For every action, there is an equal and opposite reaction. Climate intervention is a case in point. As interest has grown in pursuing research into ways to intentionally reflect sunlight so as to cool the planet (“solar radiation management” or “SRM”), calls for a “moratorium” on SRM deployment have proliferated.
In assessing these calls, two considerations are, in our view, paramount.
- Research into the risks, benefits, and feasibility of various options for SRM is urgently needed. We explored the reasons such research is needed in detail previously, and they have only intensified as the world moves further from a safe temperature trajectory.
- At the same time, like many others, we consider the deployment of SRM — if any — to be premature. There is a need for both greater scientific/technological understanding and well-informed international discussion regarding the conditions under which any future deployment might conceivably be undertaken.
The question, then, is whether an internationally agreed moratorium on SRM deployment is the best way to put the brakes on such deployment while not deterring necessary research. We conclude that a moratorium is not the right answer and that its spirit would be better addressed through the bottom-up proliferation of a “deployment is premature” norm, in the context of pursuing research.
First, reaching agreement would be very difficult.
Reaching international agreement on the design of a moratorium would likely be extremely difficult, if not impossible.
Broadly speaking, different proponents of a moratorium might have at least three different motivations:
- Preventing SRM altogether: A moratorium might be intended to permanently prevent deployment, as well as chill research that could potentially lead to deployment.
- Promoting “good governance” of SRM deployment: A moratorium might be intended to pause future deployment, if any, until more is known about the risks, benefits, and feasibility of SRM techniques and there are sufficient international rules/procedures in place to govern any deployment.
- Promoting SRM-related research: A moratorium might aim to create a “safe space” for research by addressing concerns about deployment.
Depending on their motivations, proponents of a moratorium would have very different views on its key design features, including:
- its substantive scope (e.g., where it would draw the line between permissible research and prohibited deployment);
- which actors it would cover (e.g., whether it would apply to both public and private actors);
- at what level it would be adopted (e.g., national, regional, global) and by whom (e.g., by States, multilateral bodies, scientists);
- whether it would be binding or non-binding;
- whether it would affirmatively call for, incentivize, or discourage research; and
- how/when it would end (e.g., at the end of a fixed term, when certain conditions were met, through some defined decision-making process).
Consider one variable: duration. Those seeking to prevent deployment would presumably attempt to make it as difficult as possible to unwind the moratorium, while those supporting a moratorium simply to secure a safe space for research would likely pursue the “lightest” duration possible (e.g., a fixed time period).
Issues of scope (broad versus narrow), legal character (binding versus non-binding), and other features would also invariably provoke sharp disagreement.
And this assumes agreement among States to pursue a moratorium in the first place, as well as an agreed international forum in which to do so.
Second, a negotiated moratorium may not effectively prevent deployment by the most “irresponsible” actors.
Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that some group of States could reach agreement on a moratorium, it cannot be assumed that those most likely to be able and willing to engage in “irresponsible” deployment would end up being constrained.
States would have to voluntarily submit to a moratorium for it to apply to them. In order to sign on, States seeking to keep open the option of deployment would likely demand design features that were on the weak end of the continuum. To the extent the features were strong, those States might not sign on in the first place — or might not honor such a moratorium even if they did.
The more likely result could be — perversely — that the States, funders, scientists, and other stakeholders already inclined toward responsible behavior would be the only ones that ended up constrained by a moratorium.
Third, a negotiated moratorium would likely be difficult to unwind.
Even a carefully drafted moratorium on SRM deployment would likely be difficult to undo.
History suggests that moratoria (and even decisions reflecting less than a moratorium) are generally characterized after the fact as more stringent than their actual terms. For example:
- In the climate intervention space, the decision adopted by the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) in 2010 (and recently reaffirmed) is a non-binding “invitation” to Parties and other governments to “consider” guidance not to engage in climate-related geo-engineering activities, while explicitly allowing certain small-scale scientific research. However, it is often understood in overbroad terms as a “moratorium” and one that applies to climate intervention generally.
- The 1982 amendment to the International Whaling Convention, which paused commercial whaling pending a comprehensive assessment of whale stocks, has evolved from a moratorium to a de facto ban.
In addition, a moratorium on SRM deployment could end up extending indefinitely because of the difficulty of reaching agreement on appropriate conditions for its termination.
For example, with respect to a moratorium pending conclusion of international governance arrangements for any SRM deployment, there would likely be a wide range of views on what would constitute appropriate governance. Even those very much in agreement on wanting “good governance” might find it difficult to decide whether it should involve a particular level of scientific understanding, a particular decision-making rule, a particular climate event/situation, or some combination. For example, the CBD decision on geo-engineering invited States to pause all climate-related activities absent “transparent and effective control and regulatory mechanisms for geo-engineering.” But there would likely be widely varying views about what would constitute “effective control and regulatory mechanisms.” (CBD Decision X/33, para. 8(w)).
Unless, perhaps, an SRM deployment moratorium contained a time limit on efforts to reach agreement on a governance arrangement, it could end up lasting far longer than anticipated.
Fourth, a negotiated moratorium could end up chilling research.
It is possible that a moratorium on SRM deployment could unlock the “safe space” or “social license” to accelerate research. However, it is not actually clear that the current impediment to research is the absence of a moratorium, or that relevant actors (States, scientists, funders, etc.) would all share the same view. It is also not clear that, even for those who would ease their opposition to research if there were a moratorium, the type of moratorium that could conceivably emerge from a highly contentious negotiation would suffice.
A moratorium could, in fact, end up having the opposite effect. While the term “moratorium” derives from a word with the neutral meaning of “delay,” it tends to carry a negative connotation concerning the activity in question. That is, it may suggest that the activity in question is not just off the table for the moment but also undesirable. Thus, by virtue of its name and/or design features, a moratorium could send a negative signal about SRM that could dampen interest in engaging in or supporting SRM research. It might also push some ongoing research out of the public eye, making it less transparent and — ironically — less “responsible.”
Fifth, negotiating a moratorium would be time-consuming and distracting.
Given the difficulties discussed earlier in reaching agreement on a moratorium’s design, the negotiations would likely be time-consuming and divert energy away from both research activities and international discussions on the appropriate conditions for any potential deployment.
Moreover, initiating negotiations might itself be seen as an acknowledgment that a moratorium on deployment is a precondition for undertaking more intensive research activities. As a result, research could be delayed while the negotiations proceed — perhaps indefinitely, if agreement proves elusive.
If not a negotiated moratorium, then what?
Given the many pitfalls associated with a moratorium, we believe it would be preferable to pursue a bottom-up norm-setting approach — specifically, establishing and proliferating the norm that SRM deployment is premature, particularly if it is large-scale. A normative approach could be expressed and solidified by all kinds of relevant actors; for example, a single State, a group of States, or other entities engaging in SRM research could make clear that they consider deployment, if any, to be premature.
Such an approach would not prevent premature deployment by irresponsible States. But neither would a moratorium or anything else. What a bottom-up approach could do is to help create an international norm regarding responsible deployment without the downsides noted above of attempting to achieve an international, negotiated moratorium.
- It could be undertaken immediately, avoiding what would invariably be a contentious, time-consuming, and potentially unsuccessful global negotiation.
- Rather than counting on States to implement an international agreement with respect to their sub-national actors, such actors (researchers, funders, the private sector) would be encouraged to reflect the norm.
- By focusing on the “premature” nature of deployment, it would sidestep the trickiest question — under what circumstances SRM deployment might no longer be premature — a question that itself is premature to answer, given the need for greater scientific/technological understanding and international discussion.
- Given that such a norm could be affirmatively linked to undertaking and supporting research activities, it would be clear, by definition, that it was not intended to have a chilling effect on research.
In addition, States and other relevant actors could model good behavior in other ways, including with respect to SRM-related research itself:
First, States could undertake a model national research program. Elements of such a program could address:
- Jurisdiction: To ensure that its private actors do not engage in irresponsible behavior, a State could assert jurisdiction over SRM activities that may have a significant environmental impact.
- Transparency: To address concerns about secrecy, a State could require researchers to provide advance notice of their research projects through a publicly-accessible registry and to publish their research results or otherwise make them available.
- Environmental assessment: To address environmental concerns, a State could require researchers to prepare an environmental impact assessment for outdoor experiments that could have a significant impact.
- Inclusiveness: To address concerns about parochialism, a State could encourage researchers to engage scientists from other countries, including in particular from the Global South.
Any one of these elements, even if pursued voluntarily at the researcher or funder level, could help build norms of responsible behavior.
In addition, for those focusing on the need for a “social license” as a precondition for research they consider vitally important, going ahead with research but doing so in a manner that is maximally safe and responsible could actually help create a social license for increased SRM research.
Second, individual States and other actors engaging in research could address concerns underlying calls for a moratorium by indicating certain constraints regarding their intentions:
- They might make clear that their research plans are limited, e.g., that they will not engage in experiments that cause more than a specified level of radiative forcing, that are not reversible, or that release more than a defined quantity of material.
- They might identify a limited purpose of their intended research, such as how one might compensate for the incremental warming caused by the unmasking effect of reducing sulphur dioxide pollution. Specifying the limited purpose of research (the “why”) may ease concerns about broader uses of SRM.
Third, while there are good reasons for States to avoid an international moratorium, there are also good reasons for States to pursue other international confidence-building measures, such as those focused on:
- preliminary discussion of the conditions under which SRM deployment might conceivably be undertaken, as noted above;
- coordination of research internationally, e.g., through the World Climate Research Program; and
- periodic assessments of the state of scientific knowledge, to identify gaps and prioritize future research.
These kinds of national and international approaches, particularly in combination, could provide a reasonable measure of SRM-related “governance” and thereby help allay public concerns going forward.
