Excerpts from Joint Deposition

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House Committee on Oversight and Reform
House Committee on Foreign Affairs

Q: And when you say that, this was the first time I heard that the security assistance—not just the White House meeting—was conditioned on the investigation, when you talk about conditioned, did you mean that if they didn’t do this, the investigations, they weren’t going to get that, the meeting and the military assistance?

A: That was my clear understanding, security assistance money would not come until the President [of Ukraine] committed to pursue the investigation.

Q: So if they don’t do this, they are not going to get that was your understanding?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Are you aware that quid pro quo literally means this for that?

A: I am.
Rudy Giuliani, Ambassador Gordon Sondland, Secretary of Energy Rick Perry, and Ambassador Kurt Volker operated “an irregular, informal channel of U.S. policymaking with respect to Ukraine.” (Page 23-24)

At the same time, however, there was an irregular, informal channel of U.S. policymaking with respect to Ukraine, one which included then-Special Envoy Kurt Volker, Ambassador Sondland, Secretary of Energy Rick Perry, and as I subsequently learned, Mr. Giuliani. I was clearly in the regular channel, but I was also in the irregular one to the extent that Ambassadors Volker and Sondland included me in certain conversations. Although this irregular channel was well connected in Washington, it operated mostly outside of official State Department channels.

During a meeting on May 23, 2019, President Trump made clear to those in the “irregular channel” that, in order for President Zelensky to get an Oval Office meeting, “they needed to work with Rudy Giuliani.” (Page 24, 59, 113)

A: This irregular channel began when Ambassador Volker, Ambassador Sondland, Secretary Perry, and Senator Ron Johnson briefed President Trump on May 23rd upon their return from President Zelensky’s inauguration. The delegation returned to Washington enthusiastic about the new Ukrainian president and urged President Trump to meet with him early on to cement the U.S. Ukraine relationship. But from what I understood, President Trump did not share their enthusiasm for a meeting with Mr. Zelensky.

… President Trump, I think I mentioned in my statement, was skeptical of Ukraine in general, but—of the new Ukrainian administration. And when Secretary Perry, Ambassador Volker, and Ambassador Sondland suggested that it would be a good idea for the two Presidents, President Trump and President Zelensky to get together in a meeting. [sic] This now is before the letter was signed. Right, but so the idea to get together for a meeting was a good idea so that President Trump could see himself, what they had seen when they were in Kyiv, and what they had seen in their meetings with President Zelensky. President Trump didn’t agree, but what he did say was work with Rudy Giuliani, he told the three of them to work with Rudy Giuliani.

…

Q: Or what had to be effectuated with Mr. Giuliani?
A: Here’s what I understood from Ambassador Volker and Ambassador Sondland. In order to get President Zelensky and President Trump in a meeting in the Oval Office, they took from that May 23rd meeting that they needed to work with Rudy Giuliani, so—and so they did.
It was “well-known” within the State Department that Ambassador Sondland, Secretary Perry, and Ambassador Volker were directed “to do something with regard to Ukraine policy” at their meeting with President Trump on May 23, 2019. (Page 285)

Q: Did you ever receive any indication when you relayed any concerns to the State Department about this irregular policy group that anyone in the Department actually took any steps to resolve anything?
A: There was some discomfort within the State Department with Ambassador Sondland’s role in Ukraine. Of course, Ukraine is not in the EU. But it was well-known that, in that famous May 23rd meeting in the Oval Office, that Ambassador Sondland was given direction, with Secretary Perry and Ambassador Volker, to focus on Ukraine, to do something with regard to Ukraine policy.

As Ambassador Sondland was preparing for a call between President Trump and President Zelensky on June 28, 2019, he “cut out” the regular interagency participants and “requested that the call not be transcribed.” (Page 126-128, 128)

Q: And in the two paragraphs below, you say: “I sensed something odd when Ambassador Sondland told me on June 28 that he did not wish to include most of the regular interagency participants in the call planned with President Zelensky later that day.” Why did you sense something odd about that?
A: He and I were on the phone talking about the timing of this call. This call had been set up. Obviously, when you’re trying to get the head of state on a call, get President Zelensky on a call, you had to work through the timing. Was it convenient? Could he—there may have had to be interpreters present. He had to be at the right phone. So we were working on when the meeting would happen. On the phone, Ambassador Sondland told me that the timing was going to change, that the time of the phone call was going to change. And I asked him something like, shouldn’t we let everybody else know who’s supposed to be on this call? And the answer was, don’t worry about it. Even his staff, I think, were not aware that the time had changed.

Q: And what was odd to you about that?
A: This suggested to me that there were the two channels. This suggested to me that the normal channel, where you would have staff on the phone call, was being cut out, and the other channel, of people who were working, again, toward a goal which I supported, which was having a meeting to further U.S.-Ukrainian relations, I supported, but that irregular channel didn’t have a respect for or an interest in having the normal staff participate in this call with the head of state.

Q: So was this an early indication to you that these two channels were diverging?
A: It was.

Q: And the interests of the irregular channel, represented by Mr. Giuliani, may not be the same interests as the State Department and what was in the best interest of the United States?
A: That second part I came to believe. I’m not sure it was at this point. This is within a week, a week and a half, of me—10 days of me arriving there. And so I
was still, maybe naively, but I was still of the view that I was on—I was part of a team that might have several parts but we were moving in the same direction. So it was not—I think, Mr. Chairman, it was not yet. That would come.

... But Ambassador Sondland made it clear not only that he didn’t wish to include most of the regular interagency participants but also that no one was transcribing or monitoring the call as they added President Zelensky. What struck you as odd about that?

A: Same concern. That is, in the normal, regular channel, the State Department operations center that was putting the call together would stay on the line, in particular when you were having a conversation with the head of state, they would stay on the line, transcribe, take notes so that there could be a record of the discussion with this head of state. It is an official discussion. When he wanted to be sure that there was not, the State Department operations center agreed. And they told us, they said—in response to his request, they said, we won’t monitor and will not—and we certainly won’t transcribe because we’re going to sign off.

In July, Ambassador Volker advised President Zelensky and his Chief of Staff “how President Zelensky could prepare for the phone call with President Trump” and “suggested to President Zelensky that President Trump would like to hear about the investigations.” (Page 64-66)

Q: Okay. And you do reference specifically in your opening remarks that President Zelensky needed to make it clear to President Trump that he was not standing in the way of investigations. And that was a preview to the call that you had with President Zelensky the day after?

A: Right. On June 27th, correct.

Q: And do you recall whether or not that message was conveyed to President Zelensky on the call on the 28th?

A: It was not. And—and Ambassador Volker intended to pass that message in Toronto several days later.

Q: Okay. And did you speak to Ambassador Volker after he went to Toronto in early July?

A: Many times. But about that?

Q: Specifically about a conversation that he had with President Zelensky?

A: Yes.

Q: And what did he tell you about that conversation?

A: He said that he had been in a broader conversation, a larger conversation with many officials on both sides. And then he had an opportunity to have a smaller conversation with President Zelensky and President Zelensky’s Chief of Staff, Andriy Bohdan where Kurt said that he had—Kurt told me that he had discussed how President Zelensky could prepare for the phone call with President Trump. And without going into—without providing me any details about the specific words, did talk about investigations in that conversation with—in Toronto with Zelensky and Bohdan.

Q: In what context did he tell you that he spoke about investigations?
A: So when did he tell me—
Q: No, in what context did the issue or topic of investigations come up? Was it in connection with an interaction between President Zelensky and President Trump?
A: Yes, it was specifically in preparation for the phone call and Kurt suggested to President Zelensky that President Trump would like to hear about the investigations.
Q: Okay. And at that point did you know what investigations he was talking about?
A: No.
Q: It was—It was just described as investigations?
A: Correct.

Rudy Giuliani told Ukrainian Prosecutor General Yuriy Lutsenko that President Zelensky’s call with President Trump was unlikely to happen. (Page 67)

Q: On July 10th you testified that you had a meeting in Kyiv with President Zelensky’s Chief of Staff Andriy Bohdan who had indicated to you that he had heard from Mr. Giuliani that the phone call between the two Presidents was unlikely to happen and that they I think you said were alarmed and disappointed. Oh, and the meeting also was [with] the Foreign Minister Vadym Prystaiko?
A: Yeah.
Q: Did they indicate to you who had heard from Mr. Giuliani and how that message had been relayed?
A: You know, I was going over my notes last night. Yes, it was relayed through the then prosecutor general, this fellow I mentioned earlier, Lutsenko and it was—and as we know, Giuliani and Lutsenko talked a lot. And so Prystaiko and Bohdan had heard from Giuliani through Lutsenko.

National Security Advisor John Bolton abruptly ended a meeting with Ukrainian officials on July 10, 2019, after Ambassador Sondland raised “investigations,” which “triggered Ambassador Bolton’s antenna, political antenna, and he said, we don’t do politics here.” (Page 163-164)

Q: Have you ever had a readout from Volker about what happened in the July 10 meeting? Or is your only information coming from Dr. Hill and Lieutenant Colonel Vindman?
A: It might just be from that source of information. I don’t remember having a conversation—
Q: Okay.
A: —about these other ones. Danyliuk was, obviously, in that meeting. Yermak was in that meeting. And I’ve had multiple conversations with them, more often than, actually, with—
Q: Did anyone relate to you that Danyliuk was getting way into the weeds with Ambassador Bolton and it was not a long meeting in—
A: No, no. Actually, it was—no. What I heard from Vindman and Hill was that the first part of that meeting went well. Substantive discussions: security, national security, both sides, energy security. And, apparently, according to them, their
boss, John Bolton was appreciating the substance of that meeting. And, in their
description, when Ambassador Sondland raised investigations in the meeting, that
triggered Ambassador Bolton’s antenna, political antenna, and he said, we don’t
do politics here.

Q: Uh-huh.
A: And so he ended the meeting.

Ambassadors Volker and Sondland told Ambassador Taylor that President Trump
“wanted to hear from Zelensky” before a meeting would be scheduled in the Oval Office.
(Page 125-126)

Q: On page 5 of your testimony, in the third paragraph, you say: “But during my
subsequent communications with Ambassador Volker and Sondland, they relayed
to me that the President, quote, “wanted to hear from Zelensky,” unquote, before
scheduling the meeting in the Oval Office. It was not clear to me what this meant.
Now, I take it, Ambassador, you used that word “before” deliberately, that is, they
wanted to hear from Zelensky before they would schedule this meeting. Is that
right?
A: That is correct.
Q: Now, at the time I think you said it wasn’t clear to you what this meant.
A: That is also correct.

Ambassador Sondland explicitly “connected ‘investigations’ with an Oval Office meeting
for President Zelensky” during the meeting with Ukrainian officials on July 10, 2019.
(Page 133-134)

Q: You go on to say, a couple paragraphs later, “In the same July 19 phone call, they
gave me an account of the July 10 meeting with the Ukrainian officials at the
White House. Specifically, they told me”—and I believe you’re referring to Dr.
Hill and Mr. Vindman, I believe—
A: Yes.
Q: —“that Ambassador Sondland had connected ‘investigations’ with an Oval Office
meeting for President Zelensky, which so irritated Ambassador Bolton that he
abruptly ended the meeting, telling Dr. Hill and Mr. Vindman that they
should have nothing to do with domestic politics.” Again, is this going to the
conditionality of Ukraine having to do these investigations if they wanted the
Oval Office meeting?
A: That was the implication of that connection, of the connection between the
meeting and investigations.

Ukrainian official “believed that opening those investigations, in particular on Burisma,
would have involved Ukraine in the 2020 election campaign.” (Page 135-136)

Yes. I think it was becoming clear to the Ukrainians that, in order to get this meeting that
they wanted, they would have to commit to pursuing these investigations. And Mr.
Danyliuk, at least, understood—and I’m sure that he briefed President Zelensky, I’m sure
they had this conversation—believed that opening those investigations, in particular on Burisma, would have involved Ukraine in the 2020 election campaign. He did not want to do that.

On July 18, 2019, Ambassador Taylor and others “sat in astonishment” as an OMB official revealed during an inter-agency call that President Trump ordered a hold on military assistance to help Ukraine counter Russian aggression. (Page 27-28, 131)

A: In a regular, NSC secure video conference call on July 18th, I heard a staff person from the Office of Management and Budget say that there was a hold on security assistance to Ukraine but could not say why. Toward the end of this otherwise normal meeting, a voice on the call, the person who was off screen, said that she was from OMB and her boss had instructed her not to approve any additional spending of security assistance for Ukraine until further notice. I and the others on the call sat in astonishment. The Ukrainians were fighting the Russians and counted on not only the training and weapons but also the assurance of U.S. support. All that the OMB staff person said was that the directive had come from the President to the Chief of Staff to OMB. In an instant, I realized that one of the key pillars of our strong support for Ukraine was threatened. The irregular policy channel was running contrary to the goals of longstanding U.S. policy.

…

Q: What did you mean by that?
A: Longstanding goal of U.S. policy would be to support Ukraine in its attempt to defend itself against the Russians. Part of that was security assistance. Security assistance had been very effective. It was weapons, it was training, it was the communications equipment, it was sustainables. It allowed Ukrainian soldiers to actually defend themselves. That was longstanding U.S. policy. Even in the previous administration, the previous administration did not provide lethal weapons, but they did provide all this other—so that was longstanding policy. To stop it, to hold it, for no apparent reason that I could see, was undercutting the longstanding U.S. policy.

Both the military assistance to Ukraine and the White House meeting with the President “got blocked by this second channel.” (Page 150)

Q: You know, I guess the more accurate way to ask the question is, in this actual case, not like prior track two discussions, the irregular channel came to co-opt the regular channel in pursuit of an objective that was not in U.S. interests. Is that fair to say?
A: In one aspect of the regular channel—that is, in the security assistance component of the regular channel. The regular channel is all of our interactions with Ukraine, and one of the very important components of that interaction with Ukraine is the security assistance. And the security assistance got blocked by this second channel.

Q: Well, not just the one, because it was also the meeting, correct?
A: The meeting as well. Yes, sir. The meeting as well.
It was the “[u]nanimous opinion of every level of interagency discussion” that the security assistance should be resumed “without delay.” (Page 132)

Q: In the last paragraph on page 6, you say: “There followed a series of NSC-led interagency meetings, starting at the staff level and quickly reaching the level of Cabinet secretaries. At every meeting, the unanimous conclusion was that the security assistance should be resumed, the hold lifted.” I take it by that there was no dissent, no disagreement with that. Everyone thought that, from the point of view of U.S. national security and our ally fighting the Russians, that security assistance should be resumed without delay.

A: Unanimous opinion of every level of interagency discussion.

Q: Was that it should resume without delay?

A: Without delay.

President Trump told Ambassador Sondland that “he wants President Zelensky to state publicly that Ukraine will investigate Burisma and alleged Ukrainian interference in the 2016 election.” (Page 35-36, 141-142, 36-37)

A: I was hopeful that, at the bilateral meeting or shortly thereafter, the White House would lift the hold, but this was not to be. Indeed, I received a readout of the Pence-Zelensky meeting over the phone for [sic] Mr. Morrison, during which he told me President Zelensky had opened the meeting by asking the Vice President about security cooperation.

…

A: During this same phone call I had with Mr. Morrison, he went on to describe a conversation Ambassador Sondland had with Mr. Yermak at Warsaw. Ambassador Sondland told Mr. Yermak that the security assistance money would not come until President Zelensky committed to pursue the Burisma investigation. I was alarmed by what Mr. Morrison told me about the Sondland–Yermak conversation. This was the first time I had heard that security assistance, not just the White House meeting, was conditioned on the investigations.

…

Q: You go on, at the end of that paragraph, top of page 11: “This was the first time I had heard that the security assistance—not just the White House meeting—was conditioned on the investigations.” So both of these things you now had learned were conditioned on these two political investigations, right?

A: That’s correct, sir.

Q: That is, but for the Ukrainians’ willingness to do these two investigations, they were not only not going to get the White House meeting, they were also not going to get the military assistance.

A: That is what Mr. Sondland told Mr. Yermak.

…

A: Very concerned, on that same day, I sent Ambassador Sondland a text message asking if we are now saying that security assistance and a White House meeting are conditioned on investigations. Ambassador Sondland responded asking me to
call him, which I did. During that phone call, Ambassador Sondland told me that
President Trump had told him that he wants President Zelensky to state publicly
that Ukraine will investigate Burisma and alleged Ukrainian interference in the
2016 U.S. election. Ambassador Sondland also told me that he now recognized
that he had made a mistake by earlier telling Ukrainian officials to whom he
spoke that a White House meeting with President Zelensky was dependent on a
public announcement of investigations. In fact, Ambassador Sondland said
everything was dependent on such an announcement, including security
assistance. He said that President Trump wanted President Zelensky in a box by
making public statement \[sic\] about ordering such investigations. In that same
September 1st call, I told Ambassador Sondland that President Trump should
have more respect for another head of state and that what he described was not in
the interest of either President Trump or President Zelensky. At that point, I
asked Ambassador Sondland to push back on President Trump’s demand.
Ambassador Sondland pledged to try.

According to National Security Council Senior Director Tim Morrison’s readout to
Ambassador Taylor, President Trump insisted on a September 7th call with Ambassador
Sondland that the President of Ukraine “go to a microphone and say he is opening
investigations of Biden and 2016 election interference.” (Page 38)

According to Mr. Morrison, President Trump told Ambassador Sondland that he was not
asking for a quid pro quo. But President Trump did insist that President Zelensky go to a
microphone and say he is opening investigations of Biden and 2016 election interference,
and that President Zelensky should want to do this himself. Mr. Morrison said that he told
Ambassador Bolton and the NSC lawyers of this phone call between President Trump
and Ambassador Sondland.

The next day, Ambassador Sondland told Ambassador Taylor directly that “President
Trump was adamant that President Zelensky himself had to clear things up and do it in
public,” and “if President Zelensky did not clear things up in public, we would be at a
stalemate.” (Page 39)

The following day, on September 8th, Ambassador Sondland and I spoke on the phone.
He said he had talked to President Trump, as I had suggested a week earlier, but that
President Trump was adamant that President Zelensky himself had to clear things up and
do it in public. President Trump said it was not a quid pro quo.

Ambassador Sondland said that he had talked to President Zelensky and Mr. Yermak and
told them that, although this was not a quid pro quo, if President Zelensky did not clear
things up in public, we would be at a stalemate. I understood a stalemate to mean that
Ukraine would not receive the much-needed military assistance. Ambassador Sondland
said that this conversation concluded with President Zelensky agreeing to make a public
statement in an interview with CNN.
Ambassador Sondland and Ambassador Volker understood that “if President Trump was going to sign the check for military assistance,” the Ukrainians “needed to pay up first and that pay-up was a public declaration of these two political investigations.” (Page 146-147)

Q: On page 13, the middle paragraph, you’re talking about the text messages, and you testified: “Before these text messages, during our call on September 8, Ambassador Sondland tried to explain to me that President Trump is a businessman. When a businessman is about to sign a check to someone who owes him something, he said, the businessman asks that person to pay up before signing the check.” Now, when Ambassador Sondland described to you this signing of the check, did you take it by that he was referring to signing the check for the military assistance?
A: Yes.
Q: You go on in the next sentence to say, “Ambassador Volker used the same terms several days later when we were together at the Yalta European Strategy Conference.” Did he use the same “signing the check” term?
A: Yes.
Q: Did that strike you as remarkable, that the same analogy was used by both ambassadors?
A: No. It struck me—I concluded that they had had a conversation.
Q: And that they both understood that if President Trump was going to sign the check for military assistance then they needed to pay up first and that pay-up was a public declaration of these two political investigations?
A: That was the parallel.

It would be a “nightmare” if the Trump Administration withheld military aid after the Ukrainians announced the investigations because the “Russians are paying attention to how much support the Americans are going to provide the Ukrainians,” and that “humiliation” would “give the Russians a freer hand, and I would quit.” (Page 209-210)

Q: Okay. Going back to the text messages, do you see the message on September 8th at 12:37 p.m.? Can you just read what you wrote there about ‘the nightmare’?
A: I will. “The nightmare” is they give the interview and don’t get the security assistance. The Russians love it—parenthetical—(and I quit.)
Q: Can you unpack that a little bit for us?
A: Sure.
Q: What did you mean by “the nightmare” and what would the Russians love?
A: “The nightmare” is the scenario where President Zelensky goes out in public, makes an announcement that he’s going to investigate Burisma and the election in 2016, interference in 2016 election, maybe among other things. He might put that in some series of investigations. But he had to—he was going—the nightmare was he would mention those two, take all the heat from that, get himself in big trouble in this country and probably in his country as well, and the security assistance would not be released. That was the nightmare.
The Russians loving it. The Russians are paying attention. The Russians are paying attention to how much support the Americans are going to provide the Ukrainians. The Russians are leaning on Ukraine. They are leaning on Ukraine about Donbas. They are leaning on Ukraine about sovereign—small little sovereign countries here, little statelets. They are leaning on economically [sic], they have got the Nord Stream coming through, they have got—they are putting pressure on—they have to come to a new gas agreement by the 1st of January.

So they are leaning on them. And they, the Russians want to know how much support the Ukrainians are going to get in general, but also what kind of support from the Americans. So the Russians are loving, would love, the humiliation of Zelensky at the hand of the Americans, and would give the Russians a freer hand, and I would quit.

On September 28, 2019, John Bolton suggested that Ambassador Taylor write a “first-person cable” directly to Secretary Pompeo about President Trump’s hold on aid to Ukraine “to get attention back there.” (Page 229-230)

Q: Okay. And then Ambassador Bolton comes to Ukraine on August 27th?
A: Correct.
Q: And did you discuss these issues with him at that time?
A: At the end of—yes. Yes. At the end of his—he was there for, like, 3 days. And the second day—he left the morning of the third day, early. The evening of the second day, which I think is maybe the 28th of September [August] or so, I asked for a meeting with him to talk about this. And, again, this is the 28th.1 September [August] 29th is when the word leaks out in the Politico article, okay, there is a hold on—so it wasn’t out then, and, thus, it wasn’t a topic of conversation with the Ukrainians. And he saw the full range of Ukrainians, including the President. But I knew it. And I asked him at the end of his meeting, at the end of his visit, before he went to bed, if I could have a session with him. And I did, and I raised exactly this question. It was he who suggested then at that meeting that I write this note to Secretary Pompeo, which I did the next day.

Q: Okay. Did he urge—he didn’t urge a telephone call or anything of that sort?
A: No. He urged the first-person cable to get attention back there.
Q: Okay. Did you ask him whether he was trying to work the issue from his vantage point?
A: He indicated that he was very sympathetic. I had known from earlier conversations with people that he was also trying with the two Secretaries and the Director of the CIA to get this decision reversed. So he confirmed that and urged me to make my concerns known to the Secretary again.

1 Ambassador Taylor corrects himself later in the transcript to clarify that he was referring to August 28 rather than September.
Ambassador Taylor agreed that his understanding of the state of affairs in July 2019 was that a White House meeting was conditioned on the release of public statements about the two political investigations. (Page 130)

Q: Now, my colleague in the minority asked you about ‘quid pro quo.’ And are you a lawyer?
A: I am not. I am not, Mr. Chairman.
Q: Because he asked you about the legal definition of ‘quid pro quo.’ So you’re not in a position to talk about legal definitions?
A: I am definitely not in the position.
Q: Okay.
A: I don’t speak Latin.
Q: And, of course, whether it meets a legal definition of ‘quid pro quo’ or it doesn’t is really irrelevant to what we’re focused on here. But it is your testimony that, hey, you don’t make these public statements about these two political investigations we want, you’re not getting this meeting— you make these statements, you’ll get the meeting; you don’t make these statements, you won’t. Was that your understanding of the state of affairs in July of 2019?
A: Yes.

Ambassador Taylor testified that security assistance money “would not come until the President [of Ukraine] committed to pursue the investigation.” (Page 189-190)

Q: And when you say that, this was the first time I heard that the security assistance—not just the White House meeting—was conditioned on the investigation, when you talk about conditioned, did you mean that if they didn’t do this, the investigations, they weren’t going to get that, the meeting and the military assistance?
A: That was my clear understanding, security assistance money would not come until the President [of Ukraine] committed to pursue the investigation.
Q: So if they don’t do this, they are not going to get that was your understanding?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Are you aware that quid pro quo literally means this for that?
A: I am.

The State Department refused to produce to the Committees documents that Ambassador Taylor provided to the Department. (Page 45-46)

Q: Thank you, Ambassador Taylor. Thank you for the detailed opening statement. We obviously just received it, and we’ll do our best not to be too repetitive. It is incredibly detailed, and I note that you mention that you wrote a memo to file on June 30th and that you sent a cable to Secretary Pompeo on August 27. Can you tell us whether there were any other documents that you relied upon in putting together this opening statement today?
A: Yes. Three sources, I guess. One you are familiar with are the texts of WhatsApp messages that Ambassador Volker, Ambassador Sondland, and I exchanged. There were other WhatsApp messages that I exchanged with Ukrainian officials
and other American officials, all of which, like Ambassador Volker’s package, I have provided to the State Department. That’s number one. Number two, I’ve always kept careful notes, and I keep a little notebook where I take notes on conversations, in particular when I’m not in the office. So, in meetings with Ukrainian officials or when I’m out and I get a phone call and I can—I keep notes. The third documents are handwritten notes that I take on a small, little spiral notebook in my office of phone calls that take place in my office. So those, I think are the three sources of information that you see here. You will see some quotes and those are quotes from either the WhatsApp texts or from my notes.

Q: And have you provided all of those documents to the State Department?
A: I have.