State officials replied that it does so by “encouraging non-governmental organizations to share related information with their government points of contact,” and that “creating an external mechanism would be impractical given staff and resource constraints, and unnecessary given that the State Department already has “an established process.”
The so-called process consists of a U.S. government-only e-mail inbox that accepts reports only from U.S. government personnel. GAO also reported that, unlike the Leahy law vetting process, no State employees are specifically tasked with conducting open-source searches for information about civilian harm caused by U.S.-origin items. (State Department staff doing Leahy law vetting conduct open-source searches for gross violations of human rights by security forces who could receive U.S. military assistance, as well as unit commanders.)
The current reporting process is restricted, ad hoc, and assumes that all relevant sources of information have U.S. government points of contact. GAO made clear that the CHIRG needs a public-facing reporting process for a wider range of reports, similar to the Human Rights Reporting Gateway for the Leahy law. This would provide an avenue to receive reports directly from NGOs and from the public, especially from people on the ground in conflict zones, who have no U.S. government points of contact. Organizations and individuals operating inside war zones are the sources with the best information, and they often face severe obstacles in traveling and gaining access to U.S. embassies to provide information.
The State Department’s mention of staff and resource constraints tacitly admits that there are many credible allegations of abuse that State is overlooking. The GAO report confirms this, concluding that the CHIRG process “may not be investigating the full scope of incidents and does not have enough staff to manage the related workload.” For example, while the CHIRG has received 634 cases thus far, the report notes that Airwars, a highly respected non-profit organization that monitors civilian casualties in conflicts, has verified more than 8,000 civilian harm incidents in the Israel-Hamas conflict, 4,000 of them in the first six months of war alone.
While even a well-resourced CHIRG cannot investigate every allegation, having access to a wider range of reports would provide a more accurate picture of which foreign forces and which U.S. arms are causing the most civilian harm. This, in turn, would allow the CHIRG to develop responses and policies that mitigate civilian harm in more than just the cases it reviews.
Although resource limitations are doubtless to blame for the CHIRG’s lack of results, the GAO report, and the State Department’s feeble responses, suggest another problem: lack of political will. State Department officials, especially higher-level officials whose approvals are necessary to move forward with findings and action plans, must be committed to making the process work. The evidence thus far strongly suggests many are not.
A Worthy Institution in Jeopardy
The CHIRG is in jeopardy. Because it is an internal State-DOD process that is not enshrined in law, the CHIRG could be abolished by the stroke of a pen. President Donald Trump has already thrown out two key policy frameworks governing arms transfers. In February, President Trump rescinded the Biden administration’s National Security Memorandum (NSM) 20, which required reporting on violations of international law involving U.S.-supplied weapons to partners. In March, President Trump rescinded the 2023 Conventional Arms Transfer (CAT) Policy, which emphasized human rights and international humanitarian law, and required “appropriate monitoring” for violations. Instead, the Trump administration is reverting to the 2018 policy, which included no such monitoring commitments.
The State Department should preserve and properly resource the CHIRG. Effective arms transfer decision-making requires the State Department to systematically track how recipients use U.S. weapons to ensure that they are not undermining U.S. interests. Arms transfers can have long-lasting consequences, and understanding those consequences should be a non-partisan priority.
Despite the disappointing results, the CHIRG remains a worthy institution, filling a crucial gap in end-use monitoring, especially in light of the rescission of NSM-20 and the CAT Policy. Congress could preserve the CHIRG by requiring such a process by law and allocating more resources to it.
A properly resourced CHIRG that yields concrete results would help protect against the use of American weapons in violation of U.S. and international law. It would also reassure those skeptical of U.S. arms transfers, especially lawmakers on Capitol Hill. Higher-level State Department officials should recognize what is at stake. An effective process to monitor and prevent civilian harm caused by U.S.-made weapons is in the national interest. And for State Department officials, it also provides an effective response to critics who claim that they are party to that harm.
