While compliance with International Humanitarian Law (IHL) is a bedrock legal obligation for parties engaged in armed conflicts, it is sometimes misleadingly portrayed as a dangerous hindrance to battlefield effectiveness. However, even aside from the rule of law imperative of IHL compliance, there are strong moral and policy considerations in favor of States not only complying with IHL, but overtly highlighting such compliance. The Ministry of Defense of Ukraine’s (MoDU) recent voluntary report on IHL implementation provides an opportunity to examine the concept of moral injury in armed conflict, particularly as it relates to the MoDU report. This article will then examine the current state of affairs in Israel with respect to moral injury and the conflict with Hamas, and recommend that Israel consider issuing a similar report on IHL implementation as one possible means of minimizing moral injury and maximizing the effectiveness of their fighting forces.
The MoDU Report
In December 2024, the MoDU released its first-ever voluntary report on the domestic implementation of International Humanitarian Law (IHL). The Georgetown Law Center on National Security and the Embassy of Ukraine held an event celebrating the launch, which featured a panel following a presentation of the report by Lieutenant Colonel Inna Zavorotko, Deputy Head of the International Law Section at the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, who also discussed the report in a recent blog post.
While the report is largely designed to demonstrate “to partners Ukraine’s adherence to IHL and reliability in providing weapons and military equipment,” it serves another important purpose as well. As explained by Lieutenant Colonel Zavorotko at the Georgetown event, Ukraine regards IHL compliance as a tool that provides soldiers with a moral high ground, stressing that it differentiates between the “Ukrainian heroes” and condemned murderers. The reasoning is demonstrated in the supplemental Ukrainian IHL study package, noting that “proper respect for IHL while participating in hostilities directly determines the moral self-understanding of servicemen/servicewomen both during armed conflict and in the aftermath, since respect for IHL affects the moral condition of a serviceman/servicewoman, their psychics and further adaptation in the society.” Zavorotko also acknowledged that fighting lengthy wars takes a toll on soldiers who witness the ravages of war and that IHL serves as a tool to protect them.
This connection between IHL compliance and moral well-being is evident in the voluntary MoDU report as well. For example, the Ukrainian Minister of Defense Rustem Umerov describes the report as representative of “Ukraine’s devotion to the common values of humanity” (p. 4). The report also describes the creation of a Chaplaincy within the Armed Forces of Ukraine (p. 34-35). The chaplains are credited with increasing the moral and ethical values of Ukrainian forces, particularly with respect to IHL compliance. The notion that IHL represents a moral code/structure is not unique to Ukraine. Stemming from the writings of Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, and other Christian realists, Just War theory is a moral framework for war that developed over many centuries and became the basis for much of modern IHL.
Moral Injury
Moral injury is a distinctive and potentially debilitating type of harm that participants in armed conflict are susceptible to. It arises from “perpetrating, failing to prevent, bearing witness to, or learning about acts that transgress deeply held moral beliefs and expectations.” Moral injury can also result from betrayal-based events, “when trusted authorities, such as military commanders or political leaders, pursue morally transgressive policies that betray or undermine the trust and faith soldiers have in these same authorities.” Put more simply, if someone experiences something that convinces them that they are no longer a morally good person or that the world is no longer a morally coherent place, they can suffer moral injury.
Importantly, moral injury can extend beyond the soldiers on the kinetic battlefield. Articles have documented moral injury in drone pilots, who remain safe, removed from the battlefield. Some have also argued that aid workers, health care workers, lawyers, and others who support the war effort may suffer moral injury.
Moral injury overlaps with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), although some of the symptoms and causes are unique. It is possible to suffer from either moral injury, PTSD, or both simultaneously. The essential component of moral injury, as opposed to PTSD, is the awareness of significant moral transgressions. With moral injury, moral values have been seriously violated in a traumatizing way that has lasting effects. The symptoms are significant and often long-lasting, including (but not limited to) profound feelings of guilt or shame, loss of functionality, and disfigurement. As noted by David Luban, the loss of functionality can take the form of a “loss of agency […] erosion of moral judgment […] and the ability to act in ways that promote the warrior’s own flourishing,” making it difficult for the individual to reintegrate into society.
Examples of things that can cause moral injury include killing for a cause that one comes to view as unjust, intentionally killing an enemy combatant in a manner more painful than necessary, and shooting or even just drawing one’s weapon on a child (see Luban). Note that some of these examples are not necessarily illegal, but rather their legality under IHL will depend on the specific factual circumstances. However, given the power of the law in shaping moral narratives of right and wrong, it is likely that individuals who believe they have committed a war crime are even more susceptible to moral injury.
The intersection of IHL compliance and moral injury
As noted above, IHL provides a legal framework that can help to make moral sense of the violence and destruction of war. It is valuable for the people who are tasked with conducting violence on behalf of the State to know that there are rules that govern such violence and to believe that there are boundaries beyond which they will not go. These boundaries are psychologically and morally important. Michael Walzer, a leading Just War theorist, has written, “War is distinguishable from murder and massacre only when restrictions are established on the reach of battle” (p. 42). IHL provides restrictions that, when complied with, distinguish the act of killing that we demand of our armed forces from committing murder that we would condemn and punish. This applies to other forms of harm as well.
This distinction between murder and lawful killing under IHL is not only important in a legal sense, but it also heavily influences how members of the armed forces perceive their actions on the battlefield, as suggested by Zavorotko. Members of the armed forces might be training to kill on the orders of the State, but it is psychologically and morally important for members of the armed forces to be able to look in the mirror and not see a monster staring back.
Zooming out to the broader war effort, enabling members of the armed forces to engage in violence without succumbing to moral injury can act as a force multiplier by keeping service members in the fight. IHL compliance is a useful way to achieve that outcome. Considering the high cost of training service members and the importance of their mission to the State that they are fighting for, it is a strategic imperative for IHL compliance to be deeply embedded into military operations. Ukraine’s voluntary report seems to grasp this point and offers an example for other militaries to follow.
Moral injury prevention as a form of force protection
This raises another issue—the tension between IHL and force protection. It is true that in some instances, IHL demands that military forces take on more risk than would otherwise be the case. By its very nature, IHL balances considerations of military necessity and humanity, which means military necessity itself does not reign supreme on the battlefield. This is an intensely important and personal consideration for members of the armed forces as tactics that they might prefer to maximize their immediate personal safety may not always be lawful. It is, therefore, a natural reaction at least to consider disregarding IHL when it is one’s own life at risk.
While there are sometimes tradeoffs between IHL and force protection, with some rare exceptions, IHL is far less restrictive than it is often made out to be. Many battlefield restrictions come not from IHL but from rules of engagement and other policy decisions. Conflating policy-driven decisions to place constraints on force (generally through rules of engagement) and legal constraints from IHL can sometimes give the misimpression that IHL is more limiting than is, in fact, the case.
There is, for better or worse, enormous flexibility built into IHL, and in many contexts, it actually permits shocking degrees of violence. There are few bright-line tests, and the few that exist do not always impede military operations. For example, IHL is clear that you cannot execute POWs, target civilians (unless they are directly participating in hostilities), or commit torture. While these are firm constraints, none of the prohibited actions are militarily useful tactics. Most of the other IHL targeting rules, like proportionality, involve some sort of balancing test that expands the permissible destruction in response to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated prior to the attack (of course, this rule, like the others that do not involve bright lines, must not be hollowed out completely, which would defeat their protective purpose). The force-protection criticism of IHL compliance is, therefore, less persuasive than it may at first appear.
However, protecting troops against moral injury is its own form of force protection–one that matters in battle and for decades after the fighting is over. Considering the ability of IHL to create a moral framework within which combatants can make sense of their destructive actions, reinforcing and supporting IHL compliance may in fact be among the most useful force-protection measures military commanders can take.
From Ukraine to Gaza
The ongoing armed conflict between Hamas and other designated terrorist organizations and the state of Israel has resulted in a scale of harm that is undeniable. The harm caused to the civilian population in Gaza extends far beyond deaths and injuries, impacting its physical and social-ecological system. Today, the overall conditions of life in the Gaza Strip are frightfully deteriorating. It is difficult for anyone seeing the images coming out of Gaza to remain indifferent to the immense human suffering.
Over the years, Israel prided itself on its legal system and its devotion to the rule of law and has, expressed its commitment to the laws of armed conflict. Recently, Israel’s commitment to IHL has been reiterated by the Deputy Attorney General Mr. Gilad Noam, before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) (72-73). Israel’s adherence to international law has, in our view, been a distinguishing factor from its adversaries. It is common to encounter references to the IDF as “the most moral army in the world,” including in the context of the ongoing war. In the past, this distinction has provided IDF soldiers a moral high ground in conducting military operations and became a part of the IDF’s ethos.
It is now unfortunately common to find the opposite view expressed given the scale of devastation, the conditions of life in Gaza, and the constant statements made by Israeli Ministers contrary to IHL. Further, recent discussions on the prospect of re-occupying the Gaza strip has raised much criticism both externally and internally, particularly as the government has failed to reach a deal with Hamas to end the war and return the Israeli hostages. The current state of affairs requires noting several issues in this regard.
In light of recent reporting from Israel, highlighting moral injury cases amongst Israeli soldiers and civilians, Israel should consider putting forward a voluntary report reiterating its commitment to IHL and the ways in which it is implemented and enforced. The following notes emphasize the timeliness of this suggestion.
First, since the outbreak of hostilities on October 7th, Israeli government officials have repeatedly issued statements that seem at odds with the IHL provisions. These were in the center of South Africa’s application instituting proceedings against Israel under the Genocide Convention (p. 59-67). Even assuming the military is de facto conducting itself in line with international law, as Israel argued before the ICJ, the fact that state officials make statements that seem at odds with IHL could, in itself, raise ethical and moral issues.
Since moral injury is a factor not only of the facts on the ground but the individual’s perception as well, these statements might undermine individuals’ perception of the justness of their conduct, eroding the moral high ground that the IDF and Israeli society rely on so heavily. Coupled with the extensive harm in Gaza, this might contribute to betrayal-based moral injury amongst IDF soldiers and others.
Second, prior to the outbreak of hostilities on October 7th, Israel had been experiencing significant internal tensions over the government’s plan to reform the legal system (sometimes referred to as “judicial reform” or the “Judicial overhaul”). While the reform’s supporters argue it rectifies the balance between the executive and judicial branches, its opponents argue it weakens the institutions entrusted with upholding the rule of law, upsetting the delicate system of checks and balances and ultimately undermining Israeli democracy. More recently, the coalition voted unanimously to fire the Attorney General (AG), whose role in safeguarding the Israeli democracy is well recognized. The AG’s removal from office has been frozen by the Supreme Court pending review.
The government’s plan was met with mass demonstrations, tearing apart Israeli society. Interestingly, the demonstrations were backed by active duty and reservist IDF officers, concerned they might be ordered to engage in illegal operations. The main concern expressed by these groups was that the weakening of the legal system compromises their protection from prosecution in foreign jurisdictions, particularly before the International Criminal Court (ICC). These concerns, echoed by the deputy AG, are a testament to the role IHL plays in providing IDF forces with a moral and protective structure. A voluntary IHL compliance report would benefit the soldiers in this time of turmoil, potentially providing them additional protection from both moral injury and ICC prosecution.
Third, traditionally, the information publicized by Israel regarding its compliance with international law is shared through reports by state commissions of inquiry examining particular events (e.g., The Turkel Commission Report). Under Israeli law, the government “may set up a commission of inquiry which shall inquire into the matter and shall report to it.” Despite widespread public calls for the establishment of such a commission to investigate the events leading up to the October 7th attack and its aftermath, Prime Minister Netanyahu and his coalition thus far have declined to do so, promoting instead the appointment of a “government commission,” consisting of political appointees, which would receive limited power and significantly less public trust. The political reality makes the rendering of a report by a commission of inquiry quite unlikely. As such, there is a heightened need to reaffirm the IDF’s commitment to IHL in other ways, a voluntary report being one of them.
As noted, the issues described above are deeply tied to the perception of IDF soldiers of the justness of their cause. The continuation of the war, along with the growing numbers of soldiers refusing to serve, warrants reexamining Israel’s posture. All these factors further contribute to the conclusion that Israel would greatly benefit from the production of a voluntary report, similar to Ukraine.
Conclusion
As explained by Ukraine’s Defense Minister, Rustem Umerov, “[n]ot every state can boast transparent international reporting in the domain of international humanitarian law. Definitely, no defense authority of the state all over the world has ever produced a Voluntary report in times of an armed conflict threatening the life of the nation” (p. 4). Despite their relative novelty, there are several advantages to producing such reports. Israel, as a state that deeply cares for its citizens, its soldiers, and the rule of law, should leverage those values as a source of strategic strength. Following the example of the MoDU voluntary report on IHL implementation could be an important step in minimizing moral injury for participants in this conflict, yielding benefits for Israel both on the battlefield and beyond.
Author’s Note: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Naval Academy, Department of the Navy, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
