



UNITED STATES CAPITOL POLICE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Review of the Events Surrounding the January 6, 2021, Takeover of the U.S. Capitol

Flash Report: Operational Planning and Intelligence

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Report Restriction Language

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On January 6, 2021, a physical breach of U.S. Capitol Building security occurred during a Joint Session of Congress to certify the Electoral College vote. See Appendix A for the United States Capitol Police's (USCP or Department) official timeline of events leading up to and during the physical security breach.

In accordance with our statutory authority Public Law (P.L.) 109-55, the USCP Office of Inspector General (OIG) began a review of the events surrounding the takeover of the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021. Our objectives for this review were to determine if the Department (1) established adequate measures for ensuring the safety and security of the Capitol Complex as well as Members of Congress, (2) established adequate internal controls and processes for ensuring compliance with Department policies, and (3) complied with applicable policies and procedures as well as applicable laws and regulations. The scope included controls, processes, and operations surrounding the security measures prior to the planned demonstrations and response during the takeover of the Capitol building.

Based on this ongoing work, this flash report is designed to communicate any deficiencies with the Department's operational planning and intelligence for planned demonstrations on January 6, 2021. The deficiencies included the following (a) lack of a comprehensive operational plan or adequate guidance for operational planning, (b) failure to disseminate relevant information obtained from outside sources, (c) lack of consensus on the interpretation of threat analyses, (d) dissemination of conflicting intelligence, and (e) lack of security clearances.

In order to improve its operational planning capabilities, USCP should implement detailed guidance for operational planning. The guidance should include policies and procedures that designate the entity or entities responsible for overseeing the operational planning and execution process, require documentation of supervisory review and approval, and standardize planning document formats. Guidance should also require that individual units develop plans and coordinate those plans with other units for a comprehensive, Department-wide effort. Additionally, the guidance should communicate when specific operational planning documents are required. For, example the Department could use a multi-tiered system based on the anticipated size and scope of an event as criteria for determining the required level of operational planning documentation it needs to prepare.

Implementing formal guidance requiring that employees communicate any intelligence reports and concerns from external sources to appropriate commanders would improve USCP ability to effectively disseminate intelligence throughout the Department. Providing additional training to personnel on how to better understand intelligence assessments and an increased role for

Department entities that have intelligence analysis and dissemination responsibilities in operational planning would also improve USCP ability to achieve a consensus on threat analyses. Furthermore, the Department should require supervisory review and approval for intelligence products to ensure the products are supported by relevant intelligence information and are internally consistent. Lastly, receiving classified briefings on emerging threats and tactics would better prepare the Department's sworn and operational civilian employees to identify and counter threats and tactics in the field. See Appendix B for a complete list of recommendations.

This is the first in a series of flash reports OIG will produce as part of its ongoing review of the events surrounding the takeover of the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021. Therefore, we may still perform additional, in-depth work related to those areas during our review. We anticipate that our next flash report will focus on the Department's intelligence operations and Civil Disturbance Unit.

BACKGROUND

On January 6, 2021, a physical breach of U.S. Capitol security occurred during a Joint Session of Congress to certify the Electoral College vote. See Appendix A for the United States Capitol Police's (USCP or Department) official timeline of events leading up to and during the physical security breach.

The Department's Protective Services Bureau (PSB) and Security Services Bureau are the two operational bureaus that report to the Assistant Chief of Police for Protective and Intelligence Operations. According to PoliceNet,¹ PSB's mission is to "provide safety and security to the Capitol, Members of Congress, Officers of Congress, and their immediate family." PSB has a Dignitary Protection Division, Investigations Division, and Intelligence and Interagency Coordination Division (IICD).

The PSB Investigations Division has three sections: the Criminal Investigations Section, the Threat Assessment Section, and the Intelligence Operations Section (IOS).

PoliceNet states that IOS:

- Provides overt and covert patrol of the Congressional Community to identify and disrupt individuals or groups intent on engaging in illegal activity directed at the Congressional Community and its legislative process.
- Provides an investigative response to identified or reported suspicious activity to determine any nexus to terrorism or other criminal activity.
- Conducts protective intelligence operations to support Department operations related to Member Protection, Threat Assessment, and Intelligence Collection.

¹ PoliceNet is the Department's intranet.

Listing of Recommendations

Recommendation 1: We recommend the United States Capitol Police establish policies and procedures requiring documentation for supervisory review and approval, standardized planning document formats, and communication to personnel of criteria for determining the level of operational planning documentation necessary for each anticipated event.

Recommendation 2: We recommend the United States Capitol Police establish policies and procedures designating the specific entity or entities responsible for overseeing the operational planning and execution process for each anticipated event.

Recommendation 3: We recommend the United States Capitol Police establish policies and procedures requiring that individual units develop operational plans and coordinate those plans with other units for a comprehensive, Department-wide effort.

Recommendation 4: We recommend the United States Capitol Police implement formal guidance requiring that employees communicate any intelligence reports and concerns from external sources to appropriate commanders.

Recommendation 5: We recommend the United States Capitol Police implement detailed policies and procedures requiring any threat analysis included in operational planning is coordinated with Department entities having intelligence analysis and dissemination responsibilities.

Recommendation 6: We recommend the United States Capitol Police provide training to its personnel on how better to understand and interpret intelligence assessments.

Recommendation 7: We recommend the United States Capitol Police revise Standard Operating Procedure PS-602-08, *Analytic Standards*, dated February 1, 2018, to require supervisory review and approval for intelligence products to ensure its products are supported by relevant intelligence information and internally consistent.

Recommendation 8: We recommend the United States Capitol Police require its sworn and operational civilian employees to obtain a Top Secret clearance and require that administrative civilian employees obtain a minimum of a Secret clearance.