19-1540-cv

United States Court of Appeals

for the

Second Circuit

DONALD J. TRUMP, DONALD J. TRUMP, JR., ERIC TRUMP, IVANKA TRUMP, DONALD J. TRUMP REVOCABLE TRUST, TRUMP ORGANIZATION, INC., TRUMP ORGANIZATION LLC, DJT HOLDINGS LLC, DJT HOLDINGS MANAGING MEMBER LLC, TRUMP ACQUISITION LLC, TRUMP ACQUISITION, CORP.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

(For Continuation of Caption See Inside Cover)

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

JOINT APPENDIX

MARC LEE MUKASEY MUKASEY FRENCHMAN & SKLAROFF LLP Two Grand Central Tower 140 East 45th Street, 17th Floor New York, New York 10017 (212) 466-6400 PATRICK STRAWBRIDGE CONSOVOY MCCARTHY PLLC Ten Post Office Square, 8th Floor South PMB #706 Boston, Massachusetts 02109 (617) 227-0548

WILLIAM S. CONSOVOY CAMERON T. NORRIS CONSOVOY MCCARTHY PLLC 1600 Wilson Boulevard, Suite 700 Arlington, Virginia 22209 (703) 243-9423

Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants

(For Continuation of Appearances See Inside Cover)

-v.-

DEUTSCHE BANK AG, CAPITAL ONE FINANCIAL CORPORATION,

Defendants-Appellees,

COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES OF THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE OF THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

Intervenor Defendants-Appellees.

Douglas N. Letter United States House of Representatives 219 Cannon House Office Building Washington, DC 20515 (202) 225-9700

Attorneys for Defendants-Appellees
Committee on Financial Services of the
United States House of Representatives
and Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the United States House
of Representatives

PARVIN D. MOYNE
AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER
& FELD LLP
One Bryant Park
New York, New York 10036
(212) 872-1000

Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee Deutsche Bank AG

STEVEN D. FELDMAN
JAMES A. MURPHY
MURPHY & MCGONIGLE
1185 Avenue of the Americas,
21st Floor
New York, New York 10036
(212) 880-3999

Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee Capital One Financial Corporation

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Tatelman Declaration	
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STAYED, APPEAL, ECF

U.S. District Court Southern District of New York (Foley Square) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:19-cv-03826-ÉR

Donald J. Trump et al v. Deutsche Bank, AG et al

Assigned to: Judge Edgardo Ramos

Case in other court: U.S.C.A. – 2nd Circ., 19–01540

Cause: 28:2201 Constitutionality of State Statute(s)

Date Filed: 04/29/2019 Jury Demand: None

Nature of Suit: 890 Other Statutory

Actions

Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Plaintiff

Donald J. Trump represented by William Consovoy

Consovoy McCarthy Park PLLC 3033 Wilson Blvd, Suite 700 Arlington, VA 22201

(703) - 243 - 9423Fax: (703)-243-9423

Email: will@consovoymccarthy.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patrick Strawbridge

Consovoy McCarthy Park PLLC

Ten Post Office Square 8th Floor South PMB, #706 Boston, MA 02109

617-227-0548

Email: patrick@consovoymccarthy.com

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff

Donald J. Trump, Jr. represented by William Consovoy

(See above for address)

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patrick Strawbridge (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff

Eric Trump represented by William Consovoy

(See above for address)

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patrick Strawbridge (See above for address)

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff

Ivanka Trump represented by William Consovoy

(See above for address)

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patrick Strawbridge (See above for address)

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff

Donald J. Trump Revocable Trust represented by Marc Lee Mukasey

Mukasey Frenchman & Sklaroff

2 Grand Central Tower

Case 19-1540, Document 37, 07/01/2019, 2598263, Page5 of 164

140 East 45th Street 17th Floor New York, NY 10017 212-466-6400

Email: marc.mukasey@mfsllp.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Consovoy (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patrick Strawbridge (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff

Trump Organization, Inc. represented by Marc Lee Mukasey

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Consovov (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patrick Strawbridge (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff

Trump Organization LLC represented by Marc Lee Mukasey

> (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Consovoy (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patrick Strawbridge (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff

DJT Holdings LLC represented by Marc Lee Mukasey

> (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Consovoy (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patrick Strawbridge (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff

DJT Holdings Managing Member LLC represented by Marc Lee Mukasey

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Consovoy (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patrick Strawbridge (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff

Trump Acquisition LLC

represented by Marc Lee Mukasey

(See above for address)

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Consovov

(See above for address)

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patrick Strawbridge

(See above for address)

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff

Trump Acquisition, Corp.

represented by Marc Lee Mukasey

(See above for address)

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Consovoy

(See above for address)

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patrick Strawbridge

(See above for address)

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.

Defendant

Deutsche Bank, AG

represented by Parvin Daphne Moyne

Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP

One Bryant Park

New York, NY 10007-2632

212-872-1076

Fax: 212-872-1002

Email: pmoyne@akingump.com

LEAD ÂTTÖRNEY

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Raphael Adam Prober

Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP

2001 K Street NW Washington, DC 20006

202–887–4319

Email: rprober@akingump.com

LEAD ÂTTORNEY

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Steven R Ross

Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP 2001 K Street NW Washington, DC 20006 202-887-4343

Email: sross@akingump.com

LEAD ATTORNEY

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case 19-1540, Document 37, 07/01/2019, 2598263, Page7 of 164

Thomas C Mover

Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP 2001 K Street NW Washington, DC 20006 202-887-4528

Email: tmoyer@akingump.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant

Capital One Financial Corp.

represented by James Alwin Murphy

Murphy & McGonigle, P.C. 1185 Avenue of the Americas, 21st fl New York, NY 10036 212-880-3968 Fax: 212-880-3998 Email: jmurphy@mmlawus.com

LEAD ATTORNEY

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Steven David Feldman

Murphy & McGonigle PC (NYC) 1185 Avenue of the Americas, Fl 21 New York, NY 10036 212-880-3988

Fax: 212-880-3998

Email: sfeldman@mmlawus.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Intervenor Defendant

Committee on Financial Services of the **U.S.** House of Representatives

represented by **Douglas Neal Letter**

U.S. House of Representatives 219 Cannon HOB Washington, DC 20515 202-225-9700 Email: douglas.letter@mail.house.gov LEAD ATTORNEY

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brooks M Hanner

Office of General Counsel, U.S. House of Representatives 219 Cannon House Office Building Washington Washington, DC 20515 202-225-9700 Email: <u>brooks.hanner@mail.house.gov</u> ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Josephine Morse

Office of General Counsel 219 Cannon House Office Building Washington, DC 20515 202-225-9700 Email: jodie.morse@mail.house.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Megan Barbero

Office of General Counsel Poc James, Melissa Office of General Counsel Cannon House Office Building, Ste 219 Washington, DC 20515 202-225-9700

Email: megan.barbero@mail.house.gov

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Todd Barry Tatelman

U.S. House of Representatives 219 Cannon House Office Building Washington, DC 20515 202–225–9700

Email: todd.tatelman@mail.house.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Intervenor Defendant

Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the U.S. House of Representatives

represented by **Douglas Neal Letter**

(See above for address)

LEAD ATTORNEY

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brooks M Hanner

(See above for address)

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Josephine Morse

(See above for address)

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Megan Barbero

(See above for address)

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Todd Barry Tatelman

(See above for address)

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed	#	Docket Text
04/29/2019	<u>1</u>	COMPLAINT against Deutsche Bank, AG, Capital One Financial Corp (Filing Fee \$ 400.00, Receipt Number ANYSDC–16789203)Document filed by The Trump Organization, Inc., Trump Acquisition, Corp., Eric Trump, Trump Organization LLC, DJT Holdings Managing Member LLC, Donald J. Trump, Jr, DJT Holdings LLC, Donald J. Trump, Ivanka Trump, Trump Acquisition LLC, The Donald J. Trump Revocable Trust.(Strawbridge, Patrick) (Entered: 04/29/2019)
04/29/2019	2	CIVIL COVER SHEET filed. (Strawbridge, Patrick) (Entered: 04/29/2019)
04/29/2019	3	REQUEST FOR ISSUANCE OF SUMMONS as to Deutsche Bank AG, re: 1 Complaint,. Document filed by DJT Holdings LLC, DJT Holdings Managing Member LLC, The Donald J. Trump Revocable Trust, The Trump Organization, Inc., Donald J. Trump, Jr, Donald J. Trump, Eric Trump, Ivanka Trump, Trump Acquisition LLC, Trump Acquisition, Corp., Trump Organization LLC. (Strawbridge, Patrick) (Entered: 04/29/2019)
04/29/2019	4	REQUEST FOR ISSUANCE OF SUMMONS as to Capital One Financial Corp., re: 1 Complaint,. Document filed by DJT Holdings LLC, DJT Holdings Managing Member LLC, The Donald J. Trump Revocable Trust, The Trump Organization, Inc., Donald J. Trump, Jr, Donald J. Trump, Eric Trump, Ivanka Trump, Trump Acquisition LLC, Trump Acquisition, Corp., Trump Organization LLC. (Strawbridge, Patrick) (Entered: 04/29/2019)
04/29/2019	<u>5</u>	RULE 7.1 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT. No Corporate Parent. Document filed by DJT Holdings LLC.(Strawbridge, Patrick) (Entered: 04/29/2019)
04/29/2019	<u>6</u>	RULE 7.1 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT. No Corporate Parent. Document filed by DJT Holdings Managing Member LLC.(Strawbridge, Patrick) (Entered: 04/29/2019)

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		7 1340, Document 37, 07/01/2013, 2330203, 1 ages of 104
04/29/2019	7	RULE 7.1 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT. No Corporate Parent. Document filed by Trump Acquisition, Corp(Strawbridge, Patrick) (Entered: 04/29/2019)
04/29/2019	8	RULE 7.1 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT. No Corporate Parent. Document filed by Trump Acquisition LLC.(Strawbridge, Patrick) (Entered: 04/29/2019)
04/29/2019	9	RULE 7.1 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT. No Corporate Parent. Document filed by The Trump Organization, Inc(Strawbridge, Patrick) (Entered: 04/29/2019)
04/29/2019	<u>10</u>	RULE 7.1 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT. No Corporate Parent. Document filed by Trump Organization LLC.(Strawbridge, Patrick) (Entered: 04/29/2019)
04/29/2019	11	MOTION for Patrick Strawbridge to Appear Pro Hac Vice . Filing fee \$ 200.00, receipt number ANYSDC–16789656. Motion and supporting papers to be reviewed by Clerk's Office staff. Document filed by DJT Holdings LLC, DJT Holdings Managing Member LLC, The Donald J. Trump Revocable Trust, The Trump Organization, Inc., Donald J. Trump, Jr, Donald J. Trump, Eric Trump, Ivanka Trump, Trump Acquisition LLC, Trump Acquisition, Corp., Trump Organization LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit, # 2 Certificate of Good Standing (Maine), # 3 Certificate of Good Standing (Massachusetts), # 4 Certificate of Good Standing (Connecticut), # 5 Text of Proposed Order)(Strawbridge, Patrick) (Entered: 04/29/2019)
04/29/2019	<u>12</u>	MOTION for William S. Consovoy to Appear Pro Hac Vice . Filing fee \$ 200.00, receipt number ANYSDC–16789731. Motion and supporting papers to be reviewed by Clerk's Office staff. Document filed by DJT Holdings LLC, DJT Holdings Managing Member LLC, The Donald J. Trump Revocable Trust, The Trump Organization, Inc., Donald J. Trump, Jr, Donald J. Trump, Eric Trump, Ivanka Trump, Trump Acquisition LLC, Trump Acquisition, Corp., Trump Organization LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit, # 2 Certificate of Good Standing (Virginia), # 3 Certificate of Good Standing (D.C.), # 4 Text of Proposed Order)(Consovoy, William) (Entered: 04/29/2019)
04/30/2019		>>>NOTICE REGARDING PRO HAC VICE MOTION. Regarding Document No. 12 MOTION for William S. Consovoy to Appear Pro Hac Vice . Filing fee \$ 200.00, receipt number ANYSDC-16789731. Motion and supporting papers to be reviewed by Clerk's Office staff., 11 MOTION for Patrick Strawbridge to Appear Pro Hac Vice . Filing fee \$ 200.00, receipt number ANYSDC-16789656. Motion and supporting papers to be reviewed by Clerk's Office staff The document has been reviewed and there are no deficiencies. (wb) (Entered: 04/30/2019)
04/30/2019		***NOTICE TO ATTORNEY REGARDING CIVIL. CASE OPENING STATISTICAL ERROR CORRECTION: Notice to attorney Patrick Strawbridge. The following case opening statistical information was erroneously selected/entered: Cause of Action code 12:3410. The following correction(s) have been made to your case entry: the Cause of Action code has been modified to 28:2201. (dnh) (Entered: 04/30/2019)
04/30/2019		***NOTICE TO ATTORNEY REGARDING PARTY MODIFICATION. Notice to attorney Patrick Strawbridge. The party information for the following party/parties has been modified: The Donald J. Trump Revocable Trust; The Trump Organization, Inc The information for the party/parties has been modified for the following reason/reasons: Exclude from the entry of business name any leading A, An or The (dnh) (Entered: 04/30/2019)
04/30/2019		CASE OPENING INITIAL ASSIGNMENT NOTICE: The above—entitled action is assigned to Judge Edgardo Ramos. Please download and review the Individual Practices of the assigned District Judge, located at http://nysd.uscourts.gov/judges/District . Attorneys are responsible for providing courtesy copies to judges where their Individual Practices require such. Please download and review the ECF Rules and Instructions, located at http://nysd.uscourts.gov/ecf_filing.php . (dnh) (Entered: 04/30/2019)

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04/30/2019		Magistrate Judge Robert W. Lehrburger is so designated. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 636(c) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 73(b)(1) parties are notified that they may consent to proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge. Parties who wish to consent may access the necessary form at the following link: http://nysd.uscourts.gov/forms.php . (dnh) (Entered: 04/30/2019)
04/30/2019		Case Designated ECF. (dnh) (Entered: 04/30/2019)
04/30/2019	<u>13</u>	ELECTRONIC SUMMONS ISSUED as to Deutsche Bank, AG. (dnh) (Entered: 04/30/2019)
04/30/2019	<u>14</u>	ELECTRONIC SUMMONS ISSUED as to Capital One Financial Corp (dnh) (Entered: 04/30/2019)
04/30/2019	15	ORDER granting 11 Motion for Patrick Strawbridge to Appear Pro Hac Vice. (HEREBY ORDERED by Judge Edgardo Ramos)(Text Only Order) (jar) Transmission to Attorney Services/Help Desk. (Entered: 04/30/2019)
04/30/2019	16	ORDER granting 12 Motion for William S. Consovoy to Appear Pro Hac Vice. (HEREBY ORDERED by Judge Edgardo Ramos)(Text Only Order) (jar) Transmission to Attorney Services/Help Desk. (Entered: 04/30/2019)
05/01/2019	<u>17</u>	NOTICE OF APPEARANCE by James Alwin Murphy on behalf of Capital One Financial Corp (Murphy, James) (Entered: 05/01/2019)
05/01/2019	<u>18</u>	NOTICE OF APPEARANCE by Steven David Feldman on behalf of Capital One Financial Corp (Feldman, Steven) (Entered: 05/01/2019)
05/01/2019	<u>19</u>	RULE 7.1 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT. No Corporate Parent. Document filed by Capital One Financial Corp(Feldman, Steven) (Entered: 05/01/2019)
05/01/2019	<u>20</u>	WAIVER OF SERVICE RETURNED EXECUTED. Capital One Financial Corp. waiver sent on 4/30/2019, answer due 7/1/2019. Document filed by Trump Organization, Inc.; Trump Acquisition, Corp.; Eric Trump; Trump Organization LLC; DJT Holdings Managing Member LLC; Donald J. Trump, Jr; DJT Holdings LLC; Donald J. Trump; Ivanka Trump; Trump Acquisition LLC; Donald J. Trump Revocable Trust. (Strawbridge, Patrick) (Entered: 05/01/2019)
05/01/2019	21	CONSENT MOTION to Set Briefing Schedule for Preliminary—Injunction Motion . Document filed by DJT Holdings LLC, DJT Holdings Managing Member LLC, Donald J. Trump Revocable Trust, Donald J. Trump, Jr, Donald J. Trump, Eric Trump, Ivanka Trump, Trump Acquisition LLC, Trump Acquisition, Corp., Trump Organization LLC, Trump Organization, Inc (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Strawbridge, Patrick) (Entered: 05/01/2019)
05/01/2019	<u>22</u>	ORDER granting <u>21</u> motion SETTING BRIEFING SCHEDULE ON MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION So Ordered. (Signed by Judge Edgardo Ramos on 5/1/2019) (js) Modified on 5/2/2019 (js). (Entered: 05/02/2019)
05/01/2019		Set/Reset Deadlines: (Motions due by 5/3/2019., Responses due by 5/10/2019, Replies due by 5/15/2019.), Set/Reset Hearings: (Oral Argument set for 5/22/2019 at 02:30 PM before Judge Edgardo Ramos.) (js) (Entered: 05/02/2019)
05/02/2019	<u>23</u>	NOTICE OF APPEARANCE by Marc Lee Mukasey on behalf of DJT Holdings LLC, DJT Holdings Managing Member LLC, Donald J. Trump Revocable Trust, Trump Acquisition LLC, Trump Acquisition, Corp., Trump Organization LLC, Trump Organization, Inc (Mukasey, Marc) (Entered: 05/02/2019)
05/02/2019	<u>24</u>	WAIVER OF SERVICE RETURNED EXECUTED. Deutsche Bank, AG waiver sent on 4/30/2019, answer due 7/1/2019. Document filed by Trump Organization, Inc.; Trump Acquisition, Corp.; Eric Trump; Trump Organization LLC; DJT Holdings Managing Member LLC; Donald J. Trump, Jr; DJT Holdings LLC; Donald J. Trump; Ivanka Trump; Trump Acquisition LLC; Donald J. Trump Revocable Trust. (Strawbridge, Patrick) (Entered: 05/02/2019)
05/03/2019	<u>25</u>	CONSENT LETTER MOTION for Leave to File intervention addressed to Judge Edgardo Ramos from Douglas N. Letter, General Counsel, U.S. House of Representatives dated 5/3/2019. Document filed by Committee on Financial Services

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		of the U.S. House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the U.S. House of Representatives. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Letter, Douglas) (Entered: 05/03/2019)
05/03/2019	<u>26</u>	MOTION for Preliminary Injunction . Document filed by DJT Holdings LLC, DJT Holdings Managing Member LLC, Donald J. Trump Revocable Trust, Donald J. Trump, Jr, Donald J. Trump, Eric Trump, Ivanka Trump, Trump Acquisition LLC, Trump Acquisition, Corp., Trump Organization LLC, Trump Organization, Inc(Strawbridge, Patrick) (Entered: 05/03/2019)
05/03/2019	<u>27</u>	MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Support re: <u>26</u> MOTION for Preliminary Injunction Document filed by DJT Holdings LLC, DJT Holdings Managing Member LLC, Donald J. Trump Revocable Trust, Donald J. Trump, Jr, Donald J. Trump, Eric Trump, Ivanka Trump, Trump Acquisition LLC, Trump Acquisition, Corp., Trump Organization LLC, Trump Organization, Inc (Strawbridge, Patrick) (Entered: 05/03/2019)
05/03/2019	<u>28</u>	DECLARATION of Patrick Strawbridge in Support re: <u>26</u> MOTION for Preliminary Injunction Document filed by DJT Holdings LLC, DJT Holdings Managing Member LLC, Donald J. Trump Revocable Trust, Donald J. Trump, Jr, Donald J. Trump, Eric Trump, Ivanka Trump, Trump Acquisition LLC, Trump Acquisition, Corp., Trump Organization LLC, Trump Organization, Inc (Strawbridge, Patrick) (Entered: 05/03/2019)
05/03/2019	<u>29</u>	PROPOSED ORDER. Document filed by DJT Holdings LLC, DJT Holdings Managing Member LLC, Donald J. Trump Revocable Trust, Donald J. Trump, Jr, Donald J. Trump, Eric Trump, Ivanka Trump, Trump Acquisition LLC, Trump Acquisition, Corp., Trump Organization LLC, Trump Organization, Inc Related Document Number: 26. (Strawbridge, Patrick) Proposed Order to be reviewed by Clerk's Office staff. (Entered: 05/03/2019)
05/03/2019	<u>30</u>	LETTER MOTION for Conference <i>regarding Limited Expedited Discovery</i> addressed to Judge Edgardo Ramos from Patrick Strawbridge dated 5/3/2019. Document filed by DJT Holdings LLC, DJT Holdings Managing Member LLC, Donald J. Trump Revocable Trust, Donald J. Trump, Jr, Donald J. Trump, Eric Trump, Ivanka Trump, Trump Acquisition LLC, Trump Acquisition, Corp., Trump Organization LLC, Trump Organization, Inc(Strawbridge, Patrick) (Entered: 05/03/2019)
05/03/2019	31	ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO INTERVENE OF COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 25 Letter Motion for Leave to File Document. It is SO ORDERED that the motion of the proposed intervenor–defendants Committee on Financial Services and Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the U.S. House of Representatives (Committees) is GRANTED.IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the intervenor–defendant Committees shall comply with the deadlines set forth in this Courts May 1, 2019 order setting a briefing schedule (ECF No. 22). (Signed by Judge Edgardo Ramos on 5/3/2019) (jca) (Entered: 05/03/2019)
05/03/2019	<u>32</u>	ORDER granting 30 Letter Motion for Conference. A pre–motion conference will be held on Thursday, May 9, 2019, at 2:30 p.m. Defendants are directed to submit a response to Plaintiffs' letter by close of business Tuesday, May 7, 2019. It is SO ORDERED. (Pre–Motion Conference set for 5/9/2019 at 02:30 PM before Judge Edgardo Ramos.) (Signed by Judge Edgardo Ramos on 5/3/2019) (jca) (Entered: 05/03/2019)
05/03/2019		Set/Reset Deadlines: Responses due by 5/7/2019 (jca) (Entered: 05/03/2019)
05/03/2019	<u>33</u>	NOTICE OF APPEARANCE by Parvin Daphne Moyne on behalf of Deutsche Bank, AG. (Moyne, Parvin) (Entered: 05/03/2019)
05/03/2019	<u>34</u>	RULE 7.1 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT. No Corporate Parent. Document filed by Deutsche Bank, AG.(Moyne, Parvin) (Entered: 05/03/2019)
05/03/2019	<u>35</u>	MOTION for Steven R. Ross to Appear Pro Hac Vice . Filing fee \$ 200.00, receipt

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		Declaration of Steven R. Ross, # 2 District of Columbia Certificate of Good Standing, # 3 Text of Proposed Order)(Ross, Steven) (Entered: 05/03/2019)
05/03/2019	<u>36</u>	MOTION for Raphael A. Prober to Appear Pro Hac Vice . Filing fee \$ 200.00, receipt number ANYSDC–16820786. Motion and supporting papers to be reviewed by Clerk's Office staff. Document filed by Deutsche Bank, AG. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Raphael A. Prober, # 2 District of Columbia Certificate of Good Standing, # 3 New York Certificate of Good Standing, # 4 Text of Proposed Order)(Prober, Raphael) (Entered: 05/03/2019)
05/03/2019	<u>37</u>	MOTION for Thomas C. Moyer to Appear Pro Hac Vice . Filing fee \$ 200.00, receipt number ANYSDC–16820815. Motion and supporting papers to be reviewed by Clerk's Office staff. Document filed by Deutsche Bank, AG. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Thomas C. Moyer, # 2 District of Columbia Certificate of Good Standing, # 3 Virginia Certificate of Good Standing, # 4 Text of Proposed Order)(Moyer, Thomas) (Entered: 05/03/2019)
05/06/2019		>>>NOTICE REGARDING PRO HAC VICE MOTION. Regarding Document No. 35 MOTION for Steven R. Ross to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Filing fee \$ 200.00, receipt number ANYSDC-16820370. Motion and supporting papers to be reviewed by Clerk's Office staff., 36 MOTION for Raphael A. Prober to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Filing fee \$ 200.00, receipt number ANYSDC-16820786. Motion and supporting papers to be reviewed by Clerk's Office staff., 37 MOTION for Thomas C. Moyer to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Filing fee \$ 200.00, receipt number ANYSDC-16820815. Motion and supporting papers to be reviewed by Clerk's Office staff The document has been reviewed and there are no deficiencies. (wb) (Entered: 05/06/2019)
05/06/2019		***NOTICE TO COURT REGARDING PROPOSED ORDER. Document No. <u>29</u> Proposed Order was reviewed and approved as to form. (km) (Entered: 05/06/2019)
05/07/2019	<u>38</u>	LETTER addressed to Judge Edgardo Ramos from Steven R. Ross dated May 7, 2019 re: Statement of Position. Document filed by Deutsche Bank, AG.(Ross, Steven) (Entered: 05/07/2019)
05/07/2019	<u>39</u>	NOTICE OF APPEARANCE by Douglas Neal Letter on behalf of Committee on Financial Services of the U.S. House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the U.S. House of Representatives. (Letter, Douglas) (Entered: 05/07/2019)
05/07/2019	<u>40</u>	LETTER addressed to Judge Edgardo Ramos from James A. Murphy dated May 7, 2019 re: Statement of Position. Document filed by Capital One Financial Corp(Murphy, James) (Entered: 05/07/2019)
05/07/2019	41	CONSENT LETTER MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply addressed to Judge Edgardo Ramos from Douglas N. Letter, General Counsel, U.S. House of Representatives dated 05/07/2019. Document filed by Committee on Financial Services of the U.S. House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the U.S. House of Representatives. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Letter, Douglas) (Entered: 05/07/2019)
05/07/2019	<u>42</u>	ORDER GRANTING INTERVENOR–DEFENDANTS' CONSENT MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME granting 41 Letter Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply. It is SO ORDERED that the consent motion of intervenor–defendants Committee on Financial Services and Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the U.S. House of Representatives for a 24–hour extension of time to respond to plaintiffs' May 3, 2019 letter is GRANTED. (Signed by Judge Edgardo Ramos on 5/7/2019) Copies Mailed By Chambers. (rro) (Entered: 05/08/2019)
05/08/2019	43	LETTER addressed to Judge Edgardo Ramos from Patrick Strawbridge dated 05/08/2019 re: Withdrawing Letter Motion for Conference. Document filed by DJT Holdings LLC, DJT Holdings Managing Member LLC, Donald J. Trump Revocable Trust, Donald J. Trump, Jr, Donald J. Trump, Eric Trump, Ivanka Trump, Trump Acquisition LLC, Trump Acquisition, Corp., Trump Organization LLC, Trump Organization, Inc(Strawbridge, Patrick) (Entered: 05/08/2019)

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05/08/2019	44	MEMO ENDORSEMENT on re: 43 Letter, filed by Trump Acquisition LLC, DJT Holdings Managing Member LLC, Ivanka Trump, Donald J. Trump Revocable Trust, Trump Organization, Inc., Trump Acquisition, Corp., Eric Trump, Donald J. Trump, Jr., DJT Holdings LLC, Trump Organization LLC, Donald J. Trump. ENDORSEMENT: The conference previously scheduled for May 9, 2019, is hereby terminated. It is SO ORDERED. (Signed by Judge Edgardo Ramos on 5/8/2019) (kv) (Entered: 05/08/2019)
05/10/2019	<u>45</u>	RESPONSE to Motion re: <u>26</u> MOTION for Preliminary Injunction . <i>Defendant Deutsche Bank AG's Statement of Position as to Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction</i> . Document filed by Deutsche Bank, AG. (Ross, Steven) (Entered: 05/10/2019)
05/10/2019	<u>46</u>	RESPONSE to Motion re: <u>26</u> MOTION for Preliminary Injunction Document filed by Capital One Financial Corp (Murphy, James) (Entered: 05/10/2019)
05/10/2019	<u>47</u>	NOTICE OF APPEARANCE by Todd Barry Tatelman on behalf of Committee on Financial Services of the U.S. House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the U.S. House of Representatives. (Tatelman, Todd) (Entered: 05/10/2019)
05/10/2019	<u>48</u>	NOTICE OF APPEARANCE by Megan Barbero on behalf of Committee on Financial Services of the U.S. House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the U.S. House of Representatives. (Barbero, Megan) (Entered: 05/10/2019)
05/10/2019	<u>49</u>	NOTICE OF APPEARANCE by Brooks M Hanner on behalf of Committee on Financial Services of the U.S. House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the U.S. House of Representatives. (Hanner, Brooks) (Entered: 05/10/2019)
05/10/2019	<u>50</u>	NOTICE OF APPEARANCE by Josephine Morse on behalf of Committee on Financial Services of the U.S. House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the U.S. House of Representatives. (Morse, Josephine) (Entered: 05/10/2019)
05/10/2019	<u>51</u>	RESPONSE in Opposition to Motion re: <u>26</u> MOTION for Preliminary Injunction Document filed by Committee on Financial Services of the U.S. House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the U.S. House of Representatives. (Attachments: # <u>1</u> Affidavit Declaration of Todd B. Tatelman, # <u>2</u> Exhibit Ex. A to Declaration of Todd B. Tatelman, # <u>3</u> Exhibit Ex. B to Declaration of Todd B. Tatelman)(Letter, Douglas) (Entered: 05/10/2019)
05/13/2019	<u>52</u>	CONSENT LETTER MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages addressed to Judge Edgardo Ramos from Patrick Strawbridge dated 5/13/2019. Document filed by DJT Holdings LLC, DJT Holdings Managing Member LLC, Donald J. Trump Revocable Trust, Donald J. Trump, Jr, Donald J. Trump, Eric Trump, Ivanka Trump, Trump Acquisition LLC, Trump Acquisition, Corp., Trump Organization LLC, Trump Organization, Inc(Strawbridge, Patrick) (Entered: 05/13/2019)
05/14/2019	53	ORDER granting <u>52</u> Letter Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. Plaintiffs are granted leave to file a 15–page reply brief. (HEREBY ORDERED by Judge Edgardo Ramos)(Text Only Order) (jar) (Entered: 05/14/2019)
05/15/2019	<u>54</u>	REPLY MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Support re: 26 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction Document filed by DJT Holdings LLC, DJT Holdings Managing Member LLC, Donald J. Trump Revocable Trust, Donald J. Trump, Jr, Donald J. Trump, Eric Trump, Ivanka Trump, Trump Acquisition LLC, Trump Acquisition, Corp., Trump Organization LLC, Trump Organization, Inc (Strawbridge, Patrick) (Entered: 05/15/2019)
05/20/2019	<u>55</u>	NOTICE of Supplemental Authority. Document filed by Committee on Financial Services of the U.S. House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the U.S. House of Representatives. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Opinion, # 2 Exhibit Order)(Letter, Douglas) (Entered: 05/20/2019)
05/21/2019	56	ORDER granting 35 Motion for Steven R. Ross to Appear Pro Hac Vice. (HEREBY ORDERED by Judge Edgardo Ramos)(Text Only Order) (jar) Transmission to

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		Attornov Saminos (Halm Dock (Entand) 05/21/2010)
05/21/2019	57	Attorney Services/Help Desk. (Entered: 05/21/2019) ORDER granting 36 Motion for Raphael A. Prober to Appear Pro Hac Vice.
		(HEREBY ORDERED by Judge Edgardo Ramos)(Text Only Order) (jar) Transmission to Attorney Services/Help Desk. (Entered: 05/21/2019)
05/21/2019	58	ORDER granting <u>37</u> Motion for Thomas C. Moyer to Appear Pro Hac Vice. (HEREBY ORDERED by Judge Edgardo Ramos)(Text Only Order) (jar) Transmission to Attorney Services/Help Desk. (Entered: 05/21/2019)
05/22/2019	<u>59</u>	ORDER: denying <u>26</u> Motion for Preliminary Injunction. For the reasons set forth on the record in today's hearing, Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction is DENIED, Plaintiffs' motion for a stay pending appeal is DENIED, and the Committees' application for consolidation is DENIED. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate the motion, Doc. 26. It is SO ORDERED. (Signed by Judge Edgardo Ramos on 5/22/2019) (ama) (Entered: 05/22/2019)
05/24/2019	<u>60</u>	NOTICE OF INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL from <u>59</u> Order on Motion for Preliminary Injunction,. Document filed by DJT Holdings LLC, DJT Holdings Managing Member LLC, Donald J. Trump Revocable Trust, Donald J. Trump, Jr, Donald J. Trump, Eric Trump, Ivanka Trump, Trump Acquisition LLC, Trump Acquisition, Corp., Trump Organization LLC, Trump Organization, Inc Filing fee \$ 505.00, receipt number ANYSDC–16950902. Form C and Form D are due within 14 days to the Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. (Strawbridge, Patrick) (Entered: 05/24/2019)
05/24/2019		Transmission of Notice of Appeal and Certified Copy of Docket Sheet to US Court of Appeals re: 60 Notice of Interlocutory Appeal. (tp) (Entered: 05/24/2019)
05/24/2019		Appeal Record Sent to USCA (Electronic File). Certified Indexed record on Appeal Electronic Files for 60 Notice of Interlocutory Appeal, filed by Trump Acquisition LLC, DJT Holdings Managing Member LLC, Ivanka Trump, Donald J. Trump Revocable Trust, Trump Organization, Inc., Trump Acquisition, Corp., Eric Trump, Donald J. Trump, Jr., DJT Holdings LLC, Trump Organization LLC, Donald J. Trump were transmitted to the U.S. Court of Appeals. (tp) (Entered: 05/24/2019)
05/25/2019	<u>61</u>	JOINT MOTION to Stay . Document filed by DJT Holdings LLC, DJT Holdings Managing Member LLC, Donald J. Trump Revocable Trust, Donald J. Trump, Jr, Donald J. Trump, Eric Trump, Ivanka Trump, Trump Acquisition LLC, Trump Acquisition, Corp., Trump Organization LLC, Trump Organization, Inc(Strawbridge, Patrick) (Entered: 05/25/2019)
05/28/2019		USCA Case Number 19–1540 from the U.S.C.A. – 2nd Circ. assigned to <u>60</u> Notice of Interlocutory Appeal,, filed by Trump Acquisition LLC, DJT Holdings Managing Member LLC, Ivanka Trump, Donald J. Trump Revocable Trust, Trump Organization, Inc., Trump Acquisition, Corp., Eric Trump, Donald J. Trump, Jr., DJT Holdings LLC, Trump Organization LLC, Donald J. Trump. (nd) (Entered: 05/28/2019)
05/28/2019	<u>62</u>	ORDER granting <u>61</u> Motion to Stay. The application is granted. SO ORDERED. (Signed by Judge Edgardo Ramos on 5/28/2019) (kv) (Entered: 05/28/2019)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

DONALD J. TRUMP, DONALD J. TRUMP JR., ERIC TRUMP, IVANKA TRUMP,

and

THE DONALD J. TRUMP REVOCABLE TRUST, THE TRUMP ORGANIZATION, INC., TRUMP ORGANZATION LLC, DJT HOLDINGS LLC, DJT HOLDINGS MANAGING MEMBER LLC, TRUMP ACQUISITION LLC, and TRUMP ACQUISITION, CORP.,

Plaintiffs,

- against -

DEUTSCHE BANK AG and CAPITAL ONE FINANCIAL CORP.,

Defendants.

Docket No. _____

COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs, by their attorneys Consovoy McCarthy Park PLLC and Mukasey Frenchman & Sklaroff LLP, bring this complaint against Defendants and allege as follows:

A. INTRODUCTION

- 1. This case involves Congressional subpoenas that have no legitimate or lawful purpose. The subpoenas were issued to harass President Donald J. Trump, to rummage through every aspect of his personal finances, his businesses, and the private information of the President and his family, and to ferret about for any material that might be used to cause him political damage. No grounds exist to establish any purpose other than a political one.
- 2. The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Financial Services Committee issued the subpoenas to Defendants Deutsche Bank AG and Capital One Financial Corp. These two financial institutions have long provided business and personal banking services to Plaintiffs.

- 3. The Chairpersons of the Intelligence and Financial Services Committees (Adam B. Schiff and Maxine M. Waters) have confirmed the issuance of the subpoenas, making public statements to the media that emphasize their intention to probe every aspect of the private lives of the Trump family, their businesses, and even those with only the most tangential connection to Trump entities, regardless whether any evidence (credible or otherwise) exists to support such intrusive probes. The Committees have refused to provide copies of the subpoenas to Plaintiffs—preventing them from even knowing, let alone negotiating, the subpoenas' scope or breadth.
- 4. Nonetheless, Defendants' descriptions of the subpoenas confirm their remarkable overbreadth. According to Defendants, the Committees are seeking <u>all</u> banking and financial records not just concerning the individual Plaintiffs, but also their own family members. This means the subpoenas request documents about accounts of the Plaintiffs' children (and in some cases, grandchildren).
- 5. The subpoenas to the entities are equally intrusive and overbroad. They seek not only the Plaintiffs' documents, but also the financial records of their parents, subsidiaries, affiliates, branches, divisions, partnerships, properties, groups, special purpose entities, joint ventures, predecessors and successors. As if that were not broad enough, the subpoenas extend further to documents concerning each of the entities' current or former employees, officers, directors, shareholders, partners, members, consultants, managers, senior associates, staff employees, independent contractors, agents, attorneys, or other representatives.
- 6. For most of the documents, the Committees demand records from the last ten years. For others, the request is unbounded—meaning the Committees seek records dating back decades, to the individual Plaintiffs' own childhoods.
- 7. The intrusiveness and impropriety of these requests are obvious. The House of Representatives is demanding, among other things, records of every single checking withdrawal, credit-card swipe, or debit-card purchase—no matter how trivial or small—made by each and every

member of the Trump family. But the dates and times when these individuals purchased books, groceries and other personal items is not the business of the House of Representatives or anyone else. It is an abuse of power to claim otherwise (particularly since the Committees declined to ask Plaintiffs themselves for the records, or even to discuss the scope of their requests).

- 8. In an effort to justify their demands, the chairs of the Committees have claimed that the subpoenas are intended to investigate "potential foreign influence on the U.S. political process" or the use of the financial system for "illicit purposes." But the information they seek long predates the President's election to office, reaches well beyond transactions associated with foreign parties, and encompasses reams of account records for entities, individuals, children, and spouses who have never even been implicated in any probe.
- 9. The Committees have ignored the constitutional limits on Congress' power to investigate. Article I of the Constitution does not contain an "Investigations Clause" or an "Oversight Clause." It gives Congress the power to enact certain *legislation*. Accordingly, investigations are legitimate only insofar as they further some legitimate legislative purpose. No investigation can be an end in itself. And Congress cannot use investigations to exercise powers that the Constitution assigns to the executive or judicial branch.
- 10. The subpoenas to Deutsche Bank and Capital One lack any legitimate legislative purpose. There is no possible legislation at the end of this tunnel; indeed, the Committee Chairs have not claimed otherwise. With these subpoenas, the Committees are instead assuming the powers of the Department of Justice, investigating (dubious and partisan) rumors of illegal conduct by private individuals, many of whom are outside of government. Their goal is to rummage around Plaintiffs' private financial information in the hope that they will stumble upon something they can expose publicly and use as a political tool against the President.
- 11. Moreover, the Committees' attempts to obtain Plaintiffs' account records violate the statutory requirements that apply to the federal government under the Right to Financial Privacy Act

("RFPA"). Under the RFPA, federal authorities are required to follow certain steps—including the provision of notice and an opportunity to object—before obtaining private financial records. The Committees have ignored these requirements, and any production of account records by Deutsche Bank or Capital One would violate the law.

This Court has the power to declare the subpoenas invalid and enjoin Defendants from complying with them for at least two reasons. First, because the Committees' subpoenas threaten to expose Plaintiffs' confidential account information and lack "a legitimate legislative purpose," and second, because they violate the protections of the RFPA. *See Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen's Fund*, 421 U.S. 491, 501 n.14 (1975) (endorsing *U.S. Servicemen's Fund v. Eastland*, 488 F.2d 1252, 1259-60 (D.C. Cir. 1973), which authorized a private right of action for declaratory and injunctive relief); 12 U.S.C. §3418 (authorizing injunctive relief to prevent violations of the RFPA). Plaintiffs are entitled to that relief.

B. PARTIES

- 13. Plaintiff Donald J. Trump is the 45th President of the United States. President Trump brings this suit solely in his capacity as a private citizen.
 - 14. Plaintiff Donald J. Trump Jr. is the son of President Trump.
 - 15. Plaintiff Eric Trump is the son of President Trump.
 - 16. Plaintiff Ivanka Trump is the daughter of President Trump.
- 17. Plaintiff The Trump Organization, Inc. is a New York corporation with its principal place of business at 725 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10022.
- 18. Plaintiff Trump Organization LLC is a New York limited liability company with its principal place of business at 725 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10022.
- 19. Plaintiff DJT Holdings LLC is a Delaware limited liability company with its principal place of business at 725 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10022.

- 20. Plaintiff DJT Holdings Managing Member LLC is a Delaware limited liability company with its principal place of business at 725 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10022.
- 21. Plaintiff Trump Acquisition, LLC is a Delaware limited liability company with its principal place of business at 725 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10022.
- 22. Plaintiff Trump Acquisition Corp. is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business at 725 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10022.
- 23. Plaintiff The Donald J. Trump Revocable Trust is a trust created and operating under the laws of New York.
- 24. Defendant Deutsche Bank AG is a bank organized under the laws of the Federal Republic of Germany with a branch at 60 Wall Street, New York, NY 10005. Deutsche Bank received one or more subpoenas from the Committees seeking account records and other documents concerning one or more of Plaintiffs.
- 25. Defendant Capital One Financial Corp. is a bank holding company headquartered in McLean, VA, with numerous branch offices in New York City. Capital One received one or more subpoenas from the Committees seeking account records and other documents concerning one or more of Plaintiffs.

C. JURISDICTION & VENUE

- 26. This Court has subject-matter jurisdiction because this case arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States, 28 U.S.C. §§1331, 2201, and because it is brought to enforce the provisions of the RFPA, 12 U.S.C. §3416.
- 27. Venue is proper because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to Plaintiffs' claims occurred in this district and a substantial part of the property that is the subject of Plaintiffs' action is situated in this district. 28 U.S.C. §1391(b)(2).

D. BACKGROUND

1. Challenges to Congressional Subpoenas

- 28. Not infrequently, federal courts adjudicate the legality of congressional subpoenas. Most such cases follow a familiar pattern: Congress issues a subpoena, the target does not comply, Congress tries to force compliance in federal court, and the target raises the illegality of the subpoena as a defense.
- 29. But this defensive posture is not the only way to challenge a congressional subpoena. When Congress "seeks information directly from a party," that party "can resist and thereby test the subpoena." *Eastland*, 421 U.S. at 501 n.14. But when Congress "seeks that same information from a third person," this option is not available; the third party might not have an interest in protecting the information or resisting the subpoena, and its "compliance" with the subpoena "could frustrate any judicial inquiry." *Id.* For that reason, the law allows the person whose information will be exposed to sue in federal court for an injunction or declaratory judgment to block the third party from complying. *Eastland*, 488 F.2d at 1259, 1255. The third party cannot comply with the subpoena unless "a legitimate legislative purpose is present." *Eastland*, 421 U.S. at 501.
- 30. The "legitimate legislative purpose" requirement stems directly from the Constitution. "The powers of Congress ... are dependent solely on the Constitution," and "no express power in that instrument" allows Congress to investigate individuals or to issue compulsory process. *Kilbourn v. Thompson*, 103 U.S. 168, 182-89 (1880). The Constitution instead permits Congress to enact certain kinds of *legislation. See, e.g.*, Art. I, §8. Thus, Congress' power to investigate "is justified solely as an adjunct to the legislative process." *Watkins*, 354 U.S. at 197. "Congress is not invested with a general power to inquire into private affairs. The subject of any inquiry always must be one on which legislation could be had." *Eastland*, 421 U.S. at 504 n.15 (cleaned up); *see also Quinn v. United States*, 349 U.S. 155, 161 (1955) ("[T]he power to investigate" does not "extend to an area in which Congress is forbidden to legislate.").

- 31. "Oversight" and "transparency," in a vacuum, are not legitimate legislative purposes that can justify subpoenaing a private citizen. For more than a century, in fact, the Supreme Court has been quite "sure" that neither the House nor Senate "possesses the general power of making inquiry into the private affairs of the citizen." *Kilbourn*, 103 U.S. at 190. "[T]here is no congressional power to expose for the sake of exposure." *Watkins*, 354 U.S. at 200. "No inquiry is an end in itself; it must be related to, and in furtherance of, a legitimate task of the Congress." *Id.* at 187.
- 32. Additionally, because Congress must have a legitimate *legislative* purpose, it cannot use subpoenas to exercise "any of the powers of law enforcement." *Quinn*, 349 U.S. at 161. Those powers "are assigned under our Constitution to the Executive and the Judiciary." *Id.* Put simply, Congress is not "a law enforcement or trial agency," and congressional investigations conducted "for the personal aggrandizement of the investigators" or "to 'punish' those investigated" are "indefensible." *Watkins*, 354 U.S. at 187. Our tripartite system of separated powers requires that "any one of the[] branches shall not be permitted to encroach upon the powers confided to the others, but that each shall by the law of its creation be limited to the exercise of the powers appropriate to its own department and no other." *Kilbourn*, 103 U.S. at 190-91.
- 33. Finally, when a subpoena is issued by a committee, any legislative purpose is not legitimate unless it falls within that committee's jurisdiction. "The theory of a committee inquiry is that the committee members are serving as the representatives of the parent assembly in collecting information for a legislative purpose." *Watkins*, 354 U.S. at 200. Congress therefore must "spell out that group's jurisdiction and purpose with sufficient particularity ... in the authorizing resolution," which "is the committee's charter." *Id.* at 201. The committee "must conform strictly to the resolution." *Exxon Corp. v. FTC*, 589 F.2d 582, 592 (D.C. Cir. 1978). And when an investigation is "novel" or "expansive," courts will construe the committee's jurisdiction "narrowly." *Tobin v. United States*, 306 F.2d 270, 275 (D.C. Cir. 1962).

- 2. The Campaign of Abusive Investigations and Harassment of Plaintiffs
- 34. After the 2018 midterm elections, Democrats won a majority of seats in the House. Every House committee in the current Congress is thus chaired by a Democrat.
- 35. On the night of the election, soon-to-be House Speaker Nancy Pelosi announced that "tomorrow will be a new day in America" because the new majority would enact "checks and balances to the Trump administration." And "subpoena power," she explained a few days later, is "a great arrow to have in your quiver." "Congress is going to force transparency on this president," another congressional aide repeated. "Once there is transparency, I am sure there are going to be a lot of questions that flow from that."
- 36. The statements about "checks and balances" and "transparency" were not referring to legislation. Instead, according to news outlets that interviewed party leaders and aides shortly after the election, the statements meant that they were going to spend the next two years launching a "fusillade" of subpoenas in order to "drown Trump with investigations," "turn Trump's life upside down," and "make Trump's life a living hell."
- 37. Prominent Representatives were quite candid about their mission. Representative John Yarmuth, now chair of the House Budget Committee, stated that the new House majority would be "brutal" for President Trump: "We're going to have to build an air traffic control tower to keep track of all the subpoenas flying from here to the White House." Another senior official revealed that, from November 2018 to January 2019, Representatives were busy preparing a "subpoena cannon" to fire at President Trump based on a "wish-list" of nearly 100 investigatory topics. Representative Nita Lowey, now chair of the House Appropriations Committee, confirmed a long list of topics that the House planned to investigate and stated, "We have our boxing gloves on. I'm ready." Just last month, Chairwoman Waters declared that "I haven't forgotten about 45"—meaning President Trump. "I have the gavel—and subpoena power—and I am not afraid to use it."

- 38. The "focus," according to then–Minority Whip Steny Hoyer, would be examining "the President in terms of what [business] interests he has" from his time as a private citizen. Chairwoman Waters declared that "[w]e're going to find out where your money has come from." The Committees want this personal information in the hopes they will find something to score political points against the President leading up to the 2020 election.
- 39. The Committee Chairpersons are executing their plan in earnest. Recently, several House committees issued a flurry of subpoenas and requests for information about the President's family, personal finances, and businesses. Just one request by Chairman Jerrold Nadler of the House Judiciary Committee, for example, asked 81 different individuals and entities for information about President Trump.
- 40. A few weeks ago, Chairpersons Schiff, Waters, and Elijah Cummings of the House Oversight Committee agreed to coordinate their subpoenas in order to inflict maximum political damage on President Trump by targeting his business and financial records.
- 41. Last Monday, Chairman Cummings sent one such subpoena to Mazars USA LLP—Plaintiffs' longtime accountant.
 - 42. The subpoenas at issue in this lawsuit were sent shortly thereafter.
 - 3. The Subpoenas to Deutsche Bank and Capital One.
- 43. Chairman Schiff and Chairwoman Waters issued statements to the press confirming the existence of the subpoenas to Defendants shortly after they were sent. Chairman Schiff confirmed that Deutsche Bank had received a "friendly" subpoena. Chairman Waters told the press that the subpoenas were sent as part of an alleged inquiry into the "potential use of the U.S. financial system for illicit purposes."
- 44. Plaintiffs, through counsel, contacted the Committees and requested copies of the subpoenas to help determine their scope. Notwithstanding their willingness to discuss the subpoenas

with the press, the Committees declined to provide copies of the subpoenas (or any information about their contents) to Plaintiffs.

- 45. On April 17, 2019, counsel for Deutsche Bank confirmed in writing to Plaintiffs that it had received the subpoenas. According to Deutsche Bank, the subpoenas seek "records and/or information related to banking activities, including information regarding accounts, financings, and related financial information" for all of the named Plaintiffs.
- 46. Moreover, the subpoenas to Deutsche Bank seek production of account records and other financial information for Plaintiffs' "parents, subsidiaries, affiliates, branches, divisions, partnerships, properties, groups, special purpose entities, joint ventures, predecessors, successors or any other entity in which they have or had a controlling interest." The subpoenas further extend to all "current or former employees, officers, directors, shareholders, partners, members, consultants, managers, senior associates, staff employees, independent contractors, agents, attorneys or other representatives" of the Plaintiff entities.
- 47. For the individual Plaintiffs, Deutsche Bank has advised that the subpoenas seek banking and financial records for all "members of their immediate families," including any accounts for which they are beneficiaries, trustees, beneficial owners, or over which they have control. This sweeps in the complete banking and account records of numerous children—including minors—and spouses of the named individuals.
- 48. Deutsche Bank subsequently confirmed that, in general, the subpoenas call for it to produce responsive documents from January 1, 2010 through the present—although for some documents (including account applications and opening documents), the subpoena requires production without any time limitation.
- 49. Deutsche Bank informed Plaintiffs that, absent a court order, they intend to begin production of documents in response to the subpoena on May 6.

- 50. Plaintiffs subsequently contacted Capital One, which confirmed receipt of a subpoena that, upon information and belief, seeks similar documents from the same Plaintiffs. Capital One has informed Plaintiffs that it feels obligated to comply with the subpoena absent court intervention before May 6.
- 51. Plaintiffs have numerous accounts, including personal, family, and business accounts, at Deutsche Bank and Capital One.
- 52. The records at issue are protected from disclosure by the federal Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. §3501 *et seq.*, which imposes strict procedural requirements on federal attempts to obtain account records. The Committees did not follow those procedures here and, as a result, the Act prohibits Deutsche Bank and Capital One from producing the account records.
- Plaintiffs bring this suit to challenge the validity and enforceability of the subpoenas. Now that the subpoenas have issued, Deutsche Bank and Capital One face a difficult choice: ignore the subpoenas and risk contempt of Congress, or comply with the subpoenas and risk liability to Plaintiffs under the RFPA and other laws. To resolve these conflicting commands, courts instruct third-party custodians like Defendants to hold onto the subpoenaed materials until the dispute over the subpoenas' validity is finally resolved in court. *See United States v. AT&T Co.*, 567 F.2d 121, 129 (D.C. Cir. 1977); *United States v. Deloitte LLP*, 610 F.3d 129, 142 (D.C. Cir. 2010). Thus, Congress cannot take any action against Deutsche Bank or Capital One until this litigation is finally resolved.

E. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

- 1. The Subpoenas Exceed the Committees' Constitutional Authority
- 54. Plaintiffs incorporate all their prior allegations.
- 55. The subpoenas are invalid and unenforceable because they have no legitimate legislative purpose.
- 56. The subpoenas seek to investigate events that occurred while President Trump was a private citizen, years before he was even a candidate for public office.

- 57. The subpoenas seek to investigate events that could not possibly lead to legislation within the Intelligence or Financial Services Committees' statutory jurisdiction and constitutional authority.
- 58. The subpoenas are an attempt to investigate and adjudicate possible violations of federal law by private individuals—law-enforcement powers that only the executive and judicial branches can exercise.

2. The Subpoenas Violate the Right to Financial Privacy Act

- 59. Plaintiffs incorporate all their prior allegations.
- 60. The RFPA prohibits Deutsche Bank and Capital One from giving a customer's protected account information to the federal government. 12 U.S.C. §3403(a).
- 61. Financial institutions can turn over a customer's information only if the government certifies that it has complied with the RFPA's procedures. §3403(b). For a subpoena, those procedures include (1) "reason to believe" that the records are "relevant to a legitimate law enforcement inquiry"; (2) giving a copy of the subpoena to the customer; and (3) waiting at least 10 days so the customer has a chance to object. §3405; see also §3408 (similar procedures for "written requests").
- 62. The Committees have not complied with the RFPA's provisions or issued the required certifications.
- 63. The RFPA authorizes injunctive relief "to require that the procedures of this chapter are complied with." §3418.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs ask this Court to enter judgment in their favor and to provide the following relief:

- a. A declaratory judgment that the subpoenas are invalid and unenforceable;
- b. A permanent injunction quashing the subpoenas;

- c. A permanent injunction prohibiting Deutsche Bank and Capital One from disclosing, revealing, delivering, or producing the requested information, or otherwise complying with the subpoenas;
- d. A temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction prohibiting Deutsche Bank and Capital One from disclosing, revealing, delivering, or producing the requested information, or otherwise complying with the subpoenas, until the subpoena's validity has been finally adjudicated on the merits;
 - e. Plaintiffs' reasonable costs and expenses, including attorneys' fees; and
 - f. All other preliminary and permanent relief to which Plaintiffs are entitled.

Dated: April 29, 2019

Marc L. Mukasey
MUKASEY FRENCHMAN & SKLAROFF LLP
250 Park Avenue, 7th Floor
New York, NY 10177
347-527-3940
marc.mukasey@mukaseylaw.com

Counsel for The Trump Organization, Inc., Trump
Organization LLC, The Trump Corporation, DJT
Holdings LLC, DJT Holdings Managing Member LLC,
The Donald J. Trump Revocable Trust, Trump
Acquisition LLC, and Trump Acquisition, Corp.

Respectfully submitted,

_s/ Patrick Strawbridge
Patrick Strawbridge (pro hac vice pending)
CONSOVOY MCCARTHY PARK PLLC
Ten Post Office Square
8th Floor South PMB #706
Boston, MA 02109
patrick@consovoymccarthy.com

William S. Consovoy
Cameron T. Norris
CONSOVOY MCCARTHY PARK PLLC
3033 Wilson Blvd., Ste. 700
Arlington, VA 22201
(703) 243-9423
will@consovoymccarthy.com
cam@consovoymccarthy.com

Counsel for President Donald J. Trump, Donald J. Trump Jr., Eric Trump, and Ivanka Trump

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

DONALD J. TRUMP, DONALD J. TRUMP JR., ERIC TRUMP, IVANKA TRUMP,

and

THE DONALD J. TRUMP REVOCABLE TRUST, THE TRUMP ORGANIZATION, INC., TRUMP ORGANZATION LLC, DJT HOLDINGS LLC, DJT HOLDINGS MANAGING MEMBER LLC, TRUMP ACQUISITION LLC, and TRUMP ACQUISITION, CORP.

Plaintiffs,

- against -

DEUTSCHE BANK AG and CAPITAL ONE FINANCIAL CORP.,

Defendants.

Docket No. 1:19-cv-03826-ER

<u>DECLARATION OF PATRICK</u> <u>STRAWBRIDGE</u>

- 1. I am an attorney at the law firm Consovoy McCarthy Park PLLC and counsel for Plaintiffs President Donald J. Trump, Donald J. Trump Jr., Eric Trump, and Ivanka Trump in their personal capacities.
- 2. I am over the age of 18 and under no mental disability or impairment. I have personal knowledge of the following facts and, if called as a witness, would competently testify to them.
- 3. Exhibit A is an email that I received on April 22, 2019 from Douglas N. Letter, General Counsel of the U.S. House of Representatives.
- 4. Exhibit B is a letter that I received on April 17, 2019 from Steven R. Ross and Raphael A. Prober of Akin Gump, outside counsel for Deutsche Bank.
 - 5. Exhibit C is an email that I received on April 22, 2019 from Mr. Ross.

Casse11991540,3B26tERenD37tu07t01/2819;il25995/63/19agP29e1216f49

Per 28 U.S.C. §1746, I declare under penalty of perjury that the above is true and correct to
the best of my knowledge.
Executed on May 3, 2019.
_/s Patrick Strawbridge

Exhibit A

From: Letter, Douglas Douglas.Letter@mail.house.gov

Subject: Subpoena email response Date: April 22, 2019 at 2:06 PM

To: patrick@consovoymccarthy.com, will@consovoymccarthy.com

Cc: Tatelman, Todd Todd.Tatelman@mail.house.gov

Mr. Strawbridge,

I write on behalf of the Committee on Financial Services and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence ("Committees") in response to your April 19, 2019 email request that the Committees provide you with copies of "any subpoenas from the [Committees] seeking information from any financial institution about my clients."

Please be advised that your clients are not the recipients of any subpoenas issued by the Committees and, consistent with long-standing practice, the Committees do not provide copies of subpoenas to third parties. Please feel free to direct any and all future inquiries about these matters to my attention and to Deputy General Counsel Todd Tatelman (copied here).

Sincerely,

Douglas N. Letter
General Counsel
Office of General Counsel
U.S. House of Representatives
219 Cannon House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515
Douglas.Letter@mail.house.gov
(202) 225-9700

From: Tatelman, Todd

Sent: Monday, April 22, 2019 2:00 PM

To: Letter, Douglas <Douglas.Letter@mail.house.gov>

Subject: Strawbridge email

DL

Exhibit B

Akin Gump STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP

STEVEN R. ROSS

+1 202.887.4343/fax: +1 202.887.4288 sross@akingump.com

RAPHAEL A. PROBER

+1 202.887.4319/fax: +1 202.887.4288 rprober@akingump.com

April 17, 2019

Alan Garten
Executive Vice President and
Chief Legal Officer
The Trump Organization
725 Fifth Avenue
New York, NY 10022

Patrick Strawbridge Consovoy McCarthy Park PLLC 3033 Wilson Boulevard Suite 700 Arlington, VA 22201

Dear Messrs. Garten & Strawbridge:

This is to inform you that our client, Deutsche Bank AG ("Deutsche Bank"), has received subpoenas issued by the United States House of Representatives Committee on Financial Services and Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence requiring production of certain records and/or information related to banking activities, including information regarding accounts, financings and related financial information, with respect to:

- Donald J. Trump
- Donald Trump, Jr.
- Ivanka Trump
- Eric Trump
- The Donald J. Trump Revocable Trust
- Trump Organization Inc.
- Trump Organization LLC
- DJT Holdings LLC
- DJT Holdings Managing Member LLC
- Trump Acquisition LLC
- Trump Acquisition Corp.



Alan Garten Patrick Strawbridge April 17, 2019 Page 2

• any other name, alias, code name, code number, or entity used in lieu of any of the individuals or entities named above or members of their immediate family

or any account (including, but not limited to, any money market, securities, or trading account or any loan account or structure) in the name of any of the above-named individuals or entities (or any other name, alias, code name, code number, or entity used in lieu of any of the named individuals or entities) or members of their immediate family, individually or with other parties, as well as any account in which any of the above-named individuals or entities are or were, or have been identified as being, a trustee, settlor or grantor, beneficiary, or beneficial owner, or in which any of the individuals or entities have or have had in any way control over, individually or with others.

These subpoenas extend to relevant records and/or information related to the listed entities' parents, subsidiaries, affiliates, branches, divisions, partnerships, properties, groups, special purpose entities, joint ventures, predecessors, successors, or any other entity in which they have or had a controlling interest, and any current or former employee, officer, director, shareholder, partner, member, consultant, senior manager, manager, senior associate, staff employee, independent contractor, agent, attorney or other representative of the above listed entities.

This letter is intended to provide notice of the subpoenas to the above-referenced parties and entities, including—to the extent applicable—any relevant current or former employees of such entities. The return date of the subpoenas is May 6, 2019. Deutsche Bank is legally obligated to comply with these subpoenas and intends to begin so complying on that date.

Please contact the undersigned with any questions.

Steven B. Ross

Raphael A. Prober

cc: Rudy Giuliani

Exhibit C

From: Ross, Steven sross@AKINGUMP.COM

Subject: RE: Deutsche Bank AG Date: April 22, 2019 at 3:53 PM

To: Patrick Strawbridge patrick@consovoymccarthy.com

Cc: Prober, Raphael rprober@akingump.com, Moyer, Thomas tmoyer@AKINGUMP.com



Patrick—During our Friday telephone conversation, you asked if we would identify the time period applicable to the information sought by the subpoenas the Bank received from the House Committees on Intelligence and Financial Services. In general, the subpoenas call for the Bank to produce responsive documents regarding your clients from January 1, 2010 through the present, with the exception of any documents related to account applications, opening documents, KYC, due diligence, and closing documents. For these documents the subpoena requires production without any time limitation.

In addition, I had copied Bob Roach of the House Financial Services Committee in an earlier written communication. I have been informed that the proper contact person at that committee should be Jennifer Read.

Steven R. Ross

AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP

1333 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W. | Washington, DC 20036-1564 | USA | Direct: <u>+1 202.887.4343</u> | Internal: <u>24343</u> Fax: +1 202.887.4288 | <u>sross@akingump.com</u> | <u>akingump.com</u> | <u>Bio</u>

Please note that on May 6, 2019, our address will change to 2001 K Street N.W., Washington, DC 20006

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

DONALD J. TRUMP; DONALD J. TRUMP, JR.; ERIC TRUMP; IVANKA TRUMP; THE DONALD J. TRUMP REVOCABLE TRUST; THE TRUMP ORGANIZATION, INC.; TRUMP ORGANIZATION LLC; DJT HOLDINGS LLC; DJT HOLDINGS MANAGING MEMBER LLC; TRUMP ACQUISITION LLC; and TRUMP ACQUISITION, CORP.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

DEUTSCHE BANK AG and CAPITAL ONE FINANCIAL CORP.,

Defendants,

COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES and PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

Intervenor-Defendants.

Case No. 1:19-cv-03826-ER

DECLARATION OF TODD B. TATELMAN

- I, Todd B. Tatelman, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1746 declare and say:
- 1. I am the Deputy General Counsel in the Office of General Counsel of the U.S. House of Representatives. I have served in this capacity since 2018, and have served in the Office of General Counsel since 2011. I represent both the Committee on Financial Services and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the U.S. House of Representatives in this matter.

- 2. Attached as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the redacted subpoena to Deutsche Bank that I prepared and provided to plaintiffs' counsel.
- 3. Attached as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of the subpoena to Capital One that I provided to plaintiffs' counsel.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on May 10, 2019, in Washington, D.C.

Todd B. Tatelman

Exhibit A

SCHEDULE A

Custodian of Records Deutsche Bank AG

The time period applicable to this subpoena is <u>January 1, 2010 through the present</u>, except for Items 1(i) and 6(i), for which there is no time limitation.

Please provide complete and unredacted copies of the following documents by May 6, 2019:

1. With respect to:

- Donald J. Trump
- Donald Trump, Jr.
- Eric Trump
- Ivanka Trump
- The Donald J. Trump Revocable Trust
- Trump Organization Inc.
- Trump Organization LLC
- DJT Holdings LLC
- DJT Holdings Managing Member LLC
- Trump Acquisition LLC
- Trump Acquisition Corp.
- any other name, alias, code name, code number, or entity used in lieu of any of the individuals or entities named above or members of their immediate family

or any account (including, but not limited to, any money market, securities, or trading account or any loan account or structure) in the name of any of the above-named individuals or entities (or any other name, alias, code name, code number, or entity used in lieu of any of the named individuals or entities) or members of their immediate family, individually or with other parties, as well as any account in which any of the above-named individuals or entities are or were, or have been identified as being, a trustee, settlor or grantor, beneficiary, or beneficial owner, or in which any of the individuals or entities have or have had in any way control over, individually or with others:

- i. any document related to account applications, opening documents, KYC, due diligence, and closing documents, including, but not limited to, any document identifying:
 - a. any financial relationship, transactions, or ties between the above-named individuals or entities and any foreign individual, entity, or government;
 - b. any interest held by any foreign individual, entity, or government in the abovenamed accounts;
 - c. any trustee, settlor, grantor, administrator, controlling party, protector, beneficiary, beneficial owner, or signatory; and
 - d. any relationship manager or account manager;

- ii. any monthly or other periodic account statement, including, but not limited to, any such document showing any incoming or outgoing funds transfers involving the above-named individuals, entities, and accounts and any foreign individual, entity, or government;
- iii. any document related to any domestic or international transfer of funds in the amount of \$10,000 or more, including, but not limited to, any wire transfer, check, cash letter, cashier's check, book entry transfer, or other such documents showing the originator, beneficiary, source of funds, and destination of such transfer, including whether any party to such transfer was a foreign individual, entity, or government;
- iv. any summary or analysis of domestic or international account deposits, withdrawals, and transfers, including, but not limited to, sources of deposits and the destination of withdrawals/transfers, including any wire transfer, check, cash letter, cashier's check, or other monetary instrument, including, but not limited to, any summary or analysis of financial relationships, transactions, or ties between the above-named individuals, entities, and accounts and any foreign individual, entity, or government;
- v. any document related to monitoring for, identifying, or evaluating possible suspicious activity, including suspicious activity identified by Deutsche Bank AG's surveillance/monitoring program or referred by any employee or third-party, including, but not limited to, suspicious activity relating to relationships, transactions, or ties between the above-named individuals, entities, and accounts and any foreign individual, entity, or government;
- vi. any document related to any investment, bond offering, line of credit, loan, mortgage, syndication, credit or loan restructuring, or any other credit arrangement or arrangement to raise or provide funding, including, but not limited to, those involving any foreign individual, entity, or government, or any other third party, including, but not limited to:
 - a. application and account opening documents, including, but not limited to, any such document showing any financial relationship, transactions, or ties between the above-named individuals or entities and any foreign individual, entity, or government;
 - b. KYC and due diligence, including, but not limited to, any such materials showing any financial relationship, transaction, or ties between the above-named individuals or entities and any foreign individual, entity, or government;
 - c. personal or third-party guarantees, including, but not limited to, any guarantee provided by a foreign individual, entity, or government;
 - d. collateral and appraisals for any underlying assets, including any asset in which a foreign individual, entity, or government has any interest and any asset located in a foreign country or jurisdiction;
 - e. any financial information provided by the borrower (or prospective borrower) or otherwise obtained by Deutsche Bank AG, including, but not limited to:
 - 1. financial statements (including those showing any revenue, interest, or other income generated from, or payments made to, any foreign individuals, entities, or governments);
 - 2. statements of net worth (including those showing any foreign assets and liabilities);
 - 3. debt schedules (including those showing any debts owed to any foreign individuals, entities, or governments);


- 4. business operating statements (including, but not limited to, those showing any revenue, interest, or other income generated from, or payments made to, any foreign individuals, entities, or governments);
- 5. cash flow statements (including, but not limited to, those showing any revenue, interest, or other income generated from, or payments made to, any foreign individuals, entities, or governments);
- 6. bank and brokerage account records (including those relating to any such accounts held at foreign banks or other foreign financial institutions):
- 7. tax returns and schedules (including, but not limited to, those showing all foreign sources of income, all foreign debt payments, all interests held by the taxpayer in any foreign business entity or bank/brokerage account, and all interests held by any foreign individual, entity, or government in any of the taxpayer's business entities); and
- 8. records of any bankruptcies;
- f. offering memoranda, including, but not limited to, any such document that shows any financial relationships, transactions, or ties between the above-named individuals, entities, or accounts and any foreign individual, entity, or government;
- g. communications involving the underwriting or credit risk management units, credit risk committee, reputational risk committee, management and supervisory boards, or similar units or bodies, including any such communication relating to any financial relationships, transactions, or ties between the above-named individuals, entities, or accounts and any foreign individual, entity, or government; and
- h. term sheets, including those showing the involvement of any foreign individual, entity, or government in the transaction;
- risk assessments, risk ratings, and risk upgrades or downgrades, including those relating to any financial relationships, transactions, or ties between the abovenamed individuals, entities, or accounts and any foreign individual, entity, or government;
- j. credit assessment memoranda and credit reports, including, but not limited to, those assessing any financial relationships, transactions, or ties between the above-named individuals, entities, or accounts and any foreign individual, entity, or government;
- k. closing documents and loan documentation, including, but not limited to, any such document showing any role that any foreign individual, entity, or government had in the transaction; and
- 1. periodic loan statements, loan monitoring records, and records relating to any refinancing, restructuring, modification, repayment, forgiveness, foreclosure, or default, including any such document showing any role that any foreign individual, entity, or government had in the refinancing, restructuring, modification, repayment, forgiveness, foreclosure, or default;
- vii. any document related to any request for information issued or received by Deutsche Bank AG pursuant to Sections 314(a) or 314(b) of the USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. 107-56, including, but not limited to, any such document relating to any financial relationships,

viii.	transactions, or ties between the above-named individuals, entities, or accounts and any foreign individual, entity, or government; any document possessed or generated by, or communications involving,
	Selected Deutsche Bank Employees relating to any of the above-named individuals, entities, accounts, or transactions, particularly, but not limited to, any such document or communication
ix.	relating to any financial relationships, transactions, or ties between the above-named individuals, entities, or accounts and any foreign individual, entity, or government; any document not otherwise kept in customary record-keeping systems (including, but not limited to, any document in any personal file or desk file), related to any of the above-named individuals, entities, or accounts and/or any issue or document identified in items i through viii above, including, but not limited to, any such document relating to any financial relationships, transactions, or ties between the above-named individuals,
х.	entities, or accounts and any foreign individual, entity, or government; and any document provided to, discussed with, or generated by any member of Deutsche Bank AG's Management Board, Supervisory Board, or Reputational Risk Committee related to any of the above-named individuals, entities, or accounts and/or any issue or document identified in items i through ix above, including, but not limited to, any such document relating to any financial relationships, transactions, or ties between the above-named individuals, entities, and accounts and any foreign individual, entity, or government.
meeting prepare supervelation	y document related to Deutsche Bank AG's program, including, but not d to, any report or analysis related to the decision to identify an individual or entity as a ; any tracking list of any periodic review of any internal correspondence, in any memoranda relating to any internal correspondence, in any memoranda relating to any such document or communication relating to any financial conship, transaction, or tie between any and any foreign individual, entity, or government.
any su	or any similar study, review, or analysis, including, but not limited to, ach document relating to any financial relationship, transaction, or tie between the relevant nt holders or customers and any foreign individual, entity, or government.
4. Wi	ith respect to the following events or activities:



- i. any document related to any review or analysis of those events or activities conducted by or possessed by Deutsche Bank AG or its agents or representatives, including, but not limited to, any document related to any Deutsche Bank AG personnel facilitating or involved in any of those events or activities, the identity of any third-party individual or entity, or the beneficial owner of any third-party entity, involved in any of those events or activities;
- ii. any record of any transaction involved in, or related to, any of those events or activities;
- iii. any document related to any request for information issued or received pursuant to Sections 314(a) or 314(b) of the USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. 107-56; and
- iv. any document provided to, discussed with, or generated by any member of Deutsche Bank AG's management board or supervisory board related to any event or activity identified above and/or any issue or document identified in items i through iii above.
- 5. Any document related to any review, study, analysis, or communication to or from any U.S. federal, state, or local agency regarding any or immediate family member, including, but not limited to, any government official or entity in which such an individual has been identified as a trustee, settlor, or grantor, beneficiary, beneficial owner, or has or had in any way control over, individually or with others.

6. With respect to:



or any account (including, but not limited to, any money market, securities, or trading account or any loan account or structure) in the name of any of the above-named entities, as well as any account in which any of the entities have or have had in any way control over, individually or with others:

- i. any document related to account applications, opening documents, KYC, due diligence, and closing documents, including any document identifying:
 - a. any trustee, settlor, grantor, administrator, controlling party, protector, beneficiary, beneficial owner, or signatory; or

- b. any relationship manager or account manager;
- ii. any monthly or other periodic account statement;
- iii. any document related to any domestic or international transfer of funds in the amount of \$10,000 or more, including, but not limited to, any wire transfer, check, cash letter, cashier's check, book entry transfer, or other document indicating the originator, beneficiary, source of funds, or destination of such transfer;
- iv. any summary or analysis of domestic and international account deposits, withdrawals, and transfers, including, but not limited to, sources of deposits and the destination of withdrawals/transfers, including any wire transfer, check, cash letter, cashier's check, or other monetary instrument;
- v. any document related to monitoring for, identifying, or evaluating possible suspicious activity, including suspicious activity identified by Deutsche Bank AG's surveillance/monitoring program or referred by any employee or third-party, including, but not limited to, possible suspicious activity relating to foreign individuals and entities and international funds transfers;
- vi. any document related to any agreement, business relationship, or business venture (including, but not limited to, joint underwritings, loans, financings or securitizations such as CDOs) between Deutsche Bank AG and any of the above-named entities;
- vii. any document related to any request for information issued or received by Deutsche Bank AG pursuant to Sections 314(a) or 314(b) of the USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. 107-56;
- viii. any document not otherwise kept in customary record-keeping systems (including, but not limited to, any document in any personal file or desk file), related to any entity identified above and/or any issue or document identified in items i through vii above; and
- ix. any document provided to, discussed with, or generated by any member of Deutsche Bank's Management Board, Supervisory Board, or Group Reputational Risk Committee related to any entity identified above and/or any issue or document identified in items i through viii above.
- 7. Any document related to any periodic, special, or other review conducted by or for Deutsche Bank AG of any of the individuals, entities, accounts, or transactions identified in items 1 and 6 above, including, but not limited to, any relationship or account history, exposure reports, particular transactions, management and servicing, or any other review associated with Deutsche Bank AG's policies and procedures for loan/credit risk analysis or accounts related to correspondent banking, private banking, public figures, politically prominent persons, or their family members, including, but not limited to, any such document relating to any financial relationships, transactions, or ties between the above-named individuals, entities, and accounts and any foreign individual, entity, or government.
- 8. Any document related to any communication sent or received by Deutsche Bank Employees concerning any individual, entity, or any issue or document identified in items 1 through 7 above, including, but not limited to, any entity in which such an individual has been identified as a trustee, settlor, or grantor, beneficiary, beneficial owner, or has or had in any way control over, individually or with others, or any government official.

RESPONDING TO COMMITTEE SUBPOENAS

In responding to the document request, please apply the instructions and definitions set forth below:

INSTRUCTIONS

- 1. In complying with this request, you should produce all responsive documents in unreducted form that are in the possession, custody, or control or otherwise available to Deutsche Bank AG or its agents, employees, or representatives, regardless of whether the documents are possessed directly by you.
- 2. Documents responsive to the request should not be destroyed, modified, removed, transferred, or otherwise made inaccessible to the Committee.
- 3. In the event that any entity, organization, or individual named in the request has been, or is currently, known by any other name, the request should be read also to include such other names under that alternative identification.
- 4. Each document should be produced in a form that may be copied by standard copying machines.
- 5. When you produce documents, you should identify the paragraph(s) and/or clause(s) in the Committee's request to which the document responds.
- 6. Documents produced pursuant to this request should be produced in the order in which they appear in your files and should not be rearranged. Any documents that are stapled, clipped, or otherwise fastened together should not be separated. Documents produced in response to this request should be produced together with copies of file labels, dividers, or identifying markers with which they were associated when this request was issued. Indicate the office or division and person from whose files each document was produced. Documents produced on paper (those from paper files that you choose to produce as such) shall not contain any permanent fasteners (i.e., staples), but shall be separated based on the divisions between documents as it is maintained in the custodian's files by non-permanent fasteners (e.g., paper clips, binder clips, rubber bands) or a non-white slip sheet.
- 7. Each folder and box should be numbered, and a description of the contents of each folder and box, including the paragraph(s) and/or clause(s) of the request to which the documents are responsive, should be provided in an accompanying index.
- 8. Responsive documents must be produced regardless of whether any other person or entity possesses non-identical or identical copies of the same document.
- 9. The Committee requests electronic documents in addition to paper productions. If any of the requested information is available in machine-readable or electronic form (such as on a computer server, hard drive, CD, DVD, back up tape, or removable computer media such as thumb drives, flash drives, memory cards, and external hard drives), you should immediately

consult with Committee staff to determine the appropriate format in which to produce the information. Documents produced in electronic format should be organized, identified, and indexed electronically in a manner comparable to the organizational structure called for in (6) and (7) above.

- 10. Documents shall be produced in accordance with the attached Data Delivery Standards. Alternatively, all documents derived from word processing programs, email applications, instant message logs, spreadsheets, and wherever else practicable, shall be produced in text searchable PDF format. Spreadsheets shall also be provided in their native form. Audio and video files shall be produced in their native format, although picture files associated with email or word processing programs shall be produced in PDF format along with the document it is contained in or to which it is attached.
- 11. Other than native files produced along with TIFF images in accordance with the attached Data Delivery Standards, every page of material produced to the Committee, whether from paper files or as a text searchable PDF, must contain a unique Bates number. All files produced in PDF format shall be named according to the Bates range that the file contains (e.g. YourCo-00001 YourCo-00035.pdf).
- 12. With respect to the requested wire transfer records, please provide such records in Excel (.xls) format that is enabled (not "read only" format), with separate columns that show each wire transfer field, including, but not limited to, the following fields: "Payment Date," "Amount," "Ordering Customer" #1 through #4, "Ordering Bank" #1 through #5, "Debiting ID," "Debiting Address" #1 through #4, "Credit ID," "Credit Address" #1 through #4, Account Party" #1 through #5, "Ultimate Beneficiary" #1 through #5, "Det_Payment" #1 through #4, and "Bank to Bank" #1 through #6.
- 13. If any document responsive to this request was, but no longer is, in your possession, custody, or control, or has been placed into the possession, custody, or control of any third party and cannot be provided in response to this request, you should identify the document (stating its date, author, subject and recipients) and explain the circumstances under which the document ceased to be in your possession, custody, or control, or was placed in the possession, custody, or control of a third party.
- 14. If any document responsive to this request was, but no longer is, in your possession, custody or control, state:
 - a. how the document was disposed of;
 - b. the name, current address, and telephone number of the person who currently has possession, custody or control over the document;
 - c. the date of disposition;
 - d. the name, current address, and telephone number of each person who authorized said disposition or who had or has knowledge of said disposition.
- 15. If any document responsive to this request cannot be located, describe with particularity the efforts made to locate the document and the specific reason for its disappearance, destruction or unavailability.

- 16. If a date or other descriptive detail set forth in this request referring to a document, communication, meeting, or other event is inaccurate, but the actual date or other descriptive detail is known to you or is otherwise apparent from the context of the request, you should produce all documents which would be responsive as if the date or other descriptive detail were correct.
- 17. The request is continuing in nature and applies to any newly discovered document, regardless of the date of its creation. Any document not produced because it has not been located or discovered by the return date should be produced immediately upon location or discovery subsequent thereto.
- 18. You should consult with Committee majority staff regarding the method of delivery prior to sending any materials.
- 19. In the event that a responsive document is withheld on any basis, including a claim of privilege, you should provide a log containing the following information concerning every such document: (i) the reason the document is not being produced; (ii) the type of document; (iii) the general subject matter; (iv) the date, author and addressee; (v) the relationship of the author and addressee to each other; and (vi) any other description necessary to identify the document and to explain the basis for not producing the document. If a claimed privilege applies to only a portion of any document, that portion only should be withheld and the remainder of the document should be produced. As used herein, "claim of privilege" includes, but is not limited to, any claim that a document either may or must be withheld from production pursuant to any statute, rule, or regulation.
 - (a) Any objections or claims of privilege are waived if you fail to provide an explanation of why full compliance is not possible and a log identifying with specificity the ground(s) for withholding each withheld document prior to the request compliance date.
 - (b) Any assertion by a request recipient of any such non-constitutional legal bases for withholding documents or other materials, for refusing to answer any deposition question, or for refusing to provide hearing testimony, shall be of no legal force and effect and shall not provide a justification for such withholding or refusal, unless and only to the extent that the Committee (or the chair of the Committee, if authorized) has consented to recognize the assertion as valid.
- 20. If the request cannot be complied with in full, it should be complied with to the extent possible, which should include an explanation of why full compliance is not possible.
- 21. Upon completion of the document production, you must submit a written certification, signed by you or your counsel, stating that: (1) a diligent search has been completed of all documents in your possession, custody, or control which reasonably could contain responsive documents; (2) documents responsive to the request have not been destroyed, modified, removed, transferred, or otherwise made inaccessible to the Committee since the date of

receiving the Committee's request or in anticipation of receiving the Committee's request; and (3) all documents identified during the search that are responsive have been produced to the Committee, identified in a log provided to the Committee, as described in (18) above, or identified as provided in (12), (13) or (14) above.

22. When representing a witness or entity before the Committee in response to a document request or request for transcribed interview, counsel for the witness or entity must promptly submit to the Committee a notice of appearance specifying the following: (a) counsel's name, firm or organization, and contact information; and (b) each client represented by the counsel in connection with the proceeding. Submission of a notice of appearance constitutes acknowledgement that counsel is authorized to accept service of process by the Committee on behalf of such client(s), and that counsel is bound by and agrees to comply with all applicable House and Committee rules and regulations.

DEFINITIONS

- 1. The term "Deutsche Bank AG" includes, but is not limited to each of its, subsidiaries, affiliates, branches, divisions, partnerships, properties, groups, special purpose entities, joint ventures, predecessors, successors, or any other entity in which they have or had a controlling interest, and any current or former employee, officer, director, shareholder, partner, member, consultant, senior manager, manager, senior associate, staff employee, independent contractor, agent, attorney or other representative of any of those entities.
- 2. Each entities listed in items 1 and 6 above includes, but is not limited to, each of its parents, subsidiaries, affiliates, branches, divisions, partnerships, properties, groups, special purpose entities, joint ventures, predecessors, successors, or any other entity in which they have or had a controlling interest, and any current or former employee, officer, director, shareholder, partner, member, consultant, senior manager, manager, senior associate, staff employee, independent contractor, agent, attorney or other representative of any of those entities.
- 3. The term "documents in your possession, custody or control" means (a) documents that are in your possession, custody, or control, whether held by you or your past or present agents, employees, or representatives acting on your behalf; (b) documents that you have a legal right to obtain, that you have a right to copy, or to which you have access; and (c) documents that have been placed in the possession, custody, or control of any third party.
- The term "document" means any written, recorded, or graphic matter of any nature whatsoever, regardless of how recorded, and whether original or copy, including, but not limited to, the following: agreements; papers; memoranda; correspondence; reports; studies; reviews; analyses; graphs; diagrams; photographs; charts; tabulations; presentations; marketing materials; working papers; records; records of interviews; desk files; notes; letters; notices; confirmations; telegrams; faxes, telexes, receipts; appraisals; interoffice and intra office communications: electronic mail (e-mail) and attachments; electronic messages; text messages; contracts; cables; recordings, notations or logs of any type of conversation, telephone call, meeting or other communication; bulletins; printed matter; computer printouts; teletype; invoices; transcripts; audio or video recordings; statistical or informational accumulations; data processing cards or worksheets; computer stored and/or generated documents; computer databases; computer disks and formats; machine readable electronic files, data or records maintained on a computer; instant messages; diaries; questionnaires and responses; data sheets; summaries; minutes; bills; accounts; estimates; projections; comparisons; messages; correspondence; electronically stored information and similar or related materials. A document bearing any notation not a part of the original text is to be considered a separate document. A draft or non-identical copy is a separate document within the meaning of this term.
- 5. The term "immediate family" means any parent, spouse, child, step child, daughter-in-law, or son-in-law.
- 6. The term "administrator or controlling party" means any individual, organization, or entity that established, managed, administered, represented, served as signatory for, or engaged in any transaction on behalf of, or in any way had control over any of, or any account or assets of, the entities identified in or responsive to any of the items above.

- 7. The term "entity" means a corporation, partnership, limited partnership, limited liability company, joint venture, business trust, or any other form or organization by which business or financial transactions are carried out.
- 8. The term "communication" means each manner or means of disclosure or exchange of information, regardless of means utilized, whether oral, electronic, by document or otherwise, and whether face to face, in meetings, by telephone, mail, telex, facsimile, computer, discussions, releases, delivery, or otherwise.
- 9. The terms "and" and "or" shall be construed broadly and either conjunctively or disjunctively to bring within the scope of this subpoena any information which might otherwise be construed to be outside its scope. The singular includes plural number, and vice versa. The masculine includes the feminine and neuter genders.
- 10. The terms "person" or "persons" mean natural persons, firms, partnerships, associations, limited liability corporations and companies, limited liability partnerships, corporations, subsidiaries, divisions, departments, joint ventures, proprietorships, syndicates, other legal, business or government entities, or any other organization or group of persons, and all subsidiaries, affiliates, divisions, departments, branches, and other units thereof.
- 11. The terms "referring" "related" "relating" or "concerning," with respect to any given subject, mean anything that constitutes, contains, embodies, reflects, identifies, states, refers to, deals with, or is in any manner whatsoever pertinent to that subject.
- 12. The term "employee" means agent, borrowed employee, casual employee, consultant, de facto employee, joint adventurer, loaned employee, part-time employee, permanent employee, provisional employee, contract employee, contractor, or any other type of service provider.

Exhibit B

SUBPOENA

BY AUTHORITY OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Capital One Financial Corporation You are hereby commanded to be and appear before the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives of the United States at the place, date, and time specified below. $\overline{\mathbf{V}}$ to produce the things identified on the attached schedule touching matters of inquiry committed to said committee or subcommittee; and you are not to depart without leave of said committee or subcommittee. Place of production: Committee on Financial Services, Rayburn House Office Building, Room 2129 Date: May 6, 2019 Time: 12:00 PM to testify at a deposition touching matters of inquiry committed to said committee or subcommittee; and you are not to depart without leave of said committee or subcommittee. Place of testimony: Time to testify at a hearing touching matters of inquiry committed to said committee or subcommittee; and you are not to depart without leave of said committee or subcommittee. Place of testimony: to serve and make return. Witness my hand and the seal of the House of Representatives of the United States, at day of April the city of Washington, D.C. this Chairman or Authorized Member Attest:

Clerk

PROOF OF SERVICE

Address Capital One Financial Corporation, 1680 Capital One Drive, McLean, VA 22102-3491 before the Committee on Financial Services	
before the Committee on Financial Services	
before the Committee on Financial Services	
U.S. House of Representatives 116th Congress	
	,
	1
Served by (print name) David Abramowitz	
Title General Counsel and Parliamentarian, House Financial Services Committee	
Manner of service Electronic Mail	
TYTULINOT OF BOLLIO	
Date April , 2019	
Signature of Server David S. allus	
Address Rayburn House Office Building, Room 2129, Washington, D.C. 20515	•

SCHEDULE A

Custodian of Records Capital One

The time period applicable to this subpoena is <u>July 19, 2016 through the present</u>, except for Item "i." and "ii.", for which there is no time limitation.

Please provide complete and unredacted copies of the following documents by May 6, 2019:

1. With respect to:

The Donald J. Trump Revocable Trust;

The Trump Organization Inc.;

Trump Organization LLC;

The Trump Corporation;

Trump Old Post Office LLC;

Trump Old Post Office Member Corp.;

DJT Holdings LLC;

DJT Holdings Managing Member LLC;

OPO Hotel Manager LLC;

OPO Hotel Manager Member Corp.;

THC DC Restaurant Hospitality LLC;

Trump Acquisition LLC;

Trump Acquisition Corp.;

Trump International Hotels Management LLC;

Trump International Hotels Management Member Corp.;

Any parent, subsidiary, affiliate, joint venture, predecessor, or successor of the foregoing; or

Any principal, including directors, shareholders, or officers, or any other representatives of the foregoing;

or any account (including, but not limited to, any securities or trading account) in the name of any of the above-named entities, as well as any account in which such entities are or were a beneficiary, or beneficial owner, or in which such entities have or have had in any way control over, individually or with others:

- i. any document related to account opening, due diligence, or closing;
- ii. any document that identifies, addresses or is related to the identification of any trustee, guarantor, settlor or grantor, administrator or controlling party, protector, beneficiary, beneficial owner or signatory;
- iii. any document that identifies any relationship manager or account manager;
- iv. any monthly or periodic statement showing line item detail for all account activity, including, but not limited to, intrabank transfers between any of the accounts, and images of all cancelled checks in excess of \$5,000;

- v. any summary record or analysis of account deposits and transfers, including, but not limited to, the sources of the deposits into those accounts and the destination of the transfers from those accounts, including any wire transfer (showing all wire field information and originator-to-beneficiary and bank-to-bank information), check, cash letter or other monetary instrument involving those accounts;
- vi. any document related to any transfer of funds in excess of \$10,000, including, but not limited to, any wire transfer, check, cash letter, or any document indicating the originator, beneficiary, intermediary, source of funds or destination of such transfer;
- vii. any document related to any possible suspicious activity identified by Capital One Financial Corporation's surveillance or monitoring system or program or referred by any employee or third-party;
- viii. any document relating to any annual, special, or other reviews of the accounts pursuant to Capital One Financial Corporation's policies and procedures related to the Bank Secrecy Act, anti-money-laundering, and compliance with guidance on Politically Exposed Persons and domestic or foreign public figures or their families;
- ix. any document, including, but not limited to, any personal file not otherwise kept in customary record-keeping systems, related to any loan or extension of credit requested by or provided to any of the above-named entities;
- x. any document related to any real estate transaction; and
- xi. any document related to, or provided in response to:
 - a. any request, subpoena, inquiry or investigation, by any U.S. federal or state agency;
 - b. any notice of administrative, civil, or criminal legal action;
 - c. any subpoena, search warrant, seizure warrant, summons, or other legal writ, notice, or order or request for information, property, or material, including, but not limited to, those issued pursuant to the USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. 107-56; Sections 314(a) or 314(b) of that Act, or any other tax, anti-money laundering or bank statute; and
 - d. any request for information made to or by a third party, including, but not limited to any government agency or financial institution.

RESPONDING TO COMMITTEE SUBPOENAS

In responding to the document request, please apply the instructions and definitions set forth below:

INSTRUCTIONS

- 1. In complying with this request, you should produce all responsive documents in unreducted form that are in the possession, custody, or control or otherwise available to Capital One Financial Corporation or its agents, employees, or representatives, regardless of whether the documents are possessed directly by you.
- 2. Documents responsive to the request should not be destroyed, modified, removed, transferred, or otherwise made inaccessible to the Committee.
- 3. In the event that any entity, organization, or individual named in the request has been, or is currently, known by any other name, the request should be read also to include such other names under that alternative identification.
- 4. Each document should be produced in a form that may be copied by standard copying machines.
- 5. When you produce documents, you should identify the paragraph(s) and/or clause(s) in the Committee's request to which the document responds.
- 6. Documents produced pursuant to this request should be produced in the order in which they appear in your files and should not be rearranged. Any documents that are stapled, clipped, or otherwise fastened together should not be separated. Documents produced in response to this request should be produced together with copies of file labels, dividers, or identifying markers with which they were associated when this request was issued. Indicate the office or division and person from whose files each document was produced. Documents produced on paper (those from paper files that you choose to produce as such) shall not contain any permanent fasteners (i.e., staples), but shall be separated based on the divisions between documents as it is maintained in the custodian's files by non-permanent fasteners (e.g., paper clips, binder clips, rubber bands) or a non-white slip sheet.
- 7. Each folder and box should be numbered, and a description of the contents of each folder and box, including the paragraph(s) and/or clause(s) of the request to which the documents are responsive, should be provided in an accompanying index.
- 8. Responsive documents must be produced regardless of whether any other person or entity possesses non-identical or identical copies of the same document.
- 9. The Committee requests electronic documents in addition to paper productions. If any of the requested information is available in machine-readable or electronic form (such as on a computer server, hard drive, CD, DVD, back up tape, or removable computer media such as thumb drives, flash drives, memory cards, and external hard drives), you should immediately

consult with Committee staff to determine the appropriate format in which to produce the information. Documents produced in electronic format should be organized, identified, and indexed electronically in a manner comparable to the organizational structure called for in (6) and (7) above.

- 10. Documents produced in electronic format should be produced as delimited text with images and native files in accordance with the attached Data Delivery Standards. Alternatively, all documents derived from word processing programs, email applications, instant message logs, spreadsheets, and wherever else practicable, shall be produced in text searchable PDF format. Spreadsheets shall also be provided in their native form. Audio and video files shall be produced in their native format, although picture files associated with email or word processing programs shall be produced in PDF format along with the document it is contained in or to which it is attached. The requested wire transfer records should be produced in Excel (.xls) format that is enabled (not "read only" format), with separate columns that show each wire transfer field, including, but not limited to, the following fields: "Payment Date," "Amount," "Ordering Customer" #1 through #4, "Ordering Bank" #1 through #5, "Debiting ID," "Debiting Address" #1 through #4, "Credit ID," "Credit Address" #1 through #4, Account Party" #1 through #5, "Ultimate Beneficiary" #1 through #5, "Det Payment" #1 through #4, and "Bank to Bank" #1 through #6.
- 11. Other than native files produced along with TIFF images in accordance with the attached Data Delivery Standards, every page of material produced to the Committee, whether from paper files or as a text searchable PDF, must contain a unique Bates number. All files produced in PDF format shall be named according to the Bates range that the file contains (e.g. YourCo-00001 YourCo-00035.pdf).
- 12. If any document responsive to this request was, but no longer is, in your possession, custody, or control, or has been placed into the possession, custody, or control of any third party and cannot be provided in response to this request, you should identify the document (stating its date, author, subject and recipients) and explain the circumstances under which the document ceased to be in your possession, custody, or control, or was placed in the possession, custody, or control of a third party.
- 13. If any document responsive to this request was, but no longer is, in your possession, custody or control, state:
 - a. how the document was disposed of;
 - b. the name, current address, and telephone number of the person who currently has possession, custody or control over the document;
 - c. the date of disposition;
 - d. the name, current address, and telephone number of each person who authorized said disposition or who had or has knowledge of said disposition.
- 14. If any document responsive to this request cannot be located, describe with particularity the efforts made to locate the document and the specific reason for its disappearance, destruction or unavailability.

- 15. If a date or other descriptive detail set forth in this request referring to a document, communication, meeting, or other event is inaccurate, but the actual date or other descriptive detail is known to you or is otherwise apparent from the context of the request, you should produce all documents which would be responsive as if the date or other descriptive detail were correct.
- 16. The request is continuing in nature and applies to any newly discovered document, regardless of the date of its creation. Any document not produced because it has not been located or discovered by the return date should be produced immediately upon location or discovery subsequent thereto.
- 17. You should consult with Committee majority staff regarding the method of delivery prior to sending any materials.
- 18. In the event that a responsive document is withheld on any basis, including a claim of privilege, you should provide a log containing the following information concerning every such document: (i) the reason the document is not being produced; (ii) the type of document; (iii) the general subject matter; (iv) the date, author and addressee; (v) the relationship of the author and addressee to each other; and (vi) any other description necessary to identify the document and to explain the basis for not producing the document. If a claimed privilege applies to only a portion of any document, that portion only should be withheld and the remainder of the document should be produced. As used herein, "claim of privilege" includes, but is not limited to, any claim that a document either may or must be withheld from production pursuant to any statute, rule, or regulation.
 - (a) Any objections or claims of privilege are waived if you fail to provide an explanation of why full compliance is not possible and a log identifying with specificity the ground(s) for withholding each withheld document prior to the request compliance date.
 - (b) Any assertion by a request recipient of any such non-constitutional legal bases for withholding documents or other materials, for refusing to answer any deposition question, or for refusing to provide hearing testimony, shall be of no legal force and effect and shall not provide a justification for such withholding or refusal, unless and only to the extent that the Committee (or the chair of the Committee, if authorized) has consented to recognize the assertion as valid.
- 19. If the request cannot be complied with in full, it should be complied with to the extent possible, which should include an explanation of why full compliance is not possible.
- 20. Upon completion of the document production, you must submit a written certification, signed by you or your counsel, stating that: (1) a diligent search has been completed of all documents in your possession, custody, or control which reasonably could contain responsive documents; (2) documents responsive to the request have not been destroyed, modified, removed, transferred, or otherwise made inaccessible to the Committee since the date of receiving the Committee's request;

- and (3) all documents identified during the search that are responsive have been produced to the Committee, identified in a log provided to the Committee, as described in (18) above, or identified as provided in (12), (13) or (14) above.
- 21. When representing a witness or entity before the Committee in response to a document request or request for transcribed interview, counsel for the witness or entity must promptly submit to the Committee a notice of appearance specifying the following: (a) counsel's name, firm or organization, and contact information; and (b) each client represented by the counsel in connection with the proceeding. Submission of a notice of appearance constitutes acknowledgement that counsel is authorized to accept service of process by the Committee on behalf of such client(s), and that counsel is bound by and agrees to comply with all applicable House and Committee rules and regulations.

DEFINITIONS

- 1. The term "Capital One Financial Corporation" includes, but is not limited to Capital One Financial Corporation and each of its subsidiaries, affiliates, branches, divisions, partnerships, properties, groups, special purpose entities, joint ventures, predecessors, successors, or any other entity in which they have or had a controlling interest, and any current or former employee, officer, director, shareholder, partner, member, consultant, senior manager, manager, senior associate, staff employee, independent contractor, agent, attorney or other representative of any of those entities.
- 2. Each entities listed in items 1 and 6 above includes, but is not limited to, each of its parents, subsidiaries, affiliates, branches, divisions, partnerships, properties, groups, special purpose entities, joint ventures, predecessors, successors, or any other entity in which they have or had a controlling interest, and any current or former employee, officer, director, shareholder, partner, member, consultant, senior manager, manager, senior associate, staff employee, independent contractor, agent, attorney or other representative of any of those entities.
- 3. The term "documents in your possession, custody or control" means (a) documents that are in your possession, custody, or control, whether held by you or your past or present agents, employees, or representatives acting on your behalf; (b) documents that you have a legal right to obtain, that you have a right to copy, or to which you have access; and (c) documents that have been placed in the possession, custody, or control of any third party.
- The term "document" means any written, recorded, or graphic matter of any nature whatsoever, regardless of how recorded, and whether original or copy, including, but not limited to, the following: agreements; papers; memoranda; correspondence; reports; studies; reviews; analyses; graphs; diagrams; photographs; charts; tabulations; presentations; marketing materials; working papers; records; records of interviews; desk files; notes; letters; notices; confirmations; telegrams; faxes, telexes, receipts; appraisals; interoffice and intra office communications; electronic mail (e-mail) and attachments; electronic messages; text messages; contracts; cables; recordings, notations or logs of any type of conversation, telephone call, meeting or other communication; bulletins; printed matter; computer printouts; teletype; invoices; transcripts; audio or video recordings; statistical or informational accumulations; data processing cards or worksheets; computer stored and/or generated documents; computer databases; computer disks and formats; machine readable electronic files, data or records maintained on a computer; instant messages; diaries; questionnaires and responses; data sheets; summaries; minutes; bills; accounts; estimates; projections; comparisons; messages; correspondence; electronically stored information and similar or related materials. A document bearing any notation not a part of the original text is to be considered a separate document. A draft or non-identical copy is a separate document within the meaning of this term.
- 5. The term "immediate family" means any parent, spouse, child, step child, daughter-in-law, or son-in-law.
- 6. The term "administrator or controlling party" means any individual, organization, or entity that established, managed, administered, represented, served as signatory for, or engaged in any transaction on behalf of, or in any way had control over any of, or any account or assets of, the entities identified in or responsive to any of the items above.

- 7. The term "entity" means a corporation, partnership, limited partnership, limited liability company, joint venture, business trust, or any other form or organization by which business or financial transactions are carried out.
- 8. The term "communication" means each manner or means of disclosure or exchange of information, regardless of means utilized, whether oral, electronic, by document or otherwise, and whether face to face, in meetings, by telephone, mail, telex, facsimile, computer, discussions, releases, delivery, or otherwise.
- 9. The terms "and" and "or" shall be construed broadly and either conjunctively or disjunctively to bring within the scope of this subpoena any information which might otherwise be construed to be outside its scope. The singular includes plural number, and vice versa. The masculine includes the feminine and neuter genders.
- 10. The terms "person" or "persons" mean natural persons, firms, partnerships, associations, limited liability corporations and companies, limited liability partnerships, corporations, subsidiaries, divisions, departments, joint ventures, proprietorships, syndicates, other legal, business or government entities, or any other organization or group of persons, and all subsidiaries, affiliates, divisions, departments, branches, and other units thereof.
- 11. The terms or "relating" "concerning" with respect to any given subject, mean anything that constitutes, contains, embodies, reflects, identifies, states, refers to, deals with, or is in any manner whatsoever pertinent to that subject.
- 12. The term "employee" means agent, borrowed employee, casual employee, consultant, de facto employee, joint adventurer, loaned employee, part-time employee, permanent employee, provisional employee, contract employee, contractor, or any other type of service provider.

In responding to the subpoena, please apply the instructions and definitions set forth below:

Instructions

The documents subpoenaed include all those that are in the custody, control or possession, or within the right of custody, control or possession, of Capital One or its agents, employees, or representatives.

If the subpoena cannot be complied with in full, it shall be complied with to the extent possible, with an explanation of why full compliance is not possible. Any document withheld on the basis of privilege shall be identified on a privilege log submitted with the responses to this subpoena. The log shall state the date of the document, its author, his or her occupation and employer, all recipients, the occupation and employer of each recipient, the subject matter, the privilege claimed and a brief explanation of the basis of the claim of privilege. If any document responsive to this subpoena was, but no longer is, in your possession, custody, or control, identify the

document and explain the circumstances by which it ceased to be in your possession, custody, or control.

Documents shall be produced as delimited text with images and native files in accordance with the attached Data Delivery Standards.

Alternatively, all documents derived from word processing programs, email applications, instant message logs, spreadsheets, and wherever else practicable, shall be produced in text searchable PDF format. Spreadsheets shall also be provided in their native form. Audio and video files shall be produced in their native format, although picture files associated with email or word processing programs shall be produced in PDF format along with the document it is contained in or to which it is attached.

Other than native files produced along with TIFF images in accordance with the attached Data Delivery Standards, every page of material produced to the Committee, whether from paper files or as a text searchable PDF, must contain a unique Bates number. All files produced in PDF format shall be named according to the Bates range that the file contains (e.g. YourCo-00001 - YourCo-00035.pdf).

Documents produced on paper (those from paper files that you choose to produce as such) shall not contain any permanent fasteners (i.e., staples), but shall be separated based on the divisions between documents as it is maintained in the custodian's files by non-permanent fasteners (e.g., paper clips, binder clips, rubber bands) or a non-white slip sheet.

DATA DELIVERY STANDARDS

Record productions shall be prepared according to, and strictly adhere to, the following standards:

- 1. Records produced shall be organized, identified, and indexed electronically.
- 2. Only alphanumeric characters and the underscore ("_") character are permitted in file and folder names. Special characters are not permitted.
- 3. Two sets of records shall be delivered, one set to the Majority Staff and one set to the Minority Staff. To the extent the Minority Staff does not have an electronic record review platform, records shall be produced to the Minority Staff in searchable PDF format and shall be produced consistent with the instructions specified in this schedule to the maximum extent practicable.
- 4. Production media and produced records shall not be encrypted, contain any password protections, or have any limitations that restrict access and use.
- 5. Records shall be produced to the Committee on one or more CDs, memory sticks, thumb drives, or USB hard drives. Production media shall be labeled with the following information: Case Number, Production Date, Producing Party, Bates Range.
- 6. Records produced to the Committee shall include an index describing the contents of the production. To the extent that more than one CD, hard drive, memory stick, thumb drive, box, or folder is produced, each CD, hard drive, memory stick, thumb drive, box, or folder shall contain an index describing its contents.
- 7. All records shall be Bates-stamped sequentially and produced sequentially.
- 8. When you produce records, you shall identify the paragraph or number in the Committee's Request to which the records respond and add a metadata tag listing that paragraph or number in accordance with **Appendix A**.

9.

- a. All submissions must be organized by custodian unless otherwise instructed.
- b. Productions shall include:
 - 1. A Concordance Data (.DAT) Load File in accordance with metadata fields as defined in **Appendix A**.
 - 2. A Standard Format Opticon Image Cross-Reference File (.OPT) to link produced images to the records contained in the .DAT file.

- 3. A file (can be Microsoft Word, Microsoft Excel, or Adobe PDF) defining the fields and character lengths of the load file.
- c. The production format shall include images, text, and native electronic files. Electronic files must be produced in their native format, i.e., the format in which they are ordinarily used and maintained during the normal course of business. For example, a Microsoft Excel file must be produced as a Microsoft Excel file rather than an image of a spreadsheet. **NOTE:** An Adobe PDF file representing a printed copy of another file format (such as Word Document or Webpage) is NOT considered a native file unless the record was initially created as a PDF.

1. Image Guidelines:

- 1. Single or multi page TIFF files.
- 2. All TIFF images must have a unique file name, i.e., Bates Number
- 3. Images must be endorsed with sequential Bates numbers in the lower right corner of each image.

2. Text Guidelines:

- 1. All text shall be produced as separate text files, not inline within the .DAT file.
- 2. Relative paths shall be used to link the associated text file (FIELD: TEXTPATH) to the record contained in the load file.
- 3. Associated text files shall be named as the BEGBATES field of each record.

3. Native File Guidelines:

- 1. Copies of original email and native file records/attachments must be included for all electronic productions.
- 2. Native file records must be named per the BEGBATES field.
- 3. Relative paths shall be used to link the associated native file (FIELD: NATIVEFILELINK) to the record contained in the load file.
- 4. Associated native files shall be named as the BEGBATES field of each record.

- d. All record family groups, *i.e.*, email attachments, embedded files, etc., should be produced together and children files should follow parent files sequentially in the Bates numbering.
- e. Only 1 load file and one Opticon image reference file shall be produced per production volume.
- f. All extracted text shall be produced as separate text files.
- g. Record numbers in the load file should match record Bates numbers and TIFF file names.
- h. All electronic record produced to the Committee should include the fields of metadata listed in **Appendix A**.

Appendix A

Production Load File Formatting and Delimiters:

• The first line shall be a header row containing field names.

• Load file delimiters shall be in accordance with the following:

o Field Separator: ¶ (20)

Text Qualifier: þ (254)

o Newline: \n (10)

Multi-Value Separator: ; (59)

o Nested Value Separator: \ (92)

• All Date / Time Data shall be split into two separate fields (see below).

o Date Format: mm/dd/yyyy—i.e., 05/18/2015

o Time Format: hh:mm:ss A—i.e., 08:39:12 AM

Required Metadata Fields

Field Name	Sample Data	Description
FIRSTBATES	EDC0000001	First Bates number of native file record/email
LASTBATES	EDC0000001	Last Bates number of native file record/email **The LASTBATES field should be populated for single page records/emails.
ATTACHRANGE	EDC000001- EDC0000015	Bates number of the first page of the parent record to the Bates number of the last page of the last attachment "child" record
BEGATTACH	EDC0000001	First Bates number of attachment range
ENDATTACH	EDC0000015	Last Bates number of attachment range

Field Name	Sample Data	Description
CUSTODIAN	Smith, John	Email: mailbox where the email resided Attachment: Individual from whom the record originated
FROM	John Smith	Email: Sender Native: Author(s) of record **semi-colon should be used to separate multiple entries
ТО	Coffman, Janice; LeeW [mailto:LeeW@MS N.com]	Recipient(s) **semi-colon should be used to separate multiple entries
CC	Frank Thompson [mailto: frank Thompson@ cdt.com]	Carbon copy recipient(s) **semi-colon should be used to separate multiple entries
BCC	John Cain	Blind carbon copy recipient(s) **semi-colon should be used to separate multiple entries
SUBJECT	Board Meeting Minutes	Email: Subject line of the email Native: Title of record (if available)
DATE_SENT	10/12/2010	Email: Date the email was sent Native: (empty)
TIME_SENT/TIME _ZONE	07:05 PM GMT	Email: Time the email was sent/ Time zone in which the emails were standardized during conversion. Native: (empty) **This data must be a separate field and cannot be combined with the DATE_SENT field
TIME_ZONE	GMT	The time zone in which the emails were standardized during conversion. Email: Time zone Native: (empty)
NATIVEFILELINK	D:\001\ EDC0000001.msg	Hyperlink to the email or native file record **The linked file must be named per the FIRSTBATES number
MIME_TYPE	MSG	The content type of an Email or native file record as identified/extracted from the header

Field Name	Sample Data	Description
FILE_EXTEN	MSG	The file type extension representing the Email or native file record; will vary depending on the email format
AUTHOR	John Smith	Email: (empty) Native: Author of the record
DATE_CREATED	10/10/2010	Email: (empty) Native: Date the record was created
TIME_CREATED	10:25 AM	Email: (empty) Native: Time the record was created **This data must be a separate field and cannot be combined with the DATE_CREATED field
DATE_MOD	10/12/2010	Email: (empty) Native: Date the record was last modified
TIME_MOD	07:00 PM	Email: (empty) Native: Time the record was last modified **This data must be a separate field and cannot be combined with the DATE MOD field
DATE_ACCESSD	10/12/2010	Email: (empty) Native: Date the record was last accessed
TIME_ACCESSD	07:00 PM	Email: (empty) Native: Time the record was last accessed **This data must be a separate field and cannot be combined with the DATE_ACCESSD field
PRINTED_DATE	10/12/2010	Email: (empty) Native: Date the record was last printed
NATIVEFILESIZ E	5,952	Size of native file record/email in KB **Use only whole numbers
PGCOUNT	1	Number of pages in native file record/email
PATH	J:\Shared\Smith J\October Agenda.doc	Email: (empty) Native: Path where native file record was stored including original file name
INTFILEPATH	Personal Folders\Deleted Items\Board Meeting Minutes.msg	Email: original location of email including original file name Native: (empty)
INTMSGID	<000805c2c71b\$7 5977050\$cb 8306d1@MSN>	Email: Unique Message ID Native: (empty)

Field Name	Sample Data	Description
MD5HASH	d131dd02c5e6eec 4693d9a069 8aff95c 2fcab58712467ea b4004583eb 8fb7f89	MD5 Hash value of the record
TEXTPATH	\TEXT\AAA0001 .txt	Path to the record's text file that contains extracted text to be used for processing. Every record has a relative path to its text file in this field. Note: These paths may also be fully qualified; and thus do not have to be relative.
NATIVEFILEPAT H	\NATIVES\MES SAGE1.msg; \NATIVES\ATT ACHMENT1. doc	Path to the record's native file. Every record has a relative path to its native file in this field. Note: These paths may also be fully qualified; and thus do not have to be relative.
HANDWRITTEN	YES	Field should be marked "YES" if the record has any handwritten notes or other text that is not contained in the text file
REDACTED	YES	Field should be marked "YES" if the record contains any redactions, "NO" otherwise

Metadata Fields Required Upon Specific Request

TAGS	FirstPass\Respon sive; FirstPass\ForQC	If requested—a list of tags assigned to the record. Multiple tags are separated by the multi-value separator, for example: "A; B; C", and nested tags are denoted using the nested value separator, for example: "X\Y\Z". Tags for attachments will appear under the custom field "ATTACHMENT_TAGS".
FOLDERS	JohnDoeDocs\Fir stPass	If requested—a list of folders of which the record is a part. Multiple folders are separated by the multi-value separator, for example: "A; B; C", and nested folders are denoted using the nested value separator, for example: "X\Y\Z". Folders for attachments will appear under the custom field "ATTACHMENT_FOLDERS".

J5m2tru1 1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK -----X 2 DONALD J. TRUMP, et al., 3 Plaintiffs, New York, N.Y. 4 v. 19 Civ. 3826(ER) 5 DEUTSCHE BANK, AG, et al., 6 Defendants, 7 COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES 8 OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 9 Intervenor Defendant, 10 PERMAMENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON 11 INTELLIGENCE OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 12 Intervenor Defendant. 13 Conference 14 May 22, 2019 2:30 p.m. 15 Before: 16 HON. EDGARDO RAMOS, 17 District Judge 18 19 APPEARANCES 20 CONSOVOY McCARTHY, PLLC 21 Attorneys for Plaintiffs BY: PATRICK STRAWBRIDGE 22 CAMERON T. NORRIS 23 MUKASEY FRENCHMAN & SKLAROFF, LLP 24 Attorneys for Trump Business Entity Plaintiffs BY: MARC L. MUKASEY 25

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1 **APPEARANCES** (continued) 2 AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD, LLP 3 Attorneys for Defendant Deutsche Bank, AG BY: RAPHAEL A. PROBER STEVEN R. ROSS 4 5 MURPHY & McGONIGLE, PC 6 Attorneys for Defendant Capital One Financial Corp. BY: JAMES A. MURPHY 7 STEVEN D. FELDMAN 8 OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL 9 U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Attorneys for Intervenor Defendants 10 BY: DOUGLAS N. LETTER 11 12 ALSO PRESENT: 13 DANIEL S. NOBLE, Senior Counsel for Investigations U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee 14 on Intelligence 15 JENNIFER L. READ, Senior Counsel 16 U.S. House of Representatives 17 Committee on Financial Services 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

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THE DEPUTY CLERK: Counsel, please state your names for the record.

MR. MUKASEY: Good afternoon, your Honor. Mukasey, from the law firm of Mukasey Frenchman & Sklaroff, for what I will call the business entity plaintiffs.

With me are Cam Norris and Patrick Strawbridge from the Consovoy McCarthy law firm in D.C. Mr. Strawbridge is going to be handling most of the argument today, Judge.

THE COURT: Very well.

MR. LETTER: Good morning, your Honor. I am Douglas I am the general counsel of the United States House of Representatives. With me today is Jennifer Read from the Financial Services Committee of the House and Mr. Daniel Noble from the Intelligence Committee of the House.

THE COURT: Good afternoon.

MR. MURPHY: Good afternoon, your Honor. My name is James Murphy, of the firm of Murphy & McGonigle. I represent Capital One Financial Corporation. My partner Steve Feldman, also of Murphy & McGonigle, is here with us.

MR. ROSS: Good afternoon, your Honor. Steven Ross, from Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, on behalf of Deutsche Bank, and with me is my partner Rafi Prober, also on behalf of the bank.

THE COURT: Good afternoon to you all.

This matter is on for a hearing on the preliminary injunction application by the plaintiffs, the Donald Trump organizations and the various Trump family members.

So, Mr. Strawbridge, whenever you are ready.

MR. STRAWBRIDGE: Thank you, your Honor. We appreciate the opportunity to be heard this afternoon.

This case requires the court to confront serious questions about the outer reaches of the power of a committee of the House of Representatives to obtain decades worth of private financial information about any individual that its members decide would be a useful case study for some potential legislation.

For more than a century, the courts have reiterated time and time again that Congress's powers of investigation, although substantial, are not unlimited. Congress cannot assume the role of the executive branch, in law enforcement, it cannot seek to expose for the sake of exposure, it cannot seek information for which it lacks the authority to act, a committee cannot exceed the scope of its jurisdiction, and it cannot compel production of information that is not pertinent to its stated and valid legislative purpose.

The subpoenas challenged here transgress those limits. With startling breadth, they seek private records of virtually every banking transaction or interaction by not only the named plaintiffs, but in some cases their children, their spouses,

their in-laws, and in the present case even his grandchildren. Every debit card transaction, every account application, every internal report, every loan document, they want it all. In many cases, they say want these documents without time limitation. In other cases, they only want them for the last ten or in some cases three years. These subpoenas are the epitome of an inquiry into private or personal matters. If Congress can make a case study out of the plaintiffs, they can make a case study out of me, out of my friends on the other side, or anyone in this courtroom, including, unfortunately, your Honor.

THE COURT: I know that the House lawyer used the term "case study" in their papers. They are probably sorry about it. But, in fact, don't they provide a number of valid legislative reasons for asking for these documents and for the Trump family documents in particular?

MR. STRAWBRIDGE: No, your Honor. We do not believe that they do. And we will say that they generally aver to a number of investigations or goals or potential legislation. But when it comes time to actually talk about what purposes these subpoenas, these investigative acts, what legitimate legislative purpose they advance, they are actually quite specific and they are somewhat narrow and they differ a little bit depending upon which committee, which I am happy to talk about if your Honor would like.

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. STRAWBRIDGE: Let's start with the Capital One subpoena, which is only issued by the Financial Services

Committee. The purpose — and this is on page 16 of their opposition, they actually assert what this particular subpoena is designed to advance — is, again, invoking language to learn more about unsafe lending practices and money laundering and there is the reference to the fact that they might make some legislative changes to the Bank Secrecy Act or the money laundering statutes.

That is, on its face -- and I would, indeed, encourage the court to look at the House resolution that was cited by the House with respect to supporting that purpose -- that is law enforcement activity, and you can look at the face of the subpoena and distill as much.

If you look at the Capital One subpoena, among other things, it asks for all documents concerning transfers in excess of \$10,000 -- I'm sure your Honor is familiar with the significance of the 10,000 limit and what that means -- documents concerning any potential violations of various statutes, documents that are related to or produced in response to state or local law enforcement investigations. If the U.S. Attorney's office in the Southern District of New York wanted to launch the broadest possible investigative warrant of the plaintiffs in this case, it could not ask for more than it has

asked for in the Capital One subpoena, and that's a prime example of how, if you look at the face of the subpoena, the legislative purpose that Congress is using or arguing to advance that particular subpoena is plainly invalid, it plainly encroaches upon the executive's responsibilities for law enforcement.

THE COURT: Certainly those requests do touch upon matters that are, maybe not strictly speaking, but generally speaking, within the ambit of law enforcement, but it is also part of the job of Congress, is it not, to continually, if need be, look at the current laws, see whether they are doing the job they were meant to do and, if not, make appropriate accommodations?

MR. STRAWBRIDGE: That is true, but the courts have also noted -- and Shelton is very clear about this -- it cannot simply tack on the notion that you are interested in some type of remedial legislation and use that to provide cover for what is essentially a law enforcement investigation. When you look at both who the people are that are targeted and the extent of the documents that the House is seeking, it is plain that that is the activity that they are trying to do.

Again, I will refer your Honor to the House resolution. It specifically talks about trying to encourage enforcement of money laundering and Bank Secrecy Act. It is actually the last line in the House resolution that they cite.

And right there you have, on the face of the legislative record, an avowed improper legislative purpose, which McGrain specifically says --

THE COURT: What does the specific language say?

MR. STRAWBRIDGE: This is House Resolution 206. There are a number of whereas clauses and, at the end, No. 4 is that the committee urges financial institutions to comply with the Bank Secrecy Act and the anti-money laundering laws and regulations and affirms that financial institutions and individuals should be held accountable for money laundering and terror financing crimes and violations." It is hard to imagine

THE COURT: Or an encouragement to banks and particular individuals, probably individuals, to follow the law. Why isn't that an appropriate thing for Congress to be urging?

what that is other than an announced intention to --

MR. STRAWBRIDGE: It is certainly an appropriate thing for Congress to urge. I would hope we would all urge that. But it changes when they actually put a series of document requests into a subpoena and seek to compel production of materials that touch upon individuals who might be — which, I think, when you look at the face of the subpoena, is clearly trying to investigate individuals and entities in this case for violation of those acts. At that point it's law enforcement, and at that point the cases going back 150 years, all the way

back to the original case, *Kilbourn*, make it clear that is not the province of Congress.

It is certainly not when we are talking about private affairs. I think it is important to emphasize that this is not a subpoena about government activity. This is not a subpoena to people about their actions in official office. This is a subpoena for private financial records, and it is not backed by a valid legislative purpose. It amounts to attempted law enforcement, and so it fails on those grounds alone.

THE COURT: Well, if you take my argument, assume for the sake of argument that it is a valid legislative purpose. If so, is a subpoena directed to an individual with respect to their banking records, where the Congress has been made aware that the individual has engaged in transactions with this particular bank in a fashion that may be violative of the current laws?

MR. STRAWBRIDGE: Well, investigation of crimes is no less of an executive function than the actual prosecution of them. So to the extent that what they are attempting to do is to investigate whether or not criminal conduct has occurred, that is an executive function, and all the cases say the legislature does not have a general power to inquire into private records to do so.

THE COURT: But hasn't the Supreme Court said over and over again that the examination about the current state of

affairs, the current state of law enforcement, the current state of the extent to which elected officials are complying with their ethical obligations is an appropriate function for Congress to take?

MR. STRAWBRIDGE: So let me break that into two parts because the answer changes a little bit based on your Honor's question.

With the last thing you said, ethical violations, whatever power Congress has to inquire into that, that is outside the jurisdiction of the committees that issued these subpoenas. So as a general matter, that is off the table with respect to the subpoenas.

With respect to Congress's ability to serving the state, of course. The courts have made clear that Congress has a general ability to gather useful information that might advance some actual legislative act, usually legislation.

Legislation is basically the only act that is identified here by the House.

But, again, the courts are equally as clear it cannot cross the line into law enforcement investigation, particularly when you are dealing with private records and private affairs. So in that case these subpoenas transgress those limitations.

I will also note -- I will just note as an aside, before I move on to the Deutsche Bank subpoena, the RFPA is an additional independent reason. If your Honor wants to talk

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about RFPA somewhat later in the case, I will bracket that, because it obviously applies to both subpoenas and the clients.

With respect to the Deutsche Bank subpoena, it suffers from many of the same problems that the Capital One subpoena has. It is equally as broad. In fact, it is broader. It goes back ten years as a presumptive limit. It goes back even further in some cases. It is a little bit broader in terms of the named individuals who it seeks to discover information from.

And to the extent that it was issued by the Financial Services Committee, my understanding of the record is that that subpoena was essentially issued twice. Identical subpoenas were issued by the Financial Services Committee and by the Intelligence Committee. Those committees obviously have different jurisdictional missions. They have different limits on the powers that they can exercise as committees of Congress. The subpoenas are the same, but to the extent that the Financial Services Committee has issued that subpoena, it suffers from the same defects and essentially amounts to investigatory —

THE COURT: You also complained about the vast breadth of the subpoenas and the fact that they reach to certain of Mr. Trump's children and grandchildren. But doesn't the way in which the Trump organization is structured require, if a legitimate investigation is going to be conducted, that

includes the subpoenaing of these records? Doesn't it require that it reaches the family members because of the closely held structure of the Trump organizations?

MR. STRAWBRIDGE: So obviously I don't agree that it is a legitimate investigation that can be had by Congress in the first place. But even if it was, if that's a basis to do it, no, I think that at some point when we are talking about the private affairs of officials, Congress lacks general power to inquire into private affairs, and there should be, obviously, some limitation.

This is the concept of pertinence that pops up in the case law, and I would encourage your Honor to particularly focus on the *Bergman* case, which is a case out of the Southern District involved in an express attempt to narrow, in fact, a successful attempt by a judge in this court to narrow a congressional subpoena.

It is one thing to say that we are gathering information as part of a case study or to make some sort of assessment of something to the intelligence system or to the political process, but I don't think that that purpose can mesh when you actually look at the text in the face of the investigative subpoena that's issued. They are literally looking for records about minors. They are literally looking for records about in-laws.

If that is a justification, it is a justification to

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reach everybody in the country's records. Anyone can be a case study. Anyone can have close relationships with their children or with their in-laws. There can always be a hypothetical possibility that somebody is receiving foreign payments, somebody is involved in some sort of banking transaction, and it simply can't be the case that that recitation alone is enough to justify the kind of thorough and impressive investigation into individual records, private individuals, that these subpoenas do.

I will note that obviously the Intelligence Committee has powers that are related to monitoring the activities of the intelligence agencies and those types of affairs, but their power does not extend to essentially running parallel intelligence investigations themselves.

THE COURT: I'm sorry. So you are suggesting that the committee is running a parallel intelligence investigation with whom?

MR. STRAWBRIDGE: Well, I would suggest that the subpoena indicates that the act that they are trying to undertake is essentially to run their own intelligence investigation, to do their own surveillance, to obtain their own records about individual private conduct and activity.

THE COURT: Why isn't that an appropriate legislative purpose if what they are trying to do is figure out how do we prevent foreign sovereigns from influencing our internal

elections? Shouldn't they have to know how? To the extent that's happening now, don't they have to know how it is happening?

MR. STRAWBRIDGE: Well, there are obviously a variety of ways in which they may be able to obtain that information through other sources the committee has available to it. The question is whether --

THE COURT: They can. They can also get that information by virtue of these subpoenas, no?

MR. STRAWBRIDGE: Well, so we disagree that they can do that in this case. They certainly cannot do so — and I guess this would be the second point. To the extent that they do have some authority to inquire into those types of matters, the face of the subpoena, again, belies the information they are actually seeking is pertinent to that legitimate purpose. The subpoenas are not limited to foreign transactions. The subpoenas are not limited to interactions with known potential enemies or rogue states. The subpoenas literally ask for all domestic transactions. They ask for records of all account transactions. They are so overly broad that, looking at the face of the subpoenas alone, you can see it is not pertinent to the asserted purpose that the Intelligence Committee is relying on.

THE COURT: But you would agree, would you not, that to the extent I determine that it is a facially legitimate

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legislative function, at that point I can't go and look at the subpoena and read it line by line and determine, okay, you can get this category of documents and not that category of documents?

MR. STRAWBRIDGE: No. Actually I disagree with that for a couple of different reasons.

First of all, when you are determining whether or not it is a facially legitimate legislative purpose, the language that is used specifically is that the investigative act has to have a facially legitimate legislative purpose. In this case the investigative act is the subpoena. So we can certainly look at the text of the subpoena and make an assessment as to whether or not we think it is confined to the legitimate purpose or if it stretches into an illegitimate purpose.

There are examples in the cases -- Bergman is one of them, Tobin is another -- where courts have taken it upon themselves to narrow subpoenas and narrow categories of information that Congress can obtain. I think that your Honor is authorized to do that. I think you are also authorized to basically say the subpoenas are invalid; and if the committees want to reissue newly valid subpoenas, they can do so, and we can --

THE COURT: Well, let me ask you, have you had that conversation with the committees?

MR. STRAWBRIDGE: We did raise with the committees

whether they had any interest in narrowing the subpoenas and if it was something that they were willing to discuss. We did not receive a response.

I think if you look at the *Bean* case, Fusion GPS, both district courts that handled that at one point had directed the parties to sit down and negotiate. The *AT&T* case, from the D.C. Circuit, is another where the court urged the parties to sit down and try to narrow their differences at least, if not eliminate them. Obviously if the court ordered us to do that, we would be happy to do so.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. STRAWBRIDGE: One point on the argument on a preliminary injunction proceeding, under the *Citibank* standard, which I know your Honor is familiar with, we merely need to raise serious questions on the merits because I think our irreparable harm is well established in the case law and indisputable in this case.

THE COURT: Is that standard applicable on the facts of this case?

MR. STRAWBRIDGE: Yes. I don't see why it would not be.

THE COURT: Isn't there case law suggesting that where it is the function of a government agency or a government regulation that's being tested or challenged, that the party has to make a finding of likelihood of success and cannot

resort to the less stringent standard?

MR. STRAWBRIDGE: No. I don't think that that exception applies in this case in part because this is not an administrative agency or a law enforcement agency. This is a congressional subpoena.

I will note that the <code>Eastland</code> case from the D.C. Circuit, which the procedural posture of that case was not disagreed with by the Supreme Court, the <code>Eastland</code> case basically supports the view that in this case, when you have these types of serious questions and you run the obvious risk of disclosure, which would not only basically resolve the case but would moot the ability to obtain further review, a preliminary injunction can be imposed on this posture, because we have met that. Even if the regular standard applied, we think it would satisfy it on a preliminary injunction standard at this point, not only with respect to our arguments regarding legitimate legislative purpose, but also with the RFPA.

 $\label{eq:And I would like to talk about the RFPA for just a few $$\min utes if I can.$

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. STRAWBRIDGE: The Right to Financial Privacy Act plainly applies to the individuals who are named in some of the subpoenas. The House's argument, obviously, is that the committees of the House of Representatives are not government authorities as defined in the act. And that argument is not

well taken. It is inconsistent with both the purpose and the text of the statute. Government authority, as you know, is defined as "any department or agency of the United States."

The fact that it is the department and the agency means the word "department" must be doing some work there that agency is not. "Agency" is typically interpreted in federal statutes to encompass the entire executive branch, so "department" must mean something more than that.

Moreover, there are several references to Congress or Congress-controlled investigators in the text of the RFPA which, if the RFPA was not intended to cover Congress, there would be no reason to make the limited exceptions or allowances for certain congressional investigations outside the RFPA requirements.

THE COURT: But hasn't the Supreme Court already defined "Congress" outside of the terms "agency or department of the United States."

MR. STRAWBRIDGE: Interestingly not. That is the Bramblett -- I'm sorry, that is the --

THE COURT: Hutcheson?

MR. STRAWBRIDGE: Hubbard or Hutcheson?

MR. LETTER: Hubbard.

THE COURT: Hubbard.

MR. STRAWBRIDGE: So *Hubbard*, in 1995, overruled *Bramblett*, which was the case from around 1950 or so. That

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case interpreted, for purposes of 1001, that false statements made to Congress or false statements made to an agency or department of the United States did not include Congress. Setting aside the fact that that is a criminal statute, that it has different interpretive principles that apply to interpreting that, that does absolutely no help for the committee because the act, the Right to Financial Privacy Act, was enacted in 1978. In 1978, the governing law for several decades was Bramblett. Bramblett had plainly applied that exact same language to cover Congress. And there are Supreme Court cases I would refer you to, Cannon v. University of Chicago and Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Committee, that say when we interpret a statute and we are thinking what is the definition that Congress would have presumed based on legal interpretations, we use the legal interpretations that were in place at the time the statute was passed. Obviously a 1995 decision can't affect what Congress intended in 1978. Nor does it explain why the GAO has a particular exemption and why there is a reference to congressional committees receiving documents as outside the RFPA's particular procedures if Congress has never intended to cover this.

I will also note that after that decision came down in 1995 in *Hubbard*, Congress very quickly amended 1001 to revert to the old understanding that of course was in place in 1978 and added Congress back into the scope of the false statement

statute.

We raise serious questions on both the RFPA claim as well as the legitimate legislative purpose challenge. Either one of them are sufficient to meet the requirements for preliminary injunctive relief, and we would certainly urge the court to give us a preliminary injunction, then we can proceed with relative speed to a final hearing on the merits.

THE COURT: What about the balance of equities?

MR. STRAWBRIDGE: The balance of equities in this case, I think, favor the plaintiffs here for a couple of reasons.

We are willing to expedite this case. We have expedited this case all along. I appreciate that counsel on the other side has worked with us. We would not need a particularly long period of time to proceed to a final judgment. 30, 60, 90 days I think would be sufficient to develop the record that we would need for full briefing. There would be no harm to that modest extension of time to submit these documents. The documents are being preserved. They aren't going anywhere. There is adequate time remaining in the remaining Congress. This could be resolved by the district court no later than the fall. These are important issues. They deserve a full and fair hearing.

THE COURT: So you object to the consolidation of the $\ensuremath{\mathsf{--}}$

MR. STRAWBRIDGE: We do object to consolidation. We do have some additional record that we would like to develop in this case. We think we should have the opportunity to do so. The courts are very clear that consolidation requires some type of fair notice to parties and the opportunity to prepare for trial.

THE COURT: I believe Judge Mehta gave you an opportunity to supplement the record in the case before him in connection with his decision to consolidate. Did you in fact add to the record there?

MR. STRAWBRIDGE: Yes, we did. We submitted a couple of documents. We were given three days to add to the record in that case. We took some steps and we did supplement the documents in that case with some of the committee correspondence and other related matters.

In this case, of course, it is two different committees. We would like the opportunity to explore what discovery we would like voluntarily to be able to obtain from those committees. Obviously we have not heard from the House in terms of responsive pleadings, so we would very much like to know what facts are or may not be disputed for purposes of final judgment.

There is also some interesting information that could be developed perhaps about the RFPA claim, both factually and legally, that would benefit from further briefing and further

argumentation.

So for all of those reasons, I suggest that we should proceed to an actual hearing on the merits.

THE COURT: What would discovery look like in this case? Are there any facts that need to be developed?

MR. STRAWBRIDGE: Yeah, as I just said, we do think — well, here is an example of some facts we would like to develop. There has been additional time since we filed our papers in which there may be further legislative statements or public legislative statements from members or from the committees that we would like the opportunity to explore and to put into the record.

We think that there is some interesting both factual and legal development that could be done on the RFPA claim. The RFPA applied to trusts, trusts would be considered persons within the reach of the House of Representatives. We would obviously benefit from some additional time to develop facts about who are the targets of the subpoenas and entities that are targets of the subpoenas as well as what the original legislative expectation and understanding of the RFPA's scope was.

We would also like the opportunity, as I said, to look to --

THE COURT: Why isn't that a purely legal question? Why can't we just look at the legislative history.

MR. STRAWBRIDGE: Because in some case there might be a question about who are the representatives. Not to get too technical, but if you look at the Capital One subpoena, for example, after listing the entities that the committee is seeking discovery from, they include language that they also want basically the accounts and the documents of any principal, including directors, shareholders, officers, other representatives of the foregoing. There at least is some factual record that could be developed as to who that would encompass and how broad the subpoenas actually are as well as the RFPA's ability.

If I can just make one more note before I sit down?
THE COURT: Yes.

MR. STRAWBRIDGE: Although I am obviously happy to address any other questions your Honor has.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. STRAWBRIDGE: In the 1950s, as you are aware, a lot of the cases that are at issue here revolved around the activities of the House Un-American Activities Committee, an investigation into the extent to which people were involved with disfavored political organizations at the time. And notwithstanding the fact that those obviously raised difficult and important questions and there was a strong desire to defer to congressional prerogatives, the Supreme Court reiterated that Congress lacks the ability to just generally inquire into

the private affairs of citizens and it emphasized that a measure of added care on the part of the House or Senate in authorizing the use of compulsory process by their committees would suffice and be a small price to pay to uphold the principles of limited constitutional government. That statement of principle is no less true today than it was 60 years ago, and I encourage the court to heed it and to grant us the preliminary injunction.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Letter.

Folks want to put the signs down, please?

MR. LETTER: Thank you, your Honor.

My friend, Mr. Strawbridge, has made an eloquent presentation. Several problems with it, unfortunately, for the position he is advocating is contrary to numerous decades of numerous Supreme Court opinions. Mr. Strawbridge is asking you basically to overrule a whole batch of Supreme Court opinions, which I will be happy to discuss because of the breadth of his argument today.

Before I get more into it, though, I want to just raise two things. One is probably the best brief of the House of Representatives today is the opinion issued the other day by Judge Mehta in district court in DC. Judge Mehta recognized that these arguments being made today are identical to what was made before him except for the right to financial privacy,

which I will get to, and he rejected all of them. In fact, he rejected them so soundly that he then also denied a stay pending appeal because he said there is absolutely no merit to any of these arguments because they are directly contrary to Supreme Court precedent.

Which leads me to my second point: McGrain. McGrain v. Daugherty, Teapot Dome, I think, as Judge Mehta recognized, if you read that opinion, you could probably just switch in the name "Trump" and it would be almost identical of the claims that were made, the kinds of arguments that Mr. Strawbridge is making today. They were all rejected unanimously by the Supreme Court. Not a single justice bought those arguments.

THE COURT: Mr. Letter, let me ask you this. I appreciate the broad authority that's given to Congress to investigate in connection with its legislative charter, but is it appropriate for Congress, even acting within its appropriate realm, to identify a particular individual, much less the president of the United States, and label him and his organization and his family as a case study in an effort to carry out its job?

MR. LETTER: Several responses, your Honor.

First of all, McGrain, McGrain focused specifically on I think it was Harry Dougherty, the disgraced Attorney General, part of the Teapot Dome. The opinion talks about how the court below had quashed that subpoena because it said you are

focusing on an individual. You are engaging in law enforcement activities. As I say, it is almost identical words to

Mr. Strawbridge. And the Supreme Court again unanimously said,
no, that doesn't work.

As far as focusing on an individual and a case study, a couple of points, your Honor. The Financial Services

Committee here issued a whole batch of subpoenas. We are only talking about two here. There were quite a few others and quite a few people, quite a few entities having nothing to do with Mr. Trump or his family. Even the subpoena, one of the subpoenas here, the one to Deutsche Bank, lists a whole batch of other individuals and other organizations. I think we have redacted them from the public record. They have nothing to do with Mr. Trump.

So Mr. Trump is here arguing: This is focusing on me. It is not. It is focusing on him among any number of other people. And I will address why that is so, why that is important, because this is not — and I cannot emphasize this enough, this is being totally misportrayed — this is not an investigation just about Mr. Trump and his family.

THE COURT: But it is easy to argue with the breadth of the subpoenas that have been issued, right? I mean you are going back ten years. And then with respect to certain categories of documents, you are going back even further than that. You are reaching out as far as Mr. Trump's

grandchildren. If this were an ordinary civil case, I would send you guys into a room and tell you don't come out until you come back with a reasonable subpoena.

MR. LETTER: Right. Absolutely, your Honor. Why does this go back so far? Because remember, and I refer you to page -- I think it is about 3 through 6 of our brief here, where we talk about the numerous things that we are investigating, and we are talking about money laundering, we are talking about using lots of foreign entities and particularly Russian money flowing from oligarchs into the United States over a sustained period of time.

So clearly we have to go back in time. Mr. Trump has had a relationship with Deutsche Bank for many, many years and, as you know, one of the reasons, you could say, we are looking at Deutsche Bank, we are focusing on Deutsche Bank paid immensely heavy fines because of its involvement in these kinds of activities.

And that raises, by the way, another point. Remember that a significant part of these subpoenas are directed at Deutsche Bank. We are asking Deutsche Bank for how did you analyze this? What was your policy on that? What kinds of memos? Why were you lending money to Mr. Trump when numerous other banks wouldn't touch him? And why was the money being used in particular ways, especially given the fine that Deutsche Bank paid for some of the activities in which it was

involved?

So you have to go back quite a few years. Any kind of serious investigation involving financial, you know, complicated and very large amounts of money, financial affairs are going to go back years and years, and so that is exactly why we are asking for it.

THE COURT: The concern is primarily, as I understand you, foreign entanglement. Why are you asking for all of the domestic documents?

MR. LETTER: Your Honor, that is only one part of it.

And in addition, remember that if there is money flowing in

from Russian oligarchs and money being laundered and being a

source for Russian oligarchs to move money out of Russia to

here, you have to look at where is it going here? What kind of

projects? So there was a project in Chicago that ran into

major financial trouble, okay? Why did -- did Deutsche Bank

come in and rescue, and why?

So it is all tied together, especially if what you are investigating is, is Russian money, Russian and other money, coming into the United States as a good way of laundering it, and then how is it being used in the United States? What kind of impact does it have in the United States?

THE COURT: Why isn't this a criminal investigation of the Trump organization?

MR. LETTER: I'm glad you asked that, your Honor.

Very clear answer that I gave -- same thing I gave to

Judge Mehta. The United States House of Representatives cannot
prosecute anybody. We cannot send anybody to jail. We
absolutely have no authority to investigate a criminal matter
and send somebody to jail.

THE COURT: But you can get a truckload of documents and then hand them over to a prosecutor who would ordinarily have to comply with the RFPA.

MR. LETTER: Well, we would expect that, your Honor. If the House of Representatives does a major investigation and discovers criminal activity, of course we would turn that over to law enforcement people. But again, if this is the --

THE COURT: Could you do that in conjunction with a prosecutor?

MR. LETTER: I don't know the answer to that. That would probably raise all sorts of very serious issues. It is not at all what's happening here. You have would have a big concern there, your Honor, of the bill of attainder since the Congress cannot focus its legislative activity on accusing somebody in particular of a crime.

But, again, that's not what's happening here. There has been no allegation whatsoever that the House of Representatives is in collusion with the Trump-led Justice Department. That's not what's happening here.

And in addition, again, your Honor, remember I keep

coming back to McGrain, McGrain was an investigation into criminal activity by, among others, Attorney General Dougherty. Watergate, Watergate was obviously investigating criminal activity. Whitewater, there were allegations of criminal activity. It is clear that the House can investigate matters that may indeed be criminal, but it is not a law enforcement investigation.

THE COURT: So what is the outer line? If these proposals that you are making or if the justification that you are providing for why this is a facially legitimate legislative purpose, clearly the plaintiffs would make at least a reasonable argument that these are also arguably criminal matters that are being investigated. Where do I draw the line? How far can I go in giving Congress the leeway that obviously I am required to give?

MR. LETTER: Your Honor, with all due respect, you answered your own question earlier. The Supreme Court has made clear, again, with all due respect, you do not have the power to do that. That is not your task.

The Supreme Court -- and, again, I'm not making this up -- the Supreme Court said this, in the Watkins case, "Power to investigate is broad." Eastland, "It is as penetrating and far-reaching as the potential power to enact and appropriate under the Constitution." Barenblatt, "Congress might legislate or we can look into things which Congress might legislate or

decide, upon due investigation, not to legislate." McGrain 1 2 says, "Legislation could be had." 3 THE COURT: So then what am I doing here? 4 MR. LETTER: I'm sorry? 5 THE COURT: So then what am I doing here? MR. LETTER: Your Honor, we did not bring this case. 6 7 Again, I come back to Judge Mehta. Judge Mehta said this is so 8 clearly wrong and, as Judge Mehta pointed out, no judge has 9 done what Mr. Strawbridge is asking you to do in an extremely 10 long time. 11 THE COURT: But he has pointed to cases where judges 12 have at the very least directed the parties to narrow the scope 13 of subpoenas. 14 MR. LETTER: I'm not aware that in any of these cases that happened, your Honor. And these are totally -- we are 15 16 doing a very major, complex investigation across a whole 17 industry, not just Mr. Trump, a whole industry. We are looking 18 into major questions about serious, serious possible amendments 19 to --20 THE COURT: You mentioned that there were other 21 parties besides Mr. Trump and his organization? 22 MR. LETTER: Yes. 23 THE COURT: What can you tell me about that, if 24 anything? 25 MR. LETTER: Your Honor, we have redacted from -- not

publicly disclosed, it is a list of I think about nine or ten others; and then, as I say, we have completely separate subpoenas that were issued simultaneously to this one, I don't know, about ten, I think, by memory. They all come through me, and I think it was about ten or so, and they have nothing to do with Mr. Trump.

So we are doing a very big, very serious investigation on behalf of the American people to see whether we need new legislation, do we need to tighten things or, remember I said, or not to legislate. And, again, I wasn't making those words up. This is the Supreme Court of the United States, Eastland, "When determining the legitimacy of a congressional act, courts do not look to the motives alleged to have prompted it."

McSurely, a D.C. Circuit case, "There is no requirement that every piece of information gathered in such an investigation be justified before the judiciary."

There is a key separation of powers issue here, and Mr. Strawbridge knows this very well. There is a reason Judge Mehta ruled as he did.

THE COURT: So can I go only as far as making a determination that there is a facially legitimate legislative purpose here and that's it?

MR. LETTER: Yes, your Honor. The Supreme Court has given that instruction. And, again, that makes perfect sense under our separated powers principle in our Constitution.

Again, there is a reason why the Supreme Court said that. It is not me as the current general counsel of the House. This has been going on for a very long time.

As you know, Judge Mehta quoted at the beginning, the very beginning of his opinion, President Buchanan was furious that Congress was focusing on him and accusing him of all sorts of bad and horrible things, and that is part of the role of Congress. That's why we have a Congress. We are a check on the president. And that's why, again, this case, a major theme of ours is this case is here only because of a massive and fundamental misunderstanding by Mr. Trump about the legislative branch. He clearly views us as some sort of nuisance, and we can't focus on him, we can't investigate him. This is all absolutely wrong and it shows a very serious misunderstanding of the way the law has developed since the very beginning of our country.

I just want to look before I switch to Right to Financial Privacy. If your Honor would give me one more moment.

The one other thing I want to mention is Judge Mehta did talk about the informative power of Congress supported by the *Rumely* decision from the Supreme Court, and so I urge your Honor to look at that because Judge Mehta obviously felt that that was a key point. In fact, during the hearing there he asked me about that on a couple of occasions, and you can see

that in his opinion.

I know one of the things I wanted to mention.

Mr. Strawbridge talks about family, in-laws, grandchildren,
etc. Come on, your Honor. We know lots of people do things.

They hide assets. They create dummy corporations. They put
their relatives in charge. They put things in the names of
their grandchildren. This is what people who are committing
financial fraud do.

I once handled a case, your Honor, when I was at the Justice Department for many years, I handled a case involving a drug lord. He had put entire companies, a major drug chain in South America, in the names of two of his teenaged daughters.

This is not some unusual and strange investigation that we are doing here. And indeed, indeed, your Honor, before Mr. Strawbridge can really talk about, oh, my gosh, in-laws, can you imagine investigating in-laws, Jared Kushner is the son-in-law of president Trump. And his businesses and him as an individual are also part of the subpoena.

THE COURT: But he is also part of the administration in some advisory capacity. But there are other in-laws that Mr. Trump has that are not nearly, presumably, as involved in his administration.

MR. LETTER: Because Mr. Kushner has, like Mr. Trump, a family business. Remember, we are not talking about Ford Motor Company. We are talking about a family business. And,

indeed, one of the reasons why this is the way it is is because, as everybody knows, Mr. Trump has refused to do what so many others in his position do, which is disclose. If he voluntarily disclosed, we probably wouldn't have to do nearly as much in the way of subpoenaing.

THE COURT: But he is not required to disclose.

MR. LETTER: He is absolutely not, your Honor. He is not. Except by statute he is required, for instance, to make financial disclosure under the Ethics in Government Act.

THE COURT: So long as we are talking about the documents, Mr. Letter, let me ask you this, because it also touches upon the irreparable harm issue. Let's say you get these documents from Deutsche Bank and Capital One. What are you going to do with them?

MR. LETTER: Your Honor, they will be analyzed in depth by the staffs of the two committees. They will be poured over and looked through, as well as, remember I said, we are gathering material from any number of other banks about other individuals and entities —

THE COURT: At that point are they public?

MR. LETTER: There are two different rules here.

One is the Intelligence Committee, and the Intelligence Committee, their normal mode of operation is, no, they would not be public. The documents like this would be received in what's called executive session. The committee

could vote to make them public if it wished.

The Financial Services Committee, the chairman can decide to make them public or not, as she decides, as she determines. We don't just willy-nilly disclose things, no. We would look at things, we would be willing to talk to individuals involved to see whether there is certain material that should or shouldn't be redacted, etc.

But ultimately it is up to the Congress of the United States to decide what the people of the United States should hear. And, again, Judge Mehta went through this at some length.

THE COURT: I think I may have read this somewhere in the public record, but was there some discussion on the part of the parties concerning maintaining the confidentiality of the documents even if they are produced by the banks, whether the Congress would commit to maintaining their confidentiality?

MR. LETTER: I don't -- if you will hold on one moment, your Honor.

(Counsel confer)

MR. LETTER: No, your Honor, we have not had any discussions like that.

THE COURT: Is that something that you are willing to consider?

MR. LETTER: We, of course, will listen to them. And, again, I gave the same answer to Judge Mehta where there it was

the Oversight Committee. We will listen to them. We are willing to talk with them. We are willing to hear a presentation from them.

But ultimately -- and, again, this is a matter -- it is a separation of powers issue. This is for the Congress of the United States. If the Congress determines that it should serve, as well as a legislative function, an informative function, that's why they were elected. That's why they are there. This is not like a court case.

THE COURT: Now, the Right to Financial Privacy Act obviously involves a strong sentiment in this country that individuals, private individuals, financial lives ought be kept private to the extent possible except if you are a judge or government lawyer.

MR. LETTER: Exactly. You and I, we don't have privacy, your Honor.

THE COURT: We do not, but we agree to that.

MR. LETTER: Yes.

THE COURT: So therefore, if Mr. Trump and the organization and the other individual plaintiffs have that right and these documents are turned over to Congress, who is not on record as being willing to commit to their confidentiality, why isn't that irreparable harm? Why doesn't that irreparably damage the Trumps and the Trump organization?

MR. LETTER: Your Honor, it could be -- if your Honor

decides that we are right on the law, based on a massive amount of Supreme Court precedent, then you would need to decide should you nevertheless issue a preliminary injunction or should you, like Judge Mehta, consider should you issue a stay pending appeal because of the harm to them, and that's a factor you could take into account. We say Judge Mehta got that right. If you don't have really any good argument on the merits, then you shouldn't be granting an junction. And, as we know, the Supreme Court said that in Winter.

And you can do it either under, as Judge Mehta did, converting it under Rule 65, but you don't even have to do that. The Supreme Court — we cited you several cases, the one that comes to most readily to mind, because I worked on it, was Munaf. The Supreme Court said — it was up before the court on a preliminary injunction. The Supreme Court said there is no case on the merits here. There clearly would have been irreparable injury if Mr. Munaf said, Do not release me to Iraqi officials. Bad things will happen to me. Nobody denied that maybe there would be irreparable injury, but the Supreme Court said you don't have a case on the merits. Again, there is no case here on the merits.

THE COURT: So do I understand you to be conceding that aspect of the analysis?

MR. LETTER: No, your Honor. Obviously I concede that if the documents are out, it is then irreparable. But if we

are talking about how that ties in with things like the public interest, I will just go to that and then come back to the right to financial privacy, with your Honor's permission.

THE COURT: Very well.

MR. LETTER: There is massive public interest in disclosure here. Mr. Strawbridge said, well, you know, I probably could do this in 60 days, 80, 90 days. Remember that Congress has a limited time.

THE COURT: How long does this Congress have?

MR. LETTER: The Congress lasts two years, so. . .

THE COURT: So 90 days is comfortably within that period of time.

MR. LETTER: I assume. I may be wrong about this, and Mr. Strawbridge is free to get up and tell me I am wrong. I suspect that if you rule in the House's favor here, he will be appealing, just as Judge Mehta's ruling was appealed I think it was the next morning. So we are talking about then there will be an appeal. I'm guessing also that once it is upheld by the Court of Appeals, he will file a cert. petition. As you know, Mr. Trump said, Thank goodness I have got the Supreme Court. I will go to them any time I can.

So the judicial proceedings here, for instance, the Miers case, the Holder case, these things dragged on for a very long time, and we desperately do not want that to happen here. That's not how this should happen. And in fact your Honor the

Supreme Court in *Eastland* chided the lower courts and said, you know, this is what happens when you interfere with House investigations. I'm sorry. I think it was a Senate investigation there. What happens is these things then drag on for a long time, and that's not supposed to be the way that this works.

Right to financial privacy. First, I was very interested to hear, well, Mr. Strawbridge noted that Hubbard had reversed Barenblatt, but he said but the statute here was passed while Barenblatt was still the law. There is a serious problem with that, your Honor. Hubbard involved 1001, as I recall. I think that statute has been around for a very, very long time. The Supreme Court said, You know what? We were wrong before. This phrase "department or agency of the United States" does not apply to Congress, and they applied that rule in that case, even though when 1001 was passed, it was way before that time. So that argument doesn't get any -- well, again, it asks you to ignore Supreme Court precedent.

So a couple of things:

One, Hubbard says, directly on point, these words don't cover Congress.

Two, this is a key point, when the Right to Financial Privacy Act was being considered, the Justice Department suggested an express provision that it would cover Congress.

Big surprise, congress took that out and it was not part of the

legislation. So it is not there, even though it was expressly suggested.

Another thing is, just three years before that statute was passed, the Supreme Court had, in <code>Eastland</code>, upheld the ability of the House to get these very kind of financial records. So what we are being asked to believe here is, <code>sub silentio</code>, with no indication that it meant to do this, Congress meant three years later, after <code>Eastland</code>, to give up this very power the Supreme Court had just said, well, of course you have, with never saying so, Congress meant to do that. The likelihood of that is basically nil. Somebody would have said something to say, you know what, we are going to change the law that the Supreme Court just retold us again for the umpteenth time is our power.

Another interesting thing is there can be punitive damages under that statute. So we are being asked to believe that Congress wanted to provide punitive damages against itself, again, with no indication whatsoever that that is what it was doing.

In addition, as Mr. Trump argues in his brief, he says look at Section 3403 of the statute, which says records can be turned over only for a legitimate law enforcement inquiry.

Well, as your Honor and I were just talking, the House doesn't do law enforcement inquiries. That's not what we do. So that means, again, Congress would have been passing this statute

basically cutting off its own ability to do this kind of investigation without a single word to that effect.

In addition, there are other statutes, the Dual Compensation Act, for example, 5 U.S.C. 553(1), where Congress does expressly make the statute apply to itself.

So this, too, this is not a good argument. We don't have a whole lot of case law in it to point to, but it is not a reason to grant a preliminary injunction. Preliminary injunction could be to freeze the status quo, to say, whoa, we have to do some -- I have got a lot of factual work to do.

This is not a factual inquiry. This is does the statute apply or not?

With regard to the facts, I am very puzzled.

Mr. Strawbridge said he is going to engage in discovery, and you pushed back at one point saying, Why is this not just a legal issue? Mr. Strawbridge cannot engage in any discovery against the House of Representatives. The Eastland decision makes that absolutely clear, speech or debate clause immunity. There is no discovery here. He can't take the deposition of Chairman Schiff or Chairwoman Waters. There is no discovery here.

He can do his own investigation of -- I think he was talking about trying to see what the history of the Right to Financial Privacy statute is, etc. He can look through more congressional documents, etc., but he can't do any discovery.

 ${\tt J5m2tru1}$

So that's why we are here. This is a pure legal question. I don't understand why there would be any more briefing. We have had plenty of briefing and we are having a lengthy hearing. Mr. Strawbridge can make any points he wants. There is no need for anything further here.

(Continued on next page)

THE COURT: Why don't you speak, if you would, to the balance of the equities.

MR. LETTER: The balance of the equities, as I said, I realize, yes, they've got the irreparable injury. If the documents are out, they're out. Although, remember, we had pointed out in the Exxon case, just because documents are turned over to Congress, that itself is not irreparable injury. The question is if Congress was going to disclose them. So just turning it over to Congress is not irreparable injury.

The balance of the equities primarily are that we're very limited in time, and so we need to move forward on what is an extremely important investigation that the American people, at some point, need to know about. Maybe we'll have some major legislation so that, you know, Russian oligarchs are not using the United States' banking system as a way to launder money and all of the impacts that that has.

Another thing, and this one is directed to say, and, Mr. Trump, we really do want to know — and this is a key part of what the Intelligence Committee is set up to do — we want to find out is our government, at its highest levels, being subject to influence of foreign governments that the American people don't know about. Either because of financial ties, is the President or people close to him, like Mr. Kushner and others, are they beholden to foreign financial interests because of their major personal financial dealings that they

will not disclose and have, thus far, resisted disclosing to the American people?

So if that is true, if they are subject to this kind of influence and control by foreign entities and foreign leaders, the public interest is that we know that immediately, as fast as possible. We're way overdue in knowing that. So that's the balance of the equities, your Honor, and again I'm back to McGrain, Judge Mehta, Munaf. There is simply no argument here. The Supreme Court has made that absolutely clear.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. LETTER: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Before we get back to Mr. Strawbridge, did the banks want to say anything about that? You came all the way down here.

Okay. Mr. Strawbridge.

MR. STRAWBRIDGE: My friend, Mr. Letter, said that he was not aware of any example of a schema being narrowed. We cite in our papers a number of examples where just that happened either by ordinance, order or basically instructing the parties to go negotiate. It happened in Bergman in 1975. It happened in Tobin in 1962. The DC circuited remanded the case and ordered the parties to negotiate over a congressional subpoena in AT&T in 1976. And last year, in the Fusion GPS case, both Judge Chutkan and Judge Leon required the parties to

sit down and at least try to narrow, if not resolve, their differences.

THE COURT: But I suppose if I did that here, it would be cold comfort to you.

MR. STRAWBRIDGE: I'm sorry?

THE COURT: If I did that here, it would be cold comfort to you.

MR. STRAWBRIDGE: Well, we remain open and reasonable and willing to discuss. So as long as we're not being required, or at least the banks are not being required to turn over documents, we are always happy to engage in reasonable discussions.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. STRAWBRIDGE: So Mr. Letter talked a lot about McGrain. I just want to direct the Court to McGrain on two particular facts. Interesting fact about McGrain is there was initially a document request, as well as congressional testimony. The document request, in fact, sought private banking records, including transactions over \$25,000 at the time, which was in excess of \$300,000 in modern time.

The House withdrew the document subpoena. It was not before the court in McGrain, and when the court issued its decision in McGrain, it said something very important. It noted the difference, in talking about how much it could credit the asserted legislative purpose of the House, it specifically

said that it was not as if an inadmissible or unlawful object was affirmatively or definitely avowed by the committee. It made a difference that the committee did not say it was going to engage in an impermissible purpose, such as law enforcement investigation.

Now, what we just heard from Mr. Letter up here was a lot about Russian oligarchs, and financial fraud, and failure to disclose, and the need to expose to the American people certain information about the Trump organization and Mr. Trump. That is not the House's legitimate legislative role. It is exposure expressly for the sake of exposure, and it's completely confirmatory of what — we actually don't need to take Mr. Letter's word for it.

The Congressional record page that they cited, this is from Chairman Waters' Financial Services Committee, stood up and gave a statement about the investigations that she was doing. This is on page H2698 of the Congressional record, and she specifically says: The movement of illicit funds through the global financial system raises numerous questions regarding the actors who are involved in these money laundering schemes and where the money is going. This is precisely why the Financial Services Committee is investigating the questionable financing provided to President Trump and the Trump organization that lead banks, like Deutsche Bank, to finance this real estate properties.

You can read this entire page of the Congressional record. You won't find reference to any other individuals.

You won't find reference to any other organizations. They are targeting one particular private party, one particular party's financial transactions, and if they are believed, then someone should suggest otherwise.

Judge Mehta's decision, respectfully, we disagree with aspects of it, but it has very little bearing on the questions here because it involved a different committee, which has different jurisdiction and different assertive legislative purposes. Ethics and disclosure, for example, is outside the jurisdiction of either of the committees here.

THE COURT: I'm sorry, which? What's outside the jurisdiction?

MR. STRAWBRIDGE: Ethics and disclosure principles, which is what some of Mr. Letter referred to and which was the basis for some of Judge Mehta's decision.

Obviously, the RFPA claim was not before Judge Mehta, but the real concern with the larger view that Judge Mehta took, and I think your Honor appropriately hit upon it, was the lack of any limiting principle. If anyone can be a case study, if anyone's private affairs can simply be inquired into under the view that, well, we need to know something about the banking law; we have a remedial statute that we might want to undertake, then the ability to come to court and to enforce the

separations of powers and to prevent Congress from exercising the general ability to investigate anybody they want, their private affairs — this is not McGrain involving the Attorney General; these are private individuals, that the dates of these subpoenas almost exclusively apply to a time before anybody was a candidate, let alone elected to office — then we have really lost the entire purpose of all these Supreme Court cases and their repeated assertion that there are limitations upon Congress' power.

Those limitations have been overstepped here. We remain willing to follow whatever the Court does, but I think we have easily satisfied the substantial question test for preliminary injunction, and we ask the Court to enter one.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Strawbridge.

What we're going to do is we're going to take -- I'm sorry, Mr. Letter.

MR. LETTER: May I just address one point, your Honor?
THE COURT: Sure.

MR. LETTER: Thank you. Mr. Strawbridge talked about narrowing the subpoenas, but I may have misunderstood. I thought his argument was that because these are so broad, that shows that they are invalid. I don't think I've ever heard that his client would be willing to say, okay, you can have all of the records, but instead of six years, let's limit it to four. I'm fairly sure that's not what he's talking about.

Again, I think his argument is because it's so broad, that shows it's illegitimate.

THE COURT: He said, I think no less than twice, that he was willing to sit down and have a reasonable discussion about limiting the subpoenas.

MR. LETTER: Fine. If you are going to order that, your Honor, I hope you'll order that that be done extremely fast because I'm fairly sure it will be evident immediately that it is not a serious endeavor. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you. So we're going to take ten minutes, and then I'll come out and give you my decision.

(Recess)

THE COURT: Everyone, please be seated. Now, I'm going to read this. It's approximately 25 pages, and if history is any guide, it's going to take me about 40, 45 minutes to read or so. I won't chain you to your chairs, but if any of you wish to leave before I finish reading, I would just ask that you do so as unobtrusively as possible.

On April 15, 2019, two subcommittees of the United States House of Representatives issued subpoenas to Deutsche Bank and Capital One Financial Corporation. The subpoenas seek financial and account information concerning President Donald J. Trump, his children, members of their immediate family, and several entities associated with his family.

Two weeks later, plaintiffs filed the above-captioned

suit, claiming that the subpoenas violate the United States

Constitution and the Right to Financial Privacy Act, the

"RFPA". Plaintiffs also moved for a preliminary injunction

that would prohibit the Committees from enforcing the subpoenas
and prohibit the banks from complying with the subpoenas until

the resolution of this lawsuit. This bench ruling addresses

that motion.

The question presented in plaintiffs' motion is straightforward: Does the Committees' subpoenas violate the Constitution or the RFPA? After reviewing the parties' briefs and hearing from them today, the Court is convinced that the answer is no. Accordingly, I will not enjoin enforcement of the subpoenas.

The Court begins by addressing two preliminary matters: the applicable standard for a preliminary injunction, and the Committees' request for consolidation.

The Court begins with the applicable standard of review. "A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest."

Winter v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555

U.S. 7.

In this circuit, if a plaintiff does not establish a

likelihood of success on the merits, a preliminary injunction, nonetheless, may issue if the plaintiff shows that there exists sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly toward the plaintiff. Citing Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund Ltd., 598 F.3d 30. It is not enough that the question be substantial, however.

Regardless of whether the plaintiff opts to show likelihood of success on the merits or sufficiently serious question going to the merits, the plaintiff always must demonstrate that irreparable harm is likely, absent the injunction. At all times, the Court remains mindful that preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, and it is never awarded as of right. *Munaf v. Geren*, 553 U.S. 674.

Next, the Court denies committees' request for consolidation. In their opposing papers, the committees asked the Court to consolidate this hearing with a trial on the merits, pursuant to Rule 65(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs opposed consolidation on the ground that consolidation would violate their rights to due process. Ultimately, the Court concludes that any decision to consolidate is of little consequence here. The Committees are not prejudiced by the denial of a consolidation, given that the

Court will not enjoin them from enforcing their subpoenas.

Conversely, if the Court chooses to consolidate the preliminary injunction hearing with a trial on the merits, there is a slight risk that plaintiffs will be prejudiced, notwithstanding that Plaintiffs have yet to adequately explain what further discovery, briefing, witnesses, and time is needed before they will be ready for a trial on the merits.

In any event, to ensure that plaintiffs are not prejudiced, the Court will deny the committees' application for consolidation. Should this matter ultimately proceed to the merits, however, the Court appreciates the urgency with which matters concerning two coordinate branches of government should proceed, and the limited universe of facts that may be subject to discovery.

Turning to the merits of plaintiffs' motion. The Court finds that while plaintiffs have shown that they will suffer irreparable harm, absent a preliminary injunction, they are unlikely to succeed on the merits of their claims, that the questions presented in their motion are not sufficiently serious in light of Supreme Court precedent and the plain text of the Right to Financial Privacy Act, the balance of hardships and equities, in conjunction with consideration of the public interest, do not weigh in their favor. Consequently, the Court concludes that a preliminary injunction is inappropriate.

The Court begins with whether Plaintiffs have

demonstrated a likelihood of irreparable harm absent an injunction, because if there is not a likelihood of irreparable harm, then the Court need not grapple with the constitutional and statutory issues in this case.

Plaintiffs allege that if this Court does not intervene to preserve the status quo, there will be no way to unring the bell once the banks give Congress the requested information.

The Court agrees. In this circuit, it is well settled that individuals whose financial records are subpoenaed possess a privacy interest in their personal financial affairs that gives them standing to move to quash a subpoena served on a non-party financial institution, which is why all parties appear to agree that plaintiffs have standing to challenge subpoenas that were issued to them directly. Citing Arias-Zeballos v. Tan, reported at 2007 WL 210112.

In this case, the inevitable impingement of the same privacy interests that suffice to confer standing to plaintiffs also suffice to demonstrate a likelihood of irreparable harm. Courts in this circuit have recognized that the disclosure of private, confidential information is the quintessential type of irreparable harm that cannot be compensated or undone by money damages. Citing, Airbnb, Inc. v. City of New York, report at 2019 WL 91990.

It is true that some courts outside of this circuit

have questioned whether the mere disclosure of information, absent evidence of misuse or unauthorized disclosure by the receiving party automatically constitutes irreparable injury. See, e.g., Baker DC v. National Labor Relations Bd., 102 F. Supp. 3d 194, from the District of D.C. The Court is of the opinion, however, that plaintiffs possess strong privacy interests in their financial information such that unwanted disclosure may properly constitute irreparable injury, without an additional showing of likelihood of misuse or unauthorized disclosure by the recipient.

The committees disagree and proffer two arguments why the Court should find that plaintiffs have failed to show a likelihood of irreparable harm. Neither argument is persuasive, and in fact, in oral argument, I understood them to concede that the Trump organization and Trump family members would suffer irreparable harm.

First, the committees contended that plaintiffs have provided no actual evidence of their potential injury, but the very act of disclosure to Congress is itself the injury that is both inevitable, absent an injunction, and irreparable.

The Committees attempt to differentiate between disclosure to Congress and disclosure to the public, arguing that the former is somehow not a cognizable injury. The Court is unpersuaded. Here, plaintiffs have an interest in keeping their records private from everyone, including congresspersons,

and that interest necessarily will be impinged by the records' disclosure to the committees. In any event, the committees have not committed one way or the other to keeping plaintiffs' records confidential from the public once received.

Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiffs have shown a likelihood of irreparable harm absent an injunction.

The Court begins with the statutory claim, because there is no need to address plaintiffs' constitutional claim if the committees are bound by the RFPA and have, in fact, violated it.

Plaintiffs contend that the committees issued the challenged subpoenas in violation of the requirements of the RFPA. The RFPA provides that no government authority may have access to or obtain copies of information containing the financial records of any customer from a financial institution unless certain notification and certification requirements are met.

Plaintiffs argue that Congress is a government authority for purposes of the RFPA and that, as government authorities, the committees failed to act in accordance with the RFPA before issuing the challenged subpoenas.

The Court disagrees. The Committees have provided sound arguments why the RFPA does not apply to Congress.

First, as mentioned above, the RFPA applies to government authorities. While plaintiffs urge the Court to

resort to Black Law's Dictionary to define this statutory term, it is unnecessary. Congress expressly defined the term "government authority" in RFPA. Pursuant to that statute, "government authority" means any agency or department of the United States, or any officer or agent thereof.

Thus, if Congress is not an agency or department of the United States, then the statute does not apply to Congress. The Court finds the Supreme Court's reasoning in Hubbard v. United States, reported at 514 U.S. 695 controlling here. There, the Court explored the reach of 18 U.S.C. 1001, a statute criminalizing knowingly false representations made in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States.

The question presented was whether 1001 applies to false statements in judicial proceedings. The Court held that it didn't and instead generally only refers to the Executive Branch. The Court held that it didn't unless the context of the statute strongly suggests that the phrase was intended to describe more than just the Executive Branch. In so holding, the Court expressly overruled its prior decision in United States v. Bramblett, which held that the phrase "department," as used in 1001, referred to the executive, judicial, and legislative branches of government.

Of course, the RFPA arises in a different title of the United States Code, but the Supreme Court's interpretation in

Hubbard wasn't limited to any particular statutory provision.

Rather, the Court found that a straightforward interpretation of the phrase "department or agency" leads inexorably to the conclusion that the phrase only covers the Executive Branch.

Moreover, as detailed in the Committees' papers, the structure and context of the RFPA makes clear that Congress did not believe it was binding itself to the RFPA. More on this point need not be said. Congress is not bound by the RFPA.

Plaintiffs are also unlikely to succeed on the merits of their constitutional claim. Turning to plaintiffs' claim that the committees' subpoenas violate the Constitution, the Court concludes that plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on the merits.

As today's argument and the parties' moving papers make clear, plaintiffs challenge the committees' subpoenas on four principal grounds: the committees' subpoenas are not supported by a legitimate legislative purpose; the committees' subpoenas are really an unlawful exercise of law-enforcement power; the committees' subpoenas are overly broad; and finally, the committees' motives in issuing the subpoenas render the subpoenas unlawful, as they seek exposure for the sake of exposure.

The Court addresses and rejects, each argument in turn, and begins by setting forth the legal principles guiding its analysis.

A review of the relevant case law makes clear that the Committees' investigative power is broad, yet not unlimited.

Article 1 of the United States Constitution vests Congress with all legislative powers. While Article 1 does not expressly refer to Congress' investigative powers, Congress' authority to investigate matters related to contemplated legislation is beyond debate.

As the Supreme Court has explained, there can be no doubt as to the power of Congress, by itself or through its committees, to investigate matters and conditions relating to contemplated legislation. This power, deeply rooted in American and English institutions, is indeed co-extensive with the power to legislate. Without the power to investigate, including of course the authority to compel testimony, either through its own processes or through judicial trial, Congress could be seriously handicapped in its efforts to exercise its constitutional function wisely and effectively. Citing Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155.

So too is the committees' general authority to issue subpoenas well settled, given that committee members serve as the representatives of the parent assembly in collecting information for a legislative purpose and their function is to act as the eyes and ears of the Congress in obtaining facts upon which the full legislature can act. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178.

As alluded to in the quotes recited, congressional investigations must be in furtherance of a legislative purpose. As the Supreme Court has explained, an essential premise in this situation is that the House or Senate shall have instructed the committee members on what they are to do with the power delegated to them. It is the responsibility of the Congress, in the first instance, to ensure that compulsory process is used only in furtherance of a legislative purpose. That requires that the instructions of an investigating committee spell out that group's jurisdiction and purpose with sufficient particularity. Those instructions are embodied in the authorizing resolution. That document is the committee's charter. Citing Watkins again.

However, that Congress must investigate in furtherance of a legislative purpose does not mean that the Congress is constrained to investigations in furtherance of contemplated legislation in the form of a bill or statute. Congress performs may different functions attendant to its legislative function under the Constitution.

Congress' power also includes a more general informing function, that is, the power of the Congress to inquire into and publicize corruption, maladministration or inefficiency in agencies of the Government. Again citing Watkins.

Put simply, the power of the Congress to conduct investigations is inherent in the legislative process. That

power is broad. It encompasses inquiries concerning the administration of existing laws, as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It includes surveys of defects in our social, economic or political system for the purpose of enabling Congress to remedy them. It comprehends probes into departments of the Federal Government to expose corruption, inefficiency or waste. Citing Watkins.

While broad, Congress' investigative powers are not unlimited. Rather, its powers are subject to several limitations, five of which will be mentioned now.

First, the subject of any inquiry must be one on which legislation could be had. Citing <code>Eastland</code>, 421 U.S. at 504. This means that, in determining the constitutionality of requests for information, pursuant to a congressional investigation, a court must first determine whether an investigation is related to a valid legislative purpose, for Congress may not constitutionally require an individual to disclose his political relationships or other private affairs except in relation to such a purpose. Citing <code>Barenblatt v. United States</code>, 360 U.S. 109.

Second, the Bill of Rights is applicable to congressional investigations as to all forms of governmental action, and serves to limit Congress' investigative powers.

Third, while the public is entitled to be informed

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concerning the workings of its government, the Supreme Court has made clear that this entitlement cannot be inflated into a general power to expose, where the predominant result can only be an invasion of the private rights of individuals.

Fourth, since Congress may only investigate into those areas in which it may potentially legislate or appropriate, it cannot inquire into matters which are within the exclusive province of one of the other branches of the Government.

Lacking the judicial power given to the Judiciary, it cannot inquire into matters that are exclusively the concern of the Judiciary. Neither can it supplant the Executive in what exclusively belongs to the Executive. Citing Barenblatt.

Fifth, and finally, when analyzing the investigative boundaries of congressional subcommittees, such as the committees here, the committees' investigative boundaries are defined by its source. Citing <code>Eastland</code>. Thus, with respect to the committees, their powers are further restricted to the missions delegated to them, i.e., to acquire certain data to be used by the House or the Senate in coping with a problem that falls within its legislative sphere and, consequently, no witness can be compelled to make disclosures on matters outside that area.

Among other sources to consider in ascertaining a subcommittee's boundaries in a given investigation, courts may consider the congressional resolutions authorizing the

investigation, the committee's jurisdictional statements, and statements of the members of the committee. Shelton v. United States, 404 F.2d 1292.

The committees' subpoenas have a legitimate legislative purpose. Plaintiffs argue that the committees' subpoenas lack a legitimate legislative purpose. The Court disagrees.

The Committee of Financial Services and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence issued substantively identical subpoenas for records to Deutsche Bank on April 15. That same day, the Committee of Financial Services issued a similar subpoena to Capital One Financial Corporation. The committees, through their subpoenas, seek financial records and account information related to Plaintiffs that mostly date back to 2010. However, with respect to some records, such as, for example, documents related to account applications, opening documents, know your customer, due diligence, et cetera, revealing financial relationships between plaintiffs and any foreign individuals, entities, or governments, there is no time limitation.

In analyzing whether the committees acted within their constitutional boundaries, the Court first looks to each committee's respective jurisdiction. With respect to the Committee on Financial Services, according to Rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives for the

116th Congress, the Committee on Financial Services enjoys jurisdiction over matters relating to, among other subjects, banks and banking, including deposit insurance and federal monetary policy, insurance generally, international finance, and international financial and monetary organizations.

According to Rule X, as a standing committee, the

Committee on Financial Services is also charged with general

oversight responsibilities to assist the House of

Representatives in its analysis, appraisal, and evaluation of,

among other subjects, the application, administration,

execution, and effectiveness of federal laws; and, importantly,

conditions and circumstances that may indicate the necessity or

desirability of enacting new or additional legislation.

The Committee on Financial Services contends that it is investigating whether existing policies and programs at financial institutions are adequate to ensure the safety and soundness of lending practices, and the prevention of loan fraud.

It points the Court to news sources reporting that financial institutions have issued more than \$1 trillion in large corporate loans, called leveraged loans, to heavily indebted companies that may be unable to repay those loans. It contends that it's investigating the lending practices of financial institutions, including Deutsche Bank, for loans issued to the Trump family and companies controlled

by President Trump.

Citing news sources reporting that over the years,

Deutsche Bank has provided more than \$2 billion in loans to

President Trump, despite concerns raised by senior bank

officials regarding some of the loans. It contends that it's

investigating industry-wide compliance with banking statutes

and regulations, particularly anti-money laundering policies.

Importantly, it points to House Resolutions originating in the committee and predating the subpoenas, that support its representations to the Court. For example, House Resolution 206, introduced by Chairwoman Maxine Waters on March 8, 2019, and passed by a floor vote on March 13, 2019, the House expressed that money laundering and other financial crimes are serious threats to our national and economic security, and resolved to acknowledge that the lack of sunlight and transparency in financial transactions poses a threat to our country; to support efforts to close money laundering loopholes; to encourage transparency; to detect and deter financial crimes; and to urge financial institutions to comply with various anti-money laundering laws and regulations.

The Committee on Financial Services believes that the challenged subpoenas further its investigations bearing upon the integrity of the U.S. financial system and the national security, including bank fraud, money laundering, foreign influence in the U.S. political process, and the

counterintelligence risks posed by foreign powers' use of financial leverage.

It maintains that the banks' lending practices, including loans made to plaintiffs, are an important piece to that investigation, as the subpoenas seek records relating to individuals and entities, including plaintiffs, that may have served as conduits for illicit funds or may not have been properly underwritten, and the public record establishes that they serve as a useful case study for the broader problems being examined by the committee.

Based on the aforementioned, the Court concludes that this committee's investigation and attendant subpoenas are in furtherance of a legitimate legislative purpose, plainly related to the subjects on which legislation can be had.

With respect to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, according to Rule X, this committee enjoys jurisdiction over matters relating to, among other subjects, intelligence and intelligence-related activities of all other departments and agencies of the government, and the organization or reorganization of a department or agency of the government, to the extent that the organization or reorganization relates to a function or activity involving intelligence or intelligence-related activities.

The Permanent Select Committee is also charged with special oversight functions. Specifically, the Committee is

charged with, among other responsibilities, reviewing and studying on a continuing basis laws, programs, and activities of the intelligence community.

The Intelligence Committee contends that it is currently investigating efforts by Russia and other foreign powers to influence the U.S. political process during and since the 2016 election, including financial leverage that foreign actors may have over President Trump, his family, and his business, and the related counterintelligence, national security, and legislative implications.

Moreover, the Committee contends that it is evaluating whether the structure, legal authorities, policies, and resources of the U.S. Government's intelligence, counterintelligence, and law enforcement elements are adequate to combat such threats to national security. The Intelligence Committee justifies its subpoena on the ground that its investigation requires an understanding of Mr. Trump's complex financial arrangements, including how those arrangements intersect with Russia and other foreign governments and entities.

The Committee further argues that this inquiry is, by definition, not limited to Mr. Trump's time in office and, given the closely held nature of the Trump Organization, must include his close family members. Among other items, the Intelligence Committee points to a press release by its

Chairman, dated February 6, 2019, in which Chairman Schiff stated that the Intelligence Committee would conduct a rigorous investigation into efforts by Russia and other foreign entities to influence the U.S. political process during and since the 2016 U.S. election; and that the Committee would work to fulfill its responsibility to provide the American people with a comprehensive accounting of what happened, and what the United States must do to protect itself from future interference and malign influence operations.

In this press release, Chairman Schiff further stated that the committee also plans to develop legislation and policy reforms to ensure the U.S. government is better positioned to counter future efforts to undermine our political process and national security.

Based on the aforementioned, the Court concludes that this Committee's investigation and attendant subpoena is in furtherance of a legitimate legislative purpose, plainly related to subjects on which legislation can be had.

Plaintiffs contend that the committees' purported agendas are solely focused on oversight and transparency, which, in a vacuum, are not legitimate legislative purposes that can justify subpoenaing a private citizen. But Congress' investigative power is not judged in a vacuum. As explained in Barenblatt, the congressional power of inquiry, its range and scope, and an individual's duty in relation to it, must be

viewed in proper perspective. The power and the right of resistance to it are to be judged in the concrete, not on the basis of abstractions.

And here, the Committees seek financial information pertinent to specific areas of investigation on which legislation could be had. As the D.C. Circuit recognized in Shelton, in deciding whether the purpose is within the legislative function, the mere assertion of a need to consider remedial legislation may not alone justify an investigation accompanied with compulsory process, but when the purpose asserted is supported by references to specific problems which in the past have been or which in the future could be the subjects of appropriate legislation, then a court cannot say that a committee of the Congress exceeds its broad power when it seeks information in such areas.

Simply put, the committees' subpoenas all are in furtherance of facially legitimate legislative purposes.

Next, and relatedly, plaintiffs contend that the committees' subpoenas as "outrageously broad," given the information the committees seek long predates the President's election to office, reaches well beyond the transactions associated with foreign parties, and encompasses reams of account records for entities, individuals, children, and spouses, who have never even been implicated in any probe.

Plaintiffs contend that the financial conduct of

private citizens years before they were anywhere near public office, has nothing to do with government oversight.

The Court finds Plaintiffs' contention unpersuasive.

Based on the cases cited by the parties in their papers, they seem to agree that so long as the requested information in the subpoenas are pertinent to legitimate legislative purposes of the committees, the subpoenas are not overly broad, and the Court need not conduct a line-by-line review of the information requested.

The Supreme Court has previously concluded that where the records called for by a subpoena were not plainly incompetent or irrelevant to any lawful purpose of a subcommittee in the discharge of its duties, but, on the contrary, were reasonably relevant to the inquiry, then such records are, in fact, pertinent. Citing McPhaul v. United States, reported at 364 U.S. 372.

As noted by Judge Mehta in his opinion earlier this week, the standard adopted by the Supreme Court is a forgiving one. Here, as mentioned earlier, the committees' subpoenas seek plaintiffs' financial information mostly dating back to 2010. The committees contend that this information is necessary to investigate serious and urgent questions concerning the safety of banking practices, money laundering in the financial sector, foreign influence in the U.S. political process, and the threat of foreign financial leverage,

including over the President, his family, and his business.

In light of the scope of the committees' investigations, the Court finds the committees' requests for information, while undeniably broad, is clearly pertinent to the committees' legitimate legislative purposes. Consequently, the Court will not engage in a line-by-line review of the subpoenas' requests, merely because some requests may be more pertinent than others.

As the Supreme Court has made clear, the wisdom of congressional approach or methodology is not open to judicial veto, nor is the legitimacy of a congressional inquiry to be defined by what it produces. The very nature of the investigative function, like any research, is that it takes the searchers up some blind alleys and into nonproductive enterprises. To be a valid legislative inquiry, there need be no predictable end result. Citing Eastland.

Next, the plaintiffs challenge the subpoenas on the ground that the committees have never identified a single piece of legislation within their respective jurisdictions that they are considering. While that argument may be true as far as it goes, it is also irrelevant. Congress need not issue proposed legislation prior to the start of an investigation; it need not pass a bill; and it need not have particular legislation in mind when conducting a legitimate, lawful investigation in aid of its legislative function.

As the Supreme Court noted in Watkins, most of instances of use of compulsory process by the first Congress concerned matters affecting the qualification or integrity of their members or came about in inquiries dealing with suspected corruption or mismanagement of government officials. There was very little use of the power of compulsory process in early years to enable the Congress to obtain facts pertinent to the enactment of new statutes or the administration of existing laws.

As explained by the Second Circuit, it is immaterial that in the past a particular committee has proposed but little legislation. Information gained by a committee might well aid Congress in performing its legislative duties, in deciding that the public welfare required the passage of new statutes or changes in existing ones, or that it did not.

United States v. Josephson, 165 F.2d 82.

Again, as stated earlier, and quoting the Supreme

Court in *Eastland*, the subject of the congressional

inquiry simply must be one "on which legislation could be had."

Accordingly, plaintiffs' argument on this point fails.

Next, the Committees contend that, at best, the

Committees seek these documents so they can conduct

law-enforcement activities that the Supreme Court has held are
reserved to the other branches. The Court disagrees. The

Supreme Court has made clear that the power to investigate

should not be confused with any of the powers of law enforcement. Those powers are assigned under our Constitution to the Executive and the Judiciary. *Quinn v. United States*, 349 U.S. 155.

However, the Supreme Court has also made clear that a congressional investigation is not transformed into the invalid exercise of law enforcement authority merely because the investigation might possibly disclose crime or wrongdoing.

Citing McGrain.

Similarly, the Supreme Court has recognized that while it may be conceded that Congress is without authority to compel disclosures for the purpose of aiding the prosecution of pending suits, the authority of Congress, directly or through its committees, to require pertinent disclosures in aid of its own constitutional power is not abridged because the information sought to be elicited may also be of use in such suits. Citing Sinclair, 279 U.S. at 295.

The Supreme Court has clearly acknowledged that many powers of government overlap. Thus, in determining whether a congressional investigation has morphed into an impermissible law enforcement investigation, the critical inquiry is whether Congress has exercised an exclusive power of the Judiciary or Executive.

For example, in Barenblatt v. United States, the Supreme Court affirmed an individual's conviction for contempt

of Congress arising from his refusal to answer questions posited to him by a subcommittee of the House of Representatives. In so holding, the Supreme Court noted that whereas "Congress may only investigate into those areas in which it may potentially legislate or appropriate, it cannot inquire into matters which are within the exclusive province of one of the other branches of the Government."

Similarly, in *Kilbourn*, the Supreme Court limited congressional investigative power to situations where "[1] the investigation which the committee was directed to make was judicial in character; and [2] could only be properly and successfully made by a court of justice; and [3] related to a matter wherein relief or redress could be had only by a judicial proceeding."

Likewise, in *Tenney v. Brandhove*, the Supreme Court stated that in order "to find that a committee's investigation has exceeded the bounds of legislative power it must be obvious that there was a usurpation of functions exclusively vested in the Judiciary or the Executive."

Here, however, it is not obvious that the committees usurped any powers exclusively vested in the Judiciary or the Executive when it issued the challenged subpoenas. There is nothing here to suggest that the sole function of the challenged subpoenas is to amass evidence either to prosecute plaintiffs, civilly or criminally. On the contrary, the

committees have provided ample justification establishing clear, legitimate legislative purposes for the information requested in the subpoenas.

Accordingly, contrary to plaintiffs' protestations, the Court finds that the committees' investigations and attendant subpoenas do not constitute impermissible law enforcement activities.

Finally, plaintiffs contend that regardless of whether the challenged subpoenas further legitimate legislative purposes, this Court should, nonetheless, enjoin the banks from complying with them because the committees really want to collect and expose the financial documents of the President and his children and grandchildren for the sake of exposure.

In response, the committees contend that plaintiffs' contention is unsupported by anything other than political rhetoric and press statements, and note that even if plaintiffs had provided some basis to question the committees' motives, the Court should not look behind the legitimate legislative purpose of the investigations.

The Court agrees with the committees. The committees' alleged ulterior motives, even if such exist, are insufficient to vitiate their subpoena powers. In their papers, plaintiffs quote Watkins for the notion that there is no congressional power to expose for the sake of exposure. That much is true.

Had plaintiffs read further, however, they would

realize that the propriety of legislative motives is not a question left to the courts. As the Supreme Court explained in the same paragraph relied upon by plaintiffs: We have no doubt that there is no congressional power to expose for the sake of exposure. The public is, of course, entitled to be informed concerning the workings of its government. That cannot be inflated into a general power to expose, where the predominant result can only be an invasion of the private rights of individuals.

But a solution to our problem is not to be found in testing the motives of committee members for this purpose. Such is not our function. Their motives alone would not vitiate any investigation which had been instituted by a House of Congress if that assembly's legislative purpose is being served.

Put simply, even in the face of investigations in which the predominant result is exposure of an individual's privacy, courts generally lack authority to halt an investigation otherwise supported by a facially legitimate legislative purpose.

The Supreme Court has repeated this over and over again. See, e.g., *Eastland*, at 508 ("Our cases make clear that in determining the legitimacy of a congressional act, we do not look to the motives alleged to have prompted it."); *Sonzinsky* v. *United States*, 300 U.S. 506 ("Inquiry into the hidden

motives which may move Congress to exercise a power constitutionally conferred upon it is beyond the competency of courts."); Smith v. Kansas City Title & Tr. Co., 255 U.S. 180, ("Nothing is better settled by the decisions of this court than that, when Congress acts within the limits of its constitutional authority, it is not the province of the judicial branch of the government to question its motives."); and United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, ("It is a familiar principle of constitutional law that this Court will not strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive.").

Of course, it is true that abuses of the investigative process may imperceptibly lead to abridgment of protected freedoms. Citing Watkins. But this danger, too, has been addressed thoroughly by the Supreme Court in prior decisions. The Supreme Court has detailed the remedy for all left uncomfortable with the idea of a congressional committee probing through the financial history of an individual on grounds, pretextual, even if technically legal.

In Barenblatt, the Supreme Court said: "It is, of course, true that if there be no authority in the judiciary to restrain a lawful exercise of power by another department of the government, where a wrong motive or purpose has impelled to the exertion of the power, that abuses of a power conferred may be temporarily effectual. The remedy for this, however,

lies not in the abuse by the judicial authority of its functions, but in the people upon whom, after all, under our institutions, reliance must be placed for the correction of abuses committed in the exercise of a lawful power."

In other words, the correction of abuses committed in the exercise of a lawful power is a matter left to voters, not judges. Moreover, the propriety of making plaintiffs' finances a subject of the committees' investigation is a subject on which the scope of the Court's inquiry is narrow. Citing Eastland.

The wisdom of this approach is beyond reproach. As explained by the Supreme Court, inquiries into congressional motives or purposes are a hazardous matter. Citing O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 383. And in times of political passion, dishonest or vindictive motives are readily attributed to legislative conduct and as readily believed.

Thus, as the Court stated in *Barenblatt*, so long as Congress acts in pursuance of its constitutional power, the Judiciary lacks authority to intervene on the basis of the motives which spurred the exercise of that power. Accordingly, the Court finds that the committees' alleged ulterior motives, assuming they exist, do not vitiate the legitimate legislative purposes supporting the challenged subpoenas.

At bottom, the committees' power to issue and enforce the subpoenas at issue is well settled. What's more, it is

appropriate to observe that just as the Constitution forbids the Congress to enter fields reserved to the Executive and Judiciary, it imposes on the Judiciary the reciprocal duty of not lightly interfering with Congress's exercise of its legitimate powers. Citing Hutcheson, 369 U.S. at 622.

Having been satisfied that the committees have exercised their legitimate powers in issuing the challenged subpoenas, the Court concludes that plaintiffs are highly unlikely to succeed on the merits of their constitutional claim, a conclusion that weighs against preliminary injunctive relief.

The Court now turns to whether they have, nonetheless, shown sufficiently serious questions going to the merits of their claim, along with a balance of hardships tipped decidedly in their favor.

To begin, the Court notes that, based on the facts of this particular case, it is uncertain whether plaintiffs may show entitlement to injunctive relief merely by showing serious questions going to the merits.

The Second Circuit has explained that where the moving party seeks to stay government action taken in the public interest pursuant to a statutory or regulatory scheme, the district court should not apply the less rigorous "serious questions" standard and should not grant the injunction unless the moving party establishes, along with irreparable injury, a

likelihood that he will succeed on the merits of his claim.
Citing Citigroup, 598 F.3d at 35.

This exception reflects the idea that governmental policies implemented through legislation or regulations developed through presumptively reasoned democratic processes are entitled to a higher degree of deference and should not be enjoined lightly.

Here, of course -- let me read ahead -- plaintiffs contend that they have identified several serious questions warranting preservation of the status quo because if the Court accepts the committees' view of the law, then Congress can issue a subpoena on any matter, at any time, for any reason, to any person, and there is basically nothing a federal court can do about it.

But, as previously explained, that is not the case. There are several limits to the Committees' power to investigate in aid of its legislative functions.

Plaintiffs similarly point out that the question whether the RFPA applies to Congress is one that this Court will be the first in the country to decide. But, while that may be true, plaintiffs' statutory argument fails to rise to the level of "serious," as the plain text and structure of the RFPA, along with binding Supreme Court precedent interpreting substantively identical language, strongly undercut their proposed interpretation of the statute.

Finally, plaintiffs urge the Court to go the way of the Court of Appeals in Eastland by staying this case pending a decision on the merits. In Eastland, the Court of Appeals stayed enforcement of a congressional subpoena directing a bank to produce the financial records of an organization. While the ultimate question decided in Eastland is the same presented here, that is, whether a congressional subpoena issued to a third party was a product of legitimate legislative activity, a question, by the way, answered in the affirmative by the Supreme Court, the procedural postures differ greatly, warranting a different result here.

Central to the Court of Appeals' decision to grant a stay in Eastland, aside from its determination that irreparable harm was likely to befall plaintiffs absent intervention, was its determination that serious constitutional questions were presented by this litigation, which require more time than is presently available for proper consideration.

Citing 488 F.2d at 1256.

The challenged subpoena in that case was issued on May 28, 1970, with a return date of June 4. The organization sued to enjoin compliance with the subpoena on June 1. The district court denied the injunction on June 1. Thus, while the record is unclear as to when the organization noted an appeal, at most, the Court of Appeals had two days to review the merits of plaintiff's arguments before the return date was

to take effect.

Indeed, the Court of Appeals noted that the decisive element in their decision to stay the case was that, absent a stay, the case would be mooted on the same morning that their decision issued. Consequently, with only, at most, two days to have reviewed plaintiff's application, a stay was a prudent move by the Court of Appeals.

Here, plaintiffs first filed suit on April 29, 2019.

So the Court had the case before it for roughly three weeks, as compared with, at most, two days in Eastland; and, while the instant motion remains pending, the committees have agreed not to enforce the subpoenas. So the Court had the benefit of the time necessary to thoroughly consider the merits of plaintiffs' motion. As well, I should note, the thorough opinion of Judge Mehta of the D.C. District Court.

Consequently, the Court of Appeals' actions in Eastland has little bearing here.

Moreover, the biggest difference between the circumstances before this Court and the Court of appeals in *Eastland* is clear. The Court of Appeals in *Eastland* did not have the benefit of the Supreme Court's opinion in *Eastland*, which reversed the Court of Appeals in an eight-to-one decision, laying out the same framework the Court uses today to resolve this case.

So, while the question at the heart of this case

concerning the extent congressional power may have been an open and serious one before, it is not nearly so serious today.

Of course, use of congressional subpoena power to receive from a third party a sitting President's financial records will always be serious in that the outcome will have serious political ramifications.

In the context of judicial interpretation, however, the word "serious" relates to a question that is both serious and open to reasonable debate. Otherwise, every complaint challenging the power of one of the three coordinate branches of government would result in preliminary relief, regardless of whether established law renders the complaint unmeritorious. Indeed, every litigant that comes before the Court seeks relief that is she considers serious. That cannot be the law.

Whereas, here, a subdivision of Congress acts plainly within its constitutional authority, preliminary injunctive relief will not issue simply because the plaintiff challenges that authority. More is required to demonstrate entitlement to extraordinary and drastic relief in the form of a preliminary injunction.

The Court concludes that plaintiffs have not raised any serious questions going to the merits. As the above analysis makes clear, the Supreme Court has likely foreclosed the path plaintiffs ask this Court to travel. It is well settled that the committees possessed the power to issue

and enforce subpoenas of the type challenged by Plaintiffs, and it is also plain, based on standard constructions of statutory interpretation and prior Supreme Court cases, that the RFPA is no hurdle to the committees' efforts to obtain the financial information sought.

Accordingly, the Court finds that the statutory questions in this case are not sufficiently serious in light of the governing law. In any event, as explained below, plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that the balance of the hardships weighs in their favor. Accordingly, even if the questions were sufficiently serious, injunctive relief remains unwarranted.

The Court finds that Plaintiffs have also failed to establish that the balance of equities and hardships, along with the public interest, favor a preliminary injunction.

These factors merge when the Government is the opposing party.

Citing Nken, 556 U.S. at 435.

The Court has found that the committees' subpoenas are likely lawful. Thus, delaying what is likely lawful legislative activity is inequitable. With respect to the balance of hardships, plaintiffs compare the irreparable harm that they are likely to suffer with what they maintain is the committees' sole potential hardship, namely, some delay before receiving the documents if the committees activities are deemed lawful.

Plaintiffs maintain that courts have consistently held that such harm is given little weight. But here, the committees have alleged a pressing need for the subpoenaed documents to further their investigation, and it is not the role of the Court or plaintiffs to second guess that need, especially in light of the Court's conclusions that the requested documents are pertinent to what is likely a lawful congressional investigation.

What's more, because the House of Representatives is not a "continuing body," see *Eastland*, 421 U.S. at 512, any delay in the proceedings may result in irreparable harm to the committees. Thus, the Court finds that the balance of hardships and equities do not tip in plaintiffs' favor, much less decidedly in their favor, as the standard in this circuit requires.

Turning to the public interest, plaintiffs contend that this factor weighs strongly in favor of preserving the status quo because applying the law in a way that violates the Constitution is never in the public's interest and no public interest in advanced by allowing the committees to enforce illegal subpoenas. These rationales, of course, presupposes the subpoenas' illegality.

Here, the Court has already determined that there is a strong likelihood that the committees actions are lawful, and courts have long recognized a clear public interest in

maximizing the effectiveness of the investigatory powers of Congress. See e.g. *Exxon Corp. v. F.T.C.*, 589 F.2d 582.

And, in the committees' words, "Plaintiffs' contrary argument ignores the clear and compelling public interest in expeditious and unimpeded Congressional investigations into core aspects of the financial and election systems that touch every member of the public."

The Court agrees and, therefore, finds that the public interest weighs strongly against a preliminary injunction.

As the Supreme Court noted in Watkins, "it is unquestionably the duty of all citizens to cooperate with the Congress in its efforts to obtain the facts needed for legislative action. It is their unremitting obligation to respond to subpoenas, to respect the dignity of the Congress and its committees, and to testify fully with respect to matters within the province of proper investigation."

Here, the Court finds that the challenged subpoenas fall within the province of proper congressional investigation. Accordingly, the Court will not enjoin the committees' efforts to enforce the subpoenas.

Finally, Plaintiffs contend that the Court should issue an injunction to preserve the status quo because refusing to do so may otherwise moot their right to appeal, a classic form of irreparable harm.

The Court is unpersuaded. Plaintiffs will have ample

time to appeal the Court's decision before it takes effect.

The committees have already agreed to

suspend enforcement of the subpoenas until seven days following resolution of plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction.

Once the Court's decision is entered on the docket, plaintiffs may immediately appeal the decision to the Court of Appeals, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1292(a)(1). Moreover, plaintiffs are free to ask the Court of Appeals for a stay pending review of this Court's decision, which the Court of Appeals will have discretion to grant, if warranted. Plaintiffs need not reinvent the wheel in applying for a stay, given the substantial overlap between factors justifying a stay and preliminary injunction. See e.g. Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418.

Plaintiffs simply can, likely will, and almost certainly must, proffer the same arguments raised here.

Indeed, the Court takes judicial notice that plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal the following morning after the D.C. district court ruled against them in that case earlier this week. Thus, contrary to plaintiffs' arguments, refusal to issue an injunction here would not moot plaintiffs' right to an appeal.

For the reasons set forth above, plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction is denied. That constitutes the opinion of the Court.

And with that, Mr. Strawbridge, is there anything else

that we need to do today?

MR. STRAWBRIDGE: Yes, your Honor. This may just be pro forma, in light of your Honor's opinion. I do believe we are required to request a stay of the district court pending appeal. That result may be preordained, but I want to put on the record that we are requesting a stay. I don't know if the Court desires or wants briefing on that, or if it would like to make the ruling clear now.

THE COURT: That application is denied.

MR. STRAWBRIDGE: All right. Then I also take it that no administrative stay? The Court of Appeals' own administrative stay is appropriate at this time?

THE COURT: That is correct.

MR. STRAWBRIDGE: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Letter?

MR. LETTER: I have nothing further, your Honor, unless you have any questions.

THE COURT: I don't. What do the parties expect to be their next steps? Mr. Strawbridge, I assume there will be an appeal?

MR. STRAWBRIDGE: Obviously, I haven't had a chance to talk to anybody yet, but that's probably a safe bet. We will, obviously, confer with our client and take appropriate action as quickly as we can.

THE COURT: We will put a short order on the docket as

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soon as practicable.
 1
               MR. STRAWBRIDGE: Okay. Thank you.
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                THE COURT: Thank you, folks. Unless there is
 3
      anything else, we are adjourned.
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                (Adjourned)
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DATE FILED: <u>5/22/2019</u>

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

DONALD J. TRUMP; DONALD J. TRUMP, JR.; ERIC TRUMP; IVANKA TRUMP; THE DONALD J. TRUMP REVOCABLE TRUST; THE TRUMP ORGANIZATION, INC.; TRUMP ORGANIZATION LLC; DJT HOLDINGS LLC; DJT HOLDINGS MANAGING MEMBER LLC; TRUMP ACQUISITION LLC; and TRUMP ACQUISITION, CORP.,

Plaintiffs,

- against -

DEUTSCHE BANK AG and CAPITAL ONE FINANCIAL CORP.,

Defendants,

- and -

COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES and PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

Intervenor-Defendants.

ORDER

19 Civ. 3826 (ER)

Ramos, D.J.:

For the reasons set forth on the record in today's hearing, Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction is DENIED, Plaintiffs' motion for a stay pending appeal is DENIED, and the Committees' application for consolidation is DENIED. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate the motion, Doc. 26.

It is SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 22, 2019

New York, New York

Edgardo Ramos, U.S.D.J.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

DONALD J. TRUMP, DONALD J. TRUMP JR., ERIC TRUMP, IVANKA TRUMP,

and

THE DONALD J. TRUMP REVOCABLE TRUST, THE TRUMP ORGANIZATION, INC., TRUMP ORGANIZATION LLC, DJT HOLDINGS LLC, DJT HOLDINGS MANAGING MEMBER LLC, TRUMP ACQUISITION LLC, and TRUMP ACQUISITION, CORP.,

Plaintiffs,

- against -

DEUTSCHE BANK AG and CAPITAL ONE FINANCIAL CORP.,

Defendants,

and

COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES and PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

Intervenor-Defendants.

Docket No. 1:19-cv-03826-ER

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Plaintiffs (Donald J. Trump; Donald J. Trump Jr.; Eric Trump; Ivanka Trump; The Donald J. Trump Revocable Trust; The Trump Organization, Inc.; Trump Organization LLC; DJT Holdings LLC; DJT Holdings Managing Member LLC; Trump Acquisition LLC; and Trump Acquisition, Corp.) hereby appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit this Court's order from May 22, 2019, denying Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction and denying Plaintiffs' motion for a stay pending appeal. *See* Dkt. 59.

Dated: May 24, 2019

s/ Marc L. Mukasey
Marc L. Mukasey

Mukasey Frenchman & Sklaroff LLP 250 Park Avenue, 7th Floor New York, NY 10177 347-527-3940

marc.mukasey@mukaseylaw.com

Counsel for The Donald J. Trump Revocable Trust, The Trump Organization, Inc., Trump Organization LLC, DJT Holdings LLC, DJT Holdings Managing Member LLC, Trump Acquisition LLC, and Trump Acquisition, Corp. Respectfully submitted,

s/ Patrick Strawbridge

Patrick Strawbridge

CONSOVOY MCCARTHY PLLC

Ten Post Office Square

8th Floor South PMB #706

Boston, MA 02109

patrick@consovoymccarthy.com

William S. Consovoy Cameron T. Norris

CONSOVOY MCCARTHY PLLC 3033 Wilson Blvd., Ste. 700

Arlington, VA 22201

(703) 243-9423

will@consovoymccarthy.com cam@consovoymccarthy.com

Counsel for President Donald J. Trump,

Donald J. Trump Jr., Eric Trump, and Ivanka Trump

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on May 24, 2019, I filed this notice via the CM/ECF system, which will notify counsel for all parties in this case.

Dated: May 24, 2019 <u>s/ Patrick Strawbridge</u>

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I filed a true and correct copy of this joint appendix with the Clerk of this Court via the CM/ECF system, which will notify all counsel who are registered CM/ECF users.

Dated: June 18, 2019

/s/ Patrick Strawbridge
PATRICK STRAWBRIDGE
CONSOVOY McCarthy PLLC
Ten Post Office Square
8th Floor South PMB #706
Boston, MA 02109
(617) 227-0548

Counsel for Plaintiffs-Appellants