Committee on Oversight and Reform

Fact Sheet and Timeline:
Delayed National Guard Response to January 6 Insurrection

- The Capitol Police and D.C. Officials Made 12 Urgent Requests for National Guard Support During the Capitol Assault.
  
  o Beginning at 1:30 p.m. on January 6, U.S. Capitol Police (USCP) Chief Steven Sund, D.C. Metropolitan Police (MPD), and city officials requested D.C. National Guard (DCNG) support at least 12 times, as detailed in the timeline below.

  o Acting Secretary of Defense Christopher Miller did not authorize the National Guard to “re-mission” and secure the Capitol until 4:32 p.m., and they did not arrive until 5:20 p.m., more than four hours after the Capitol perimeter was breached.

- Army Officials Expressed Concerns About “Optics” During the Delayed Response by the Department of Defense (DOD).
  
  o During a pivotal 2:30 p.m. conference call between senior Army leaders, including Lt. Gen. Piatt and Lt. Gen. Flynn; U.S. Capitol Police Chief Sund; D.C. National Guard Commander Major General Walker; Metropolitan Police Department Chief Robert Contee; and other D.C. officials; Lt. Gen. Piatt stated, “it would not be his best military advice to send the D.C. National Guard to the U.S. Capitol at this time” and a “military presence could make the situation worse and that the optics were bad,” according to D.C. National Guard notes of the call.

  o Chief Contee later testified that Army staff raised “optics” as a concern on the call.

- Army Leaders Told National Guard to “Standby” Five Times as the Attack Unfolded.
  
  o According to a timeline prepared by the D.C. National Guard, at 2:14 p.m., Army Secretary McCarthy “instructed” Maj. Gen. Walker to “standby” while the attack was unfolding.

  o During the 2:30 p.m. call, Lt. Gen. Piatt and Lt. Gen. Flynn told Maj. Gen. Walker and the D.C. National Guard to “standby” at least three additional times.

  o An hour later, at 3:34 p.m., Army Chief of Staff Gen. James McConville advised Maj. Gen. Walker “that Acting [Secretary Miller] directed D.C. National Guard to standby on deployment.”
**Vice President Pence Directed the Acting Defense Secretary to “Clear the Capitol.”**

- At 4:08 p.m., nearly two hours after the Capitol building was breached, Vice President Pence (VPOTUS) spoke by phone to Acting Secretary Miller and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) General Mark Milley. DOD call notes state: “VPOTUS call. VPOTUS at Capitol. Building not secure. What is the timeline? FBI must clear. CJCS briefs VPOTUS on status of FBI HRT, USSS, ATF, and DCNG efforts. VPOTUS relays direction to ‘clear the capitol.’ A/SD and CJCS do not say no; underscore DoD is in a supporting role for local law enforcement efforts. VP: why were more troops not provided in advance? CJCS: we fulfilled everything DC Mayor asked for. A/SD asked if more troops needed. VPOTUS replied no. Ends 1609.”

- In testimony, Acting Secretary Miller initially denied receiving this order from the Vice President, stating: “The Vice President is not in the chain of command. He did not direct me to clear the Capitol.” However, Acting Secretary Miller later acknowledged, “He might have said something to that extent, but it was more a conversation, very brief.”

**Army Officials Recommended Alternative Missions for the D.C. National Guard Rather Than Repelling the Attack, Possibly Contributing to Delays.**

- According to a timeline prepared by the D.C. National Guard, at 2:37 p.m., Lt. Gen. Flynn and Lt. Gen. Piatt recommended that, rather than directly repel the Capitol assault, the D.C. National Guard should “take over more points and help relieve Law Enforcement Officers (LEOs) to go to the U.S. Capitol to assist USCP.”

- Although Acting Secretary Miller determined at 3:00 p.m. that “all available forces of the DCNG are required to reinforce MPD and USCP positions to support efforts to reestablish security of the Capitol complex,” a D.C. National Guard timeline shows that at 4:20 p.m., Lt. Gen. Piatt advised Maj. Gen. Walker that the National Guard should “plan and prepare to transition from [traffic control points] and be placed around other federal building and monuments.”

- At 4:29 p.m., Maj. Gen. Walker “reiterated that 150 D.C. Guardsmen were at the Armory ready to support the USCP.” National Guard troops did not arrive at the Capitol until 5:20 p.m.
### Timeline: Requests for Assistance & Key DOD Actions

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<th>Requests for Assistance</th>
<th>Key DOD Actions &amp; Conversations</th>
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<td><strong>1:34 p.m.</strong> – D.C. Mayor Muriel Bowser “communicates [a] request for unspecified number of additional forces” while on a call with Secretary of the Army Ryan McCarthy.</td>
<td><strong>1:15 p.m.</strong> – Acting Secretary Miller “informed of demonstrators beginning to march to U.S. Capitol.”</td>
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<td><strong>1:49 p.m.</strong> – Chief Sund makes “a frantic call” to Maj. Gen. Walker, during which Chief Sund “indicated that there was a dire emergency on Capitol Hill and requested the immediate assistance of as many Guardsmen” as the D.C. National Guard could muster.</td>
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<td><strong>2:10 p.m.</strong> – Chief Sund contacts Maj. Gen. Walker again “to request immediate assistance and stated 200 Guardsmen were needed and to send more if they are available.”</td>
<td><strong>2:14 p.m.</strong> – Army Secretary McCarthy instructs Maj. Gen. Walker to “standby.”</td>
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<td><strong>2:19 p.m.</strong> – D.C. Homeland Security and Emergency Management Agency Director Dr. Christopher Rodriguez advises Maj. Gen. Walker that “U.S. Capitol building windows are being broken” and requests that D.C. National Guard members “report to the U.S. Capitol immediately.”</td>
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1 Source: Documents produced to the Oversight Committee by the Department of Defense, Army, and D.C. National Guard, unless otherwise noted.

**2:36 p.m.** – During the conference call, Chief Sund requests immediate support from the D.C. National Guard.

**2:30 p.m.** – Acting Secretary Miller, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley, and Army Secretary McCarthy meet to discuss USCP and Mayor Bowser’s requests for assistance.

**2:37 p.m.** – During the conference call, Lt. Gen. Flynn and Lt. Gen. Piatt “recommend[] that D.C. National Guard standby and start drafting a plan for courses of action (COA).” They recommend “that the D.C. National Guard can take over more points and help relieve Law Enforcement Officers (LEOs) to go to the U.S. Capitol to assist USCP.”

**2:40 p.m.** – During the conference call, Chief Sund makes another verbal request for D.C. National Guard assistance.

**2:41 p.m.** – During the conference call, Lt. Gen. Flynn advises D.C. National Guard to “standby until the request has been routed to the [Army Secretary] and Acting Secretary of Defense.”

² Documents produced to the Committee are inconsistent about when Chief Sund joined the conference call.
2:42 p.m. – During the conference call, D.C. Police Chief Contee reiterates Chief Sund’s request.

After Lt. Gen. Piatt states it would not be his advice to send the D.C. National Guard to the Capitol, Chief Contee states “it sound[s] like the Department of Defense (DOD) was denying the request to assist Chief Sund’s (USCP) request for assistance,” according to D.C. National Guard notes of the call.

2:43 p.m. – Lt. Gen. Flynn advises that “National Guard did not deny request just standby for an action plan and approval.”

3:00 p.m. – Acting Secretary Miller determines all available forces of the [D.C. National Guard] are required to reinforce MPD and USCP positions to support efforts to reestablish security of the Capitol complex.”

3:26 p.m. – Chief Sund again calls Maj. Gen. Walker “requesting immediate assistance.”

3:26 p.m. – Secretary McCarthy speaks with Mayor Bowser and MPD Chief Contee and “relays there was no denial of their request, and conveys [Acting Secretary Miller’s] approval of the activation of full [D.C. National Guard].”

3:34 p.m. – Maj. Gen. Walker is “advised by [Army Chief of Staff General] McConville that Acting [Secretary Miller] directed D.C. National Guard to standby on deployment.”

3:46 p.m. – Chief Sund again calls Maj. Gen. Walker “requesting immediate assistance.”

3:48 p.m. – Secretary McCarthy leaves the Pentagon en route for MPD Headquarters.
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<td>4:08 p.m.</td>
<td>Vice President Pence <em>speaks</em> with Acting Secretary Miller and directs him to “clear the Capitol.”</td>
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<td>4:20 p.m.</td>
<td>Lt. Gen. Piatt advises Maj. Gen. Walker “to plan and prepare to transition from [traffic control points] and be placed around other federal building and monuments.”</td>
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<td>4:22 p.m.</td>
<td>Chief Sund makes another verbal request to Maj. Gen. Walker for D.C. National Guard support.</td>
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<td>4:32 p.m.</td>
<td>Acting Secretary Miller “provides verbal authorization to re-mission [D.C. National Guard] to conduct perimeter and clearance operations in support of USCP.”</td>
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<td>5:08 p.m.</td>
<td>Maj. General Walker <em>receives</em> order to deploy D.C. National Guard to the Capitol.</td>
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<td>5:20 p.m.</td>
<td>D.C. National Guard <em>arrives</em> at the Capitol.</td>
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