

1 Plaintiffs) were the victims of psychological and physical torture. Plaintiffs are all
2 foreign citizens and bring these claims pursuant to the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. §
3 1350 (hereafter “ATS”). As this is review of a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12,
4 the factual allegations are taken as true, unless they do not pass the plausibility standard
5 of *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and *Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S.
6 544 (2007). The court’s recitation of the alleged facts are taken solely from Plaintiffs’
7 Complaint and do not constitute findings of fact by this court. Plaintiffs allege the
8 Defendants, James Mitchell and John Jessen, “are psychologists who designed,
9 implemented, and personally administered an experimental torture program for the U.S.
10 Central Intelligence Agency.” (Complaint, ¶ 1).

11 **A. Allegations of Mr. Salim**

12 Plaintiff Salim is a Tanzanian citizen who was captured by the CIA and Kenyan
13 Security Forces in Somalia in March, 2003, where he was working as a trader and
14 fisherman. He was transferred to official U.S. Government sites in Afghanistan and held
15 there for a total of sixteen months. In July 2004, he was transferred to Bagram Air Force
16 Base in Afghanistan and held in custody there for an additional four years, until being
17 released in August 2008. (Complaint ¶ 9). Mr. Salim alleges he was subjected to
18 numerous coercive methods, including: prolonged sleep deprivation, walling, stress
19 positions, facial slaps, abdominal slaps, dietary manipulation, facial holds, and cramped
20 confinement. (*Id.* at ¶ 74). He also claims he was subjected to prolonged nudity and
21 “water dousing that approximated waterboarding.”(*Id.*). The conditions of his
22 confinement are pled with great specificity, including that he was kept in a dark, frigid
23 cell, “continually chained to the wall” in a stress position in which the “only position he
24 could adopt was a squatting position that very quickly became uncomfortable and
25 extremely painful” and was fed a meager meal of “a small chunk of bread in a watery
26 broth—only once every other day.” (*Id.* at ¶ 79-82).

27 The allegations of ongoing torture are also pled with great specificity. (Complaint

1 ¶¶ 71-116). By way of brief example, the following: Mr. Salim alleges being stripped
2 naked and then placed, cuffed and shackled on the center of a large plastic sheet where,
3 he alleges, he was repeatedly doused with ice-cold water and kicked and slapped in the
4 stomach and face. After 20 to 30 minutes of dousing, he was then rolled up in the plastic
5 sheet and “left to shiver violently in the cold for some 10 or 15 minutes.” (*Id.* at ¶ 88).
6 He claims he was forced naked into “a small wooden box, measuring about three square
7 feet”, which was locked with a padlock. Inside, the box smelled “rancid” and he
8 “vomited in pain and fear” while locked inside the box. (*Id.* at ¶ 91-92).

9 Mr. Salim claims after two or three weeks of these “aggressive” methods he was
10 assessed by his interrogators to be “broken” and “cooperative.” (*Id.* at ¶ 104). Mr. Salim
11 occasionally met with people he believed to be health care providers and received
12 treatment. He was given a polygraph test. (*Id.* at ¶ 105). Shortly thereafter, he claims
13 he was given “three very painful injections in his arm”, against his will. He states he
14 does not know what happened after his face went numb and he fell asleep/lost
15 consciousness. (*Id.* at ¶ 106). After some four or five weeks in custody, he alleges he
16 attempted to kill himself by taking pain pills. (*Id.* at ¶ 107).

17 Shortly after the suicide attempt, Mr. Salim was transferred by CIA personnel to
18 another site in Afghanistan he states was known as the “Salt Pit” and remained there for
19 14 months, often in solitary confinement. (*Id.* at ¶ 109). Thereafter he was transferred to
20 Bagram Air Force Base, where he was detained for four years, in a small cage in a
21 “hangar-type building” with constant illumination. He was never allowed outside. (*Id.*
22 at ¶ 111). After being released Mr. Salim contends he continues to suffer repercussions
23 from the torture: debilitating pain in his jaw and teeth; pain in his back, shoulders, and
24 legs; frequent nightmares/flashbacks; and other symptoms of post-traumatic stress
25 disorder (PTSD). (*Id.* at ¶ 115-116).

26 **B. Allegations of Mr. Soud**

27 Mr. Soud is a Libyan citizen, who allegedly fled Libya fearing prosecution from

1 the Gadaffi regime and went to Pakistan, where in 2003 his home was raided by U.S. and
2 Pakistani forces. (Complaint at ¶ 117-18). During the raid, he states he was shot which
3 shattered a bone in his left leg. He claims he was detained, interrogated, and abused for
4 two weeks after the raid by Pakistani and U.S. officials. (*Id.* at ¶ 119). He denied any
5 knowledge of terrorism plans against the U.S. or any connection to al-Qa'ida. He alleges
6 he was then told he was not being cooperative and transported to COBALT². He alleges
7 he was subjected to several of the same interrogation techniques as Mr. Salim, including:
8 prolonged sleep deprivation, stress positions, walling, being slapped, dietary
9 manipulation, facial holds, cramped confinement, and a form of waterboarding. (*Id.* at ¶
10 121). Mr. Soud claims that after he arrived at COBALT he was told “he was a prisoner
11 of the CIA, that human rights ended on September 11, and that no laws applied in
12 prison.” (*Id.* at ¶ 124).

13 At COBALT, Mr. Soud was “kept naked for more than a month” and he was not
14 allowed to wash for five months. (*Id.* at ¶ 127-28). Mr. Soud alleges he was given
15 meager meals of poor nutritional quality and during his year-long detention at COBALT
16 his weight fell from 187 to 139 pounds. (*Id.* at ¶ 129). He additionally claims to have
17 been subjected to prolonged sleep deprivation which “drove him close to madness”. (*Id.*
18 at ¶ 131). He alleges about two weeks after he arrived at COBALT the “torture increased
19 in severity” and moved into an “aggressive phase” that lasted four to five weeks. (*Id.* at
20 ¶ 133-34). He alleges he was subjected to “walling” where a foam collar was placed
21 around his neck, and he was then thrown into a wooden wall, while also being slapped
22 in the face and stomach. (*Id.* at ¶ 137-38). Similar to Mr. Salim, he describes being
23 doused in ice water while on a plastic sheet. These methods of interrogation allegedly
24 lasted for approximately two weeks, until another interrogation team took over.

25 Mr. Soud alleges the new interrogation team increased the severity of the physical
26 beatings. (*Id.* at ¶ 142). He states he was also subjected to two different confinement

27 ²COBALT is alleged to be a CIA prison in Afghanistan. (Complaint ¶ 9).

1 boxes. After two to three weeks, the second interrogation team found Mr. Soud to be
2 “broken” and “cooperative” and stopped the aggressive interrogation tactics. Mr. Soud
3 was held by the U.S. Government, often in solitary confinement, until August 22, 2004
4 when he was turned over to the Libyan Government. In Libya, Mr. Soud was sentenced
5 to life imprisonment, but was released in 2011 after the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime.
6 (*Id.* at ¶ 153). Mr. Soud alleges he “continues to suffer both physically and
7 psychologically from the tortures he endured” while in the custody of the U.S.
8 Government. (*Id.* at ¶ 154).

9 **C. Allegations of Gul Rahman**

10 Gul Rahman was born in Afghanistan. In October 2002, Mr. Rahman was living
11 in Pakistan where he was detained by a joint U.S./Pakistani operation. Plaintiff alleges
12 that in November 2002, “Defendant Jessen conducted a psychological evaluation of Mr.
13 Rahman at COBALT.” (Complaint at ¶ 160). Defendant Jessen allegedly concluded Mr.
14 Rahman was resistant and further torture would be required to break his will. It is alleged
15 Defendant Jessen “directly participated in the more aggressive phase” of Mr. Rahman’s
16 interrogation and “tortured” him. (*Id.*)

17 After Mr. Jessen left COBALT, the interrogation of Mr. Rahman allegedly
18 continued, using techniques such as: slaps, stress positions, dietary manipulation, sleep
19 deprivation, prolonged nudity, and water dousing. On November 19, 2002, Mr. Rahman
20 was chained, partially nude, in a stress position, with temperatures in the 30s. The next
21 morning he was found dead. The autopsy report listed the likely cause of death as
22 hypothermia, with contributing factors of dehydration, lack of food, and “immobility due
23 to short chaining.” (*Id.* at ¶ 164).

24 Plaintiffs allege Mr. Rahman’s death was investigated by the CIA and included in
25 a CIA Inspector General Report in 2004, but no one was held accountable. Plaintiffs
26 allege Mr. Rahman’s death was concealed from the public until 2010. (*Id.* at 165-167).

D. Alleged Conduct and Involvement of Defendants

1 Defendant James Mitchell is a U.S. citizen and a psychologist. He was the chief
2 psychologist at the Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (“SERE”) training program
3 at Fairchild Air Force Base near Spokane, Washington. From 2001 to 2005 he “worked
4 as an independent contractor for the CIA”, and from 2005 to 2009 worked at Mitchell,
5 Jessen & Associates in Spokane, Washington, and continued to work under contract with
6 the CIA. (Complaint at ¶ 12). Defendant John “Bruce” Jessen is also a psychologist, U.S.
7 citizen, and worked under contract with the CIA and at Mitchell, Jessen & Associates in
8 Spokane, Washington. (*Id.* at ¶ 13).

9 Plaintiffs allege Defendants began working with the CIA in December 2001.
10 Defendants allegedly produced a “white paper” for the CIA entitled: “Recognizing and
11 Developing Countermeasures to Al-Qa’ida Resistance to Interrogation Techniques: A
12 Resistance Training Perspective.” (*Id.* at ¶ 24). The paper allegedly proposed
13 countermeasures that could be employed to defeat resistance to interrogations, and
14 according to Plaintiffs “justified the use of torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman, and
15 degrading treatment.” (*Id.* at ¶ 25). The paper allegedly described a theory of “learned
16 helplessness”.

17 In March 2002, U.S. authorities captured Abu Zubaydah and Defendant Mitchell
18 was allegedly contacted to provide “real-time recommendations to overcome Zubaydah’s
19 resistance to interrogation.” (*Id.* at ¶ 32). Mitchell allegedly encouraged the CIA to
20 develop the learned helplessness techniques. (*Id.*) In April 2002, “CIA Headquarters sent
21 Mitchell to GREEN [a CIA black-site prison] to consult on the psychological aspects of
22 Abu Zubaydah’s interrogation.” (*Id.* at ¶ 34). Allegedly there was a dispute between the
23 CIA and FBI as to whether Zubaydah should be tortured, and control of the interrogation
24 was transferred to the CIA and led by Mitchell. (*Id.* at ¶ 35-37). In July 2002, the CIA
25 and Mitchell believed Zubaydah was being “uncooperative” and decided to pursue a more
26 “aggressive” phase of interrogation, and contracted with Defendant Jessen to assist
27

1 Mitchell. (*Id.* at ¶ 41-42). The Complaint alleges Jessen and Mitchell proposed 12
2 coercive methods, and the CIA agreed to propose 11 of them to the Attorney General.
3 On July 24, 2002, the Attorney General allegedly verbally approved all of the proposed
4 methods except waterboarding. (*Id.* at ¶ 43-44). Defendants argued waterboarding was
5 a convincing technique and necessary, and the Attorney General approved it on July 26,
6 2002. Plaintiffs allege Defendants “personally conducted or oversaw” aspects of
7 Zubaydah’s interrogation, including physically assaulting him, forcing him into
8 confinement boxes, and waterboarding. (*Id.* at ¶ 46-48).

9 Plaintiffs claim Defendants pronounced the interrogation of Zubaydah a “success”
10 and recommended the CIA use the aggressive coercion methods for future high value
11 captives. (*Id.* at ¶ 55-56). Defendants then allegedly devised the program of CIA
12 “enhanced interrogation techniques” including “designing instruments of torture such as
13 confinement boxes”. (*Id.* at ¶ 57). Defendants “trained and supervised CIA personnel in
14 applying their phased torture program”. (*Id.* at ¶ 62). Plaintiffs allege that “together
15 with the CIA, Defendants supervised and oversaw” the program including assessing: 1)
16 whether prisoners had been tortured long enough to induce “learned helplessness”; 2)
17 what combinations and sequences of torture were most effective; and 3) had the prisoners
18 become fully compliant. (*Id.* at ¶ 63). Plaintiffs allege the CIA has since concluded that
19 Defendants should not have assessed the effectiveness of the techniques, because
20 Defendants had designed the techniques and had a financial conflict of interest in the
21 continuation of the interrogation program. (*Id.* at ¶ 64). Plaintiffs contend that between
22 2001 and 2010, Defendants, and the company they formed, Mitchell, Jessen, &
23 Associates, were paid over \$80 million to provide “security teams for renditions,
24 interrogators, facilities, training, operational psychologists, de-briefers, and security
25 personnel at all CIA detention sites.” (*Id.* at ¶ 65-68).

26 **II. Standard of Review**

27 Defendants bring their Motion pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).

1 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only a “short and plain statement of the
2 claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief.” This rule does not require “detailed
3 factual allegations” but does require more than labels and conclusions. *Twombly*, 550
4 U.S. at 555. “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
5 matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” *Ashcroft*
6 *v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 677.

7 As to the jurisdictional challenge under Rule 12(b)(1), Defendants argue they can
8 “challenge the sufficiency of the pleadings to establish jurisdiction (facial attack), or a
9 lack of any factual support for subject matter jurisdiction despite the pleading’s
10 sufficiency (factual attack)”. (ECF No. 27, p. 2). A factual attack “contests the truth of
11 the plaintiff’s factual allegations, usually by introducing evidence outside the pleadings.”
12 *Leite v. Crane Co.*, 749 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2014). If a defendant raises a factual
13 attack on subject matter jurisdiction, a plaintiff must then support jurisdictional
14 allegations with competent proof. *Id.* Defendants have presented no evidence outside the
15 pleadings to support a “factual attack.” Therefore, the court reviews this matter as a
16 facial attack, accepting the Plaintiffs’ allegations as true and drawing all reasonable
17 inferences in the Plaintiffs’ favor and determining if those allegations are sufficient to
18 invoke the court’s jurisdiction. *Id.*

19 **III. Discussion**

20 Defendants raise four primary arguments in support of dismissal: 1) the court lacks
21 jurisdiction due to the Political Question Doctrine; 2) Defendants are entitled to
22 derivative sovereign immunity; 3) the Alien Tort Statute does not confer jurisdiction over
23 Plaintiffs' claims; and 4) Plaintiff Obaid Ullah lacks the capacity to sue. Plaintiffs contest
24 all these arguments in their Response (ECF No. 28).

25 **A. Political Question Doctrine**

26 Defendants argue the case is not justiciable due to the Political Question Doctrine
27 and claim Plaintiffs seek review of “foreign policy” choices. Defendants argue there are

1 not “judicially manageable standards” and that there is no clear definition of torture.
2 (ECF No. 27, p. 7). Plaintiffs rebut this argument and claim prisoner abuse and torture
3 are not unreviewable political decisions, and argue prior case law demonstrates such are
4 justiciable.

5 Executive branch decisions are not immune from judicial review. See for example
6 *N.L.R.B. v. Noel Canning*, 134 S.Ct. 2550 (2014)(holding the President lacked the power
7 to make the recess appointments at issue in the case). “Courts in the United States have
8 the power, and ordinarily the obligation, to decide cases and controversies properly
9 presented to them.” *Alperin v. Vatican Bank*, 410 F.3d 532, 539 (9th Cir. 2005). The
10 Supreme Court set forth its most detailed discussion of the political question doctrine in
11 *Baker v. Carr*, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962), wherein the Court articulated six
12 considerations: 1) is there a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
13 issue to a coordinate political department; 2) a lack of judicially discoverable and
14 manageable standards for resolving the case; 3) the impossibility of deciding the case
15 without an initial policy determination of the kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; 4)
16 the impossibility of the court undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack
17 of respect for coordinate branches of government; 5) an unusual need for unquestioning
18 adherence to a political decision already made; or 6) potentiality of embarrassment from
19 multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.

20 These six factors have been described as “formulations” and “six independent
21 tests,” yet there is often overlap. *Alperin*, 410 F.3d at 544. In the arena of foreign affairs,
22 the Supreme Court has “cautioned against sweeping statements that imply all questions
23 involving foreign relations are political ones.” *Id.* at 544-45 citing *Baker v. Carr*.
24 Defendants argue the Constitution commits decisions involving war and foreign policy
25 to the Executive and Legislative branches. However, Defendants' argument sweeps too
26 broadly, and the Supreme Court has stated, “it is error to suppose that every case or
27 controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance.” *Baker*, 369

1 U.S. at 211. The Ninth Circuit has stated: “The Supreme Court has made clear that the
2 federal courts are capable of reviewing military decisions, particularly when those
3 decisions cause injury to civilians.” *Koohi v. United States*, 976 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir.
4 1992).

5 Defendants also argue no judicially manageable standards apply and contend there
6 is no clear definition of “torture”. This argument is rejected. Courts are well-equipped
7 to construe the meaning of terms and do so frequently. Congress passed the Torture
8 Victims Protection Act in 1991, and the TVPA contains a definition of “torture”. Other
9 statutes also define "torture". See for example 18 U.S.C. 2340 ("torture" means an act
10 committed by a person acting under color of law specifically intended to inflict severe
11 physical or mental pain or suffering..."); 18 U.S.C. § 2241(d)(1)(A)(defining “torture”
12 under the War Crimes Act). Thus, it cannot credibly be argued that no judicially
13 manageable standards exist to adjudicate a case involving allegations of "torture". Nor
14 is the adjudication of cases involving "torture" a relatively recent development. See
15 *Filartiga v. Pena-Irala*, 630 F.2d 876, 884 (2nd Cir. 1980)("We conclude that official
16 torture is now prohibited by the law of nations. The prohibition is clear and
17 unambiguous, and admits of no distinction between treatment of aliens and citizens.").

18 The Ninth Circuit has stated “the unconstitutionality of torturing a United States citizen
19 was beyond debate by 2001.” *Padilla v. Yoo*, 678 F.3d 748, 763 (9th Cir. 2012). In
20 *Chowdhury v. Worldtel Bangladesh Holding*, 746 F.3d 42, 51 (2nd Cir. 2014), the court
21 concluded that administering electric shocks for the purpose of coercion met the
22 definition of “torture”. The inquiry under the second *Baker* factor is not “whether the
23 case is unmanageable in the sense of being large, complicated, or otherwise difficult to
24 tackle from a logistical standpoint,” but rather whether the courts “have the legal tools
25 to reach a ruling that is principled, rational, and based upon reasoned distinctions.”
26 *Alperin*, 410 F.3d at 552.

27 Defendants further argue the remaining four *Baker* factors support this court

1 declining jurisdiction based on the Political Question Doctrine. The argument submitted
2 as to those four factors is brief. The Defendants' arguments as to the remaining *Baker*
3 factors is limited. Plaintiffs have not addressed it in their Response. This focus on the
4 first two factors is not surprising. See *Alperin*, 410 F.3d at 545 (“The *Vieth* plurality’s
5 observation that the *Baker* tests ‘are probably listed in descending order of both
6 importance and certainty,’ 124 S.Ct. at 1776, is borne out by the disproportionate
7 emphasis on the first two tests in both Supreme Court and lower court cases.”).

8 Some courts apply a different variation of the *Baker* factors, in cases such as this,
9 that include Government contractor defendants. The Fourth Circuit has stated it has
10 “distilled the six Baker factors into two critical components: 1) whether the government
11 contractor was under the ‘plenary’ or ‘direct’ control of the military; and 2) whether
12 national defense interests were ‘closely intertwined’ with military decisions governing
13 the contractor’s conduct, such that a decision on the merits of the claim would require the
14 judiciary to question actual, sensitive judgments made by the military.” *Al Shimari v.*
15 *CACI Premier Technology*, 758 F.3d 516, 533-34 (4th Cir. 2014). The Fourth Circuit’s
16 test requires a court to “look beyond the complaint” and consider “facts developed
17 through discovery or otherwise made a part of the record in the case.” *Id.* at 534. No
18 discovery has yet been conducted in this case.

19 In Reply (ECF No. 29), Defendants rely heavily on the District Court opinion from
20 the Eastern District of Virginia, *Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Technology*, 119 F.Supp.3d
21 434 (E.D.Va. 2015), where the court dismissed the action based on the political question
22 doctrine. Although the parties agree *Al Shimari* is relevant, and Plaintiffs cite the Fourth
23 Circuit opinion, as discussed *infra*, in regard to ATS jurisdiction, the District Court’s
24 opinion is not controlling authority. The case is currently on appeal to the Fourth Circuit.
25 Furthermore, the *Al Shimari* case sits in a very different procedural posture, with the
26 District Court having made its decision after seven years of litigation and “based on the
27 discoverable evidence presented.” *Id.* at 438. In contrast, this Motion to Dismiss seeks

1 dismissal on the pleadings, when no discovery has taken place.

2 The court finds the very decisions cited in the briefing on the political question
3 issue are contrary to Defendants' argument. The Ninth Circuit has already adjudicated
4 a case involving the several year detention of an American citizen, allegedly "held
5 incommunicado in military detention, subjected to coercive interrogation techniques and
6 detained under harsh conditions." The Defendant was a Deputy Assistant Attorney
7 General with the Department of Justice. See *Padilla v. Yoo*, 678 F.3d 748 (9th Cir. 2012).
8 The Supreme Court found it had jurisdiction to "consider challenges to the legality of
9 detention of foreign nationals captured abroad in connection with hostilities and
10 incarcerated at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base." See *Rasul v. Bush*, 542 U.S. 466
11 (2004). Much closer in time to the events of September 11, 2001, the courts of this
12 country have adjudicated cases involving Executive and Legislative branch actions taken
13 in response to those attacks. See for example *Hamdi v. Rumsfeld*, 542 U.S. 507, 509
14 (2004)("At this difficult time in our Nation's history, we are called upon to consider the
15 legality of the Government's detention of a United States citizen on United States soil as
16 an 'enemy combatant' ... We hold that although Congress authorized the detention of
17 combatants in the narrow circumstances alleged here, due process demands that a citizen
18 held in the United States as an enemy combatant be given a meaningful opportunity to
19 contest the factual basis for that detention before a neutral decisionmaker."). The Ninth
20 Circuit has stated that a "claim of military necessity will not, without more, shield
21 governmental operations from judicial review." *Koohi v. United States*, 976 F.2d 1328,
22 1331 (9th Cir. 1992). The court further stated, "this is true in time of war as well as in
23 time of peace, and with respect to claims by enemy civilians as well as by Americans."
24 *Id.* at 1332. Although application of the political question doctrine is case-specific, the
25 cases cited demonstrate the present fallacy of Defendants' argument that the court must
26 decline jurisdiction because the case falls within the realm of war and foreign policy.

27 The court does not find, based on the current record, that the *Baker* factors require

1 the court to decline jurisdiction based on the political question doctrine. Defendants'
2 Motion to Dismiss on political question grounds is **DENIED**.

3 **B. Derivative Sovereign Immunity**

4 Defendants claim private citizens and contractors who are performing work on the
5 Government's behalf are immune from suit under the doctrine of derivative sovereign
6 immunity. Defendants argue Plaintiffs claim Defendants acted pursuant to contract with
7 the CIA and Plaintiffs cannot "allege that the authority conferred upon Defendants
8 pursuant to their contracts with the CIA was improperly conferred or that Defendants
9 exceeded this authority." (ECF No. 27, p. 14). Defendants also contend in their Motion
10 to Dismiss that the Ninth Circuit's decision in *Gomez v. Campbell-Ewald*, 768 F.3d 871
11 (9th Cir. 2014) was wrongly decided. However, after the Motion was filed, the *Gomez*
12 decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court, *infra*.

13 Plaintiffs, in their Response, rely on the Supreme Court's recent decision in
14 *Campbell-Ewald v. Gomez*, 136 S.Ct. 663 (Jan. 20, 2016), wherein the Supreme Court
15 framed the question as: "Do federal contractors share the Government's unqualified
16 immunity from liability and litigation?" *Id.* at 672. The Court answered the question
17 quite succinctly and definitively: "We hold they do not." *Id.* Plaintiffs further argue the
18 Government may not immunize illegal acts by delegating them to private parties.
19 Plaintiffs argue the Executive could not lawfully authorize torture and abuse, and
20 therefore immunity does not shield the Defendants. Additionally, Plaintiffs argue
21 Defendants are not entitled to derivative immunity under *Filarsky v. Delia*, 132 S.Ct.
22 1657 (2012) because psychologists were not traditionally entitled to immunity at common
23 law and Defendants violated clearly established rights. (ECF No. 28, p. 16).

24 Government contractor immunity "unlike the sovereign's, is not absolute."
25 *Campbell-Ewald*, 136 S.Ct. at 672. An inquiry is required into whether the contractor
26 "exceeded his authority," or whether the governmental authority "was not validly
27 conferred." *Id.* at 673. In either of those circumstances, the contractor could be liable.

1 It is too early in this action, where no discovery has been conducted, to make a qualified
2 immunity determination. As the Supreme Court instructed in *Campbell-Ewald*, “at the
3 pretrial state of litigation, we construe the record in a light favorable to the party seeking
4 to avoid summary disposition.” *Id.* Plaintiffs’ allegations are not merely that Defendants
5 Mitchell and Jessen acted specifically at the direction of the Government, but rather that
6 they designed and implemented an experimental torture program. (ECF No. 1, ¶ 20).
7 Plaintiffs allege it was Defendants who proposed the “pseudoscientific theory” of
8 “learned helplessness.” (*Id.* at ¶ 25). Plaintiffs allege, “Defendants helped convince
9 Justice Department lawyers to authorize specific coercive methods” and argued to the
10 Attorney General for the use of waterboarding as “an absolutely convincing technique.”
11 (*Id.* at ¶ 43-44). It is also alleged Jessen and Mitchell personally participated in the
12 torture of Abu Zubaydah, including waterboarding. (*Id.* at ¶ 46-52).

13 Rather than merely acting at the direction of Government personnel, it is alleged
14 “Defendants trained and supervised CIA personnel in applying their phased torture
15 program.” (*Id.* at ¶ 62). Plaintiffs allege Defendants operated under a conflict of interest
16 where Defendants were allowed to judge the effectiveness of the interrogation methods
17 when they had a financial interest in the program continuing. (*Id.* at ¶ 64). It is alleged
18 Defendants ultimately were paid over \$80 million for their efforts. (*Id.* at ¶ 68). Given
19 the allegations of the Complaint, which must be accepted as true at this stage in the
20 litigation, the court cannot conclude Defendants Mitchell and Jessen merely acted at the
21 direction of the Government, within the scope of their authority, and that such authority
22 was legally and validly conferred. See also *Cabalce v. Thomas E. Blanchard &*
23 *Associates*, 797 F.3d 720, 732 (9th Cir. 2015)(“We have held that derivative sovereign
24 immunity ... is limited to cases in which a contractor 'had no discretion in the design
25 process and completely followed government specifications.”).

26 Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss on the basis of derivative sovereign immunity is

27 **DENIED.**

C. Alien Tort Statute

Defendants contend Plaintiffs' allegations do not overcome the presumption against extraterritorial application of the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, ("ATS") as set forth by the Supreme Court in *Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum*, 133 S.Ct. 1659 (2013). Defendants claim Plaintiffs have failed to plead sufficient facts to demonstrate their actions "touch and concern" the territory of the United States.

Plaintiffs counter that although the alleged "injuries were sustained abroad, virtually every fact underpinning their claims is connected to the United States." (ECF No. 28, p. 20). Plaintiffs rely on *Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech, Inc.*, 758 F.3d 516 (4th Cir. 2014), which they contend is the "most closely analogous" case. Paragraph 18 of the Complaint contains several allegations which Plaintiffs contend demonstrate the claims herein "touch and concern" the United States. Plaintiffs allege:

- Defendants are U.S. citizens;
 - Defendants are domiciled in the U.S.;
 - Defendants devised the torture plan in the U.S.;
 - Defendants supervised the plan's implementation from the U.S. and pursuant to contracts they executed with the CIA in the U.S.; and
 - Plaintiffs were subjected to the interrogation methods while in the custody and control of the CIA in detention facilities operated by the U.S. government.
- (ECF 1, ¶ 18).

The Ninth Circuit has recognized the Supreme Court in *Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum*, 133 S.Ct. 1659 (2013), did not delineate the "touch and concern" test with a great deal of specificity. In *Mugica v. AirScan Inc.*, 771 F.3d 580 (9th Cir. 2014), the court stated: "Admittedly, *Kiobel* (quite purposely) did not enumerate the specific kinds of connections to the United States that could establish that ATS claims 'touch and concern' this country." *Id.* at 594. The court recognized a defendant's U.S. citizenship is an appropriate factor to consider, but that a plaintiff cannot bring an action based solely

1 on extraterritorial conduct merely because the defendant is a U.S. national. *Mugica* is
2 factually distinguishable from the case at bar. In *Mugica*, the plaintiffs were Colombian
3 citizens who brought suit in California arising out of the bombing of a Colombian village
4 by members of the Colombian Air Force. *Id.* at 584. Plaintiffs sued two U.S.-
5 headquartered corporations for their alleged complicity in the bombing. The *Mugica*
6 majority decision dismissed the claim on the basis that the ‘touch and concern’ test was
7 not met by the mere allegation that the defendants were United States corporations.

8 This case, as Plaintiffs contend, bears more similarity to *Al Shimari v. CACI*
9 *Premier Technology*, 758 F.3d 516 (4th Cir. 2014). In *Al Shimari*, four foreign citizens
10 brought claims against a U.S. corporation that was a military contractor alleging they
11 were tortured during their detention at Abu Ghraib. The Fourth Circuit found important
12 that the claims involved the performance of a contract executed by a U.S. corporation
13 with the U.S. Government. Also, the court considered the defendant was headquartered
14 in Virginia, the alleged torture occurred at a U.S. military facility, defendant hired
15 employees in the U.S. to perform the contract, and defendant collected payments by
16 mailing invoices to a government office in Colorado. *Id.* at 528-29.

17 In the present case, the two individual Defendants are U.S. citizens. The
18 Defendants ran a company, located in Spokane, Washington, that allegedly employed 55
19 to 60 people to assist with the enhanced interrogation program at CIA detention sites.
20 (Complaint ¶ 67). Plaintiffs allege Defendants devised and supervised the interrogation
21 program from the United States. Plaintiffs claim Defendants executed contracts with the
22 CIA in the United States. Although the court has not seen the alleged contracts, it is
23 certainly plausible that a company located in the United States and the CIA, a U.S.
24 agency, executed a contract in the United States. Similarly, as Mitchell, Jessen, &
25 Associates was located in Spokane, Washington, it is also plausible that, as alleged, work
26 on the interrogation program was performed from the United States. Plaintiffs’
27 allegations are sufficient to overcome the presumption against extraterritorial application

1 of the ATS.

2 Defendants also argue Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for relief under the ATS. The
3 Supreme Court has stated that although the ATS is primarily jurisdictional, “we think that
4 at the time of enactment the jurisdiction enabled federal courts to hear claims in a very
5 limited category defined by the law of nations and recognized at common law.” *Sosa v.*
6 *Alvarez-Machain*, 542 U.S. 692, 712 (2004). The Court further stated that lower courts
7 “should require any claim based on the present-day law of nations to rest on a norm of
8 international character accepted by the civilized world and defined with specificity
9 comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms we have recognized.” *Id.* at 725.
10 It is recognized torture violates the law of nations. See *Filartiga*, 630 F.2d at 878 (2nd Cir.
11 1980)(“we hold that deliberate torture perpetrated under color of official authority
12 violates universally accepted norms of the international law of human rights, regardless
13 of the nationality of the parties.”)

14 The majority opinion of the Supreme Court in *Kiobel* addressed only jurisdiction, and
15 not whether plaintiffs stated a claim. 133 S.Ct. at 1664 (“The question here is not whether
16 petitioners have stated a proper claim under the ATS, but whether a claim may reach
17 conduct occurring in the territory of a foreign sovereign.”). However, Justice Breyer, in
18 concurrence and joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan clearly found the
19 ATS reached acts of torture:

20 We should treat this Nation’s interest in not becoming a safe harbor for violators
21 of the most fundamental international norms as an important jurisdiction-related
22 interest justifying application of the ATS in light of the statute’s basic purposes—in
23 particular that of compensating those who have suffered harm at the hands of, e.g.,
24 torturers or other modern pirates. Nothing in this statute or its history suggests that
our courts should turn a blind eye to the plight of victims in that “handful of
heinous actions. *Id.* at 674.

25 By analogy to piracy, which was covered by the ATS at the time of its enactment, it is
26 clear the four concurring Justices believed that those who commit torture fall within the
27 reach of the ATS, both as to jurisdiction and substantively.

1 Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged the acts of Defendants “touch and concern” the
2 United States, such as to rebut the presumption against extraterritorial application of the
3 ATS. Plaintiffs have further alleged that the Defendants engaged in torture, and
4 substantively state a claim under the ATS. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for lack of
5 jurisdiction and failure to state a claim under the ATS is **DENIED**.

6 **D. Capacity of Obaid Ullah**

7 Defendants contend that capacity to sue is determined by state law, and under
8 Washington law, a personal representative must be appointed by a court. Defendants
9 argue the allegation that Mr. Ullah is the personal representative of Mr. Rahman (ECF
10 No. 1, ¶ 11) is insufficient. Plaintiffs respond they are not required to plead the facts
11 supporting legal capacity, and in any event, Mr. Ullah is the court appointed personal
12 representative. Plaintiffs have submitted an Order from the Spokane County Superior
13 Court, dated September 24, 2015 (before this action was commenced), demonstrating that
14 Mr. Ullah was appointed as personal representative of Mr. Rahman’s estate. (ECF No.
15 28-1). Defendants Motion to Dismiss Mr. Ullah for lack of capacity is **DENIED**.

16 **IV. Conclusion**

17 Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss asks the court to dismiss the action, with prejudice,
18 based solely on the allegations in the Complaint. No discovery has taken place, and the
19 court has been presented with no materials outside the pleadings. Taking the well-
20 pleaded factual allegations as true, and for the reasons stated herein, the Motion to
21 Dismiss is denied.

22 **IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:**

23 1. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 27) is **DENIED**.

24 2. The court discussed with counsel for the parties and with Department of Justice
25 attorney Andrew Warden the discovery process in this matter. The parties have agreed
26 to discuss further a proposed discovery plan and to submit that plan to the court. The
27 proposed plan concerning both the procedure for discovery and scope shall be submitted

1 **no later than May 23, 2016.**

2 **IT IS SO ORDERED.** The Clerk shall enter this Order and furnish copies to
3 counsel.

4 Dated this 28th day of April, 2016.

5 s/ Justin L. Quackenbush
6 JUSTIN L. QUACKENBUSH
7 SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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