Dear Mr. Leopold:

The enclosed documents were reviewed under the Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA), Title 5, United States Code, Section 552/552a. Below you will find checked boxes under applicable statutes for the exemptions asserted to protect information exempt from disclosure. The appropriate exemptions are noted on the processed pages next to redacted information. In addition, a deleted page information sheet was inserted to indicate where pages were withheld entirely pursuant to applicable exemptions. An Explanation of Exemptions is enclosed to further explain justification for withheld information.

430 pages were reviewed and 349 pages are being released.

Deletions were made by the Department of Justice/Office of Information Policy. To appeal those denials, please write directly to that agency.

Please see the paragraphs below for relevant information specific to your request and the enclosed FBI FOIPPA Addendum for standard responses applicable to all requests.

☑ Document(s) were located which originated with, or contained information concerning, other Government Agency (ies) [OGA].

☐ This information has been referred to the OGA(s) for review and direct response to you.

☑ We are consulting with another agency. The FBI will correspond with you regarding this information when the consultation is completed.
Please refer to the enclosed FBI FOIPA Addendum for additional standard responses applicable to your request. “Part 1” of the Addendum includes standard responses that apply to all requests. “Part 2” includes additional standard responses that apply to all requests for records on individuals. “Part 3” includes general information about FBI records that you may find useful. Also enclosed is our Explanation of Exemptions.

Although your request is in litigation, we are required by law to provide you the following information:

You may file an appeal by writing to the Director, Office of Information Policy (OIP), United States Department of Justice, Sixth Floor, 441 G Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20001, or you may submit an appeal through OIP’s FOIA online portal by creating an account on the following website: https://www.foiaonline.gov/foiaonline/action/public/home. Your appeal must be postmarked or electronically transmitted within ninety (90) days from the date of this letter in order to be considered timely. If you submit your appeal by mail, both the letter and the envelope should be clearly marked “Freedom of Information Act Appeal.” Please cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so it may be easily identified.

You may seek dispute resolution services by contacting the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS). The contact information for OGIS is as follows: Office of Government Information Services, National Archives and Records Administration, 8601 Adelphi Road-OGIS, College Park, Maryland 20740-6001, e-mail at ogis@nara.gov; telephone at 202-741-5770; toll free at 1-877-684-6448; or facsimile at 202-741-5769. Alternatively, you may contact the FBI’s FOIA Public Liaison by emailing foiaquestions@fbi.gov. If you submit your dispute resolution correspondence by email, the subject heading should clearly state “Dispute Resolution Services.” Please also cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so it may be easily identified.

Please direct any further inquiries about this case to the Attorney representing the Government in this matter. Please use the FOIPA Request Number and/or Civil Action Number in all correspondence or inquiries concerning your request.

☐ See additional information which follows.

Sincerely,

David M. Hardy
Section Chief
Record/Information Dissemination Section
Information Management Division

Enclosures

Additional Information:

In response to your Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA) request, enclosed is a processed copy of Bates Stamped documents, FBI (19-cv-1278)-1010 through FBI (19-cv-1278)-1439. The enclosed documents represent the third interim release of information responsive to your request. To minimize costs to both you and the FBI, duplicate copies of the same document were not processed.
As referenced in our letter responding to your Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA) request, the FBI FOIPA Addendum includes information applicable to your request. Part 1 of the Addendum includes standard responses that apply to all requests. Part 2 includes additional standard responses that apply to all requests for records on individuals. Part 3 includes general information about FBI records. For questions regarding Parts 1, 2, or 3, visit the www.fbi.gov/foia website under “Contact Us.” Previously mentioned appeal and dispute resolution services are also available at the web address.

Part 1: The standard responses below apply to all requests:

(i) 5 U.S.C. § 552(c). Congress excluded three categories of law enforcement and national security records from the requirements of the FOIA [5 U.S.C. § 552(c) (2006 & Supp. IV (2010)]. FBI responses are limited to those records subject to the requirements of the FOIA. Additional information about the FBI and the FOIPA can be found on the www.fbi.gov/foia website.

(ii) National Security/Intelligence Records. The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of national security and foreign intelligence records pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(1), (b)(3), and PA exemption (j)(2) as applicable to requests for records about individuals [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(1), (b)(3), and (j)(2); 50 U.S.C § 3024(i)(1)]. The mere acknowledgment of the existence or nonexistence of such records is itself a classified fact protected by FOIA exemption (b)(1) and/or would reveal intelligence sources, methods, or activities protected by exemption (b)(3) [50 USC § 3024(i)(1)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that national security or foreign intelligence records do or do not exist.

Part 2: The standard responses below apply to all requests for records on individuals:

(i) Requests for Records about any Individual—Watch Lists. The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of any individual’s name on a watch list pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(7)(E) and PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(7)(E), (j)(2)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that watch list records do or do not exist.

(ii) Requests for Records for Incarcerated Individuals. The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of records which could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any incarcerated individual pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F), and PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F), and (j)(2)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that such records do or do not exist.

Part 3: General Information:

(i) Record Searches. The Record/Information Dissemination Section (RIDS) searches for reasonably described records by searching those systems or locations where responsive records would reasonably be found. A reasonable search normally consists of a search for main files in the Central Records System (CRS), an extensive system of records consisting of applicant, investigative, intelligence, personnel, administrative, and general files compiled and maintained by the FBI in the course of fulfilling law enforcement, intelligence, and administrative functions. The CRS spans the entire FBI organization and encompasses the records of FBI Headquarters (FBIHQ), FBI Field Offices, and FBI Legal Attaché Offices (Legats) worldwide and includes Electronic Surveillance (ELSUR) records. For additional information about our record searches visit www.fbi.gov/services/information-management/foipa/requesting-fbi-records.

(ii) FBI Records. Founded in 1908, the FBI carries out a dual law enforcement and national security mission. As part of this dual mission, the FBI creates and maintains records on various subjects; however, the FBI does not maintain records on every person, subject, or entity.

(iii) Requests for Criminal History Records or Rap Sheets. The Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Division provides Identity History Summary Checks – often referred to as a criminal history record or rap sheets. These criminal history records are not the same as material in an investigative “FBI file.” An Identity History Summary Check is a listing of information taken from fingerprint cards and documents submitted to the FBI in connection with arrests, federal employment, naturalization, or military service. For a fee, individuals can request a copy of their Identity History Summary Check. Forms and directions can be accessed at www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/identity-history-summary-checks. Additionally, requests can be submitted electronically at www.edo.cjis.gov. For additional information, please contact CJIS directly at (304) 625-5590.

(iv) The National Name Check Program (NNCP). The mission of NNCP is to analyze and report information in response to name check requests received from federal agencies, for the purpose of protecting the United States from foreign and domestic threats to national security. Please be advised that this is a service provided to other federal agencies. Private citizens cannot request a name check.
EXPLANATION OF EXEMPTIONS

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552

(b)(1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified to such Executive order;

(b)(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;

(b)(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld;

(b)(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;

(b)(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;

(b)(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;

(b)(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of record or information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security investigation, information furnished by a confidential source, (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual;

(b)(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or

(b)(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552a

(d)(5) information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action proceeding;

(j)(2) material reporting investigative efforts pertaining to the enforcement of criminal law including efforts to prevent, control, or reduce crime or apprehend criminals;

(k)(1) information which is currently and properly classified pursuant to an Executive order in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy, for example, information involving intelligence sources or methods;

(k)(2) investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes, other than criminal, which did not result in loss of a right, benefit or privilege under Federal programs, or which would identify a source who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;

(k)(3) material maintained in connection with providing protective services to the President of the United States or any other individual pursuant to the authority of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3056;

(k)(4) required by statute to be maintained and used solely as statistical records;

(k)(5) investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment or for access to classified information, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;

(k)(6) testing or examination material used to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in Federal Government service the release of which would compromise the testing or examination process;

(k)(7) material used to determine potential for promotion in the armed services, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished the material pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence.

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Rick Dearborn was interviewed at 395 E. Street SW, Washington, D.C., the Special Counsel's office, in the presence of his attorney and interns from Berliner Corcoran & Rowe LLP. Participating in the interview were FBI Special Agent and FBI Intelligence Analyst Senior Counselor to the Special Counsel James L. Quarles III, and Senior Assistant Special Counsel Andrew Goldstein. Dearborn was advised it is a crime to lie to the FBI in the course of an investigation and he acknowledged he understood. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the purpose of the interview, Dearborn provided the following information:

**Relationship with Corey Lewandowski:**

Dearborn described Lewandowski as a "comfort to the President," whose loyalty was appreciated by Trump.

Investigation on 06/20/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)
Request from Lewandowski regarding AG Sessions:
Dearborn saw Lewandowski outside the Oval Office and Lewandowski said words to the effect of, "I want you to talk to the Attorney General about something." Lewandowski handed Dearborn a typed piece of paper. Dearborn no longer had the paper. It "definitely raised an eyebrow" for Dearborn. He did not want to think further about doing anything with it or where the message came from. Being asked to serve as a messenger. It made Dearborn uncomfortable. Dearborn did not recall whether Lewandowski said the message on the paper came from Trump.
Dearborn told Lewandowski words to the effect that he "took care of it," or "handled it," even though he had done nothing with the message.
Paul J. Manafort, date of birth, was interviewed at the Special Counsel's Office, located at 395 E Street SE, Washington, D.C. Participating in the interview were Special Agent (SA), Senior Assistant Special Counsel (SASC) Jeannie S. Rhee, SASC Andrew Weissman, SASC Andrew Goldstein, and Assistant Special Counsel Aaron Zelinsky. Manafort was accompanied by his attorneys, Richard Westling and Thomas Zeinle. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, Manafort provided the following information:

Toward the end of September or beginning of October 2016, Manafort was familiar with the statement Assange made on October 3, 2016, but he did not independently remember it. He may have discussed it with but he was not sure.
Manafort did not recall the release of Podesta emails. He did not recall Podesta release to happen in order to blunt the impact of the Billy Bush tape. They talked about the impact of both, but not a causal connection.

Manafort did not know, but thought the Podesta emails and the Billy Bush tape. Manafort would have been
Manafort said the Eliot Spitzer scandal, and the way he talked about the Podesta emails was different. The hookers in the Spitzer case to public. before Spitzer was Attorney General. Manafort recalled the time

Manafort was not sure if his memory of the Russia/Uranium One deal was from the Podesta emails or from the Clinton Cash book.

Manafort did not recall conversations with Manafort was of the country a lot post-election and did not recall speaking with on any of his trips.

Manafort recalled speaking to after the dossier came out at a dinner with at The Palm. Manafort thought the dossier was outrageous as the driver of the investigation. At the dinner, someone brought up
Manafort also recalled there was a distinction between the media story and what he himself believed.

Manafort and [ ] have not talked since June 2018.

Congressional and Special Counsel Investigations:

Manafort probably first learned the campaign was being investigated around the time the dossier came out. Manafort was first aware of Congressional interest in him in February or March 2017. He hired counsel in February 2017, because he assumed it would come up.

No one from the administration reached out to Manafort and Manafort did not contact the administration. No one at the White House offered any guidance on counsel Manafort should retain. Rick Gates was the only one related to the campaign or the administration that reached out to Manafort.

Between March 20, 2017 (the date then-FBI Director Comey testified about the existence of an investigation on Russian interference in the election and the campaign's links to the interference) and May 9, 2017 (the day Comey was fired), Manafort deliberately did not have any contact with anyone related to the campaign. He had no indirect or direct contact with anyone associated with the campaign. He was on a separate track and had built a wall between himself and them. Manafort had his own counsel and did not reach out to anyone. Gates may have been talking to people in the campaign, but Manafort did not.

Manafort purposely did not talk to Tom Barrack. Barrack was very risk averse. He did speak to [ ] but [ ] was not part of the administration.

Manafort recalled he discussed Comey's July 2016 press conference about Clinton with Trump, Reince Priebus, and Jared Kushner. He recalled that Trump said it was totally inappropriate for Comey to announce the position of the Department of Justice and that Comey was operating way outside of his space. Trump said it was a rigged system and signaled the politicization of the Department of Justice. They talked about how to use it in their campaign, saying that the fix was in between Loretta Lynch and
the Clintons. It happened before the Republican National Convention, and Manafort remembered they considered how to use it in the convention. He talked to a lot of people about it around then.

The focus on Comey was that the Department of Justice should not have let him make a statement, and the FBI should not have done it alone, as if it was Comey's decision alone. Trump called it a rigged system based on the fact that the Department of Justice and the White House let Comey make the statement.

Trump talked to Manafort about the propriety of publicly discussing the investigation and thought everything about it was unusual. Trump mentioned the way Clinton was interviewed and the fact that her aides were granted immunity and were allowed in the room during her interview.

Among those that advised Trump about what was appropriate or inappropriate were a number of people with prosecutorial experience, like Rudy Giuliani, Chris Christie, Donald McGahn, and Jeff Sessions. Everyone had the same message about it and it was Manafort's job to figure out what to do about it.

Manafort truly believed the system was rigged. The fix was in and the Clinton investigation's outcome was predetermined. It surprised everyone when Comey sent a follow up letter after his initial press conference. Manafort was gone by then, but counseled everyone to be careful in case it was a "wolf in sheep's clothing." He advised the campaign to use it but not to get too caught up in it or let it become the close of the campaign. Manafort thought he relayed his message through Kushner, Gates, and maybe Stephen Miller. He did not speak directly to Trump about it.

When the second letter came out, they were focused on what the close of the campaign should be and the letter was not a central part of it.

Manafort and Trump did not discuss Comey's status. Manafort did not hear anything about Trump's view of Comey. Manafort thought Trump was not a fan of Comey after the election because he had not been a fan during the campaign and nothing had changed. Manafort did not expect Trump to keep Comey on.

Manafort and Trump had conversations in which they said Comey was a political partisan. Trump thought it was a joke when people said Comey was a Republican and never viewed him as a Republican. Trump thought Comey had made his bed with the Obama administration and was part of the other team. Trump thought Comey's allegiance was to the Obama and Clinton administrations.
Manafort thought that Comey still came across as a partisan in spite of his negative statements about Clinton in the press conference because the lead up mattered less than the conclusion. Manafort thought the negative lead up to the conclusion only showed the absolute absurdity of the conclusion.

Manafort truly believed that Lynch and Bill Clinton's meeting on the tarmac was engineered in order for Lynch to give Bill Clinton the questions that would be asked in the interview of his wife. It did not make sense that they wanted to talk about their grandkids. Manafort thought there was no way their meeting was happenstance and had to have been pre-organized. Lynch had been a subordinate to the Clintons. They thought they would not get caught.

Sometime after the Special Counsel's Office was stood up, close to the end of June, Manafort's counsel told him about the email chain that set up the June 9, 2016 meeting at Trump Tower. He recalled the conversation was before the search executed at his apartment.

Manafort recalled his counsel raised the meeting and that he himself did not remember it at first. Manafort asked Gates if he (Manafort) had been at the meeting. The emails were the trigger for asking Gates about it. At some point after the meeting was public, Manafort found his notes of the meeting. In the process of downloading his material, his notes were found in the "deleted notes" section of the cloud. It was his practice to delete notes when he no longer needed them.

Manafort did not initially remember if he knew the story was coming out before it did. Manafort reviewed a July 8, 2017 New York Times article titled "Trump Team Met With Lawyer Linked to Kremlin During Campaign" that said Manafort had disclosed the meeting to congressional investigators. Based on that, he thought it was possible his counsel found the email and directed him to it and told him they planned to speak to the congressional committees about it, not that he first learned about it in the media.

Manafort stated that the article refreshed his memory and he recalled that the documents were sent to Congress and were given to Manafort's attorneys because of the disclosure to the Hill. After that, the stories came out in the press. Manafort's memory was that he got an email either from someone on the Hill or from someone else's attorney that the story was coming out. The information in the story did not come from Manafort.

Manafort assumed the June 9, 2016 meeting would be of interest to the Special Counsel's Office.
Manafort did not have access to his email account after he left the campaign, per campaign policy. He only had access to his Gmail and DMP email accounts.

Manafort did not discuss the June 9, 2016 meeting with Alan Futerfas or Alan Garten. He did discuss it with Sean Hannity, a close personal friend, after the meeting had been made public. Manafort thought he probably just complained about it. They did not talk about strategy, just the facts.

Manafort did not talk to Donald Trump, Jr. directly. Their respective counsel spoke to one another. Manafort watched Trump, Jr. on the Hannity show talk about the June 9, 2016 meeting. Manafort agreed with what Trump, Jr. said, which was that it was a nothing meeting. Trump, Jr. represented the meeting the way Manafort remembered it, not as a meeting on dirt on Clinton. Manafort did not have any concerns about Trump, Jr's statement.

The meeting was about the Magnitsky Act, which in turn made it about adoptions. Manafort knew before the meeting that the Magnitsky Act was a human rights act enacted because of torture of Bill Browder's attorney that resulted in sanctions for Russians. As a result, Vladimir Putin put a halt on US adoptions of Russian children as a way to pressure the United States to get rid of the sanctions. Manafort was familiar with the Magnitsky Act prior to the meeting and had read Browder's book on the Magnitsky Act.

Around the time of the public disclosure of the meeting, Manafort did not speak to Trump, Marc Kasowitz, Mark Corallo, or anyone affiliated with Trump's or Kushner's legal teams. All discussions were with counsel and through counsel, other than his discussion with Hannity. He did not talk to Sean Spicer, Hope Hicks, or Reince Priebus.

Trump, Jr. did not tell Manafort in advance he planned to release the emails on Twitter. Manafort was surprised Trump, Jr. did it, but understood why he did it.

Manafort did not hear from anyone that Trump or anyone else tried to stop the emails from coming out, other than what he read publicly.

Between the July 2017 search at Manafort's residence and his October 2017 indictment, Manafort did not recall any direct or indirect contact from anyone in the White House. He spoke to Hannity, who was "certainly a back channel," but also a personal friend. Manafort knew Hannity was speaking to Trump around then because Hannity would tell Manafort to hang in there, that he had been talking to Trump, that Trump had his back, and things like that. Manafort understood his conversations with Hannity to be a
message from Trump. Manafort did not remember specifically when the conversations happened, but it was the "natural kind of text messaging" they would do. They also spoke on the phone. The frequency was dependent on what was going on at the time; sometimes they spoke twice a week, some weeks not at all.

If Manafort wanted to send a message to Trump, he would have gone through a mutual friend of theirs, like Chris Christie, Tom Barrack, or but he never did so.

After Rick Gates was charged, Manafort and Gates discussed money, because Gates was concerned about financing his defense. Manafort thought they would qualify for funding from an RNC fund that had been set up. Mike Glassner sent something to Manafort's lawyer saying Manafort and Gates would qualify for the fund. Manafort and Glassner had known each other for twenty years. Ultimately, it turned out the fund would only benefit people who were unindicted.

Manafort did not talk to John Dowd, but his attorney did. Manafort did not think Dowd had contributed to their defense fund.

The conversation between Dowd and Manafort's attorney happened around the same time Manafort's attorney received the communication from Glassner about the RNC fund.

Gates and Manafort discussed getting new counsel for Gates, because Gates' counsel was not appropriate for what was going on. Gates' original counsel, was hired because Gates needed someone the day of arraignment and was available. Another of Gates' attorneys, was recommended by Tom Green was friends with which was how Gates ended up hiring Green.

Manafort does not believe Trump will pardon him.

Gates raised the issue of pardons with Manafort during a conversation about money. Gates said Manafort would get a pardon and Gates would not. Manafort did not specifically recall other conversations, but said it may have come up once or twice. Manafort did not tell or suggest to Gates that he had talked to Dowd or Trump and that they would be taken care of.

Manafort never told Gates he talked to Trump or Dowd. It was possible he told Gates that his lawyers had talked to Trump or Dowd, but it would have been in relation to money.

Talking about a pardon was not going to give Gates any comfort. Manafort told Gates they would find a way to resolve things and raise money, but he did not offer to take on Gates' legal bills.
Manafort was hopeful for a pardon but did not discuss one directly with Trump. He noticed Trump's public comments about pardons. Manafort never received any sort of assurance from Trump about a pardon. They did not discuss how best for Manafort to situate himself.

Manafort thought it was probably best to fight until the end but ultimately decided he wanted to deal with taking care of his family. When he saw the jury pool questionnaire for the trial [in the District of Columbia], Manafort knew it was over. He struck 90 of the 120 potential jurors based on their answers and thought the rest were lying. He thought that between that jury and Judge Jackson, he had no chance at trial. Manafort did decide to plead guilty to avoid the negative press of fighting it out, since the bad stuff was already in the plea. He knew he was going to lose, and it was not worth the agony or the money to continue to fight.

No one from the White House or the campaign sent a message after his plea. He did not recall telling Gates that Trump was watching their case, but it sounded like something he would say. If he said it, it was based on reading the newspaper; he did not get any private information from Trump.

Manafort had never talked to Robert Costello. He had not spoken with or received messages from Giuliani since his indictment.

Manafort was not told anything about what happened to Mike Flynn in the lead up to Flynn's termination. All Manafort knew about Flynn's calls to Kislyak was based on public reporting.

Manafort was aware that Flynn had Turkish and Middle East business connections. On a trip to the Middle East in April 2017, Manafort was interested in more work in Turkey. Manafort approached Manafort and asked if he was interested in more work in Turkey. Manafort explained part of the work was related to getting a cleric back to Turkey. Manafort said he was not interested and asked if the work was associated with Flynn, and said yes. Manafort was later led to believe Flynn had done something for and the Turkish government.

Manafort turned it down because he was not comfortable with it. He had decided not to deal with the administration until all of his issues were cleared up and did not want to lobby them.

Administrative: The original agent notes and document shown to Manafort will be maintained in the 1A section of the case file.
Stephen Miller was interviewed at the Special Counsel's Office, located at 395 E Street SW, Washington, D.C. Miller was accompanied by his attorneys, and from the law office of King & Spalding. Participating in the interview were FBI Special Agent (SA) Senior Counselor to the Special Counsel James L. Quarles III, and Senior Assistant Special Counsel Andrew Goldstein. Miller was advised it is a crime to lie to the FBI in the course of an investigation, which he acknowledged. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing team and the purpose of the interview, Miller provided the following information:
Miller recalled Comey's March 20, 2017 testimony, specifically that Trump was frustrated Comey said there was an investigation.

May 5-7, 2017 Visit to Bedminster, New Jersey:
Friday night in Bedminster, Miller went to dinner with Trump. Kushner were there.

Trump started off dinner on Friday night with the topic of Comey's termination. At the top of the dinner, Trump said he wanted to remove Comey and wanted to articulate his reasons in a "well honed" letter. Trump already had a "great concept" for a letter that would be used to fire Comey and make the announcement. Trump began to lay out his arguments for Comey's termination.
After dinner, then he went to his room, did extensive research to support the letter on his laptop, conducted some research, took his own best thoughts and Trump’s best thoughts, and began the process of putting the letter together.

Interviewers showed Miller a draft of the termination letter with handwritten notes (designated at Tab “D”); Miller confirmed most of the edits on the letter were in Trump’s handwriting. The handwriting at the
top of page one, however, was Miller’s. Miller could not specifically recall the details of the editing process, but believed when he met with Trump for breakfast, Trump had already made the edits to the letter

The situation with Comey was kept close hold. Trump was editing the letter. Miller did not discuss the letter or the decision to fire Comey.
Trump continued to edit the letter. He did not want the news to leak. He repeated that he was explicit the letter should open with a reference to Trump not being under investigation. Trump wanted to disqualify the possibility Comey was being removed because Trump was under investigation, as it was important for him to establish he was not removing the FBI Director while under investigation.

Specific Content in the Termination Letter(s):

Trump was explicit the letter should open with a reference to Trump not being under investigation. Trump wanted to disqualify the possibility Comey was being removed because Trump was under investigation, as it was important for him to establish he was not removing the FBI Director while under investigation.

The draft of the letter stated the investigation is "fabricated."
It was important to Trump that he factually establish Comey was under a "review period."

Meetings on Monday, May 8, 2017:
The 9:00 am meeting was attended by Trump, Miller, Priebus, McGahn, and one or two others. Trump started the meeting and said, “I’m going to read you a letter. Don’t talk me out of this. I’ve made my decision.” Trump then proceeded to read the letter.

McGahn pointed out DOJ had an internal review of Comey review under way complementary to what they were discussing. McGahn suggested the next step would be for McGahn to meet with DOJ to discuss.
Tuesday, May 9, 2017:

Rosenstein’s letter became the new foundation of a cover letter from Trump. Miller was provided Rosenstein’s letter so he could draft an appropriate cover letter. In discussing the letter on Tuesday, the only guidance specifically given to Miller was that he include the part about Trump being told three times he was not under investigation. McGahn recommended striking it, but Trump was insistent it be included.
Robert Roger Porter was interviewed at the Special Counsel’s Office, located at Patriots Plaza I, 395 E Street SW, Washington, DC. Porter was accompanied by his attorneys and from the law offices of Cozen O’Connor. Present for the interview were Special Agent (SA) and Senior Counselor to the Special Counsel James L. Quarles, Counselor to the Special Counsel Michael Dreeben, Senior Assistant Special Counselor Andrew Goldstein, and Intelligence Analyst. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, Porter provided the following information:
The President raised the concept of "un-recusing" at a meeting with Sessions on December 6, 2017.
Earlier that day, Porter attended a Cabinet meeting and when it ended the President told him to go get Sessions and take him to the Oval Office. The President indicated he wanted Porter to stay for the meeting.
At some point in the summer of 2017, Porter was in the Oval Office to discuss an unrelated issue and the President opened a drawer and pulled out a resignation letter from Sessions.
Discussions about Associate Attorney General Rachel Brand
The President asked Porter if he
knew Brand and what he thought of her.
The President asked if Brand was good, tough, and “on the team.”
The President asked Porter to “feel her out” and see if she would be
interested in being the Attorney General.

Porter did not fulfill the President’s request and talk to Brand. The
President asked a couple of times in passing whether Porter talked to
Brand, but Porter never did. Porter said, it did not feel right to have that discussion.
He did not want to be implicated in any way in the conversation.
At least once in that conversation, the President used the phrase “clean house” with regard to the Department of Justice.
January 2018 New York Times Article and President Trump’s Response

Porter was asked about a New York Times article from January 25, 2018 titled “Trump Ordered Mueller Fired, but Backed Off When White House Counsel Threatened to Quit.”
Porter did not recall the timing of his discussion with the President about McGahn.

Porter spoke to McGahn the same day the President asked him to do so. McGahn pushed back on the fact that the President said he (the President) did not ask McGahn to fire the Special Counsel. McGahn’s response, when Porter told him to write the letter, was something to the effect of “Well, it is true.” McGahn told Porter the President was insistent on firing the Special Counsel, but added that he himself never told the President he intended to quit. Porter told McGahn that the President suggested he would
fire McGahn if he did not write the letter and McGahn said the optics of that would be terrible.

Per DOJ/OIP

Per DOJ/OIP

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Per DOJ/OIP

Per DOJ/OIP
Chris Ruddy was interviewed at 395 E Street SW, Washington, D.C., the Special Counsel's Office in the company of his attorney, from the law firm Satterlee Stephens LLP, 230 Park Avenue, New York, New York. Participating in the interview were FBI Special Agent Senior Counselor to the Special Counsel James L. Quarles III, and Senior Assistant Special Counsel Andrew Goldstein. Ruddy was advised it is a crime to lie to the FBI in the course of an investigation and he acknowledged he understood. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the purpose of the interview, Ruddy provided the following information:

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June 12, 2017 PBS interview:

The day of the PBS interview, Ruddy had a meeting scheduled at the White House with Bannon. Ruddy, Bannon, and Priebus met, and Priebus joined at some point. In the meeting, Priebus and Bannon told Ruddy that Trump was strongly considering firing Mueller.
Feared Trump would fired Mueller one day and not tell anyone about it.

Ruddy asked Priebus if he could talk about the discussion about Mueller, and Priebus said yes. Priebus indicated to Ruddy the Comey firing was precipitous and he hoped another blow up did not happen.

Ruddy heard from friends in the media that Trump were upset about Ruddy's statements.

told Ruddy that Trump was upset with him
Robert Roger Porter was interviewed at the Special Counsel’s Office, located at Patriots Plaza I, 395 E Street SW, Washington, DC. Porter was accompanied by his attorneys ___________ and ___________ from the law offices of Cozen O'Connor. Present for the interview were Special Agent (SA) ___________ Senior Counselor to the Special Counsel James L. Quarles, Senior Assistant Special Counselor Andrew Goldstein, and Intelligence Analyst ___________ Porter was notified ___________ admonished that it is a crime to lie to the FBI in the course of an investigation, which he acknowledged. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, Porter provided the following information:

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Rachel Brand:

The President wanted to know if Porter knew Rachel Brand and what Porter thought of her. The President wondered aloud if Brand wanted to be the Attorney General one day. The President did not say it explicitly, but Porter gathered from his comments that since Sessions was recused, and it was possible Rosenstein would be recused, and Brand would be next in line, the President wanted to know what people thought of her.
DOJ was not investigating the things the President thought they should be investigating. The President said to Sessions that he did not "have to tell us, just take a look," which Porter took to mean that the President was being deferential to DOJ but wanted them to look and see if the things he wanted to investigate merited investigation.

Porter did not recall Sessions' response to the comments, but he did not think Sessions offered any assurances or promises.
Discussions of other investigations:

The President said he never liked Manafort, and Manafort did not know what he was doing either.

He recalled the general sentiment that the President wondered what was going on and in what way Manafort were cooperating.
The President talked about the great attorneys he had had in the past, such as Roy Cohn and Jay Goldberg. The President said they both had great records and were very successful. He said one of his biggest failings as President was that he had not surrounded himself with good attorneys.

The President mentioned Sessions in the discussion of current attorneys. The President raised Sessions' recusal.
Discussions with McGahn regarding New York Times article:
The President wanted McGahn to write a letter of clarification. The President said he wanted it "for our records" and wanted something beyond a press statement to demonstrate that the reporting was inaccurate.
Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Robert Porter. On 05/08/2018. Page 20 of 20

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b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b3

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6 b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b3
Kathleen Troia "K.T." McFarland was interviewed at the Special Counsel's Office, located at 395 E Street SW, Washington, D.C. McFarland was accompanied by her attorneys, and of Sullivan & Cromwell LLP. Participating in the interview were FBI Special Agent (SA) Senior Counselor to the Special Counsel James L. Quarles III, Senior Assistant Special Counsel (SASC) Andrew Goldstein, and SASC Brandon Van Grack. Pursuant to the execution of a proffer agreement, McFarland provided the following information:

[Redacted]

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Transition period:

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Mar-a-Lago Trip:

December 28, 2016
On December 28, 2016, Flynn and McFarland spoke on the telephone.
McFarland learned about the sanctions on the news that afternoon.

McFarland and Bannon met on December 29. But they also talked about sanctions. Bannon told McFarland the sanctions would hurt their ability to have good relations.
Bannon thought a Russian escalation would make things more difficult. McFarland thought she told him Flynn was scheduled to talk to the Russian ambassador later that night.

McFarland stated that she may have run into Priebus and given him a short version of her conversation with Bannon about the sanctions. She may have told Priebus that Flynn was scheduled to talk to the Russian ambassador that night, but was not sure.

McFarland and Flynn spoke on the telephone at around 4:00 pm on December 29. She noted that it was implicit in their discussion that no one wanted things to escalate.
McFarland knew before the Flynn’s call that Flynn was going to feel out the Russian ambassador on the overall relationship, knowing that the sanctions would influence it.

Trump, Priebus, Bannon, Spicer, and maybe one or two others attended.

At some point, Trump asked her if the “Russians did it” and she said yes. Trump repeated he was not sure it was the Russians.

She went through the possible responses and said they would have to see what happened. She told Trump the response would be an indicator of what the Russians wanted going forward. Trump said since Trump had leverage to use with the Russians.

She thought someone may have mentioned Flynn’s scheduled call with Kislyak as they were ending the meeting and leaving the room.

She did not recall a response from Trump before he walked out of the room.

McFarland and Flynn had a telephone call the evening of December 29, which followed the call between Flynn and Kislyak after the sanctions.
Flynn told McFarland he talked to the Russian ambassador. He told McFarland the Russian response was not going to be escalatory because they wanted a good relationship with the Trump administration.
December 31, 2016

Flynn and McFarland spoke on the phone. Flynn told her Putin’s response was an indication they wanted a better relationship with the United States. He may have said his telephone call with Kislyak may have made a difference. Flynn conveyed things were back on track.

When Flynn and McFarland spoke on December 31, Flynn told McFarland he talked to the Russian ambassador again. He said something to the effect of “Well, they want a better relationship. The relationship is back on track.” Flynn said it was a good call and he thought his own call had made a difference but not the only difference. McFarland congratulated Flynn for his work.
On Wednesday, February 22, 2017, McFarland was called to Priebus' office, and when she got there, Bannon was also there. He told her Trump wanted her to resign.
Priebus asked if she wanted to be an ambassador, Bannon suggested Singapore, and he came to her office and told her not to do the email and to forget he even mentioned it.

McFarland did not say yes or no to this request. She called Eisenberg and told him she had been fired from her job as Deputy NSA and offered the job in Singapore, but they wanted this letter from her. However, he offered his opinion it was a bad idea for her to write the letter because it was awkward and looked like a quid pro quo situation.
March - May 2017

She talked to Trump one time was in late March or early April. He asked her to pass a message to Flynn to stay strong; and that Trump felt bad for him.

Other Campaign/Administration contacts:
McFarland reviewed an email from Paul Manafort dated January 15, 2017 at 12:21 pm.
(U) On 09/12/2018 Special Agents (SA) Intelligence Analyst Assistant Special Counsel L. Rush Atkinson and Senior Assistant Special Counsel Andrew Goldstein interviewed MICHAEL COHEN (COHEN) at his attorney's offices at 655 3rd Ave, New York, NY. Present were COHEN's legal counsel, Guy Petrillo, Amy Lester, and Philip Pilmar. Additionally, Assistant United States Attorney Thomas McKay and SA from SDNY and FBI NY attended. In the presence of his attorney, COHEN reviewed and executed two proffer agreements, one from the Special Counsel's Office, attached, and one from SDNY, which was retained by SDNY. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing SAs and the purpose of the interview, COHEN provided the following:

(U) TRUMP TOWER MOSCOW

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This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.
(U) COHEN had conversations with TRUMP on multiple occasions related to TTM and traveling to Russia.

COHEN received an email from a young lady requesting a call to discuss the TTM project. COHEN called and spoke to a woman named ELENA or YELENA (ELENA),
ELENA said she would put together notes and pass them along. The financial benefit was enormous. The signed LOI. The TRUMP ORG was in a position to make hundreds of millions of dollars. TRUMP thought his campaign would be "the greatest infomercial" ever created.
history. The brand would get out and opportunities would come.

They thought about how much the campaign could bring in with the "infomercial".

brief mini-conversations with TRUMP about TTM.

TRUMP would ask what was going on with TTM.

There were dozens of mini-conversations with TRUMP as well as conversations with DONALD TRUMP JUNIOR (JUNIOR) and IVANKA TRUMP (IVANKA) about TTM.

(U) COHEN spoke to JUNIOR about TTM.
(U) IVANKA wanted to get a "starchitect" on board with the project. COHEN thought his phone call with ELENA had an effect. The Russian government liked the project.

(U) JUNIOR brought up his previous experience with a TRUMP TOWER MOSCOW deal. COHEN recalled he spoke to TRUMP about dates for travel to Moscow and he spoke to RHONA GRAFF (GRAFF) about getting a copy of TRUMP's passport. GRAFF later brought TRUMP's passport to COHEN's office.
COHEN was still advising TRUMP he was speaking with SATER.

(U) As TRUMP's campaign started to do well in the end of January 2016, COHEN and TRUMP continued to speak about TTM. COHEN kept TRUMP informed that the project was still in the sphere. TRUMP did not say to not do the project because of the campaign.

Both COHEN and TRUMP wanted TTM to succeed.
COHEN had still not seen piece of land for the property or information on the land for the property. COHEN did not want to travel to Moscow for no reason, he needed to see the property.

(U) COHEN told TRUMP about the invitation to the St. Petersburg Economic Forum and that PUTIN and/or MEDVEDEV may be there. TRUMP told COHEN to talk to COREY LEWANDOWSKI (LEWANDOWSKI) about potential dates for travel assuming COHEN could "lock and load" on the deal. TRUMP would be willing to travel if COHEN was ready to lock and load.

COHEN went to LEWANDOWSKI for dates, but COHEN would have had to go back to LEWANDOWSKI after the RNC.
(U) COHEN did not go to the St. Petersburg Economic Forum because he never got the invite.

(U) COHEN had a quick conversation with TRUMP. COHEN did not want to tell TRUMP the project was over. If COHEN later came back with the project again, TRUMP would complain the project was on-again-off-again.

The "agenda" was to minimize the Russia relationship; to shut it down; TTM never took place, so what was the difference in saying when it ended [in January]; minimize, minimize, minimize; stay on point; and discredit the investigation by staying on point.

COHEN wanted to support the WHITE HOUSE and TRUMP.

the statement to Congress

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was sent to all members of the JDA.

(U) COHEN stuck to the "party line," there was no relationship to Russia; COHEN and TRUMP spoke about the staying on "message."

COHEN was not concerned knew COHEN made an inaccurate statement because he kept to the party line.

(U) The hope was the party line would put an end to the Mueller Investigation.
It was important to say the deal was done in January 2016 because shortened the period of time for any relationship with Russia.

COHEN did brief TRUMP, JUNIOR, and IVANKA along the way. COHEN briefed JUNIOR in May or June as well. was not idle chit-chat, it was a potential $1 Billion deal.

COHEN's legal fees were initially being paid by TRUMP ORG. All fees were paid by the TRUMP ORG, which was extremely important to COHEN.

COHEN needed the power of the President to take care of him. He would defend TRUMP to stay on message.
(U) Post-Search Outreach

(U) After the FBI searches of COHEN, individuals reached out to COHEN to provide support. After the search, he saw COHEN and told him the boss loves you, from these messages, COHEN understood he had support of the WHITE HOUSE to watch his back if he toed the line. He said he was with "the Boss" in Mar-A-Lago and TRUMP said "he loves you," and not to worry. "everyone knows the boss has your back." COHEN was to stay on message and be part of the team.
RTSKHILADZE wanted to do a TTM project as well, but it did not move forward because TRUMP ORG already had the LOI in place with SATER.
(U) After the initial text messages with RTSKHILADZE, COHEN spoke to TRUMP,
When JUNIOR said he had a meeting to get some dirt on CLINTON, to COHEN, it did not sound like the first time TRUMP heard about it.
Michael Dean Cohen, date of birth [redacted] was interviewed in the Special Counsel's Office, located at 395 E Street SE, Washington, D.C. in the presence of his attorneys Guy Petrillo and Amy Lester from the law offices of Petrillo Klein & Boxer LLP, 655 Third Avenue, New York, NY. Participating in the interview were FBI Special Agent (SA) [redacted], Intelligence Analyst (IA) [redacted], Senior Counselor to the Special Counsel James L. Quarles, Senior Assistant Special Counsel (SASC) Jeannie S. Rhee, SASC Andrew D. Goldstein, and Assistant Special Counsel (ASC) L. Rush Atkinson. Also in attendance were Counselor to the Special Counsel Michael Dreeben and ASC Elizabeth Prelogar. Pursuant to signing a proffer agreement and after being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents, Cohen provided the following information:

Response to Congressional Inquiry

Cohen spoke to Jay Sekulow almost immediately after he received a letter from the House [of Representatives] requesting testimony. Sean Hannity recommended Sekulow and gave his name and phone number to Cohen. Since the request was for voluntary testimony, Sekulow told Cohen to say "thanks, but no thanks." Sekulow ultimately decided to represent President Donald Trump instead of Cohen, and provided Cohen a list of lawyers that were not either conflicted or who had not already said they would not represent people associated with the White House. Cohen retained [redacted] about two weeks later.

Cohen made an appointment for himself and Sekulow to meet with Trump at the White House to talk about the request from the House of Representatives. Cohen did not recall the exact date he and Sekulow met with Trump, but remembered he spent the night at the Trump Hotel in Washington, D.C. the night prior, and thought he would have records of the stay. After being told there were records of a meeting at the White House on May 18, 2017, Cohen thought that might have been the date of the meeting.
The intent of the meeting was to get direction from Trump and talk about what Cohen should do. At that time, Cohen did not have his trumporg email account and everything was being funneled through Alan Garten. Cohen told Trump that he had initially responded that he would not participate in a voluntary interview, and Trump asked why Cohen responded that way and questioned why he would not cooperate. Cohen told Trump it was a request, not a subpoena. Cohen took a copy of his letter with him and Trump read it and told Cohen to just cooperate. Cohen thought the request had been for documents related to a whole slew of issues, and he did not have them or have access to his documents. Leaving the meeting, Cohen understood the direction from Trump was to cooperate.

The Trump Tower Moscow project did not come up in that first meeting with Trump and Sekulow. Cohen did not recall when he understood the request from Congress was not just about the dossier, but also may include Trump Tower Moscow. Cohen thought it took over three months to get the joint defense agreement (JDA) created. Cohen gave document requests to Garten and Alan Futerfas, and they were going to provide the relevant documents. Eventually received emails and attachments from Cohen's account, for a series of specified terms. Cohen thought the emails came in closer in time to when the letter to Congress was written.

In drafting the letter to Congress about the dossier, Cohen first spoke to his counsel, but thought there were a lot of communications with a lot of people about the letter. The goal was to put the letter out through the media and get ahead of the story. Cohen said it was the same model used by Jared Kushner.

In drafting the letter to Congress about the Trump Tower Moscow project, Cohen first spoke to and another attorney at the law firm, James Commons. Cohen spoke to Trump on the telephone about the letter, but did not recall telling him specific details, just that he planned to put a letter out in response. Cohen and Sekulow, who was representing Trump, spoke all of the time. Sekulow was a conduit for Trump. He would tell Cohen that he had just talked to Trump, things were going to be okay, things were under control, and reassured Cohen of Trump's warm feelings toward him.

Cohen did not recall specifically raising with Sekulow that the information in the letter about Trump Tower Moscow was false. He did recall that Sekulow said to limit the information, to keep on message, things were going to be fine, they were all in this together, and to stay on course. Cohen's impression was that Sekulow was embracing him, because Cohen knew Sekulow was speaking to about the letter as well. Cohen understood from his conversations with Sekulow that he should keep the
statements short and tight. The message was that the deal did not happen, Trump had nothing to do with it, and there was nothing to see there. Cohen talked to Sekulow "all the time" and they talked a lot about the investigation.

Cohen said a lot of the information in the letter came from the documents provided by Trump Org. Cohen and Sekulow did not have a conversation about the disconnect between the facts and the content of the letter. Their discussion was more about staying on message, not on specifics. Sekulow told Cohen to keep it short and that that the investigation was not going anywhere. Cohen did not tell Sekulow specifically that there were more than just three meetings about Trump Tower Moscow between himself and Trump, but did tell Sekulow that there was more to the story. Sekulow told Cohen to keep the letter tight and the extra detail was not needed. Cohen understood the letter was passed around to people in the drafting phase.

Cohen told ____ while the letter was being drafted that he had received a call back from Peskov's office and did not restrict ____ ability to share that information in the JDA. Cohen believed Sekulow knew everything ____ knew. Sekulow and ____ were running the show at that time. Sekulow was also dealing with Futerfas and Garten, who knew a lot.

When Cohen and ____ received the documents from Trump Org, they sat down together and went through them. Cohen was not sure if the documents showed that Poliakova had called Cohen back after he reached out. Cohen recalled having a conversation with ____ in which he told ____ that he got a call back from a woman after he reached out to the Kremlin and was told that if there was more interest on their end, Peskov or someone would call him back. Cohen told ____ that no one ever called him back after that call. They ultimately decided to leave that part out of it. Cohen thought he discussed the call as if Poliakova was a low level employee.

Cohen did not tell ____ he was uncomfortable with the letter. Cohen was just part of the team. He answered the questions in a concise matter and stayed on message.

Cohen thought ____ drafted the first version of the letter to Congress about Trump Tower Moscow, based off of notes Cohen provided to him. Cohen's notes were generated from his memory, and he had nothing to refresh his recollection when he wrote the notes. ____ wrote a letter of his own and incorporated some of Cohen's stuff.

Cohen reviewed the August 28, 2017 letter to Congress, in particular the statement "do not recall any response to my email." Cohen said that line made it into the letter, even though he had received a call back, because he did not recall who the woman was, and there was no follow up after that.
call. Cohen did not recall whether he spoke to [Agent note: Cohen stated he would like the opportunity to review additional documents in the possession of his attorney before further discussions about the August 28, 2017 letter.] about that specific line. Cohen tried to keep everything short and simple and it was ultimately decided that part was not relevant for the purpose of the letter.

Cohen reviewed a document Bates stamped MDC-H-000690, an email dated 1/14/2016 to email address info@prpress.gov.ru, with subject line Trump Tower-Moscow. After the call back from Poliakova in Peskov's office, Cohen told Felix Sater about the call. Cohen relayed that he had a lengthy call with Peskov's office and that the woman he spoke to had a lot of questions and that they were in tune with the project. Up to that point, Cohen had questioned Sater's integrity. Cohen did not mention Sater to Poliakova, but did mention IC Expert. Sater used the call back from Poliakova as a way to continue the conversation and keep the project alive.

Cohen reviewed a document Bates stamped FSO0011, which showed text messages between himself and Sater. Text message #56, from Sater to Cohen, dated 1/21/2016 said "It's about Putin they called today." Cohen did not know who "they" was in the text message. Sater may have gotten a call from someone, but Cohen did not know from who.

Cohen did not recall telling anyone in Trump Org specifically about the call with Poliakova. The only person Cohen would have told was Trump. He thought he would have said it just was not going anywhere yet, and Trump said to keep him posted. Cohen recalled he told Trump that he spoke to someone administrative who asked a ton of questions and was very professional. Cohen remembered he said he wished they had someone that good working for them. Trump and Cohen had a short conversation, and Cohen did not relay the sum and substance of the call with Poliakova.

**UNGA 2015**

Cohen recalled that in 2015, the news reported that [former President Barack] Obama refused to meet with [Russian President Vladimir] Putin at UNGA [United Nations General Assembly]. Trump said it was stupid of Obama to say that. (Trump had said many times he thought he would get along with Putin.) After Trump's comment, Cohen told him that if Trump wanted, Cohen could reach out to Putin's office and try to arrange a meeting between the two of them. Cohen suggested it would be funny for the two men to meet at Trump Tower and have a burger. Trump agreed it was a good idea, and would be funny, and to go ahead and reach out.
After that conversation, Cohen went on Hannity's show and said publicly that Trump may meet with Putin. After Cohen went on Hannity's show, Trump asked a handful of times for updates.

Cohen did a google search for a phone number and called it from his office, but he was not sure if he used his office phone or his cell phone. Cohen called the Kremlin and spoke to a woman about the idea of Putin and Trump meeting. The woman that answered said she would speak to a supervisor and get back to him. She mentioned the name Sergei Ivanov and said he should reach out to Ambassador Kislyak. Cohen asked for the woman's email address and sent his contact information to her by sending her an email with his signature block. Cohen recalled her email address had .ru at the end, but was not sure if it was gov.ru.

When he did not hear back after that first call, Cohen reached out again, using the same number, and spoke to the same woman. He thought the second call was two or three days before Putin was supposed to arrive for UNGA. The woman told him it would not follow protocol for Putin to meet with Trump, and Cohen relayed that message to Trump.

Cohen was shown documents reflecting telephone calls from his cell phone number, to the telephone numbers and dates of connection listed below. Cohen was also provided an opportunity to review his telephone contacts for the numbers.

9/28/2015:

11/17/2015:

1/6/2016:

6/9/2017:

After reviewing his telephone directory, Cohen stated none of the numbers were in his contacts and he did not know who the calls were to.

Cohen affirmed that it was false when he previously said he never discussed the idea of the Putin lunch with Trump.

Miss Universe 2013

Cohen, Trump, and were all members of the Miss Universe Pageant Board that decided on the location of the Miss Universe Pageant in Moscow in 2013. There were also three people on the board from NBC, plus
would have served as a tie breaker if necessary, but the decision was unanimous to set the pageant in Moscow.

Cohen was not aware of any interest on the part of Trump to meet with Russian government officials during the pageant. Cohen was not aware of outreach to various government officials. Cohen had the impression Putin would attend the pageant. Cohen had that impression because the pageant was happening in Putin's "backyard" and also because he had a conversation with Trump in which Trump wondered aloud if Putin was going to show up. Cohen recalled Putin sent Trump a nice letter, but Cohen had never seen it. He had heard general mentions of the letter in conversations in Trump's office.

Trump was unhappy with the ratings the Miss Universe pageant got that year. Because of the time zone difference, the winner was announced in the United States before people woke up, and no one wanted to watch the pageant on TV.

Cohen did not attend the Miss Universe 2013 pageant.

**Relationship with Felix Sater**

Cohen met Sater when he was around fifteen years old. It was not true that they grew up together, but accurate to say they went to the same clubs with the same groups of girls. Cohen grew up in Long Island, not Brooklyn. Cohen and Sater were re-acquainted at the backyard barbecue of a mutual friend. When Sater was involved in Trump SoHo, Cohen saw more of him around, but Cohen was not himself in the Trump Org at that time. Prior to the Trump Tower Moscow project, Cohen and Sater had not worked together on a real estate deal that got all the way to signing an LOI.

The Trump Tower Moscow project was Sater's project, not Cohen's project. Sater needed Cohen to advance the project. Sater had done two other projects with Trump Org before Trump Tower Moscow - Trump SoHo and a property in Fort Lauderdale. Trump SoHo was a success, but while the property in Fort Lauderdale was built, it was not Trump branded.

Sater had a way of getting deals done. He was a sort of conduit between developers, land owners, and realtors. If Trump Tower Moscow worked out, there would be a huge pay day for both Sater and Cohen, but Sater was concerned he would get pushed out because he had bad blood with Garten, Trump, Ivanka Trump, and Donald Trump, Jr. Sater needed Cohen's help to navigate.
Cohen told Sater repeatedly they needed a piece of property to build on before they could go forward. Trump and the Trump children all wanted to know about it. None of the Trump children was assigned to the project because there was not a full deal in place.

Cohen said Trump Tower Moscow would be a multi-year project that he would spearhead. Cohen was hopeful it would work out, but not optimistic. Sater had said he had high level connections in Russia, but Cohen had no other evidence of it. Sater threw out the names of Putin's people, like Ivanov, just to keep you interested. Sater told Cohen that he was the one that arranged for Ivanka Trump to sit in Putin's chair in the Kremlin.

Cohen was not aware of whether or not Sater and Sergei Millian had a relationship.

**Sergei Millian**

Cohen reviewed a document that listed a series of LinkedIn messages from Sergei Millian to Cohen. Cohen did not recall ever seeing the messages. Cohen added Millian told him in 2016 that he was involved with the Russian American Chamber of Commerce. Other than their communications in 2016, Cohen recalled no other communications.

Cohen did not recall the messages from Millian in 2016 in which Millian stated he wanted to be on the foreign policy advisor team. Cohen did recall Millian mentioned in one of their initial phone conversations a desire to be on the team, and Cohen told Millian to call the campaign.

Cohen thought some of the things Millian said did not make sense. Cohen asked Millian who he was and why he spoke on behalf of Trump. Cohen told Millian to stop speaking on behalf of Trump. Millian said he worked at Trump Fort Lauderdale, but [ ] told Cohen that Millian never worked there.

Cohen did not recall ever responding to messages on LinkedIn. He has 11,000 contacts on LinkedIn. Cohen assumed, but did not know for sure, that Millian emailed him because the LinkedIn messages did not work. Cohen finally told Millian to stop contacting him and to stop using Trump's name.

Cohen's email address is quite available to the public.
Cohen met a month before the Inauguration, around December, having dinner with who is from and is also friends with Cohen. introduced Cohen and Cohen recalled there were no significant discussions when he met and it was just an introduction.

Cohen and met a few times after. The two discussed attending the Inauguration, for which bought two tickets. Cohen and talked about doing some business together post-Inauguration, which was fueled by since he made the introduction.

Columbus [Nova], had invested in some of

The pitch was to assist in Columbus Nova's infrastructure fund. invests in several different areas. At the time, there were discussions of significant foreign investment interest dedicated to U.S. infrastructure. Trump ran around the world claiming he received assurances of $250 Billion investment from places like Saudi Arabia and China. The infrastructure fund's purpose was to capitalize off of some of that investment. Infrastructure development requires two things, concrete and
Interview of Michael Cohen

Steel rebar. Cohen recalled the infrastructure fund with the infrastructure fund had a good track record, so it made sense to assist in bringing it foreign investment.

In Cohen's discussions with Cohen did not provide any non-public information. Cohen was not selling non-public information. Cohen could assist because Cohen understood Trump and what Trump was looking for.

Essential Consultants

Cohen's work as Essential Consultants was in a consultant and advisory role specific to whatever the company he was working with needed. In the run up to the 2016 election, Cohen estimated one thousand people were hired in Washington, D.C., all of whom had relationships with Hillary Clinton. After Clinton lost the election, those one thousand people were out of jobs because none understood Trump. Cohen was outside the administration, he knew Trump, and he had made television appearances related to his relationship with Trump, so Cohen was a perfect fit to assist companies. Cohen worked with five or six companies.

Novartis

Cohen gave the example of Novartis, a pharmaceutical company. Cohen knew at the time that Trump wanted to create jobs. Cohen researched on his own, and saw that there was no U.S.-based manufacturing of antibiotics. So, Cohen recommended to Novartis to build a manufacturing plant in the U.S. Cohen also knew from his work with the RNC where the "purple" states were. Cohen recommended Novartis build an antibiotic manufacturing plant in a purple state. This would please Trump, making Novartis look like a hero to Trump. This idea was all based on Cohen's knowledge of Trump and the U.S. map in terms of red/blue/purple states.

Trump hates the fact that pharmaceuticals cost so much. Cohen told that if there was not a drastic reduction in pricing, then he was wasting his time. Trump's agenda was all about reducing the price on drugs, not increasing.

Cohen did receive talking points, "talkers," about drug pricing from Novartis that he was supposed to take to Trump. However Cohen did not recall the topic coming up in conversation with the President.
Cohen had insight into Trump nobody else had, other than maybe Trump's adult children. Cohen did not tell Trump what he was doing as a consultant, because it did not come up. Cohen also thought Trump did not care what Cohen was doing. Cohen may have told people at the Trump Org that he was working as an advisor for some companies.

Trump is an anomaly. Cohen said a company could make more money spending one minute with a person who knows Trump than spending 365 days with an expert in the field. Cohen understood Trump.

Cohen did not tell Trump he was selling advice on how Trump thinks. Cohen did not have a lot of contact with folks at the Trump Org because he was busy trying to set up his own shop. It is possible Cohen mentioned his selling advice to Trump Jr. at a dinner.

Cohen did not have contacts or introductions. Cohen did have contacts on the inside, like [redacted] and Kellyanne Conway, whom Cohen brought into the campaign. Cohen also knew [redacted] 

A couple of years ago, [redacted] had outreach to OPIC [Overseas Private Investment Corporation]. Cohen asked [redacted] if they had received [redacted] request. Cohen was looking to have [redacted] request moved to the top of the pile, not for a rubber stamp.

Cohen did not know what Trump knew, so he did not know if Trump knew the nature of Cohen's consulting shop, but Cohen did not discuss it with Trump. Conversations with Trump's adult children did not indicate to Cohen that Trump knew what Essential Consultants was about.

**Yamo**

Cohen recalled [redacted] was investing in a company called Yamo, which was a pharmaceutical company that had a promising experimental autism drug going into Stage II with the FDA. [redacted] was looking for investors and to build relationships around the company. Cohen put [redacted] in touch with [redacted] Cohen and [redacted] sit on a board together, so Cohen put [redacted] in touch with him as well.

**KAI**

Cohen recalled KAI, Korean Aerospace Industries, was attempting to develop a footprint in the Middle East. "The Middle East" had already bought Raptor training planes years before Trump was elected. Also, Cohen had represented [redacted] Cohen put [redacted] KAI in touch with [redacted] for a deal on parts distribution for KAI.
Cohen stated that this entire deal had nothing to do with the United States.

**FrutaPOP**

Cohen recalled the deal with FrutaPOP, which was created by a friend of Cohen's from college. The company makes ice pops infused with less than 5% alcohol. Cohen does not drink alcohol, but recalled that "chewed them up." Cohen had a relationship with a buddy named (NFI) who could make a machine to mass produce the pops. At the time FrutaPOP was making the ice pops in small batches, which was inefficient. Cohen wanted investment to help purchase the machinery.

**Lobbying**

Cohen did not recall any indication that someone specifically directed these business opportunities to Cohen. Cohen was not lobbying and was not working government relations. Cohen wrote into his contracts that he specifically would not lobby.

Before the inauguration, Cohen told Trump he would not lobby. When the two sat down to discuss Cohen's title as Trump's personal attorney, Cohen said he was not going to lobby and not going to do government relations. Cohen recalled that Trump asked everyone that when they left the campaign, transition, or administration, to not become a lobbyist. Trump made Cohen sign papers that said he would not lobby for three or five years after leaving Trump Org. Cohen told Trump he would not lobby as a response to Trump asking Cohen not to do so.

There was a company that produces artificial turf that wanted Cohen to lobby. China produces turf at a fraction of the cost of production in the U.S. This group wanted Cohen to use his access to lobby, but Cohen said no. This is why Cohen had a relationship with Squire Patton Boggs; it allowed Cohen to refer groups like this to the company for lobbying. In this instance, Cohen put them in touch with.

Cohen was not concerned about Trump finding out about what Cohen was doing as Essential Consultants, even though there is a lot of overlap between consulting and lobbying. Cohen was not taking the needs of these companies to Washington, D.C. or to the head of the FDA. Cohen would tell them where to open a new factory, so it was helpful to the RNC and would make Trump happy.
Cohen became aware that [ REDACTED ] was [ REDACTED ] after he met [ REDACTED ] but before they started working together. Cohen met [ REDACTED ] before the Inauguration. Prior to this, Cohen only knew [ REDACTED ] by name. Cohen knew [ REDACTED ] Cohen stated that [ REDACTED ] but Cohen did not know anything specific about [ REDACTED ]

Cohen was shown an email from January 10, 2017 with the subject line "About us / Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs." Cohen said the email did not jog a memory of the conversation with [ REDACTED ]

Cohen recalled that [ REDACTED ] requested to meet Trump, but he did not remember whether they met or not. [ REDACTED ]

Cohen does not recall if Trump was available. It was common for people to want to stop in and meet Trump.

Cohen recalled discussing [ REDACTED ] purchasing two tickets for the Inauguration and that one ticket was for himself and he intended to bring [ REDACTED ] used to work for [ REDACTED ] originally a significant investor in [ REDACTED ] company. [ REDACTED ] has stepped away from [ REDACTED ] company over the years creating his own fund with other investors outside of [ REDACTED ]

[ REDACTED ] wanted Cohen to join Essential Consultants to use his contacts to help raise capital. [ REDACTED ] outreach to Cohen was on his own and not connected to [ REDACTED ] did not need Cohen to raise capital from [ REDACTED ]

Cohen had no contact with [ REDACTED ] separate and apart from his work with [ REDACTED ] Cohen went to [ REDACTED ] office once with [ REDACTED ] Cohen recalled discussing a deal of [ REDACTED ] involving [ REDACTED ]
Cohen knew from BTA Bank through did not ask Cohen for anything, Cohen just happened to mention he knew and said he was a good guy.

Cohen did not know how that topic came up, they talked about a dozen other things too. and Cohen may have talked about when asked Cohen to meet.

Cohen met after the inauguration, around March 2017 when he showed up at home. Cohen did not know would be there. was trying to ___ but Cohen did not think that deal went further.

Cohen was in Kazakhstan working on a Trump Tower project with Giorgi Ritzkilhadze. While there, Cohen met Cohen gave his business card and after reading it stormed out of the room. A few minutes later, returned and asked Cohen if he was related to Sacha Baron Cohen — was really angry. [AGENT NOTE: Sacha Baron Cohen played the character Borat, who is supposed to be from Kazakhstan]

After the election, Cohen had no meetings or contemplation of securing Russian Investment money with or Cohen was not approached for Russian Investment.

**Anthony Scaramucci**

Anthony Scaramucci wanted help with raising capital, and his name recognition was similar to Cohen's at the time. and all wanted a piece of the infrastructure funds. Cohen was a natural fit.

Cohen's discussions with Scaramucci occurred after the inauguration. Cohen was friends with Scaramucci from before; Cohen brought Scaramucci onto the Trump Campaign. Trump beat up Scaramucci on the campaign. Lots of Scaramucci's investors were from when Scaramucci was supporting Jeb Bush. (ph) had a relationship to Trump Jr., so they could not go to Scaramucci, so they went to Cohen instead.

There was no actual capital raising with Scaramucci that Cohen could recall.
Cohen met at an RNC Event at the Trump International Hotel in Washington, DC. brought with her. This event was the first time Cohen had seen Trump in a while, and Trump singled Cohen out during his remarks. Cohen raised a ton of money for Trump. Trump said he missed Cohen -- it was a heartfelt shout-out. Trump's comments made the Trump approach Cohen and bring with her. She introduced the individuals as Cohen stayed in touch with for an "easy check," for easy fundraising.

Cohen had a preexisting relationship with from years before. Cohen was on the Board of Columbia Grammar and Preparatory School.

The school always had a gap between the money brought in through fundraising and the amount needed for their 117 scholarship students. Cohen approached for fundraising for the school. During the campaign, multiple people, including Cohen, reached out to for a donation for the RNC. Cohen has had no other contact with other than for the school.

Cohen met through Trump; and became close to Cohen and . Cohen met many times in Trump's office. Trump tasked with Cohen introduced to who was an Cohen "fundraised the heck" out of . Cohen did not have a business relationship with they were friends.

Ukrainian Peace Plan

Cohen recalled no other Ukrainian "Peace Plans" during the transition or shortly after the inauguration, other than the one previously discussed involving and Felix Sater. Cohen was not contacted by anyone through is a U.S. Citizen

MoneyGram
Cohen attempted to send $5000 through MoneyGram to Russia. Cohen's transfer was rejected the first time he tried, so he went to another MoneyGram location and was able to send the funds.

**Misc**

In a prior interview with the FBI, Cohen stated he witnessed something involving the Inauguration he wanted to discuss but there may be privilege issues preventing him from discussing it. [Cohen's attorney Guy Petrillo said he was unsure if they had worked through all privilege issues.] Cohen did not know this information from any source independent of the potential privileged source.

Cohen did not recall the name...
Michael D. Cohen was telephonically interviewed by representatives of the Special Counsel's Office. Cohen was joined by members of his legal team. Present for the interview from the SCO were FBI Special Agent Intelligence Analyst Senior Counselor to the Special Counsel James L. Quarles, Senior Assistant Special Counsel (SASC) Andrew Goldstein, SASC Jeannie Rhee, Counselor to the Special Counsel Michael Dreeben, and Assistant Special Counsel Elizabeth Prelogar. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the nature of the interview, Cohen provided the following information:

Cohen was reminded that he was required to be truthful and that providing deliberately false information could be a crime, which he acknowledged.

Trump Tower Moscow:

Cohen recalled two occasions during the campaign in which he raised traveling to Russia, once in December 2015 and again in spring 2016. In approximately mid-December 2015, Felix Sater asked Cohen for copies of Cohen's and (then candidate) Donald Trump's passports. Cohen asked Rhona Graff for Trump's passport, but did not get it. He sent Sater a copy of his own passport, however. Cohen was not sure, but he thought he spoke to Corey Lewandowski about traveling to Russia in December. Cohen recalled that he also talked to Dave Bossie about scheduling, and Bossie indicated there were dates on the schedule that were available, but that things were filling up fast. Cohen believed he spoke to Lewandowski and Bossie about travel to Russia in December, rather than in the spring of 2016, because by spring 2016, there were not as many dates available for travel because the campaign had progressed. Cohen was not certain of the timing of his discussions with Lewandowski and Bossie.

Cohen did not recall speaking to anyone other than Trump about potential travel to Russia in the spring of 2016 for the St. Petersburg Economic Forum. He thought he probably talked to someone in the campaign about it, but did not have a specific recollection.
In June or July 2016, in a brief conversation, Cohen told Trump that the Trump Tower Moscow project was going nowhere and he had gotten nothing to indicate that the development company had a piece of property on which to build. Trump told Cohen it was "too bad" and they essentially stopped talking about it after that. Cohen believed the Trump Tower Moscow project was not formally ended until December 2016, when he believed the Trump Organization terminated it and other "licensee opportunity" projects. Cohen thought Alan Garten sent out a form letter terminating the project, but he did not actually ever see it. Cohen never verified that the letter went out. Cohen did not talk to Trump about the termination of the Trump Tower Moscow project. Trump did not tell Cohen that he (Trump) decided to end the project or that Cohen should stop pursuing it.

Cohen noted that he found it "interesting" that prior to the point in time when they stopped talking about Trump Tower Moscow, Trump would publicly state that he had nothing to do with Russia and shortly after turn to Cohen to ask what was going on with Russia.

Cohen did not recall whether Sater had any involvement in drafting the statement about Trump Tower Moscow that Cohen submitted to Congress. He thought it would be odd that Sater would have been included on the email, rather than Sater's attorney, Cohen did not recall speaking to Sater before his congressional testimony.

**Statements Regarding Trump/Putin Meeting at UNGA:**

Cohen made a conscious decision to keep Trump out of the narrative about his attempt to set up a meeting between Trump and Putin during the UN General Assembly. Cohen told Jay Sekulow the whole story about his attempt to set up a meeting between Putin and Trump, and Trump's role in it, and they talked about keeping Trump out of the narrative. When Cohen was drafting his statement to Congress regarding Trump Tower Moscow, Sekulow said the story was not relevant and not to include it. Cohen did not recall discussing with Sekulow what to say if the topic came up in his actual testimony.

Cohen did not recall his exact testimony to SSCI [Senate Select Committee on Intelligence] regarding the UN General Assembly meeting. [Agent note: Cohen's attorney reminded him that they had recently clarified to the committee the details of Cohen's attempts to schedule the meeting during the UN General Assembly, and had explained that Cohen and Trump had conversations about it, contrary to Cohen's initial congressional testimony.]
Cohen knew he was supposed to stay on message and be a loyal soldier for Trump. It was ingrained in all of them to say that there were no deals, no money, no Russia, no collusion, it was a witch hunt. Cohen said "I know what the President is saying when he looks at you and says 'no Russia, no collusion, this is all going away, and it's a witch hunt.'"

Discussions with President Trump:

Cohen and Sekulow met with Trump in the White House on May 18, 2017, after Cohen had received an invitation from Congress to be interviewed. Cohen, acting on the advice of Sekulow, had told the committee that he declined their invitation but then later received a subpoena to appear. In their discussions that day, the President told Cohen to cooperate and that there was nothing there, there was no Russia, and no collusion. Pardons did not come up in that conversation.

At some point, Cohen and Sekulow discussed the concept of pre-pardons on a phone call. Cohen thought it was around the time Trump said he could put an end to the investigations and shut them all down. They discussed the idea of pre-pardoning, that is, to pardon everyone so that no one had to comply with anything. Cohen said that they learned that doing so would actually result in people having to cooperate with everything and that the blanket immunity provided by a pre-pardon meant people would not even have the right to take the Fifth.

Cohen did not directly ask Trump for a pardon. However, some time shortly after the point at which Cohen retained as his attorney, Cohen and Sekulow discussed pardons. Cohen thought that around then, Trump was always "dangling" pardons and talking about (former National Security Advisor) Mike Flynn and (former Trump campaign manager) Paul Manafort. When Trump discussed pardons in public, Cohen asked to contact Rudy Giuliani and Sekulow to ask what was going on with pardons, and the word back was that they were not talking about pardons for anyone at that time. Cohen took it as a "not now," not that it would never happen. Cohen did not recall Sekulow ever having told him he would not get a pardon. Cohen was left with the impression that Trump was going to take care of everyone and everything.

After the raids on his home and office, Cohen reached out to Sekulow directly and the topic of pardons came up. Sekulow did not say it would not happen. Sekulow said to stay on message, there was no Russia, no collusion, it was a witch hunt, and everyone would be fine. Cohen thought
he would get a pardon or Trump would do "something else" that would make things okay for him. Cohen thought "something else" could have been something like shutting down the Special Counsel's Office.

Shortly after the raids at Cohen's home and office, Cohen and Trump spoke on the phone. Before his phones were taken away, Cohen asked for access to them and copied four telephone numbers. One of them was _______ who managed Trump's schedule. Cohen called to let her know about the searches so she could tell Trump and he would not have to see it on TV. Cohen gave _______ his wife's cell phone number. Cohen thought he bought a new cell phone the next day.

Trump called Cohen a few days after the raids either on his cell phone, which he provided as _______ or on his wife's cell phone. Cohen had a new phone by then, so he could have received the call on his own phone. Trump told Cohen to "hang in there" and said the raids must have been rough and Cohen should "stay strong." Trump told Cohen that the whole thing was a witch hunt. They did not talk about pardons on that call. Cohen has never talked directly to Trump about pardons. Cohen added that he has talked to Trump when Trump was using another person's phone, such as Hope Hicks, Keith Schiller, and on at least one occasion, _______.

Cohen did not discuss pardons with Trump or his legal team after his (Cohen's) interview with George Stephanopolous in July 2018. The only person Cohen talked to about pardons around then was Robert Costello. Costello never told Cohen that Cohen would not get a pardon. Costello mainly talked about his own importance and his relationship with Rudy Giuliani. Costello made it sound like it was always an option to get a pardon. Costello was very angry when Cohen hired Guy Petrillo as his attorney.

Trump Organization Role in Cohen's Legal Expenses:

Cohen said that when he first received document requests and subpoenas for things related to Trump Tower Moscow, it seemed to him that he was doing work in furtherance of the Trump Organization's interests, and believed that the Trump Organization should pay his legal fees.

After the raids at his home and office, four million documents were seized that required review. _______ law firm, McDermott Will & Emery, was the only one in the joint defense agreement (JDA) with the
capacity to host all of the documents so they could be shared among the members of the JDA. Cohen thought that the deal was that the law firm would house the documents and coordinate the sharing.

About a month and a half to two months after the raids, Cohen told Cohen that he had not been paid and his firm was giving him a hard time about it. Cohen learned that the Trump Organization had paid some, but not all, of the bills they owed. The bills really started to pile up, between the privilege review, the Relativity system, and the personnel needed to work on everything.

thought the Trump Organization stiffed McDermott Will & Emery, and asked Cohen to help with Alan Garten and others in the JDA. Cohen contacted Garten, who said they would not leave him high and dry.

Cohen said that at some point while he was participating in the JDA, and a lot of people had access to the documents, a lot of his own personal information was leaked to the press.

Administrative:

The original notes will be maintained in the IA section of the case file.
Sarah Huckabee Sanders was interviewed at the Special Counsel’s Office, located at 395 E Street Southwest, Washington, D.C. Also present were her attorneys, from Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan. Participating in the interview were FBI Special Agent, FBI Intelligence Analyst, and Senior Counselor to the Special Counsel James L. Quarles III, and Senior Assistant Special Counsel Andrew D. Goldstein. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the purpose of the interview, Sanders provided the following information:
FBI Director James Comey termination:

the President expressed displeasure that his team was not out defending his decision in the media.
Sanders described her comment about the rank-and-file of the FBI having lost confidence in Comey as something she said "in the heat of the moment" that was not really founded in anything.
she said "Look, we've heard from countless members of the FBI that say very different things." Sanders said that her use of the word "countless" was a slip of the tongue.

After the briefing, the President told her she had done a good job. The President did not tell her she had gotten anything wrong after the press briefing that day.
June 2017 comments about terminating the Special Counsel:

She asked the President for a response directly before speaking to the press on Air Force One. The answer she gave the press is the answer the President gave her.

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FBI(19cv1278)-1194
June 9, 2016 Trump Tower meeting and July 2017 media coverage:
Sanders was provided a copy of the transcript from her August 1, 2017 press briefing (not Bates stamped) in which she said, “the President weighed in, as any father would, based on the limited information he had” and “he certainly didn’t dictate” the statement. She talked to the President immediately before the press briefing and distinctly remembered he said he “weighed in, as any father would.”

Sanders said when she asked the President questions before doing a press briefing, he knew she intended to tell the press what he said.
Deputy Counsel to the President, Uttam Dhillon, was interviewed in FBI office space in Washington, D.C. He was accompanied by attorneys of Quinn, Emanuel, Urquhart & Sullivan LLP, (202) 538-8000. Also present and participating were SSA and SA Senior Counselor to the Special Counsel James L. Quarles; and Senior Assistant Special Counsel Andrew D. Goldstein. After being advised of the potential criminal consequences of lying to the FBI under 18 U.S.C 1001, Dhillon provided the following information:
He told them, "I know you told me not to, but I called Comey anyway." Dhillon and other WHCO attorneys had previously cautioned the President not to directly contact FBI Director James Comey.

WHCO attorneys previously told the President it was unwise to contact the FBI Director directly because it could create a perception he was interfering with investigations.
Continuation of FD-302 of (U//FOUO) Uttam Dhillon interview on 11/21/2017.
to conduct legal research on whether the President needed cause to fire the FBI Director.
the President announced in an irreversible way that [REDACTED] was firing Comey.

The President began to read a four page letter aloud, [REDACTED]
McGahn saying they should include Rosenstein and Sessions in the discussions.

Rosenstein met with McGahn and Dhillon in McGahn's office after that first meeting in the Oval Office. Sessions agreed. The basis of their concern was largely Comey's handling of the Clinton email investigation.
McGahn tried to get the President to take out the part about the three times Comey told the President he was not under investigation, but it seemed to be the most important part of the letter to the President and he insisted on keeping it in.
Rosenstein was upset about the false characterization that the firing was his idea.

In a conversation with Dhillon and McGahn the President said the communications team could not get the story right, so he was going on Lester Holt to say what really happened.
ROMAN BENIAMINOV, date of birth, place of birth, telephone, email, home address, New Jersey, work address, New Jersey, was interviewed at the Special Counsel's Office, Washington, D.C. Also present were BENIAMINOV's attorneys, Lee Anav Chung White Kim Ruger & Richter LLP, 99 Madison Avenue, 8th Floor, New York, New York, 10016, telephone 212-271-0664; Senior Assistant Special Counsel Jeannie Rhee; Assistant Special Counsel L. Rush Atkinson; Supervisory Intelligence Analyst and Intelligence Analyst. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the nature of the interview, BENIAMINOV voluntarily provided the following information:

Investigation on 01/06/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

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primarily did "PR" work for EMIN in the United States. BENIAMINOV was asked about open source reporting indicating he had told KAVELADZE about dirt on HILLARY CLINTON. BENIAMINOV does not know where the open source information came from. He does not recall if he made these statements.
(U) On 04/12/2018 and 04/13/2018 Special Agent (SA) ______________________ Intelligence Analyst ____________________ FBI Forensic Accountant ____________________ Senior Assistant Special Counsel Jeannie Rhee and Assistant Special Counsel (ASC) L. Rush Atkinson interviewed ______________________ at the Special Counsel's Office in Washington, DC. Also present were ______________________ legal counsel ____________________ and ____________________ ASC Atkinson was not present on 4/13/2018. ______________________ was admonished that the interview was voluntary and that lying to an FBI Special Agent during the conduct of an investigation has penalties under Federal statute. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview, ______________________ provided the following information:

Investigation on 04/12/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

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IKE THOMAS KAVELADZE, aka IRAKLI KAVELADZE, date of birth [______] place of birth Republic of Georgia, home address [______] cell telephone [______] was interviewed at the Special Counsel's Office, Washington, D.C. Also present were KAVELADZE's attorneys, [______] and [______] Herbert Smith Freehills New York LLP, 450 Lexington Avenue, New York, New York 10011, telephone 917-542-7600; Senior Assistant Special Counsel Jeannie Rhee; Assistant Special Counsel L. Rush Atkinson; Supervisory Intelligence Analyst [______] and Intelligence Analyst [______]. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the nature of the interview, KAVELADZE provided the following information:

- KAVELADZE grew up in [______] Georgia (former Georgian SSR)
- [______] became U.S. citizen in [______]

Investigation on 11/16/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

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At CROCUS, KAVELADZE reports to ARAS AGALAROV (ARAS).
On June 6, 2016, ARAS called KAVELADZE and asked him to travel from California to New York to take part in a meeting with someone from the TRUMP ORGANIZATION. ARAS did not provide much information. During a second call on June 6, 2016, ARAS asked KAVELADZE if he knew anything about the Magnitsky Act. KAVELADZE was familiar with it and ARAS sent him a 3 - 4 page synopsis of the meeting topics and the business card of NATALIYA VESELNITSKAYA. ARAS said the purpose of the meeting was to discuss the Magnitsky Act. KAVELADZE was supposed to act as a translator for the
they would be meeting with TRUMP, JR., JARED KUSHNER, and PAUL MANAFORT. KAVELADZE became puzzled. After seeing the list of Trump people, KAVELADZE called ROMAN BENIAMINOV who advised that VESELNITSKAYA had negative information on HILLARY CLINTON and that was the purpose of the meeting.

KAVELADZE arrived in New York on June 9, 2016. VESELNITSKAYA picked for lunch before the meeting. KAVELADZE arrived first. VESELNITSKAYA and ANATOLI SAMOCHORNOV arrived. KAVELADZE began to review the 10 - 12 page synopsis provided by VESELNITSKAYA.
The synopsis explained that BROWDER

KUSHNER appeared to be aggravated and stressed. He was really upset and said, "What are we doing here?" TRUMP, JR. then asked, "Is there anything you have on HILLARY?"

GOLDSTONE approached TRUMP, JR. after the meeting and apologized.

ARAS had asked KAVELADZE to call him after the meeting. He called KAVELADZE before KAVELADZE could call him. KAVELADZE told ARAS the meeting went well because VESELNITSKAYA was next to him. Within two hours, KAVELADZE had a second call with ARAS and provided more details. KAVELADZE told ARAS the meeting was a complete waste of time. He told ARAS the meeting was not with lawyers and they were "preaching to the wrong crowd."
Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Ike Thomas Kaveladze, On 11/16/2017, Page 12 of 12

Per DOJ/OIP
THEODORE ROOSEVELT MALLOCH, The interview was surreptitiously recorded by the interviewing Agents. MALLOCH was advised of the voluntary nature of the interview and that the interview could end at any moment of his choosing. MALLOCH was further advised that lying to an FBI Agent was a federal offense. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, MALLOCH provided the following information. The below is a summary of the recorded statements made by MALLOCH:

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

Investigation on 03/27/2018 at Boston, Massachusetts, United States (In Person)

Date drafted 04/18/2018

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MALLOCH said he met CORSI through CORSI's work at a publishing firm called WND [Note: WorldNetDaily (WND) is an American news and opinion website and online news aggregator].
MALLOCH provided his email address, he did not use any other email addresses
Theodore Roosevelt Malloch, was interviewed at the Special Counsel's Office, Patriots Plaza 1, 395 E Street SW, Washington, DC 20546. Malloch is a United States citizen who resides in the United Kingdom. Malloch's address in the United States is Present during the interview were Malloch's attorneys, and present from the Special Counsel's Office were Associate Special Counsel (ASC) Aaron Zelinsky, FBI Special Agent (SA) and FBI Intelligence Analyst (IA).

Corsi had been writing articles for WorldNetDaily (WND)

Investigation on 06/08/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # Date drafted 06/12/2018

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(U) Interview of Theodore Roosevelt
Malloch on 06/08/2018.
Malloch never made any attempts to get in touch with Assange through Farage nor did

[Redacted text]
The dinner was not the first time Malloch discussed WikiLeaks with Corsi. Malloch exchanged various emails and FaceTime calls with Corsi about the topic. Malloch assumed Malloch did not have any direct communications about Assange.

When asked if Corsi ever mentioned the name Podesta prior to the release of his emails, Malloch recalled speaking with Corsi about Podesta around that same time. Before they were released, Malloch had the impression, from his conversations with Corsi, that had a connection to Assange.
Malloch mainly communicated with Corsi, via FaceTime and emails. The two spoke about a variety of matters and Corsi would often boast about how they would soon be in the driver's seat. Malloch thought Corsi was very happy when the Podesta emails were released because he thought they contained a treasure trove of information.
Paul J. Manafort, date of birth __________ was interviewed at the Office of the Special Counsel in Washington, D.C. The interviewers were FBI Special Agents__________, Assistant Special Counsels (ASC) Jeannie S. Rhee, Andrew Weissmann and Greg Andres; and Assistant United States Attorney__________ Present representing Manafort were attorneys Richard Westling, Thomas Zehnle and Kevin Downing and paralegal__________ FBI SA__________ advised Manafort of his rights. Manafort stated that he understood his rights and that he was willing to answer questions. Manafort signed a FD-395, Advise of Rights. ASC Weissmann reviewed the terms of a letter setting forth the agreement upon which Manafort made himself available for interview. Manafort, Downing and ASC Weissmann initialed the letter agreement. After being advised of the interviewers and the nature of the interview, Manafort provided the following information:

During 09/11/2018 and 09/12/18 interviews, Manafort did not recall meeting with Kilimnik in Madrid. Manafort did not review any documents in order to help him recall meeting with Kilimnik.

Manafort met Konstantin Kilimnik in Madrid in February 2017. In response to Manafort's request, Kilimnik had been putting together background on what was occurring in Kyiv. Reporters and investigators in Kyiv were asking questions about Manafort. Kilimnik came to Madrid to update Manafort on the work of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau, information from a ledger found with Manafort's name written in it and activities by Petro Poroshenko. They met for an hour and a half at Manafort's hotel. Kilimnik reported that the criminal investigation in Ukraine was going nowhere.

Manafort did not ask Kilimnik to Madrid in order to talk about the peace plan but Kilimnik would have raised it. Because of his legal problems, Manafort would not have approached the Trump Administration about the Ukraine. At this time, Manafort did not believe that Trump had a position on the Ukraine and Russia's involvement. Manafort, however, was concerned that Trump would not be strict enough on Russia regarding the Ukraine.
While Manafort chaired Trump's campaign,

In June, Manafort had

Trump making policy speeches and meeting members of Congress. Manafort did not want Trump distracted by the titillation of a WikiLeaks's

release.

The Friday morning after the Republican Convention, Trump was supposed to give a press conference thanking the party and the people who worked to put on the convention. Trump instead attacked the party. Manafort had to deal with angry party members. The same day, WikiLeaks released more e-mails, including e-mails from Manafort and Reince Preibus, from the Republican National Committee (RNC), agreed that the RNC would handle press on the e-mails.

Trump and Manafort talked Friday afternoon. Trump and Manafort discussed how to use the e-mails. Trump told Manafort to
Manafort recalls Trump stating "Russia, if you're listening, I hope you're able to find the 30,000 emails that are missing." Manafort was surprised by the statement. Manafort and Trump had several conversations on Saturday, Sunday and Monday about the hacked emails. They never discussed that it was Russia. Manafort believes it was a spontaneous statement by Trump. Manafort does not know why Trump asked Russia as opposed to another country. In prior speeches, Trump had identified different countries as responsible - sometimes Russia, sometimes China and sometimes other countries. Over the weekend, Trump had probably talked to a lot of people about the hack and e-mails. Trump would have been talking with his "kitchen cabinet." Manafort guesses that more people than not were identifying Russia so that stuck in Trump's head.

Robby Mook held a press conference at the end of the DNC's convention week where he talked about Trump and Russia working together. Before the press conference, Manafort does not recall any discussion of Russian collusion. Manafort viewed the statement as absurd and a sign that the Clinton campaign was desperate.

Manafort viewed the drops as a gift but one that they could not control. Manafort was concerned that the next drop could contain RNC information.

Around the time of the first debate between Trump and Clinton, had supposedly released the story about Manafort's Ukraine work. On or about October 7, 2016, when the Podesta e-mails came out, Manafort Manafort told Manafort recalls that the Podesta e-mails came out on the same day as the Access Hollywood Tape but he cannot recall which came first. Trump acknowledged to Manafort that
Manafort does not know if Trump or the Trump Organization had any business in Russia. Manafort does not know if Trump or the Trump Organization owed money to anyone in Russia. Manafort did not have a conversation with Trump or anyone else as to whether there was anything negative that Manafort should know as Campaign Chair. Manafort already had the RNC book on Trump.

Interviewers read to Manafort text messages between Manafort and Kushner called Manafort.

Subsequent to Kushner's call, Manafort received a call from Kushner. Manafort never discussed whether had a solution. Manafort did not want involved. Manafort told that it had been handled. Manafort did not tell who handled it.

Manafort submitted false documents to obtain loans. Manafort is not aware of any bank personnel that knew the information was false. understood that Manafort had no income. said that we invest in people.
The Advice of Rights and Letter Agreement will be maintained in the 1-A section of this casefile.
JOHN KINNEY MASHBURN, date of birth (DOB) [ ] social security account number [ ] was interviewed at the Special Counsel's Office, 395 E Street SW, Washington, DC 20546. MASHBURN was accompanied by his attorney, [ ] from the Gammon, Howard & Zeszotarski law firm, 115 1/2 West Morgan Street, Raleigh, North Carolina 27601. [ ] telephone number is [ ]. Present from the Special Counsel's Office were Assistant Special Counsel (ASC) Aaron Zelinsky and FBI Special Agent (SA) [ ].

MASHBURN was provided with a proffer agreement for this interview. He reviewed the agreement with [ ] and they both signed it. MASHBURN was advised intentionally providing false statements to FBI Agents was a violation of federal law. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview, MASHBURN provided the following information:

CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES

MASHBURN worked as a volunteer for the DONALD J. TRUMP campaign until he became full time, in either late March or early April 2016. MASHBURN primarily worked out of the campaign's office in Alexandria, Virginia. His official title was Policy Director and he reported directly to RICK DEARBORN. SAM CLOVIS was the Policy Director prior to MASHBURN's arrival and in a sense, MASHBURN assumed CLOVIS' position when he came on board. CLOVIS was a radio surrogate and he recruited the individuals who attended the foreign policy meeting on March 31, 2016.

MASHBURN worked on domestic policy matters such as health care, the national budget, and matters related to the Armed Services. MASHBURN often reached out to various experts in those fields for policy advice and guidance. MASHBURN managed approximately four to six people during the early part of the campaign, most of which worked on foreign policy matters. The others worked on judiciary matters. WALID PHARES was an individual who worked on foreign policy. PHARES made a television appearance on behalf of the campaign which was viewed negatively by the campaign. PHARES eventually quit because he wasn't paid. A lot of campaign officials were upset about not being paid and it became an issue for the

Investigation on 06/25/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [ ] Date drafted 06/25/2018

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campaign. JD GORDON was another example. GORDON was responsible for policy matters related to the Armed Services and likely would have been paid if he had stuck around longer. GORDON and PHARES both did great work for the campaign. also worked in the Alexandria office with MASHBURN. handled both domestic and foreign policy matters.

In addition to working out of the Alexandria office, MASHBURN also had regular interactions with the campaign in New York, specifically through STEPHEN MILLER. MASHBURN referred to himself as MILLER's research assistant. MILLER often traveled with candidate TRUMP and accompanied him on his airplane.

FOREIGN POLICY MEETING ON MARCH 31, 2016

MASHBURN did not attend the foreign policy meeting at the Trump International Hotel in Washington, DC on March 31, 2016. MASHBURN was on-boarding with the campaign at the time. In addition, MASHBURN was a "domestic guy" and would have had nothing to do with a foreign policy meeting. TRUMP was close to receiving the nomination so MASHBURN was busy preparing for the general election and the debates. When asked if MASHBURN knew what was discussed at the meeting, he stated no, and relayed that GORDON had merely told him the meeting took place.

EMAIL FROM GEORGE PAPADOPoulos

MASHBURN recalled receiving an email from GEORGE PAPADOPoulos in either late May or early June 2016. MASHBURN believed he had received it while he was looking out the window of the Alexandria office. MASHBURN conducted searches for the email prior to this interview but was unable to locate it.

MASHBURN believed PAPADOPoulos sent the email prior to the Republican National Convention (RNC) but he did not have discussions about it with other members of the campaign during the RNC. MASHBURN thought PAPADOPoulos was merely trying to use headlines to make himself relevant. When MASHBURN received the email he thought, "I'm not dealing with this." If MASHBURN was to have done anything with the email, he would have
forwarded it to DEARBORN. To the best of his recollection, he did not. When asked why PAPADOPOULOS sent him the email, MASHBURN stated that PAPADOPOULOS may have viewed him as a back-channel to the New York office.

MASHBURN first met PAPADOPOULOS when he came to the Alexandria office in either late April or early May 2016. PAPADOPOULOS was working on matters related to outreach in Armenian and Greek communities and he wanted the campaign to pay for his travel expenses. MASHBURN, like the others on the campaign, were aggravated with both PAPADOPOULOS and CARTER PAGE, because they were both__________ At one point, HOPE HICKS told PAPADOPOULOS to talk to MASHBURN because PAPADOPOULOS was becoming a problem child with campaign and they wanted to get rid of him. MASHBURN believed it was CLOVIS' responsibility to control PAPADOPOULOS given that CLOVIS had initially brought him to the campaign. MASHBURN just wanted him to go away because he had been cold-calling embassies and using the campaign to bolster his own profile. In addition, PAPADOPOULOS had previously sent emails about arranging a meeting between TRUMP and Russian President, VLADIMIR PUTIN.

PAGE took up approximately 50% of GORDON's time and the campaign was upset with him after they learned of the speech he gave with the Russians.

MASHBURN believed he may have had a phone conversation with PAPADOPOULOS prior to their first in-person meeting and was fairly certain the two had not exchanged any text messages with one another. They did not communicate on Facebook or Twitter, nor did they use any encrypted applications like WhatsApp.

MASHBURN recognized the name JOSEPH MIFSUD but only in the context that the Judiciary Committee had asked him about MIFSUD during his testimony. MASHBURN had no further information about MIFSUD.

MASHBURN received thousands of emails during the campaign and therefore could not remember specific details about any one of them. MASHBURN did not believe PAPADOPOULOS used a personal email account because all campaign communications went through the campaign email system [Office365]. MASHBURN experienced a lot of technical issues when he used that system.

HILLARY CLINTON'S MISSING/DELETED EMAILS

MASHBURN remembered discussions in the campaign regarding CLINTON's missing and/or deleted emails. Everyone was looking for them and TRUMP wanted them. MASHBURN thought it would be great to find them so they could better understand several issues, like the Clinton Foundation, donations, etc. MASHBURN relayed the campaign however, was not scouring the Internet.
to try and find them. The emails they were searching for were related to CLINTON’s private server, and not related to the emails that Wikileaks released. MASHBURN also presumed that Guccifer 2.0 had all of CLINTON’s missing emails based on the press reports that surrounded Guccifer 2.0 at the time.

MASHBURN spoke with after the initial dump of Wikileaks emails on July 22, 2016. They discussed going through the content to search for anything relevant. They did so, for approximately three or four days, until MASHBURN decided he couldn't keep up with all the information. After that, he just remained online and watched what the public said about the information. MASHBURN stated that although the information was of interest when it eventually came out, they [the campaign] had no prior knowledge of Wikileaks releasing the information.

RNC PLATFORM CHANGE

MASHBURN was in charge of the platform for the campaign. Prior to the 2006 platform, MASHBURN read through the Republican platforms for RONALD REAGAN in the 1980's, and the platforms for previous elections in the years 2004, 2008, and 2012. Specifically, MASHBURN looked at what MITT ROMNEY dictated in 2012. That was an stance of not getting involved in the platform and letting it be written with a hands-off attitude. MASHBURN gave that advice to the six people who were attending at the convention. His advice was not to cancel anything unless it was a direct contradiction to what TRUMP wanted and if there was a problem then they should call MASHBURN or DEARBORN.

MASHBURN received a call from GORDON regarding an issue with Ukraine. MASHBURN called and relayed the information to DEARBORN, then stepped into a utility hallway to speak with GORDON. MASHBURN told GORDON that TRUMP had not taken a stance on the issue and not to directly intervene if it did not directly conflict with what TRUMP wanted. MASHBURN then saw that the words "appropriate assistance" were used and he thought GORDON had gone against the directions he was given. MASHBURN was not aware of GORDON...
having any discussions with campaign officials in New York at the time this issue was raised. MASHBURN thought it was strange that GORDON raised this issue with him because GORDON did not even mention an issue about an Israeli change in the platform that resulted in a page and a half of changes. Later, MASHBURN asked GORDON about that issue and GORDON said, "Oh yeah, they changed a page and a half." GORDON was sent home early after that because he interfered in something he shouldn't have.

**ADMINISTRATIVE**

MASHBURN advised that he knew of his interview with the Special Counsel's Office. MASHBURN had not made anyone else aware of this interview.

MASHBURN agreed to conduct additional searches on his computer related to search terms provided by the Special Counsel's Office.

A copy of the proffer letter for this interview is enclosed for the file as a digital attachment to this FD-302. The original will be maintained as a physical item.
JOHN MASHBURN, was interviewed on August 2, 2018
at the Special Counsel's office, 395 E Street SW, Washington, D.C. Present during the interview were MASHBURN's attorney, FBI Special Agent (SA), and Special Counsel Attorneys Aaron Zelinsky and Andrew Goldstein. MASHBURN signed the attached proffer letter and then provided the following information:

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(U//FOUO) Kathleen Troia "K.T." McFarland, date of birth [personally identifiable information redacted], social security account number [personally identifiable information redacted], telephone numbers (cell); [personally identifiable information redacted] (home) & [personally identifiable information redacted] (home) was interviewed by SA [personally identifiable information redacted] & SSA [personally identifiable information redacted] in a conference room at Debevoise & Plimpton, 919 3rd Avenue, New York, NY. Also present was [personally identifiable information redacted], an attorney. McFarland was acquainted with the interviewing agents from previous interviews. She provided the following information:

(U//FOUO) News that the Obama Administration planned to impose sanctions on Russia started to come out on December 28, 2016, but they had not been officially announced and specifics were unknown. Sanctions were just one of "several and many things" going on at that time. McFarland, who was in Mar-a-Largo with the President-elect, did not recall what specific conversations she had at which times or to whom she spoke, but sanctions were in the news, so it made sense to her they were among the topics discussed.

(U//FOUO) McFarland reviewed Email #1, which was from [personally identifiable information redacted]. She did not specifically remember the email, but recalled she had asked for information about sanctions because he was an
international lawyer. His initial response was too detailed and complicated, so she asked for something simpler. The topic was in line with hers.

Email #2 was McFarland's take on the sanctions, replying to incoming Homeland Security Adviser Tom Bossert.

While in Mar-a-Largo, which gave to the President-elect.

McFarland never discussed the specific terms of the sanctions with anyone. She would have told Michael Flynn about how the session with the President-elect went during one of their phone calls.

McFarland provided a printout of a December 29, 2016 newspaper article headlined "After Obama sanctions Russia, Trump says it's time 'to move on to bigger and better things.'" She pointed out the President-elect's statement in the story, "I think we ought to get on with our lives" and recalled it was a quick comment to reporters after he met with boxing promoter.

She recalled the difficulty communicating with him at that time because of the telephone connections. She did not have specific recollections about the times of the calls with Flynn or what was discussed in which call. Flynn mentioned several issues he intended to discuss with the Russians, and McFarland believed she would have given him her theories about the sanctions.

McFarland had no reason to think Flynn was in contact with the President-elect or anyone at Mar-a-Largo other than her. Nothing the
President-elect or Flynn ever said gave her reason to believe they had been in contact with each other during this time. She did not participate in any calls with the President-elect and Flynn or convey any messages between them. Flynn did not seem particularly well-informed when they spoke, and she had the impression he had been spending the time on the beach with his wife rather than closely following current events. She never heard the President-elect direct anyone to do anything regarding the sanctions, including communicate with anyone from Russia or talk to Flynn. She was never tasked to research, communicate with anyone or do anything related to the sanctions and the opinions she provided on the subject were unsolicited.

Email #3 contained McFarland's sanctions analysis.

McFarland was given printouts of press pool reports from May 4, 2017 through May 8, 2017 when she traveled with the President to New York and New Jersey. She read the printouts and recalled the events of the weekend. This was her last trip with the President as Deputy National...
Security Adviser. She went on the trip because National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster was in Arizona and Chief of Staff Keith Kellogg was in North Carolina.

After the meetings and dinner, they flew on Air Force One to the small airport at or near Bedminster, New Jersey. They arrived at the Trump National Golf Club, which was John DeLorean's former estate, at about midnight. Most of the staff had to stay "off campus," but the McFarland had a hotel room at the club. Attached is the sketch they drew of the facilities.

The club facilities include a club house, restaurant, hotel and two golf courses. It was functioning all weekend with club members, guests and people with a private party all around the facility. The Trumps and Kushners have their own detached houses on the grounds, and McFarland did not see or have any interaction with the President on Friday, May 5 until she saw him at dinner at the club. The McFarlands bought dinner for whom they introduced to the President. The President seemed to be in high spirits, talking to people who approached him and people sitting at different tables in the dining room. He is also the golf club president, and he appeared to be enjoying the company of his friends.

Saturday, May 6 was rainy at times, but the President played golf with friends and the McFarlands walked around the golf course. There was a 4:00 p.m. telephone call scheduled with the President of Peru, but it was delayed until 6:00 p.m. McFarland's only duties with the President that day were preparing him for the call and taking notes of his side of the conversation. They saw him that night at dinner and he again appeared to be in good spirits and enjoying interacting with all the people around. One of the nights the President had brownies sent to all the tables.

and McFarland spent the day catching up on reading and working in the SCIF. At the end of the day, she rode in the motorcade back to the airport where they boarded Air Force One for the return trip. McFarland drew a sketch of the inside of the plane which is attached. The President has a private area at the front of the plane and a conference room behind that. Behind the conference room are sections of seats separated by bulkheads. The nicest seats are closest to the front. She was sitting in the first area of seats with [redacted] and the White House photographer. She did not recall where Stephen Miller was, but Dan Scavino was around her most of the time. Ivanka Trump and Kushner and their children sat nearby as well, although McFarland thought Kushner may have gone up to the President's area a couple times during the trip. She did not see the President before they landed and did not know who rode with him.

After they landed, the passengers got their things together and were ready to leave, but they were not allowed to get off the plane. McFarland did not know the reason, but it may have been for protocol or security reasons that they had to wait for the President. When shown a report that the Kushners and their children got off the plane after about 15 minutes, McFarland did not recall when that happened or why they were allowed to go, but she remembered how restless the kids were when they were all waiting to get off the plane. Eventually the President came out of the front suite or conference room and when he looked toward the back of the plane seemed surprised to see the passengers waiting. She thought he did not know they were all being held to wait for him. He called McFarland forward for a brief conversation. They did not discuss policy issues. They talked about how it was her last trip and he remarked that Singapore was a good place to go. He invited her to come by his office for a picture with him before she left the country. She did not notice anything unusual about his demeanor then or at any time that weekend.

McFarland never heard the President or anyone else mention then-FBI Director James Comey during this weekend. She had no indication the President was considering dismissing Comey.

Administrative

McFarland drew a sketch of the west wing of the White House placing everyone's offices. The sketches and other documents mentioned in this 302 are attached in a 1-A envelope.
This interview covered subjects discussed in previous interviews, some of which is documented in this FD-302. McFarland did not say anything considered inconsistent.

The interview took place at Debevoise & Plimpton at the McFarlands' request. I greeted the agents at the beginning of the interview, but left after exchanging pleasantries. Neither he, nor anyone from the firm, participated in the interview.
The evening of December 5, 2017, K.T. attempted multiple times to reach SSA by telephone, so there were difficulties establishing a telephone connection. After failed calls to/from both K.T. and telephones, eventually SSA connected with them on K.T. McFarland’s ("McFarland’s") telephone, was able to listen in, as he could be heard contributing to the conversation.

They were aware of the significant media attention which McFarland was receiving. SSA told McFarland that with her involvement with the General Mike Flynn situation through the Special Counsel investigation and now inquiries from the United States Senate, she was entering "choppy legal waters" and he would give her the same advice he would give a friend or family member in a similar situation, which was that she should retain an experienced attorney to help her navigate through the situation. SSA said she should not draw any inferences from this advice, but that a professional with the proper experience would be useful to her since the situation had become more complicated. McFarland said they had reached the same conclusion and were in discussions with an attorney about representation. said they expected to finalize retention of an attorney the next day (December 6, 2017), but they did not want to identify the attorney until that was done.

said he had been in email contact with Special Counsel attorney Brandon Van Grack. They still planned to keep appointments with the Special Counsel in Washington, D.C. on December 14 and 15, 2017.

McFarland asked whether SSA could provide two emails which he and SA had shown to her in her interviews. She did not have the emails,
but they were now apparently widely held, including by the New York Times, which published, but grossly misrepresented them. The emails were one from her dated December 29, 2016 in which she discussed President Obama's three political objectives in imposing sanctions and mentioned Flynn's scheduled call with the Russian ambassador that evening; and an email from Flynn to her the next day, December 30, 2017, in which Flynn reported on his conversation with the ambassador. McFarland felt she was at a disadvantage since "everyone in the world" had copies of the emails except for her. SSA said he would see what he could do, but that may be a matter best handled through the attorneys.

McFarland said that documents related to Flynn's plea mentioned a transition team official, which others were identifying as her. She asked SSA what this meant. SSA told McFarland that as long as she told the truth, she should not worry about anything anyone else said. He reminded her that when people did not tell the truth they were opening themselves up to problems and as long as she was truthful, she was fine. McFarland said she understood and wanted to make sure that she was still viewed as a witness. SSA said she was.

At a later point, the connection was lost abruptly, and an effort to call McFarland back was unsuccessful.
Kathleen Troia "K.T." McFarland, date of birth ______________________, social security account number ______________________, telephone numbers ______________________ (cell); ______________________ (home) was interviewed by SA ______________________ & SSA ______________________ in a conference room at Debevoise & Plimpton, 919 3rd Avenue, New York, NY. Also present was ______________________ attorney ______________________ telephone numbers ______________________ (cell) & ______________________ (office direct line). McFarland was acquainted with the interviewing agents from a previous interview. She provided the following information:

At the onset, McFarland wanted to correct what she said in her previous FBI interview about the timing of one of her trips to Washington D.C. during the 2016 transition. The trip, which included a meeting with outgoing National Security Adviser Susan Rice was the week after the Army/Navy football game, not the week before.

After her last interview, McFarland looked on the internet for media stories to jog her memory. She found information that on December 22, 2016, the President-elect tweeted urging a veto of the United Nations (U.N.) resolution condemning Israel and followed that up with a written statement. McFarland said if the President is tweeting about something, that is a good indication about exactly what he is thinking at that time. He made no secret of his position on the U.N. vote.

Interviewing agents showed McFarland several emails (numbered and maintained in a 1-A). While she had no recollection of some of them, she did not dispute any of their authenticity.

Email #1 was from ______________________ who was on the Presidential Transition Team (PTT) staff and had previously worked for the National Security Council (NSC). McFarland did not have a specific recollection of the email, nor did she know exactly who Michael Flynn was referring to when he mentioned the "inner circle." She identified ______________________ as a Fox News Channel (FNC) colleague who was a former United Nations spokesman. He wanted a job in the incoming administration. She had known ______________________

Date of entry 09/20/2017
He wanted a job in the incoming administration. She had known him for over a decade and "everyone" would have known him.

Email #2 she did not specifically recall. She thought it was after the President-elect's tweet and statement on the U.N. vote, which she previously mentioned, and whatever actions Flynn took. They wanted a result different from what the Obama Administration had wanted. When the resolution was pulled, it appeared the President-elect's position prevailed, and the resolutions' failure would have reflected the traditional American position regarding Israel. She considered their work against the resolution a team effort.

Email #3 was an update on what Flynn was doing as he "worked the phones" on the UN resolution. It was sent to her as background information since she was not engaged on the issue. This was Flynn's area of expertise, and she did not have any responsibilities in this area. In fact, when this email was sent, she was already on Christmas vacation in New York or Washington when he sent the email. She did not know where Flynn got his information, but she was not aware of anyone else helping him on this. She could not recall any conversations about the email, although if she was involved in discussions, they would have been general talks about whether the President-elect should issue a press release.

Based on her study of prior presidential transitions, McFarland believed the sorts of things Flynn did were not unusual. She cited Richard Nixon's involvement in Vietnam War peace talks and Ronald Reagan's purported dealings with Iran to free American hostages during their transitions as precedent for proactive foreign policy engagements by an incoming administration. Most incoming administrations did similar things. No "red light" or "alarm bells" went off in her head when she heard what Flynn was doing. The President-elect made his support for Israel very clear during the campaign and contrasted his position with President Obama, who he believed had not treated Israel fairly.

McFarland was generally familiar with the Logan Act, but she had not thought deeply about it. She knew it dated back to 1799 and nobody had ever been prosecuted for violating it. Many of the people involved in the incoming administration had no government experience, so they would not be familiar with the Logan Act. She did not recall any discussions that what Flynn was doing was inappropriate.

Email #4 she did not specifically recall. It would be fair to say Flynn was working the phones with his contacts to try to get a vote in...
favor of Israel. She seemed to be telling Flynn to take credit for the critical role he played in doing what the President-elect wanted. She was probably at home with her grandchildren when she sent it.

Around this time, the President-elect had also just nominated David Friedman to be U.S. Ambassador to Israel.

It is possible Flynn was working with someone from the Washington D.C. team on the U.N. vote, but McFarland could not think of who it might be. She was not aware that he had engaged any Middle East or Israel experts, and as far as she knew, he was working alone.

The only foreign counterpart McFarland spoke to during the transition was Paddy McGuiness, her counterpart in the British government. She did not ask him to do anything and did not discuss the U.N. vote with him.

Email #5 dealt with her trip to Mar-a-Largo with the President-elect. She and Flynn agreed that there should always be an NSC "duty officer" with the President/President-elect to staff him if needed. In addition to being duty officer, she had two other jobs: attending the Presidential Daily Briefs (PDBs), which would be given by Ted Gistaro from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence; and providing the President-elect national security background information she thought he needed. The President-elect lacked a national security background and the email discussed experts who might be able to provide him useful information.

During the Mar-a-Largo trip, McFarland was accompanied by the President-elect two or three times on work matters during this trip, as well as a few times in the dining room. She sketched the layout of the main public areas of the hotel for the interviewing agents.
NSC transition staffer was there with her, although did not have a room in the hotel. The two of them took over a small area in an overflow dining room as their work area.

The President-elect did not have a "door keeper" with him and seemed to make his own scheduling decisions. At various times McFarland recalled seeing Preibus and Spicer and the President-elect's wife and young son, but she did not know exactly who was there and when they were there. There were no structured staff meetings, although there may have been discussions about logistics, such as when to have the PDB.

That meeting may have been in the bar/tap room.

During this time, when McFarland was in Florida and Flynn was in the Caribbean, they did not have regularly scheduled interactions. There were no set times for calls. She recalled them trying to check in with each other once or twice a day, but there were challenges with the telephone connections and their availabilities.

McFarland was shown a calendar entry for December 28, 2016 and confirmed the entry would have represented a PDB. She sat in the briefing, but did not recall who was there besides Gistaro. It was a small number of people and it took place in a basement studio apartment in the hotel.

There were many cut off and interrupted calls, and she could not remember a call that went on that long. A long call could have covered a range of topics such as...
(U//FOUO) Email #6 was an email to [redacted] a Los Angeles attorney who wanted a job in the administration. He was smart and she read a book he wrote about arms control. She did not recall a telephone call with [redacted] and while they might have discussed sanctions if they had a call, because he is an expert in the area, they also could have talked about potential job.

(U//FOUO) McFarland did not recall any conversations she may have had with Flynn the day the sanctions were announced.

Her focus at that time was on nuclear weapons and North Korea. McFarland and Flynn were speaking on a non-secure telephone line, so it's reasonable that they would speak somewhat vaguely on purpose, although McFarland did not specifically recall talking to Flynn about being careful on the phone.
Email # 8 was an email from Flynn which she forwarded. She and [redacted] left Mar-a-Largo that morning, and did not get home until early afternoon, so she forwarded it while she was still en route to [redacted] She did not recall being concerned that Flynn did not mention sanctions in this email.

Egypt

FBI visited Egypt in July 2014, the year after Mohamed Morsi was removed as Egypt’s president. She was working for FNC at the time. The trip was arranged by the Westminster Institute, a non-profit foreign policy organization, and she traveled with about ten other people, most of whom were former military members. The institute paid their (coach class) travel expenses.

[Redacted] was the Egyptian point person and was instrumental in setting up the group’s meetings and arranging accommodations. [Redacted] ran the largest travel agency in the Middle East and appeared to be very well-connected. The trip included a series of meetings with members of Egypt’s defense department; student groups involved in the overthrow of Morsi; business leaders; foreign ministry representatives, including the Minister of Defense; the American Chamber of Commerce; and even the Coptic
Pope. They thought they were just having a photo opportunity with Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, the former defense minister and acting Egyptian leader, but they wound up having a two and a half hour meeting with him. McFarland considered the trip a great opportunity as both a person in the national security field and a journalist. After coming home she stayed in touch with [redacted] via general emails.

A year or year-and-a-half later, McFarland had another opportunity to travel to Egypt. El-Sisi was now elected leader of Egypt. He had never been interviewed by an American media outlet and had agreed to be interviewed by FNC's Brett Baier. [redacted] again served as point man on the Egyptian side and McFarland was heavily involved in FNC's logistics in making sure the interview came off.

[U//POUO] called McFarland and told her he was passing through New York around Christmas 2015, and they met for a social engagement. He also may have called with congratulations after the 2016 Presidential election.

After McFarland began as Deputy National Security Adviser, [redacted] asked her to meet, and she agreed to do so. She set up the meeting, but someone noticed his name on her calendar, and the NSC staff advised her not to meet with [redacted] so she canceled the meeting.

**Administrative**

[U//POUO] The interview took place at Debevoise & Plimpton at the McFarlands' request, [redacted] arranged for the room and greeted the agents at the beginning of the interview. After exchanging pleasantries, [redacted] left. Neither he, nor any attorneys from the law firm participated in the interview.
On March 27, 2018, DIMITRI SIMES, President and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of CENTER FOR THE NATIONAL INTEREST (CNI), was interviewed pursuant to a proffer agreement at Patriots Plaza I, 395 E Street SW, Washington, DC 20546 by Special Agent (SA) [redacted] Intelligence Analyst (IA) [redacted] and Assistant Special Counsel (ASC) Aaron Zelinsky. Accompanying SIMES were CNI's outside counsel attorneys [redacted] and [redacted] from Baker & Hostetler, LLP. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing officials and after reviewing the proffer agreement, in the presence of his attorneys, SIMES executed the proffer agreement, whereupon he provided the following information:

Investigation on 03/27/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.
The TIME WARNER luncheon was organized with the purpose of looking for potential donors and future CNI Board members.
The last thing SIMES wanted was for CNI to be seen as an intermediary between the Russian government and a U.S. Presidential administration.
Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Dimitri Simes

KUSHNER gave SIMES the impression that
the information was "old news."
On March 7, 2018 and March 8, 2018, DIMITRI SIMES, President and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of CENTER FOR THE NATIONAL INTEREST (CNI), was interviewed pursuant to a proffer agreement at Patriots Plaza I, 395 E Street SW, Washington, DC 20546 by Special Agent (SA) Intelligence Analyst (IA) Assistant Special Counsel (ASC) Aaron Zelinsky, Senior Assistant Special Counsel (SASC) Andrew Goldstein, and SASC Jeannie Rhee. Accompanying SIMES on March 7, 2018 were CNI's outside counsel attorneys from Baker & Hostetler, LLP. Accompanying SIMES on March 8, 2018 were and . After being advised of the identities of the interviewing officials and after reviewing the proffer agreement, in the presence of his attorneys, SIMES executed the proffer agreement, whereupon he provided the following information:

At the time, SIMES was working at CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE (CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT).

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.
SIMES agreed to run the NIXON CENTER.

SIMES was currently the President and CEO of CNI. SIMES was also the Publisher and CEO of CNI's magazine, THE NATIONAL INTEREST.
KISSINGER served as Honorary Chairman for CNI's Board.
Over the years, CNI used the CARNEGIE grants for Track II's to Russia, organize and plan for a number of Russian delegations to visit the U.S., as well as organize and plan for U.S. delegations to visit Russia.

March 2016 luncheon at TIME WARNER
could benefit from conversations with KISSINGER and, in turn, they would want to become involved in CNI's work.

As previously discussed, SIMES had a telephone call with KUSHNER shortly after the TIME WARNER luncheon.
Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Dimitri Simes. On 03/08/2018, Page 7 of 33

TIMES met with KUSHNER in New York on March 31, 2016.
SIMES told KUSHNER the best way to approach foreign policy would be to organize a small group of foreign policy experts to meet with TRUMP to develop a foreign policy approach that was consistent with TRUMP's voice. SIMES thought KUSHNER was comfortable with SIMES' suggestion.
Regarding the venue for TRUMP's foreign policy speech event, SAUNDERS looked at a variety of different options. SAUNDERS looked at the MAYFLOWER HOTEL and the NATIONAL PRESS CLUB (NPC) as venues for the event. During these board member discussions, CNI decided to have THE NATIONAL INTEREST host the event in an effort to minimize the impression that CNI was endorsing TRUMP. With THE NATIONAL INTEREST as the host, the event was more or less a press event, so NPC was a natural fit for venue.
SIMES never saw an actual draft of TRUMP's foreign policy speech. He and the TRUMP campaign exchanged draft outlines.
Approximately one week before TRUMP's foreign policy speech event, SIMES told KISLYAK about the event. SIMES told KISLYAK that he would include him on the list of invitations for the event, as well as the pre-speech reception. SIMES also told KISLYAK that he (KISLYAK) would have an opportunity to meet TRUMP.
In advance of TRUMP arriving, SIMES and SAUNDERS discussed having a receiving line for TRUMP so that TRUMP could meet everyone at the pre-speech reception. SIMES and/or SAUNDERS did not coordinate the idea of a receiving line with the TRUMP campaign. SIMES decided a receiving line was a good idea, so one was quickly organized when TRUMP arrived. SIMES did not know most of the members of Congress attending the pre-speech reception, so SIMES asked SESSIONS to introduce them. SESSIONS agreed to do so. SESSIONS stood next to TRUMP introducing each member of Congress. After SESSIONS each member of Congress to TRUMP,
the May 23, 2016 Annual Awards Dinner, but SIMES was not sure if KISLYAK attended. SIMES did not recall seeing KISLYAK at the dinner.

SIMES offered two recollections of KISLYAK's presence at the May 23, 2016 Annual Awards Dinner.
After the April 27, 2016 speech, SIMES had contact with KUSHNER from
time to time to discuss how to proceed with the advisory group, Russia in
the campaign. SIMES does not remember KUSHNER initiating any conversations with him
on Russia; those conversations were initiated by SIMES. Sometime after the
speech, SIMES told KUSHNER to be careful and that it was bad optics for
the campaign to develop "hidden" Russian contacts.

KUSHNER never asked SIMES to set up back channel conversations with
Russians. SIMES told KUSHNER the campaign should
not highlight Russia as an issue and any contacts with Russians should be
handled with care.
KUSHNER organized this meeting at 666 5th Avenue in New York at SIMES' request to talk about the advisory group and about the CLINTON campaign's Russia attacks on TRUMP and how to respond.
(U) On 01/25/2018 Special Agent Intelligence Analyst FBI Linguist and Assistant Special Counsel L. Rush Atkinson interviewed ANDREY ROZOV, DOB at The Special Counsel's Office in Washington, DC. Also present were ROZOV's counsel asked if the interview was recorded via audio or video. ASC Atkinson indicated the interview was not recorded. The interview was conducted under a proffer agreement. ROZOV spoke Russian throughout the interview. FBI Linguist provided translation. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview, ROZOV provided the following information:

(U) ROZOV met FELIX SATER (SATER) while working on the Federation Building Tower in Moscow around 2007. The building was built by the company MIRAX. Later in 2014, SATER and ROZOV had a deal to purchase a building in New York, NY at 38th St and 5th Ave. ROZOV purchased the building and sold it in 2015 for a profit. In that deal, SATER identified the building and recommended to ROZOV to purchase it. ROZOV felt it was a good decision because it was a nice area. If ROZOV had a good understanding of real estate in New York, NY he would be wealthier.

(U) ROZOV and SATER communicated via phone and likely used WhatsApp. The two have not communicated for about two months. SATER's last communication to ROZOV was an apology for causing ROZOV any trouble regarding the public reporting of the TRUMP TOWER MOSCOW (TRUMP MOSCOW) deal.

(U) The TRUMP MOSCOW project was just a business idea, it never made it to the financing, location identification, design, or construction phases. SATER and ROZOV discussed the project as an idea. The project could have taken two different forms, one was a building fully developed by the TRUMP ORGANIZATION (TRUMP ORG), the other was a licensing deal for the building developed by another organization. In this instance the business idea was that the TRUMP ORG would license the Trump name to a building developed by ROZOV.

(U) ROZOV described the process for a hypothetical building development: ROZOV would have two options to secure the land, one is to purchase the land resulting in a wholly private project; the other is to lease the...
land. Once he had a plot of land, he would begin architectural and design drafts. The drafts would allow ROZOV to approach the appropriate regulatory bodies for required authorizations. ROZOV felt that was likely similar to a place like New York, NY. Once the regulatory authorization was in place, ROZOV would confirm his ideas and intent with the building, then begin to approach services in Moscow to initiate construction. This is a rough outline on how a building project would be completed and ROZOV offered to have one of his assistants produce a much more detailed version if the FBI requested.

(U) ROZOV identified [REDACTED] as a developer who has experience building in New York, NY.

(U) The Russian Federation did not have to approve the building development in Moscow. The Moscow City government would approve the project, but that was the only governmental requirement. It was obvious to ROZOV that if Vladimir Putin or a high level official in the Federal Government stated that a particular project should happen, it would speed up the process and guarantee that it would be finished. ROZOV compared this to the power the Mayor of New York, NY may have in expediting a project.

(U) ROZOV did not recall seeing any drawings or design drafts of TRUMP MOSCOW. ROZOV never formed a vision for the project. ROZOV never looked for land for the building. ROZOV's analysis of the business idea was simple: it would not be profitable. The timing for the project was wrong; ten years earlier would have been much better. The economy was bad for high-rises at the time of the proposal. ROZOV did not rule-out the possibility for the deal in the future. The Letter of Intent (LOI) does not have an end-date. Additionally, ROZOV did not view the LOI as an obligation from either party.

(U) ROZOV's expertise is in pre-construction sales. ROZOV thinks that it would cost about $2,500.00 per square meter to build a high-rise building in Moscow.

(U) When ROZOV signed the LOI his attitude was that it was bad timing for the project, but because the U.S. side of the deal would sign it, he did not want to turn down the opportunity. There is still the potential for a deal in the future. The details are in the letter.

(U) SATER introduced ROZOV to MICHAEL COHEN over the phone about two years ago. ROZOV was talking to SATER, and SATER passed the phone to COHEN. COHEN tried to say something to ROZOV in Russian, and ROZOV tried to say...
something to COHEN in English, and that was the extent of their conversation. ROZOV did not remember any specifics. ROZOV had no contacts with anyone else representing the TRUMP ORG.

(U) SATER is a very social person, and ROZOV has spoken to SATER intermittently, but as stated before, not in the last two months.

(U) SATER first contacted ROZOV regarding TRUMP MOSCOW by phone. SATER had contacted ROZOV about deals in the past, but they were never serious. ROZOV was unsure of how many times SATER had pitched him an idea.

(U) In regards to TRUMP MOSCOW, SATER suggested the idea and proposal to ROZOV. SATER did not have land, nor financing lined up. ROZOV would not rely on SATER to have those in place. ROZOV did not count on SATER to attain financing from a bank. ROZOV reiterated that his experience was in pre-construction sales, because they are guaranteed successes, though with a smaller profit margin. In pre-construction, all the financing comes from ROZOV himself.

(U) SATER never introduced an architect to the project, nor any development companies nor vendors.

(U) Prior to signing the LOI, ROZOV recalled some discussion of the document's language. The discussion was regarding the legal language, not the terms of the LOI. ROZOV received the original document in English, and had it translated by a service in Moscow.

(U) After the LOI was signed, SATER took no action in moving the project along. SATER did not explain any actions to ROZOV. ROZOV was not aware of any actions taken by the TRUMP ORG. The TRUMP ORG did not reach out to ROZOV, other than the previously discussed call with COHEN which occurred prior to the LOI being signed. According to SATER, COHEN was DONALD J. TRUMP's right hand man.

(U) If the project moved forward, ROZOV would have looked for a particular plot of land. High-rise buildings have specific requirements, so the land is a special location. The location did not have to be in Moscow center, it could have been elsewhere. ROZOV recalled that when individuals try to sell their projects, they always brand them as the tallest or the biggest building in the area. ROZOV would not have believed SATER's sales pitch. Business is a unique field where the business plans can paint a picture of something that does not exist yet.

(U) ROZOV was not asked to contact any Russian Federation Official on behalf of SATER or the TRUMP ORG. No one from the Russian Federation has contacted ROZOV regarding TRUMP MOSCOW.
(U) ROZOV was not aware of a plan to have TRUMP visit Moscow. ROZOV would not have began work on the project unless he had a personal meeting with TRUMP, however, this never happened. ROZOV had no personal meeting with COHEN, though it was probably discussed on the phone call with SATER and COHEN.

(U) SATER visited ROZOV has attended the St. Petersburg Forums, there have been many, and he has attended some but not all. He did not recall any discussion of COHEN or TRUMP attending a St. Petersburg Forum.
GIORGI RTSKHILADZE (alternatively GEORGIY RUKHILADZE), date of birth (DOB) ________, was interviewed at the Special Counsel’s Office (SCO) on 5/10/2018. Also present during the interview were RTSKHILADZE’s attorneys Senior Assistant Special Counsel Jeanne Rhee, Assistant Special Counsel L. Rush Atkinson, FBI Special Agent ___________, and FBI Intelligence Analyst ___________. The interview began at approximately 2:00 p.m. and concluded at approximately 5:00 p.m. Water was provided to RTSKHILADZE.

After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents, RTSKHILADZE voluntarily provided the following information:
Continuation of FD-302 of Interview of GIORGI RTSKHILADZE. On 05/10/2018.

A salacious tape regarding DONALD TRUMP. On the same day, says they’re fake. After hearing this, RTSKHILADZE did not contact COHEN to tell him believed they were fake.
Felix SATER, born______ was contacted in Washington, D.C. He was accompanied by his attorney, _______. Present for the interview were Senior Assistant Special Counsel Andrew Weissman, Assistant Special Counsel Lawrence Atkinson, ASAC _______ and Special Agent _______. At the outset of the interview SATER and _______ presented a proffer letter dated 9/19/2017. SATER and _______ reviewed and signed the letter. Following this, SATER provided the following information:
Post-Bayrock:

He relocated to Moscow, In 2010, Trump asked SATER to work for his organization.
Trump Tower Moscow:

SATER introduced Rozov to Cohen.
Jerome Corsi, date of birth (DOB) __________ was interviewed at the Special Counsel's Office, located at 395 E Street SW, Washington, D.C., in the presence of his attorney, __________. Present for the interview were FBI Special Agent (SA) __________, SA __________, Senior Assistant Special Counsel (SASC) Jeannie S. Rhee, SASC Andrew Goldstein, Assistant Special Counsel (ASC) Aaron Zelinsky, and FBI Intelligence Analyst __________. ASC Rush Atkinson was present for portions of the interview. Prior to the interview, Corsi signed a proffer agreement, originally signed on 9/21/2018. After being advised of the purpose of the interview and identities of the interviewing agents, Corsi provided the following information:

Corsi thanked the interviewing individuals for the opportunity to think about his testimony overnight and said he did a lot of soul searching. Corsi said he did not remember a lot of what had been shown to him the previous day and realized that the way he wanted to remember things was not actually how things happened.
Corsi said the Special Counsel's Office interview was the first time he came to terms with the truth. He had been lying to himself to believe his own cover story. Corsi apologized it had taken him so long to come to terms with the truth. He needed to admit to himself that he was lying.

Corsi first met Malloch in July 2015, when Malloch was thinking about publishing his memoirs. They spent two or three days together. Corsi thought Malloch had credentials, as he had worked at the State Department, in the United Nations, in Davos, and had other globalist affiliations. Malloch wanted to apply Christian values to business ethics and believed in sovereignty. Malloch relayed to Corsi his views on the evils of the EU and said he had connections to [redacted] before the summer of 2016.
Corsi thought he suggested to some people at WND that he had a connection to Assange, but thought he was vague about, using terms like "word is" and "sources are." Corsi thought he suggested as much to [ ] when he told him that he would go to London if WND bought him a ticket.

Corsi did not want to state that Malloch had seen Assange, because Malloch may not have. Corsi had talked to [ ] and others, all who were speculating about what WikiLeaks had, so when he said "word is" he was being intentionally vague because he had spoken to people that were smart about that sort of thing.
Corsi did not remember sending Malloch an email on August 16, 2016 about Putin.

Corsi published the August 31, 2016 memo on October 6, 2016. At that time, he still held himself out as the connection to WikiLeaks. The trigger for the release of the article was the publication of an article about [Paul Manafort and [Viktor] Yanukovych. Corsi wanted to counter it with a story about Podesta, but he really wanted to provide stimulus to Assange to release whatever he had on Podesta. Corsi was angry with Assange for not releasing emails on October 4, 2016.

October 7, 2016 was a busy day for Corsi. He watched all day to see what Assange would do.
Corsi did not recall exactly when he learned about the Billy Bush tape, but was very sure it was before it was public. He remembered the line about Trump "grabbing by the genitals" and being shocked by it. When it came out publicly later that day, Corsi was not shocked by it because he expected it.

Corsi initially thought he told people on a WND conference call on October 7, 2016 that the Billy Bush tape was coming and that he sent out a tweet about whether anyone could get to Assange, but then reflected and said maybe he did nothing.
Corsi did not have a specific memory of anything beyond the fact that he had advance knowledge of the Billy Bush tape, that he mentioned it on a conference call, and that he told Kalloch to get to Assange. He did not have a clear memory of this event. He also took credit for the WikiLeaks dump of Podesta information, but he did not deserve it. He remembered he clearly wanted to get credit for it.
Corsi did not recall any conversations about WikiLeaks, Stone, or Assange during a dinner he had on January 7, 2017 with Malloch and [redacted].
Corsi went through the "Blame Me!" article and said:

Paragraphs three through six were pulled from the Schweizer report.
In January, Corsi left WND and went to work at InfoWars, where he got a [__________________________________________] Corsi to DCI, where he got a [__________________________________________]. At DCI, Corsi wrote articles either in his own name or for DCI to use however they wanted. He wrote about Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and other various policy issues. Corsi thought [__________________________________________] was a lot of money, but it was not hard work and did not take a lot of time. The number of articles he wrote a month varied from zero to one per day. He also wrote opinion pieces that were published in someone else's name.

It never occurred to Corsi on his own to work for Alex Jones. Stone told Corsi that WND was not big enough for him and he should work for Jones, who had a bigger audience. InfoWars also paid more than WND. Corsi wrote three articles a week or so, and did some broadcasts.

Corsi recalled that as the election cycle was wearing down, Kalloch made a contact in Turkey and wanted to deliver a lobbying contract to DCI. Corsi would have worked on the contract with him, but it did not work out.

Corsi was still working for InfoWars [as of the interview] but was not paid by InfoWars directly. He did very little for InfoWars but still got [__________________________________________] He had recently discussed the terms with InfoWars and talked about several new projects.
Corsi stopped working for DCI in March or April 2018.

Administrative: The interview notes and documents shown to Corsi will be maintained in the IA section of the case file.
Jerome Corsi, date of birth (DOB) was interviewed at the Special Counsel's Office, located at 395 E Street SW, Washington, D.C., in the presence of his attorney, Present were FBI Special Agent Senior Assistant Special Counsel Jeannie S. Rhee, Assistant Special Counsel Aaron Zellinsky, and FBI Intelligence Analyst . Prior to the interview, Corsi signed a proffer agreement, originally signed on 9/21/2018. After being advised of the purpose of the interview and identity of the interviewing agent, Corsi provided the following information:

Investigation on 11/02/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)
Administrative: The original interviewing notes will be maintained in the IA section of the case file, along with the signed proffer agreement.
Jerome Corsi, date of birth (DOB) [redacted], was interviewed at the Special Counsel's Office, located at 395 E Street, SW, Washington, D.C. Also present during the interview were Corsi's attorney [redacted], Assistant Special Counsel (ASC) Aaron Zelinsky, Senior Assistant Special Counsel (SASC) Jeannie Rhee, SASC Andrew Goldstein, FBI Special Agents [redacted] and [redacted], and FBI Intelligence Analyst [redacted].

Corsi was advised his participation in the interview was voluntary and the interview could be terminated at any moment of his choosing.

Corsi was also advised that multiple Special Agents of the FBI were present in the interview and it was a crime to lie to them.

Corsi thought Assange would know who Corsi was based on Corsi's writings.

Corsi said his conversations with Malloch usually took the form of Facetime calls because Malloch liked Facetime. Malloch and Corsi would sometimes communicate via phone calls, however.

Corsi did recall Malloch was reluctant to do it, but got the impression he would try.

Corsi did not recall Malloch ever providing information from Assange.
Corsi said many people were interested in Corsi getting in touch with Assange. Corsi advised he did not get to Assange directly.

Corsi said his connections to the Donald Trump campaign included Kellyanne Conway and Stephen Miller. Corsi had known Conway from her time with the Council for National Policy (CNP) and Miller from Miller's time serving as an aide to Senator Jeff Sessions. Corsi said he would publish articles and send them to both the campaign and the White House. Corsi indicated he would often not receive a response to his emails.
Jerome Corsi, date of birth (DOB) was interviewed at the E. Barrett Prettyman United States Courthouse, located at 333 Constitution Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C., 20001. Also present during the interview were Corsi's attorney Assistant Special Counsel (ASC) Aaron Zelinsky, Senior Assistant Special Counsel (SASC) Jeannie Rhee, SASC Andrew Goldstein, FBI Special Agent and FBI Intelligence Analyst. After being advised of the purpose of the interview and identity of the interviewing agent, Corsi provided the following information:

Corsi was advised his participation in the interview was voluntary and he could terminate the interview at any time. Corsi was further advised that intentionally providing false statements to FBI Agents was a violation of federal law.

Corsi confirmed his statements from a previous interview conducted on 09/17/2018.

Corsi said, as of August 2016, he had watched and seen Podesta for a long time. Corsi thought WikiLeaks would release Podesta's emails serially in order to continually feed the news cycle, as opposed to dropping all the information at once. Corsi also thought Julian Assange (Assange) would design the release of Podesta's emails to be an "October surprise."
Corsi said after Assange did not release the Podesta emails on the date expected in October 2016, Corsi was disappointed. Corsi thought he may have posted a tweet saying something akin to "what's the drumbeat for nothing?" Corsi was still confident Assange had the information despite the delay.

Corsi recalled the day the Billy Bush tape was announced, WikiLeaks also began dropping Podesta's emails.
[Agent Note: At approximately 10:50 AM, attorney's from the SCO entered into a verbal proffer agreement with Corsi and ]

Ted Malloch
** Agent Note: Restroom break **

Corsi was asked to describe his relationship with [redacted]. Corsi described [redacted] as a crook, but admitted he had no basis for saying that. Corsi confirmed he was in attendance at a dinner with [redacted] in New York on [redacted]. Corsi described the food as "poor quality at best." Corsi said the dinner party included Corsi, Malloch, and [redacted]
Corsi said he wanted to represent that Corsi could make a lot of money if he were to also come along, however, Corsi thought the offer was nonsense and was therefore not interested. Corsi said the offer felt like a "con-job" and got the impression Malloch was in on it.

Corsi was advised that after the dinner, he said

** Agent Note: At this time, (2) identical written proffer agreements were executed, a digital copy of which is included in a digital 1A **

Corsi was asked about his relationship with Corsi described Corsi did not recall how long he has known or how they were introduced. Corsi added he has never met in person. Corsi advised sends him Corsi said his (Corsi's) Russian language ability is "pretty primitive" and is often assisted by 'Google translate' when reading Russian text. Corsi said sometimes contacts him

Corsi said many people contact him and he doesn't always know who they are. Corsi said it's as if has taken the
October 7, 2016

Because Corsi had no direct access to Assange or WikiLeaks, Corsi said he may have sent out public tweets because Corsi knew Assange was reading his tweets.

** Agent Note: _________________________________ **

Corsi said after 10/03/2016, Corsi was blasting Assange on Twitter saying how the absence of an expected release was a "big letdown." Corsi said the intent of his tweets was to communicate to Assange to drop the emails immediately, intimating "now is the time."

Corsi was asked what other action he took to initiate the release of WikiLeaks material on 10/07/2016. Corsi said there was a daily 1:00 PM EST conference call at WorldNetDaily (WND) to talk about the news of the day. The WND daily call was often attended by _________________________________ 
Corsi said sometimes various WND writers would attend the conference call.

Corsi said on 10/07/2016, on the conference call, and because Corsi had no direct means to get to Assange, Corsi instructed anyone who could reach Assange should get to him immediately. Corsi said the pressure was enormous and recalled telling the board the tape was coming soon.

Corsi did not recall anyone telling him they successfully communicated with Assange subsequent to the conference call. Corsi was convinced, however, it was through his efforts that WikiLeaks released Podesta's emails when they did.

Corsi said called him the night prior to the captioned interview. He has called Corsi multiple times since Corsi indicated to Corsi that a report has been given to Trump regarding what Corsi had been doing. Corsi said has a meeting with Trump for approximately 15 minutes every Monday/Tuesday. Corsi does not know if this is true.

told Corsi to remember talks to Assange. Corsi said was feeding him an excuse to use with investigators.
Corsi advised his wife recently said that in 27 years of marriage, Corsi has never lied to her.

Corsi said he and Trump have had a cordial relationship over time.
Jerome Robert Corsi, date of birth (DOB) [_______], social security account number [_______], was interviewed at the Special Counsel's Office, 395 E Street SW, Washington DC 20024. Corsi was accompanied by his attorney, [______]. Present during the interview was FBI Special Agent (SA) [_______], FBI SA [_______], FBI Intelligence Analyst (IA) [_______], Assistant Special Counsel, Andrew D. Goldstein, and Senior Assistant Special Counsel, Jeannie Rhee.

Prior to the interview, [____] asked if the Special Counsel's Office planned to record the interview. [____] was advised it would not be recorded and [____] inquired as to whether or not he could record the interview. [____] was advised that he could not and that all electronic devices needed to be placed outside of the interview location for security purposes. SA [____] then inquired as to whether or not [____] and/or Corsi had recorded the conversation in SA [____] Bucar, during the transport of Corsi from The Mayflower hotel to the Special Counsel's Office. Both [____] and Corsi denied recording the conversation and stated that they would have needed to have asked SA [____] for permission prior to doing so.
Corsi was advised the interview was entirely voluntary and that he could discontinue it or take a break to speak with his attorney at any time. Corsi was further advised that intentional false statements during this interview would be a violation of federal law. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing Agents, Corsi provided the following information:

Corsi began by providing a brief description of his background. Corsi worked for WorldNetDaily (WND) from approximately 2004 to 2017. Corsi quit working for WND shortly after the election, at the encouragement of [_____] per DOJ. [_____] told Corsi that WND was not visible enough and that Corsi should go to work for [_____] Infowars instead. [_____] believed [_____] had a much more visible platform with videos and a strong Internet presence. Corsi continues to work for Infowars and they still pay him. Corsi initially started at Infowars as the Washington Bureau Chief and had an office near the Metro Center.

Shortly after joining Infowars, Corsi sought to obtain press credentials for the White House. He ultimately received them, but only for a day. Corsi tried to visit the White House after his first visit and was turned away at the West gate. A Secret Service Agent told Corsi that his credentials were no longer valid so he went to a coffee shop across the street and telephoned a subordinate at the White House. Corsi's contact advised him that Infowars was not recognized as an official news organization by the White House. Corsi believed it was a result of a previous interview that [_____] did with Donald J. Trump. Corsi became frustrated because his former organization, WND, was also trying to get him press credentials at both the White House and Congress. Corsi would have received the credentials because WND was officially recognized as a news organization by the White House.

Corsi first met Trump's father, Fred Trump, in 1985. Corsi had been working in the financial services sector at a company called Marketing One, based in Portland, Oregon. Corsi was a frequent visitor of The Plaza Hotel in New York and was virtually living out of one of their hotel rooms. Corsi was such a frequent guest that the hotel staff granted him a private dining table in the Edwardian Room. When Trump purchased The Plaza Hotel he often paid personal visits to the prominent guests, like Corsi. That is how Corsi initially met Trump and Corsi has remained in contact.
with him ever since. Trump always treated Corsi as a paying customer and the two have maintained a business-like relationship with one another over the years.

In 2008, Corsi started the "birth certificate issue," which was a conspiracy theory alleging that Barack Obama was ineligible to be President of the United States because he was not a natural born citizen of the United States as required by law. Corsi had been working to publish a book entitled, "Where is the Birth Certificate," when Trump became interested in the topic. Trump often called Corsi to speak about the birth certificate issue. Corsi described his conversations with Trump as being one-sided, where Trump would often ask Corsi for his opinion and once Corsi began to speak, Trump would cut him off and tell Corsi what he thought about the topic. Corsi often left the phone calls feeling as if he had said a lot, but said nothing at all. Corsi remembered having approximately six phone calls with Trump about the birth certificate issue. Corsi was in Florida when Obama publicly released his birth certificate. Corsi received a call from [_____] who told Corsi he better put the television on. Shortly after, Corsi got a phone call from Trump. Trump told Corsi he saw the birth certificate and that he was finished with the topic. Corsi did not hear from Trump again about that issue.

In June 2016, Corsi visited the campaign headquarters at Trump Tower in New York. He visited the office on the 7th floor, which was tiny and completely empty. Corsi saw Corey Lewandowski and Hope Hicks there but did not see or interact with Trump. Corsi tried to engage Lewandowski in conversation but Lewandowski had his head buried in a computer and only made short verbal acknowledgments to Corsi such as, "uh huh." Corsi was introduced to one of the assistants at the campaign, a lady named, [_____] Last Name Unknown (LNU). [Agent Note: Corsi used the name LNU but this individual may be identifiable to Rhona Graff.] LNU took Corsi to buy a Make America Great Again (MAGA) hat and then took him to see Michael Cohen.

Corsi rarely engaged with Trump directly and relayed messages to Trump through Cohen. Corsi could call Cohen for anything but Cohen was often "disconnected" and Corsi's messages to Trump were sometimes relayed and sometimes they were not. Cohen's desk was full of memorabilia, documents, papers, and junk. Corsi described Cohen as a "casino guy" who often dealt with matters haphazardly, only to get pulled into a separate conversation by the next person who entered the room.

Corsi described the first time he met Cohen. [_____] took Corsi to Cohen's office and Cohen immediately invited him in. Cohen was in the
middle of a conversation with another man in his office and Corsi felt as if the other man was annoyed because he had interrupted their conversation. Shortly thereafter, Cohen received a phone call from a representative from the New York Yankees. Cohen took the phone call and spoke loudly to the representative, in front of both Corsi and the other man. A short time later, another individual came into Cohen's office and pressed Cohen to sign some papers that urgently needed to be completed. Cohen did so and then looked at Corsi and said, "let's go meet some people." Cohen then took Corsi around the office to meet everyone. Corsi felt as if Cohen was unable to focus on anything.
Around the same time, Corsi told Sam Clovis about Malloch. Clovis was being ignored by the campaign and his foreign policy team was failing. Corsi never met with Clovis in person, but Clovis knew of Corsi's work.
At the conclusion of this interview, Corsi and his attorney were driven back to The Mayflower in SA[______] Bucar. During the transport, Corsi made several statements to SA[______].
Continuation of FD-302 of 09/06/2018.

The following items have been enclosed for the file as digital attachments to this FD-302: 1) One copy of hand-written notes provided by Corsi:

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(U) Interview of Jerome Corsi on 09/06/2018.