On June 2, 2025, the German Bundestag disclosed the level of military support Germany has provided Israel over the past 19 months. The report states that “from October 7, 2023, to May 13, 2025, individual export licenses for the final export of military equipment to Israel with a total value of 485,103,796 euros were issued…. The deliveries included, among other things, firearms, ammunition, weapon parts, special equipment for the army and navy, electronic equipment, and special armored vehicles.”
The Bundestag’s disclosure (in full here) raises serious questions about the story Germany told the International Court of Justice in April 2024 in the pending case concerning Alleged Breaches of Certain International Obligations in respect of the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Nicaragua v. Germany). As explained further below, Germany told the Court that it sharply reduced its arms exports to Israel and that its exports involved few “war weapons” that might be used in Gaza. It appears that the former is no longer true and the latter is an open question.
Germany’s Story
Nicaragua alleges that Germany breached its obligations under the Genocide Convention by failing to prevent genocide against Palestinians in Gaza and breached its obligations under the Fourth Geneva Convention and customary international humanitarian law (IHL) to ensure respect for their rules in Gaza. Nicaragua requested the Court to indicate provisional measures (interim orders akin to preliminary injunctions) including by directing Germany to immediately suspend arms exports to Israel. The Court relied on Germany’s story in its decision not to indicate the provisional measures requested.
Germany did not say that Israel was not committing genocide or violating IHL in Gaza. On the contrary, Germany told the Court that “[i]t is not a lack of funding that prevents humanitarian aid from reaching the Palestinian population. The real problem is the restrictions on the entry and distribution of humanitarian aid.” The restrictions in question are enforced by Israel, and Germany said it opposed them.
Instead, Germany told the Court that it had ceased major arms exports to Israel while urging Israel to comply with IHL through public and private diplomacy. As summarized by Judge Iwasawa (now the Court’s President) in his separate opinion, Germany told the Court that:
the total volume of licences granted for the export of military equipment to Israel has decreased significantly since November 2023. While the volume amounted to €203.01 million in October 2023 (of which €198.68 million were granted after 7 October 2023), it decreased to €23.59 million in November 2023, €19 million in December 2023, €8.42 million in January 2024, €0.59 million in February 2024, and €1.06 million in March 2024. Germany adds that over 25 per cent of military equipment is destined for eventual reimportation and use by the German armed forces. Furthermore, it maintains that 98 per cent of the licences granted since 7 October 2023 did not concern “war weapons” but “other military equipment”
In short, Germany told the Court that between October 7, 2023, and March 2024 it granted export licenses for military equipment worth €251.34 million. In light of the recent disclosure, it seems that Germany issued export licenses for military equipment worth at least €233,763,796 after its appearance at the ICJ.*
Things may be worse than they appear. Germany told the Court that 25% of the military equipment it authorized for export prior to its appearance would be reimported and not used in Gaza. The recent disclosure refers to the “final export” of military equipment. It is unclear whether “final export” means that these items will not be reimported; if it does, then Germany has authorized more arms exports for potential use in Gaza after appearing at the ICJ than it did before. To be clear, what is most concerning is not just the total amount of arms exports, or the average amount per month, but also the dramatic increase of arms exports compared with the two months immediately preceding the ICJ hearings: February and March 2024.
In its oral submissions that April, Germany emphasized “how the total value of exports … to Israel since October 2023 is spread out over the past months.” According to Germany,
[a]lmost 80 per cent of the volume of exports was approved before the end of October 2023, in what this Court has referred to as “the immediate context” of Hamas’ horrendous massacres. At that point and in this dramatic situation, Germany decided to prioritize pending licence requests.
Following October, the total volume of exports has dropped sharply… to €24 million, €19 million, €8.5 million and so on.
Germany described as particularly “salient” its claim that “in February and March 2024, the total volume of exports for war weapons and other military equipment approved by Germany was at around half a million and around one million euros respectively.” In short, a “salient aspect[]” of Germany’s story was that its arms exports to Israel had dropped to a very low monthly level. Evidently, that changed after Germany’s appearance at the Court and after the Court issued its decision later that month. Indeed, the starkest comparison is between arms exports in the two months immediately before the hearings and in the months following the Court’s decision.
Germany also emphasized the “important distinction” between what it calls “war weapons” and what it calls “other military equipment.” “War weapons” include “automatic weapons and certain corresponding ammunition and essential components.” In contrast, “other military equipment” includes items like “daylight observation binoculars” “a slip ring for the installation in a radar system.” Germany assured the Court that “if we look at what has actually been licensed for export to Israel under this framework since October 2023, we see no artillery shells, no live munitions.”
In contrast, Germany’s recent disclosure indicates that it authorized the export of “firearms, ammunition, weapon parts, special equipment for the army and navy, electronic equipment, and special armored vehicles.” The disclosure does not provide details about when these items were exported, or in what quantity, whether they were intended for training purposes as opposed to lethal use, or whether they included restrictions on their use in Gaza. One expects the Court will want to know.
To be clear, Germany did not necessarily lie to the Court. We don’t know what German officials knew or intended at the time. Germany also never expressly said that it would not increase arms exports soon after its appearance at the Court. But that was a natural inference to draw, and it appears to be the inference the Court drew.
The Court’s Decision
In its decision on provisional measures, the Court noted that Germany is a party to the Arms Trade Treaty and that it conducts assessments “to ascertain whether there is a clear risk that the particular item subject to licensing would be used in the commission of genocide, crimes against humanity or grave breaches of the four Geneva Conventions.” The Court continued:
The Court in addition notes that, as stated by Germany, there has been a significant decrease since November 2023 in the value of material for which the licences were granted, from approximately €200 million in October 2023 to approximately €24 million in November 2023 to approximately €1 million in March 2024. …. Finally, the Court takes note of Germany’s statement that 98 per cent of the licences granted since 7 October 2023 concerned “other military equipment” and not “war weapons.”
On this basis, the Court concluded that “the circumstances, as they now present themselves to the Court, are not such as to require the exercise of its power … to indicate provisional measures” regarding Germany’s arms exports to Israel.
The natural reading of the Court’s decision is that Germany’s sharp reduction of arms exports to Israel by March 2024 and its minimal export of “war weapons” which could potentially be used in Gaza entailed that there was no urgency for the Court to order Germany to suspend all arms exports to Israel. Germany’s legal framework appeared adequate to diligently review the few export license applications still pending. This natural reading is reflected in all four separate opinions in the case, as well as in the lone dissenting opinion.
Judge Cleveland wrote that “the information presented regarding Germany’s military assistance to Israel, including with respect to the value, content and volume of exports and actual military licences issued in recent months … does not presently establish a real and imminent risk of irreparable prejudice to the rights Nicaragua invokes as a result of the actions of Germany.”
Judge (now President) Iwasawa summarized Germany’s story that its arms exports to Israel had “decreased significantly” and involved substantial reimportation and negligible export of “war weapons” (see full quote above). He concluded that
Germany’s framework governing exports of military equipment appears robust, and Nicaragua has not shown that Germany’s conduct will give rise to any real and imminent risk of irreparable prejudice before the Court gives its final decision.
Given Judge Iwasawa’s detailed summary of Germany’s story, “Germany’s conduct” naturally refers to Germany’s conduct as of March 2024, involving minimal exports of “other military equipment.”
Vice-President Sebutinde observed that
Germany argues that there is no imminent risk of harm to Palestinians in Gaza associated with Germany’s provision of assistance to Israel. In this regard, Germany notes that its existing legal procedures for exporting arms remove any imminent risk that Germany would assist Israel in violating international. Furthermore, Germany highlights the significant drop in military assistance to Israel since 7 October 2023.
Vice-President Sebutinde later reiterates that “Germany highlights the significant drop in military assistance to Israel since 7 October 2023.”
Judge Tladi poignantly asked
why, given the gravity of the situation and the potential for a breach as alleged by Nicaragua, would the Court determine the circumstances as they now present themselves do not warrant the indication of provisional measures? The simple answer is that, in its oral submissions, Germany acknowledged the gravity of the situation and indicated that it, being aware of the gravity of the situation, had significantly reduced its provision of military assistance to Israel. According to Germany, since the outbreak of the military offensive complained of in October 2023, “no artillery shells [and] no munitions” have been licensed for export to Israel and “nearly all exports [to Israel] involve what is known as ‘other military equipment’, typically of a subordinate or defensive nature”.
Judge Tladi later wrote that, “[f]or the Court, these circumstances, i.e. the reduction in the rate of export licence approval, the domestic German legislative framework and the assurance of due diligence, are relevant circumstances to be considered in determining whether it is necessary to indicate provisional measures.”
Finally, it is worth noting that, in his dissenting opinion, Judge ad hoc Al-Khasawneh (a former ICJ judge) wrote that
Learned counsel for Germany put much stock in the fact that there has been a significant decrease in German shipments to Israel. Notably, however, there has been no indication, let alone a guarantee, from Germany that this will not be reversed. And yet, it seems to have been the only ground that could have possibly persuaded the Court not to indicate measures at this time directed against Germany.
In short, the Court’s decision not to order Germany to suspend arms exports to Israel appears to have been based on Germany’s sharp reduction of arms exports to Israel and the natural inference that they would not substantially increase after the Court’s decision.
It seems that Germany did not get the message. According to the Bundestag,
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has expressly recognized the German government’s practice of careful case-by-case examination in the interim relief proceedings against Nicaragua and refrained from ordering further measures.
As we have seen, this is only part of the truth. The larger part of the truth is that the Court considered that the German government’s review process appeared adequate given its significant decrease in arms exports as of March 2024 and its supposed exclusion of “war weapons.”
Implications
What follows? Germany’s disclosure may prompt Nicaragua to return to the Court and request provisional measures again. Alternatively, Germany’s disclosure may feature prominently in Nicaragua’s argument at the merits stage years from now. Either way, the Court will want an explanation. As Judge Tladi wrote in his separate opinion,
in my opinion, any export of military equipment to Israel, in light of the evidence adduced in the current proceedings and the present Order, would render Germany without a defence against responsibility in the event of a determination that, either a genocide or serious breaches of international humanitarian law were being perpetrated or even that there was a risk of such crimes being committed. By this I mean, given these proceedings and the reminder by the Court to States, in particular Germany, of “their international obligations relating to the export of arms”, under current circumstances, it would hardly be open to Germany in the future to argue that it was not aware of the risks.
Indeed, Germany seems unlikely to persuade the Court that it employed “all means reasonably available” to it “to prevent genocide so far as possible” and to ensure respect for IHL if it indeed exported substantial amounts of “war weapons” to Israel despite the Court’s rather pointed warning that “[a]ll these obligations are incumbent upon Germany as a State party to the said Conventions in its supply of arms to Israel.”
Crucially, these obligations of prevention may be violated even if Germany does not definitively know that the arms it exports to Israel will be unlawfully used in Gaza (which is the focus of Germany’s arms export review process). These obligations of prevention may be violated if Germany “manifestly failed to take all measures to prevent genocide [or IHL violations] which were within its power, and which might have contributed to preventing the genocide [or IHL violations]” either individually or through “the combined efforts of several States” (Bosnia v. Serbia, paras. 430-431). Among the means available to Germany which are “likely to have a deterrent effect” on Israel’s conduct in Gaza, the Court may find that potentially withholding €233,763,796 of arms exports stands out, and that Germany’s decision to instead continue large-scale arms transfers was an obvious violation of its legal obligations.
One last thing. Germany told the Court that its arms export review process involves the Federal Foreign Office and that licenses for “war weapons” must be issued at the ministerial level. Germany’s Foreign Minister from October 2023 until May 2025 was Annalena Baerbock. On the same day that the Bundestag disclosed Germany’s arms exports to Israel, the United Nations General Assembly elected Annalena Baerbock as its next President. If member States had seen the Bundestag’s disclosure in time, perhaps they would have asked more questions before casting their vote.
